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
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[ERRATUM.—On page 398, fifth line from the end, for "in Christ" read "is Christ."]

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
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THE

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ARTICLE I.—THE SYSTEM OF INSTRUCTION AT WEST POINT :—CAN IT BE EMPLOYED IN OUR COLLEGES ?

THE Military Academy at West Point, in the number of its students, its course of study, and its corps of instructors, may naturally and fairly be compared with any of our leading Colleges. Such a comparison seems suitable at the present time, when misgivings as to the wisdom of the systems defended by custom and tradition are so general, and when the disposition is so strong to recast the collegiate courses. The Academy, too, as an Institution in which the mathematics occupy the largest place, has a peculiar interest to those reformers who consider that the ancient languages engross too much time and attention. As an important National Institution, also, it should be familiar to the knowledge of the people who sustain it. And yet, it is believed that very few have any practical knowledge of its management, or internal arrangements.

There is a general belief that the teaching there is thorough,
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and that an appointment as a cadet is to be valued for a son ; but beyond such vague impressions, there is little known.

In our Colleges the students, by their frequent visits home, make their friends, in a good degree, familiar with the methods of study and recitation ; but a cadet, not seeing his home for two years after he enters the Academy, has, when he does revisit it, lost his interest in the details of his daily life ; and the vocabulary which describes that daily life is peculiar enough to be a further hinderance to talking much about the system of instruction. He will tell at what time he gets up, of drills before breakfast, of the fare at the mess hall, of inspections, and will leave a strong impression in the minds of his friends of rigorous discipline, but of little besides.

The visit of the Board of Visitors, too, every June, though of some length, and intended to furnish just that information which the country should possess, usually, it must be confessed, fails of its object. The members of the Board are often appointed for political motives, and are neither able nor desirous to follow understandingly the subjects which are brought before them in the examination (and still less to report upon them), and so they are entertained as they desire, dinners are given them, officers attend the examination in full dress, a ball is given at the hotel, a "skillful," as they described it in their last report, boat race is witnessed by them, and they, in return, bestow praise so indiscriminately that it loses its value, noticing just what strikes the eye, and not recognizing wherein that thoroughness consists which is so characteristic of the Academy. If the visit of the Board of Visitors does not bring before the public the exact knowledge which is to be desired, still less do the sketchy letters of transient visitors. The Academy has won its high character by the earnest, faithful, patient labor of its Professors, who, not largely recompensed, nor greatly cheered by the intelligent approval of the world, have worked on year after year till they have produced a method of instruction which is both admirably carried out and attests by its results its worth.

It is believed that the distinctive features of the Academy appear in the daily recitations. To examine as clearly and as briefly as possible, and yet with some necessary minuteness,

the method of instruction as there given, is the purpose of this Article.

Nothing will be said of the text-books or of the curriculum of study, since these can be learned from the Annual Register. Is it not true, also, that the METHOD of teaching should always be the object of inquiry, rather than the books taught, and that a poor book and a good teacher are worth far more than a good book and a poor teacher, and that those who as champions of the practical condemn, for instance, the dead languages, perhaps condemn only a dead way of teaching them?

One should remember in judging what is done at West Point, the great diversity in preparation of those who enter, and, upon the whole, their inferiority both in energy and love of study, and in culture and refinement, to the candidates for admission to our leading colleges.

The requirements for entrance are only these, Reading, Writing, Spelling, Arithmetic, Geography, English Grammar, and History of the United States,* and so low a standard is justified by Congress, on the ground that the Academy is a National School, and that it should be open to those who, from residence in thinly settled regions, have had opportunity to acquire only the rudiments of an English education. Doubtless a higher standard would throw out a large portion of those who report from the Western States, it not being a thing unheard of for men to receive appointments who can barely read, who have hardly heard the word English Grammar, who give California and Michigan as boundaries of Pennsylvania, and honor Gen. Jackson as the hero of the Mexican war.†

* The last two requirements have been added within the past two years.

† If such facts should lead any one to ask, Why not establish a system of competitive examinations, and let all who wish to enter the national service have opportunity to do so? the answer is, the system of Congressional appointment is continued because congressmen are unwilling to give up so important an item of influence, and, if they choose, of profit. It should be understood that the Professors at West Point have long been in favor of a system of appointment by merit (as shown in a test examination) and it is only two years ago that a bill which seemed to combine everything that was needed, was rejected by the House. This bill provided that each Representative should appoint five cadets

Let us now look in upon the daily recitations, and select for our examination the fourth or incoming class, which numbers from seventy-five to one hundred. At the commencement of the year it is arranged in alphabetical order, from A to Z, and divided into six or seven divisions or sections, each containing twelve to fourteen men. Each section has two recitations per diem, except on Saturday, when the second recitation is omitted. These two recitations, during the first half of the year, are in Davies's Bourdon's Algebra, and French. The Mathematical hours are from 8 to 11; the French from 2 to 4; and this general division of time holds good through all the classes. Mathematics have the heart of the day—the three best hours—and six recitations per week; English studies, including Law, Ethics, Tactics, and Modern Languages, usually the two hours, from 2 to 4 P. M., and but five recitations per week.

To teach the Mathematics to the fourth class, there are three or four instructors besides the Professor, each of these instructors hearing two recitations in the three hours—i. e. an hour and a half is allotted to thirteen men. The sections are formed at the bugle call for recitation, in the area, within the barrack, by the "section-marchers," the roll is called, and they are marched to their respective recitation rooms, where the instructor meets them. The members of the section now file off to their places and stand there until the section-marcher, saluting the instructor, reports to him who are absent, and he returns the salute, when they take their seats. Five or six men are at once sent to the black-board, and having taken their places there and written their names, are given each a proposition to demonstrate, while another is called

instead of one, and that the President should make fifty appointments "at large" instead of ten, and then that the whole number should be reduced four-fifths by an examination. On the present system of appointment, only about one-third of those who enter graduate, and as each graduated cadet costs the country a large sum, there is a great waste; while if men were admitted by selection from the large number who apply, nearly all who entered would probably graduate. In our Eastern States congressmen are, to a considerable extent, throwing open the appointments from their districts to competition, and in every such case that we have known, the cadet has distinguished himself. Let the people demand competitive examination of Congress.

up to recite on the reading matter of the lesson in answer to questions. He is catechised until one of those first sent to the board signifies his readiness, which he does by facing the instructor and assuming the attitude of *attention*.

He begins by describing in general terms his subject, then he enunciates the theorem or scientific statement, and lastly follows out the work he has put upon the board, indicating each point of progress by the pointer.

There are certain set phrases which are so much used as almost to be obligatory. A cadet begins to recite by saying, "I am required to discuss a theorem relating to," etc., etc., and concludes by saying, if letters have been employed to represent known terms, "which literal conclusion may be thus translated;" and all this, though somewhat arbitrary, is fitted to keep before his mind that he is evolving a principle, and that the principle, when evolved, has practical application. His demonstration concluded, he, having so far proceeded without interruption, is keenly questioned by the instructor. What has been imperfectly understood is elucidated, misconceptions are corrected, and when he is at last allowed to take his seat, he can hardly fail to understand throughout what he has recited. Nor do the questions asked cover only the point of demonstration, but run over the review and back-review, including everything in any way hinted at by the recitation, so that one man may often recite half the lesson. The work is now erased, another takes the place with perhaps the same topic, and the second of those first stationed at the board is called upon for his demonstration, and so on through the section.

The lesson is gone over with so many times at each recitation, that an attentive scholar could learn it there by listening, and the reviews and back-reviews are so well kept up that we doubt not a large portion of the class, when the Algebra is finished, could begin at the beginning and, unprompted, proceed to the end.

Algebra is peculiarly adapted to be studied in this way, and any teacher who will make the trial, more and more disusing questions, and accustoming and encouraging his pupils to put the lesson on the board, will be surprised to see how they will

themselves enjoy it, and how sure their progress will be. It is not meant, it must be understood, that the instructor at West Point does not question and communicate, only that the *recitation* and *instruction* are separated. The cadet has a certain work set him to do, as, in Algebra, certain consecutive, connected courses of reasoning to master, and the first object of the recitation is to find if he has done it; the second, by free discussion and suggestion, to clear and fix his knowledge; but the mark is given chiefly for his work, and not for what he has done conjointly with the instructor. All the mathematical treatises at West Point are constructed on the synthetic plan, and especially aim at requiring the student to construct his own synthesis, and then to defend it—like a general besieged in a fortress, whose success in the defense will be just according to his skill and care in constructing his work and defending his approaches.*

Such a system of instruction puts upon a level men of equal mental power, who are unequal in power of expression. The work may be put upon the board slowly and thoughtfully, and then it is easy to follow it out. On the other hand, if a man knows nothing, it at once becomes evident, there being no middle ground between success and failure. In all that has been just said, the use of the blackboard has been implied. It has, in fact, for years at West Point almost taken the place of an additional instructor. Its importance in education is now so universally recognized by its use in all our schools, Sunday as well as secular, that nothing need be added on that point. It is employed, however, at West Point, not only in the Mathematics, but in all departments. Grammar, when studied there, was taught from a text-book constructed with special reference to recitation upon the board, great pains being bestowed upon the classification, and upon the divisions

* This remark is true of the Treatises on Algebra, Descriptive Geometry, Calculus, Analytics, Natural Philosophy, and Engineering. In fact, the only methods which find favor there are those which lead to *discovery*, the proofs of general propositions; hence, for example, Algebraic processes are preferred to Geometrical ones—because the latter only apply to just the case in hand—change a line and the conclusion fails, but the former cover an infinite number of cases.

and subdivisions of the subjects. French, too, is now taught in connection with a "Tabular System" constructed by the Professor, and these tables are put upon the board each day by the cadets. It would seem that, when the system is not too stiff, and the subject one which admits of analysis, there is great advantage in this mode. The process of writing in connection with reciting, fixes subjects in the memory, and the student is held to the point by the guide which he has himself provided in his headings upon the board. Even if the subject admits of no subdivision, the custom is to write it upon the board, and to speak, as it were, upon that subject. In Ethics, a man might say, I am required to discuss *the soul*. In French, a man might say, I am required to discuss the verb *être*.

May it not be said that in connection with almost any department of study, there is opportunity in teaching a class to introduce a daily exercise upon the blackboard; as in Greek, upon the analysis of verbs and the formation of words, in Latin, the analysis of the sentence? The board tells so much in few words that time is saved by such instruction, and a thing which comes by the eye often strikes home and is remembered.

The Instructor marks daily upon a scale as follows: 3, thorough, 2.5, good, 2, fair, 1.5, imperfect, 1, bad, 0, failure, and each Saturday transfers his marks to a printed blank which shows the daily and aggregate rank of each cadet of the section for the week. These blanks are exposed every Monday, at noon, to view,* and those who have doubts about the power of emulation would have them removed, by once seeing the stream of men which, between the first and second dinner call, pours out to the corridor of the library, eager all of them to see how they have done during the week. The marks are thus shown every week, in every department, for the four years. Dependent upon this is the system of *transfers*, which has been in operation some forty years. The sections do not remain the same from week to week. As soon as the class are

* In addition to this, once every month, notice is sent home of the progress of each cadet in scholarship and deportment.

fairly at work, perhaps a month from the beginning of the new year, the poor scholars who, in alphabetical arrangement, may have fallen into the first section are put down into the third, fourth, or fifth, and the bright S's and W's are elevated to their places, and thus the class is rough-hewn into shape. In succeeding weeks, as the marks of a man are unusually high or unduly low, he is transferred to a higher or lower section; according to the severity of the studies, men rising or sinking like the mercury in a thermometer. These transfers are made in each class and in all departments. They are read out before the whole battalion at Dress Parade every Saturday evening, which corresponds almost exactly to reading them out in a college chapel.*

The result is that men are stimulated *throughout* the class—are led to work not for the first or tenth place alone, but for the fortieth instead of the forty-first. They strive as hard to keep out of the lowest section, in cadet phrase the “Immortal,” as to gain the first; studying sometimes as hard at the lower end of the class as at the upper.

With such a system of division the good scholars are continually incited by the example of each other, and there are no dead weights upon them. By a judicious arrangement, too, the course is varied, the more difficult and intricate parts being omitted for those who cannot understand them, and the first section in the class accomplishing from one-third to one-half more than the “Immortals.” In such a study as French, the difference is very marked. The first section, being fine French scholars, are reading four or five pages per day, besides oral and written exercises, while the last are stumbling over one page.

But do not the poor scholars suffer a serious loss in having the example of the good withdrawn? Doubtless there is a loss, but there are other considerations. Every teacher has felt that the recitation of the good scholar is, in large part,

* Early in this century the custom was for the Chaplain to march out upon the Parade Ground, with the Cadets, at Evening Parade, and, in the interval just before the giving out orders for the morrow, to offer prayer. Any one who has seen Evening Parade, must feel how beautiful was the old custom.

thrown away upon the really poor, being just as far above them as theirs is below his, and the question often occurs whether this attempt to combine two so different elements, to find the profitable mean for two such extremes, is not impossible? Does not the good scholar become careless by being asked many questions which are nothings to him, and is he not led to calculate on a certain amount of success without much work? and is not the poor scholar discouraged at being asked continually questions entirely out of his range, in the hope that the time spent on him may not be wholly lost for the good scholars? The good influence of superior recitations is strongest upon those who below, are not out of sight of the good scholars, and these are the men who, in a division into sections, will work their way up into the society they desire. Every man who can feel must be saddened to see the many worthy men, some from dullness of mind, some from insufficiency of preparation, who are compelled to endure the humiliation of always failing; who, before they rise, expect to be unsuccessful; who, for four years, live in the fog. What worse preparation for life than the loss of confidence in self, which such an experience brings? Yet there is no doubt, in most cases, that if these men could be taken by themselves and time could be given for slow and patient explanation the light might come into their mind, and in their place they might make a success. Comparison may discourage as well as stimulate. Is there not a loss in our colleges where all are trying to do the same thing, where there is no Pass and Class System, as at Oxford and Cambridge—no division into Sections, as at West Point?

Another important result is, that a place is provided for that large, unworthy class who are willfully lazy; and an opportunity is afforded of putting some stigma of disgrace upon them, which plainly hints that as they are classed with the naturally dull and incompetent now, there will be their place in life, unless they reform.

Again, a large part of those who leave home to join a large institution, and, for the first time, to mix with strangers, are exceedingly diffident and judge themselves very humbly. It will be advantageous to them to let them see early how they stand as compared with their fellows. Information instead of

reticence in reply to their inquiry what they are doing, may greatly cheer them. There are so many times when the slightest influence may so alter a man's course in life that not even the effect of a mark ought to be despised. Others, also, who rate themselves too highly soon know their present level and they lose their conceit or rise to the place they desire.

A practical difficulty of exposing the marks frequently to the students in our colleges, is that the instructors are already overburdened and cannot conveniently compute the marks. But the labor is not really great. True, it is done often, but the amount of labor is so much the less, and at West Point, since they foot up not averages, but aggregates, the work of each week is merely combined with that of the week before. The whole work is done there by the instructor in fifteen minutes on Saturday noon, just after his last recitation.*

But admitting that an arrangement like that described is possible, objection is sometimes made to its wisdom. Marks, it is said, are a system of guesses at a student's proficiency, no one exact, but, in the average, and for a long enough time sufficiently correct; if marks are shown, injustice may often be done, and, in some cases, ill-feeling toward the instructor excited. True, we may say, the mark does not always represent the student's knowledge of the whole lesson, but it should always be understood to represent accurately his knowledge of what he *recites*, and students themselves are ready enough to admit that if a man who intended to make a part of the lesson pass for the whole, is caught upon a point which he has neglected, his failure upon a part ought likewise to count as a failure upon the whole. And certainly suspicion of injustice will be removed by a frequent exposure of the marks, and opportunity to correct erroneous impressions will be afforded the pupil, while the teacher will be kept constantly on his guard against that constant danger of marking the student according to his impression of his ability instead of according

* There is much less routine work to be done by instructors at West Point than in a College. All the letters to parents respecting progress or deficiency of their sons in scholarship or conduct, are written by a clerk employed for the purpose, and the noting reports of improprieties of all kind is done by cadets themselves who, as Cadet officers, are placed "in charge" of their fellows.

to the recitation which he is now making. The difficulty of marking justly, though increased by the necessity which large divisions impose of giving each man few questions and a short trial, does not seem to warrant the concealment of the mark.

Another objection, and perhaps more difficult to meet, is that which discountenances marks, as appealing to a low motive, represents that they are used at all, only because of the "hardness of the hearts" of scholars, and would dissuade from calling attention often or actively to them.

Without forgetting that the truth lies between two extremes, and that a system which carried to moderate lengths produces excellent results, often fails if pushed too far, it may be said that there are two courses open. We may say that men of mature age ought to love knowledge for its own sake, and that all competition, and everything which promotes it, is unworthy; or we may take the other course, and, remembering that those whom we teach, though men in years, are not altogether men, and recognizing the universal power of emulation upon the young, decide to avail ourselves of it. In this case, it seems more philosophical to make our system as thorough-going in its operation as possible. At West Point there seem to be no jealousies, nor heart-burnings, nor excessive regard for marks. The system only affects all, whereas, in almost all of our colleges only a few are reached, those the very ones who do not need the stimulus, while for the lower and larger part of every class, the system of marks as an incentive to study, might as well not exist.

A practical difficulty in carrying out fully in our colleges a system of division according to merit in each department will be found to exist. At West Point the recitations usually not exceeding two a day, and the hours of recitations in each department being wholly independent of the others, a man may be in the first "section" in mathematics and third in French, but where there are three or, as at Yale, four departments in Freshman and Sophomore year, to do the same would require twelve consecutive hours of recitation, i. e. beginning at 8 A. M., and allowing a recess of one hour for dinner and one hour for supper, recitations could not close until 10 P. M. Two courses remain open, to classify according to proficiency

in some one department, as in Mathematics, or which is nearly the same, in Greek and Latin combined, or according to the average of all the studies. The latter course seems more in harmony with the present plan, only doing earlier what now is delayed until Junior Exhibition or Commencement.

Under such a system a man would, perhaps, say if asked how he stood in college, not as now, I was a high oration man, but I stood in the first division of my class, which would carry a far clearer idea to people outside. It seems right, too, that those men who in the early part of their course are embarrassed by a scanty preparation, and who rapidly improve during their latter years in college, should not, as now, be weighed down by a previous low average, and have no way of showing to others their improvement. It is fit that they, having really done so much more than those who started with greater advantage, should, as they improve, be advanced to the higher divisions, and be made to feel that they have earned a place among the fraternity of scholars. Then at different points in the college course there are parts of the text-books that try men's souls, difficult places, chances for a man who has an original mind to show its power. In the long list of marks recorded in cipher in a professor's book, and never exposed, but finally burnt up or thrown away, nothing will be known of improvement or retrogression; but a system of transfers, as those who merely cram or crib, sink, and the honest workers rise, will show to the class and to the instructors, who are really the leading men.

It seems desirable now to inquire how the other motives of study at West Point and in our colleges compare? Perhaps there is no situation in life in which a man can so accurately forecast his position a dozen years hence as in that which a newly appointed cadet holds. This may not be quite so true now as before the war, when the regular army was small, and the only entrance to it was through the Academy, but still graduates are commissioned according to class rank, in the different staff and line corps, and the pay is less, and the posts are generally less pleasant as one descends.*

* The order of commission is about this: The first five or six are engineers; three or four enter the ordnance; twelve or fifteen the artillery, and the remainder the cavalry and infantry

Add to this that after an officer has been assigned to his own corps, a difference of one file in class-rank may make a delay of ten or fifteen years in promotion, and it will appear that within a narrow range one's future is in one's own hands.

While in the Academy, too, the fact that there is no other way to distinguish oneself than by scholarship—excellence in riding, in tactics, fencing, artillery practice, all coming under the head of scholarship—the circumstance that there are no prizes to be given for composition, declamation, or debates, and the consideration that the cadet officers* are made for military proficiency, all show how many influences there are to hold one to the course of study.

But a system in which external restraint and self-interest are the prominent features, however perfect, will not accomplish everything, and young men will not always keep an eye upon the future and the connection between patient work here and reward there.

All these incentives to study in the way of personal advantage, it seems to us, are hardly able to compensate for the great evil that most come to the Academy merely to enter the army through it, and, that end gained, care for nothing beyond. There is not that constant, ever ready stimulus, so far superior to all others, of the love of knowledge for its own sake, and for the mental power which it gives; whereas among college students, most of whom have enjoyed a preparatory training more expanding than admission to the Academy implies, there is not uncommonly a genuine enthusiasm for learning, an enthusiasm fostered, too, in a higher degree by the studies themselves than at West Point.

The position of a professor at West Point is somewhat

* These cadet officers enjoy certain privileges, and their duty is the care of the buildings and general supervision of their fellows. They report all improprieties of manner or of dress, maintain order in the mess hall, and do most of the routine work which would otherwise fall to their superiors. It is remarkable that there is scarcely ever the least personal ill-feeling excited by their reports. A man who walks an extra tour of guard all the afternoon of a cold winter's day, with musket on his shoulder, will not have a hard thought toward the cadet officer who procured his punishment by reporting him for throwing a piece of bread across the mess room.

peculiar, and his influence is very great. He is a professor, not a mere teacher. He delivers a few lectures, but his chief duty is, during the hours of recitation in his department, to pass from one section to another, aiding and cheering instructor and pupil, suggesting and meeting difficulties with a skill which forty years experience has taught him. He may remain in one section five minutes or an hour and a half, according to the need there seems to be. He thus superintends and makes uniform all instruction, and is the head of his department in reality. His corps of assistants, who do the work of instruction, consists of young officers detailed by the War Department upon his recommendation as possessing special qualifications. Their time of residence depends very much upon their success in teaching. If they find it a congenial occupation they sometimes remain upon the post six or even ten years; but if they desire a more active life, and if the work of instruction is irksome, they apply to be relieved at the end of a year, and their request is almost sure to be granted. One sees here the advantage which the Academy enjoys in the power which it has to draw upon the whole army for its supply of teachers. Among so many there must be a large number specially fitted to give instruction, and the fact that the service is not forced makes it more valuable. There is no temptation to an incompetent teacher to remain from considerations of support, as he is paid not as a teacher but as an officer, and his salary is the same in each case. Those who do remain as assistant professors, being young men, are fresh to the subject they teach, are urged by a personal pride, since their pupils are soon to be their associates, to master thoroughly their department, and are favored in that they have only two recitations a day to hear.

It will be seen that the permanent professor gives great stability and uniformity to the system of instruction; the textbook is his own, he regulates the length of the lessons, the transfers are approved by him, the machinery of recitation all

* The number of instructors is probably larger, in proportion to the number taught, at West Point than in any other institution in the country. We find, by the last Register, forty instructors to two hundred and ten cadets, giving an average of one instructor to every five students.

feels his controlling hand. There is, in fact, a true coöperation realized between the professor and his assistants, which would hardly be thought possible until seen; two minds unite in the work. We wish we could paint the picture of the young teacher and veteran professor, the former sharpened in wits and stimulated to study since his work must pass under the inspection of one who so thoroughly understands it; the latter fresh and active, made young as it were by his young assistant, and the pupils all interested in this joint labor in their behalf. Perhaps it would seem to some a lowering of the dignity of the instructor that he should be himself interrupted, that the professor should put in a word, break in upon his questions by an inquiry of his own; but there is nothing of the kind, and no loss of respect before the class, because it is plain that neither is thinking of himself but both of their work. Such a course, it will be seen, brings the professor in contact at once with all the students of an institution, and the influence of his personal power extends early to all. At the time when students are young, easily influenced, full of good purposes, laying the foundations, the wise master builder is present, and lends his superintendence and help. As the course of studies in our colleges is more varied than in the Academy, and the departments, which extend through a considerable part of the course, are less numerous, there would be a correspondence to the system of West Point, if the classes now taught in Greek, Latin, and Mathematics by the professor were taught by an assistant professor, and he could go at will to the rooms of his other assistants, and aid them in their work. At West Point the professor, in fact, spends most of his time with his "first section," and so the professor in the college might give his chief labor to a particular class, only his visits should be so frequent to the other classes as always to be expected, and so irregular as never to be calculated upon, and the end will be attained.

A description of the Corps of Instruction is not complete without mentioning the cadet assistant professors.

As each assistant professor hears two sections, when the whole number of sections is not a multiple of two, there must be one section unprovided for. To supply this deficiency the superintendent is allowed to detail meritorious cadets, in

number not exceeding one or two in each department, who, while continuing their own studies, may act as assistant professors. They hear only one recitation per diem, are zealous, fresh, enthusiastic, and do well. This may be called an undergraduate tutorship, in which the incumbents gladly serve without pay, in consideration of the honor. They are exempted from military duty, are distinguished by a variation in their uniform, have their names printed as among the Faculty in the Annual Register. The section which they hear recite is visited by the professor in the same way as the others, and the method of instruction is precisely the same. Of course the opportunity of forming acquaintance with the professor is one of the things which makes the position desirable. The time during which they serve is quite indefinite, it may be a fortnight or a year.

There is always in a large institution a small number who, in some special direction, are far beyond their fellows, superior classical scholars, born mathematicians, men who have enjoyed the advantage of residence abroad, and know French and German. From this class it is that at West Point cadet assistants are selected. And this system, which perhaps originated there from convenience, seems peculiarly worthy of consideration in an institution which is training many of its sons for the profession of teaching.

The occasional embarrassment caused in a college by the sudden sickness of an officer, might be avoided in some such way as this. This indeed is the service which at Yale the incumbent of the "Macy Fellowship" is expected soon to render.

It seems natural, in closing, to say a few words more generally as to the two systems of education. Very different is the relation in which the cadet stands to the professors and officers from that which a student holds to the Faculty. The student surrenders few of his privileges, and comes under the control of others for only a small number of hours each day; but the cadet really loses his liberty. West Point itself, a little spot of land separated from the State in which it is situated, and ceded to the General Government, is an illustration of his own loss of personal freedom. In entering the service, he takes a place in the army between that of non-commissioned and commissioned officers, so all his instructors are his superiors in

rank, and respect, and obedience may be exacted of him in the same way as of the private. His trial for offenses is by courts martial, and his punishment is confinement, extra tours of guard duty, or being drummed out of the service. Now, though the behavior of the instructors towards cadets is always most courteous and gentlemanly, the consciousness of the power in which they hold them must almost unavoidably separate and prevent that direct personal influence which it is so important and so easy to exercise in a college. For such reasons it is that we find little spontaneousness, no attachment to the institution, no dread of the day when one must leave, and wish to stay longer, which are so much a part of college experience.

At West Point the buildings are finer than any of which our colleges can boast. The place is beautiful beyond description; of its kind unequalled in the country, combining the grand hills, the grassy plain, the noble river; the whole settlement, in fact, corresponds to one's idea of a university town—and seems the very spot where the strongest and dearest associations would cling. The institution has more than half a century in age—in our country almost antiquity. It has furnished many men whose names are in history—and yet, among the cadets, there is no enthusiasm for it, no love. This is doubtless owing to the constraint of the life that is spent there. On the other hand, student jollity, songs, and cheer, though owing partly to a love for ivy-clad buildings which recall those whom in other days they have sheltered, partly to a sense of the privilege of living in an atmosphere of study, are perhaps chiefly due to youth and freedom—to the life so untrammelled and unconstrained.

Though cadets have not the *abandon* of students, they carry with them, at graduation, a punctuality, an accuracy in knowledge, an honesty, & truthfulness which are greatly to be praised. A low, immoral fellow seems at times almost a hero, because he holds to the truth. Said a man who left one of our colleges to enter West Point: "For some months I was in great fear that I should be caught in a falsehood and dismissed the service, I had got so in the habit of lying." Said a Professor of one of our leading colleges, some years since: "It is my opinion that it takes a man several years after graduation,

to throw off the lowering influence of the habit of untruthfulness in dealing with instructors, which college standards half sanction." These exaggerated statements have some truth at their foundation. Two points in which students chiefly sin, are—giving untrue excuses for failure in college duty, (the persuading oneself that laziness is sickness), and using unfair helps in the recitation room. Neither of these is possible at West Point. All men who consider themselves unwell report to the surgeon, and, after an examination, are by him excused from duty; and as the recitations are all made at the board, all materials for help, so easy to use at one's seat, must be left behind. On most points, indeed, the power of public opinion is greater at the academy than at college, at least the lines between things allowed and things forbidden are more sharply drawn, and evasive or misleading answers to questions of an officer, answering to another's name in roll call and the like, are not at all tolerated; the guilty man is reported by one of his own fellows, and with the approbation of the whole corps dismissed the service.

How wonderful the effect which holding the body under control has upon the mind. Take a rough, uncouth fellow, not only clumsy in movement but clownish in manners, let him stay at the academy a few months and he is transformed, in externals, to a gentleman. Deference and courtesy, so rigidly exacted in daily intercourse with the officers, his superiors, come to be naturally paid to others, and poise and control of body give steadiness and possession of mind, so that he can not only stand and look like a gentleman, but even talk like one. And so everything which is done by a cadet gains greatly from the prompt soldierlike way of performance. Even in the daily recitations, the promptness with which the place is taken at the board, the exactness of the diagram, the attitude on the bench, and the attitude in reciting, are all the reverse of the careless, slouching habit which so often disfigures the demeanor of students.

ARTICLE II.—HOW TO BUILD A NATION.*

As a leader of opinion, the American scholar is now called to face new and peculiar problems in society, to adapt the wisdom of the past to an entirely changed condition of affairs, and, if need be, to invent new principles for new times. The upheaval of the nation by the war, and the vast social revolution begun in the South, have brought to the surface questions of political and social science, that will not only test anew our *Theorem* of Popular Government, but may even invert some of its received axioms.

* The Article which we here publish comprises the substance of an Oration delivered before the Phi Beta Kappa Society at Yale College, July 22d, 1868, by Rev. JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, D. D., LL. D., of New York City. It was preceded by an address to the members of the Society, in the following words:—

"Brethren of the Phi Beta Kappa Society:

"The tribute in which we have just now joined, in the meeting of the Alumni, to the memory of him whose wisdom had so long shed its serene light and guidance upon our College, has anticipated the homage due from this Society to the most loved and most revered of its patriarchs. We can but repeat, with emotions too tender for words of eulogy, that *Clarum et venerabile Nomen*. In President Day we saw the impersonation of our motto—"Philosophy"—Wisdom in its higher sense, its diviner faculty—"the Guide of Life"—a guide ever calm, cheerful, ready, true, in personal affairs, ever sagacious, comprehensive, trustworthy in things concerning the community, the state, the church, the widest interests of human society. I remember it as one of the wisest of his many sage counsels to the students, when for weeks our Senior disputations had only echoed the debates of Calhoun, Clay, and Benton, upon reviving the National Bank—"Young gentlemen, it is all very well for you to settle the question of the United States Bank, but I do not consider it absolutely necessary for the country, and fear you are exhausting yourselves upon a subject which will be dead and forgotten long before you enter into political life. The public will never inquire what you thought about the Bank; new questions will be up, and I advise you to prepare for them by disciplining your minds in dealing with fundamental principles." That counsel gives the key of our thought to-day."

Whether these agitated elements shall be left to settle down, under mere statical pressure, as a confused inorganized mass, or by fermentation shall explode the constitution of society itself, or whether there is in scholars and statesmen, in the educated and executive mind of the nation, a dynamic wisdom capable at once of adjusting old truths to new conditions, and of squaring new facts to old foundations, and so shaping the future of the nation without destroying its past, is the question—not for ourselves only and our time, but for Humanity and History—whether there is in nations an inevitable law of decline and fall, or it is possible, at last, so to build a nation that it shall stand through the ages? “At the present moment,” says the *London Times*, “America is the scene of a hundred strange experiments, social, moral, religious, of which it is safe to predict that scarcely one is likely to be of permanent benefit to the human race.” But whatever experiments shall fail, is there not wisdom to avert the failure of the Nation itself, through any kind of empiricism attempting its constitution and life?

Man, whose constructive power gives him dominion over nature, and makes him a secondary creator in the world of material forms; man, the builder, who has covered the map of history with material monuments—temples, towers, pyramids, roads, aqueducts, cathedrals, whose very ruins are eloquent of the grandeur of departed races—has hitherto failed to build Humanity itself into permanent forms of social and political organization. Karnak stands stupendous in its solitude, the pyramids are silent sentinels of the centuries, but there is no Egypt; “her granite statues have outlived her gods.” The Parthenon stands, beautiful in its slow decay, but there is no Greece. The Coliseum oppresses one with the vastness of a Rome that has ceased to be. And now that man, by dint of science, has gained new control over material forces, and is building railroads, bridges, tunnels, telegraphs, ships, factories, utilizing nature in the service of political economy, can he at last build socially and morally, so that he himself shall survive in his institutions—build a Nation that will endure?

To *build* a nation, adjusting foundations and shaping materials with distinct forethought of the future, is a privilege

exceptional in history. It has even passed into an adage that nations are not built, but grow. Commonly the founders of States are unconscious in their work. The leaders of migratory tribes, the heads of commercial or political colonies, the conquerors of barbarian races, explorers, adventurers, or exiles, they cast into a new soil seeds of the old civilization, scattered but not always winnowed, and these grow into institutions, governments, nations—men know not how. Only at rare intervals, in some golden moment of the centuries, is it given to men at once to plan and to plant a State, laying down principles for after ages, and molding these into institutions of organic life and self-perpetuating power.

The Plymouth Pilgrims planned broader and wiser than they knew ; for when they set their seal to that brief compact of the *Mayflower*—extemporized for an emergency of a ship's company which had drifted beyond the limits of its chartered government—they laid down, broad as the continent and lasting as time, the principle of self-government by constitutional law. In their thought this was simply a government for well-certified and well-behaved Englishmen ; but their work was sublimer than their thought, and in the purpose of Providence involved the political independence of a State based upon the inherent dignity of man—a doctrine which was formulated by the second founders of the nation, building more consciously than the first, yet building on their line. The framers of the Constitution harmonized the divine gift of personal liberty with the no less divine principle of order, through an instrument which combines with marvelous skill that local and distributed autonomy which is the essence of civil liberty, with that collective sovereignty which is the essence of national life. Under their shaping, the primitive shrine of liberty set up on Plymouth Rock had grown into a temple that overarched the continent ; and when treason attempted to shake this down, we filled every breach with our dead, and made new cement of their blood. Nothing fell at last but one huge, rotten, unsightly stone, worked in by fraud at the first, laid with untempered mortar and foul with fungus, which the traitors seeking to dislodge for the foundation of a new empire, our wise engineer so toppled it upon their heads

that it ground them to powder. It is for us to see that no fragment of that fallen stone is put back into the wall; that its dust even is not used for conglomerate; but with this utterly scraped away, to fill the gap in harmony with the whole structure, and by such new ties and buttresses as experience may call for, to build with a strength and solidity that shall stand through the ages. In the light of a Past, near enough to be estimated without exaggeration, yet remote enough to be judged without prejudice under the guidance of principles tested by time and by war, and with a Future mapped out as distinctly as the physical features of the continent, we are called upon to build a model nation for mankind.

To a task so rare and grand, the educated minds of the nation must bring the fruits of their training in history, in moral and political philosophy, and social science; that deliberative judgment, that critical analysis of theories and measures, that almost intuitive perception of tendencies and results which come of a scholarly discipline; for if these be wanting, we shall fall into the crudities of charlatans, or the freaks of popular enthusiasm.

It were sheer presumption for any one mind to attempt to grasp all the conditions of this momentous, this perilous problem, and to hold them in equable solution. But whoever, by the contribution of his own most honest and patient thought to building the nation, shall start others upon a deeper and wiser thinking than his own, will not have thought or spoken in vain.

I. To build the nation strongly, our first care must be to preserve the FAMILY sacred and inviolate. The law of Nature is as old as man—and is reaffirmed in the birth of every man—that society, and by consequence the State, must grow out of the family as its root; and history teaches that human society is stable, orderly, and secure, only where the family is maintained in its integrity, at once social, seclusive, and sacred.

Mr. Henry Sumner Maine argues that “the unit of modern society is the individual;” and society is no longer as in primitive times, an “aggregation of families;” but “a collection of

individuals.”* But though it is true that the political domination of the family as seen in the patriarchy of the East, and in the clanship of feudal times, is disappearing from modern society, yet the structural basis of society lies within the family as its germ; and the organic law remains that the individual enters into society through the pupillage of the family. It is because of the family that man is social and not simply gregarious. A herd of buffaloes is a “collection of individuals” numbering tens of thousands, all of equal make and functions, but these do not constitute society. Among human beings the recognition of blood-relationship as a permanent tie creates the social feeling, and this common experience of the family binds men together in a community of interests, and joins the present both to the past and to the future as one organic life.

No ingenuity of research has found a trace of that “social compact” by which some philosophers imagine that human beings first agreed to live together. The signers of that political covenant in the cabin of the *Mayflower* did not there contract to form society, but in their original social capacity they gave form to the State. Man is born into society and cannot escape from its obligations; for as, in his own nature, he is a social being, he is also of necessity a *jural* being;—one having rights and obligations, and therefore capable of and requiring a government of law and organized civil polity. The social conditions under which he necessarily exists create obligations which modify and interpret his rights as an individual. The notion that society is simply a collection of individuals leads to the political fallacy that government is constituted solely for the purpose of protecting individuals in their particular “rights;” and that the concurrence of the majority of its individual constituents in measures for that end is the supreme law. This would establish the most mechanical and oppressive of all despotisms, the despotism of numbers. But if the individual enters into society through an organic constitution of things antecedent to his own will, then not the choices nor the rights of individuals, separately or collectively, give law to society; but the LAW OF RIGHT, which at once makes the indi-

* Ancient Law, p. 121, Am. ed.

vidual conscience an inviolable fortress, and which being only another name for the Law of Love, binds every man to be just, kind, and true in the social relations in which perforce he exists. In strict fact and philosophy, then, society is neither an aggregation of families nor a collection of individuals; but the State grows normally out of Society, and Society out of the Family, through which the individual comes into it, the subject of obligations as well as the claimant of rights. Here *Comte* reasoned more wisely than Mr. Maine, when he said, "The true social *unit* is certainly the family reduced, if necessary, to the elementary couple which forms its basis. . . . It is by this avenue that Man comes forth from his mere personality and learns to live in another, while obeying his most powerful instincts. . . . Domestic life is the inevitable preparation for social life, and within its bosom social sentiment has its spontaneous rise."*

Hence to have life in perpetuity the nation must be rooted in the soil, through the family, by the attachments of home. "He that hath a wife and children," says Bacon, "hath given hostages to fortune;" and we may add hostages to society, hostages to industry, to order and to law. Whatever dishonors marriage, or undermines its sacredness and stability, tends to demoralize society and to destroy the State. The social crime of Slavery is that it cuts at the root of national life by severing the family tie among the laboring population; for when the pledges of natural affection that should be one's hostages to society are torn from him by violence or lust, made chattels upon the block and hurried to an unknown fate,—where the love of husband and father can neither help nor soothe,—the man sees in society an enemy, in law a tyrant, in the peaceful homes of his oppressors only a provocation to revenge. In the stratum of labor upon which society rests, there is no motive of interest, of affection, or of hope, to bind the laborer to the soil he tills, or to the laws and the people that rob him of a home.

Equally destructive of that home life which must be the root of a permanent nationality, is the monopoly of land by a class

* Positive Philosophy, H. Martineau's edition, p. 502.

or caste. The growth of a landed aristocracy, fostered by Slavery, marked the decline of the Roman Republic. The small farms of early days were swallowed up in great plantations, so that while the number of Roman citizens was increased every year, the number of the landed proprietors decreased, and the old independent peasantry was reduced to a populace of paupers. England shows the same tendency to the destruction of home life among the commonalty through the absorption of land by the few—an evil poorly compensated by the growth and distribution of commercial wealth among her middling class.

At the Norman conquest, when her population numbered barely 1,000,000, there were in the realm 45,000 landholders, or 1 in 22. At the revolution there were 170,000 freeholders, in a population of 5,500,000, or 1 in 33. In 1861 the population was 20,000,000 and the number of landed proprietors had been reduced to 31,000 or 1 in 645; and according to a late reviewer, the tenantry are worse off under the modern landlord than under the feudal system of the fourteenth century. Then they had permanent rights of occupation; but now "they may be expelled at any time; as, for instance, when in Sutherland fifteen thousand persons were driven from the homesteads of their forefathers to make room for sheepwalks."

Now, the great landowner, unless by a rare exception he is also a philanthropist, cares simply for the revenue of his estate and the aggrandizement of his family. The mental, social, and moral condition of his dependents gives him no concern; indeed he would prefer a hereditary caste of cottagers, as stolid as the ground they till, to a yeomanry who might feel the instinct of political power. Create a landed aristocracy, and whether the tillers of the soil be the tenantry of Ireland, the cottagers of England, the serfs of Russia, the fellahin of Egypt, the pariahs of India, or the slaves of the South, it is all one as regards the care of the proprietary for their welfare as human beings; they are of value to him simply as producers; and schools, churches, newspapers, libraries, even the comforts and decencies of life are of small account for such! Thus it comes to pass that society is made up of two extremes—the owning and the owned, the ruling and the ruled; and when luxury

shall have weakened the one, and want shall have roused the other, then tyranny and anarchy will come into collision, and government and society itself will go down in the shock.

Tennyson has well pictured this landed lord :

“ His God is far diffused in noble groves,
And princely halls, and farms, and flowing lawns,
And heaps of living gold that daily grow,
And title-scrolls and gorgeous heraldries :”

then, as with the fiery pen of the prophet, he writes the coming doom—in the house made desolate and the tyrant imbecile—

“ Then the great hall was wholly broken down,
And the broad woodland parceled into farms.”

A radical vice of our southern society, lying back of Slavery itself, has been the plantation system in distinction from the farm system. While in Virginia, Georgia, South Carolina and Louisiana the average plantation is three and four times larger than the average farm in New York, Massachusetts, or Illinois, there are many estates in the hands of individual owners at the South, that range to ten thousand acres and upwards. Hence the mass of the white population have been divorced from any beneficial interest in their native soil, and thus has been constituted that anomalous and pestiferous caste known as “ poor white trash.” As Henry A. Wise said of Virginia, “ the landlord has skinned the tenant and the tenant has skinned the land, until both have grown poor together.” And years ago, Mr. C. C. Clay of Alabama said of a leading county in that State, “ numerous farm-houses, once the abode of industrious and intelligent freemen, are now occupied by slaves, or tenantless, deserted and dilapidated. The traveler will observe fields once fertile, now unfenced, abandoned, and covered with those evil harbingers foxtail and broomsedge ; he will see the moss growing on the moldering walls of once thrifty villages, and will find one only master grasps the whole domain that once furnished happy homes for a dozen white families. Indeed a country in its infancy, where fifty years ago scarce a forest tree had been felled by the axe of the pioneer, is already exhibiting the painful signs of senility and decay.” Thus Nature herself protests against the two-fold curse of servile labor and monop-

oly in land. But where the land is parceled into farms, open to the competition of industry, the nation is rooted to the soil by a myriad homesteads, each twining about itself the interests, the affections, the hopes of the family, and every neighborhood organizing for its associate families the school, the church, the lyceum, the library, and all the institutions of a permanent civilization. The Homestead Act that opens the vast territory from the Mississippi to the Pacific Coast in portions of 160 acres to every citizen-settler, for ten dollars and the register's fee, is a grand pledge of the permanence of our national life. The landed monopoly of the South must now yield to that necessity which is stronger than pride. The inevitable laws of Political Economy will drive the ploughshare of free industry through the decayed roots of despotic indolence, and planting the free homestead and the inviolate family in the old slave-worn furrows, will thus plant the NATION where once was only an oligarchy and its serfs. The patriarch-poet whose boundless range of nature and boundless sympathy with man are so fine a type of our national life, in a yet green age shall see fulfilled not only on the prairies of the West, but on the reclaimed Savannas of the South, the prophetic dream of his early years. Already following the tramp of armies Bryant may hear

"The sound of that advancing multitude
Which soon shall fill these deserts. From the ground
Comes up the laugh of children, the soft voice
Of maidens, and the sweet and solemn hymn
Of Sabbath-worshippers. The low of herds
Blends with the rustling of the heavy grain
Over the dark-brown furrows :"
—While "the great heavens
Seem to look down upon the scene in love."

II. The Nation being thus established upon the family, must itself be molded as nearly as possible into the consistency of family feeling and the unity of family life, by means of a RACE-STOCK sufficiently positive and vigorous to assimilate all foreign elements into its own individuality. The race is the family emerging into the nation ; and as the family is the nexus of society, so the race is the nexus of the nation—the bond of unity and continuity. Wherever a nation has rooted

itself in history, there has been a race-stock in which it was planted and through which it grew. For what were history apart from the development of dominant races in their several spheres of action, culture, and empire? However the original stock may be modified by climate, by culture, or even by intermarriage with other races, and however population may be increased by immigration or by conquest, the *growth* of the nation is not through external accretion but by vital assimilation; for, as Lord Bacon puts it, in forming a state, "by all means it is to be procured, that the trunk of the tree be great enough to bear the branches and the boughs; that the natural subjects of the state bear a sufficient proportion to the stranger subjects."

Rome lost vitality by expansion, because her foreign policy did not fuse conquered peoples in her proper nationality as, at the first, the Latin stock had absorbed all other nationalities of Italy. "It was not the Romans that spread upon the world, but it was the world that spread upon the Romans" till the weight of the branches broke the trunk.

When the Normans had conquered England, there was but one alternative possible between them and the Saxon race—fusion or extirpation; and a future England depended upon severing the Norman tie with the Continent, and grafting Norman culture upon the Saxon race-stock. When Norman nobles, shut up to England as their home, began to recognize the native beauty of her Saxon daughters, the conquered race absorbed the conquerors, and the English people, language, culture, grew from the sturdy Saxon stock, refined by grafting from the then "foremost race of Christendom." That improved English stock, modified by new incidents of climate and by a freer infusion of foreign elements, is the life of our nationality; and the permanence of that life depends upon this Anglo-American stock having enough of pith and pluck to give character and tone to the whole population. Organized communities of Americans, Germans, Irish, Negroes, French, Scotch, Chinese, Jews, dwelling side by side upon the same soil and under the same laws, cannot constitute a nation. We have seen in Austria how the molecules of diverse races continually tend asunder. Because of such unassimilated races

and communities within her body politic, Turkey is sick and ready to die. We cease to be a nation if German influence and Irish influence is to vie with American influence. Now that the negro is made a citizen, we must no longer know him as a negro, no longer help him, protect him, care for him as a negro, nor even as a freedman, but only as a man merged in the one commonwealth of equal laws. Philanthropy must not perpetuate caste. We must suffer in this land no element of political power that is not thoroughly *Americanized*.

I marvel that political economists, looking simply to the increase of production, should stimulate immigration beyond our native power of assimilation. Since the loose and partisan administration of our naturalization laws makes the crudest immigrant an active member of the body politic, we may increase our productive strength at the hazard of our political life; for a population which, for any reason, we cannot absorb betimes into our proper race-stock, becomes a cause of disintegration within the heart of the state. Look at New York city, in which it is tolerable to live only because she has surrendered every right of self-government—police, water, fire, health, parks, charities—to the saving power of the state.* Nothing unamerican in intelligence, sympathy, purpose, tone, should be admitted as a constituent of political life, unless we are ready to sacrifice nationality to numbers. One Language, speaking through the laws, through the press, through the schools, through the pulpits of the land, a language rich in the traditions of liberty, and whose literature breathes more of the spirit of Humanity, Freedom, and Christianity than any other of the tongues of men, this noble speech of Milton and of Burke permeating all business and pleasure, all work and worship, all song and all sorrow, from the cradle to the grave, is a bond of nationality stronger than political constitutions

* Of 80,532 persons arrested by the police of New York in 1867, only 27,156 were of American birth; and of the 53,376 foreigners who disturbed the peace of the city, 38,128 were Irish.

In the past eight years, within the precincts of the New York Metropolitan Police, there were 706,288 arrests; of these there were 204,129 Americans; the foreigners numbering 502,159, of which 373,341 were Irish. Such is the voting population in New York.

and to read and write that tongue intelligently should be indispensable to the candidate for American citizenship.

If immigration be not over-stimulated, if it is left to the natural, healthy influence of trade-laws without adventitious political bribes, then freedom of alliance will gradually fuse our heterogeneous populations into one. With a better imported stock, who come intelligently, and not like driven cattle, who come to work rather than to vote, and with no restrictions upon the intermarriage of races, our immigrant population, unless compacted politically or ecclesiastically into clans, will gradually be absorbed into the national stock, and their descendants of the third generation will be undeniably American. Just now the fusion of all elements into the common race-stock, which the silent influences of language and society would effect, is accelerated by the commingling of bloods upon every battle-field for our national unity. As of old the blood-baptism of the martyr canonized him in the church, though he had failed to be baptized of water into the Christian name, so this war-baptism upon the brow of Celt or Saxon, of German, Gaul, or African, naturalizes each immigrant race into the family of the American nation—no more strangers and foreigners, but fellow-citizens of the household of freedom, a commonwealth builded together into a holy temple, founded upon the apostles and confessors of '76, cemented with the blood of myriads of her native, her adopted, and her enfranchised sons, inscribed with the countless roll of martyrs, whose rude, unlettered tablets mark every field from the Susquehanna to the Gulf, from the James to the Missouri—one temple for one continent and one people, purged of the vile traffickers in the bodies and the souls of men, consecrated to Justice and to Liberty, the sanctuary of Man, the habitation of God.

III. For building the nation into permanence, there needs a CIVIL ORGANISM capable of preserving its historical identity through successive generations. Confederation and nationality are irreconcilable terms. The Greeks, with race, language, love of country, and similarity of institutions to identify them as one people, yet failed of becoming a nation, through lack of some common unit of organic life; and the chronic

jealousies and strifes of inarticulated tribes, sapped the vitality of the race itself. A nation is not framed by statute or compact, but is properly an organism, and serves itself by statutes and by governments as the organs of its own will;—constitutions and laws being the articulate expression of its inherent life. As President Lincoln tersely said, "It was the nation that made the constitution, and not the constitution the nation." Already had the nation awoke to consciousness as "one people" in the Declaration of Independence; and this consciousness asserted itself majestically in that second declaration of sovereignty, "WE, THE PEOPLE of the United States, do ordain and establish this constitution *for* the United States of America." The attempt to set aside this vital utterance of national sovereignty as a verbal contract, to be dissolved at will, brought forth from the inner consciousness of the people, the historic continuity of national life. The patriots of the Revolution, rising from almost forgotten graves, are with us once more, a living power. We strike hands across the century with the men of '76; we walk with Otis and Warren, with Hancock and Samuel Adams, as feeling that our cause is theirs, and that their heroic past is part of our daily life. This organic identity should be cherished in perpetual growth. By histories, by orations, and by monuments, by sacred graves worthy of national pilgrimages, by memorial parks and statues, by storied pictures in public halls, by legends and mottoes, by commemorative services and martyr-days, and, above all, by a festival of the REDEMPTION OF LIBERTY, a day of flags and flowers, a day of prayers and thanksgivings, a day of requiem for our heroes—when all that music and ritual and eloquence can provide, shall celebrate the worth and glory of their sacrifice—by such pains-taking regard for the past, wrought into the habits of the people, let us keep ever bright the links of historic continuity that preserve the nation through all changes and all ages, ONE. The past once lost there is no more future. The Nation severed from its history loses the life-blood of progress.

IV. For the permanent life of the nation it is essential that there be within it the largest scope for INDIVIDUAL ENTERPRISE AND DEVELOPMENT, *in harmony with the national spirit.*

While the individual, born into the nation, receives from it much of the tone of his thought and action, there come, also, to the nation fresh impulse and vigor from the activity of the individual, and any undue repression of such activity may cause a ferment of political revolution. Hence liberty in all that is not harmful to others, liberty of thought, liberty of instruction, liberty of industry, liberty of trade, liberty in matters of diet, of society, and of recreation, liberty of locomotion, liberty of religion—such liberty is the law of life for the nation. The Roman commonwealth too often repressed individual genius by “the immovable idea of a policy.” In the main each man in working out his own bent helps the development of the community, and the freer he works the more he helps. Though we may not go so far as to say that “no society in which eccentricity is a matter of reproach can be in a wholesome state,”* yet with all this freedom of individual activity, the healthy development of society does require that individuality of character be free from the tyranny of public opinion; and this freedom of individual activity should be *in harmony with*, and so subordinate to, the national spirit and life; since whoever would aggrandize himself through fraud, immorality, oppression, injustice, or whoever would enjoy himself at the cost of public decency, order, and safety, so far corrupts the national life and imperils the state. If the stray rifle-balls of the Schützenfest kill a child to-day and a man to-morrow, it is better that on the third day the sport be put under law.† In order, therefore, that the two factors of individualism and society may be adjusted to the most beneficial reciprocal influence, the individual should be trained in that sense of patriotic obligation, and that feeling of public spirit, which will lead him to requite society for its privileges and protection, by making the nation as far as possible a partner of his plans, his studies, his labors, his profits, and his hopes. Within that delicate sphere of honor and of moral sentiment which legislation can hardly touch without marring, lies the obligation to *public spirit*, which the notion that gov-

* J. S. Mill on Liberty.

† This had just happened in New York.

ernment exists only to protect the individual in his rights would utterly destroy, but which the doctrine before insisted on, of an organic life in society and the nation, will inspire to the noblest aims—teaching the individual that his liberty and rights are guaranteed by society to the end that he may have unrestricted opportunity to devote himself to that grand ideal of equal justice and the universal good, which chiefly makes the individual worth caring for.

V. Since national enterprise and wealth rest largely upon productive industry, we must MAKE LABOR HONORABLE *as serving society in accordance with divine laws*. Hitherto democratic society has failed to solve the problem of elevating the laborer without at the same time dishonoring labor itself. When the French Republic of 1792 excepted from the privilege of citizenship “all persons at domestic service,” it did homage to the spirit of slavery while destroying the forms of despotism; for if that kind of service which is indispensable to the existence of society be held beneath a citizen, then is labor made a reproach in proportion to its necessity, and a pariah caste is created in every household. But the spirit of that French proscription rules in American society.

Democratic institutions have accomplished for the laborer these things: they have made it possible for the laboring man to advance himself in social and political consideration; they have increased his facilities for changing his occupation; and have given opportunity for those combinations of laboring men which have enabled them often to dictate to capitalists and legislators in their own supposed interests. These last, however, have furnished sad examples of the tyranny of numbers, and of that rule of *mediocrity* which is apt to result from a bare ruling by majorities. The unskilled and the lazy keep down the good workmen to their average.

But while democratic institutions have in some ways wrought beneficially upon the workingman, it cannot be disguised that they tend more and more to bring work itself into contempt; that there is something in the consciousness of being a free and independent voter that rebels at the thought of dependent labor, and causes such labor to be disesteemed—as being what the French Republic branded it, *menial*, and so beneath

the dignity of a citizen. And this spirit is contagious in all departments of manual labor—teaching to evade service rather than improve it, turning the thought of the workman from the quality of his work to its issue in his being emancipated from the necessity of working. Its remedy may possibly come through the new scheme of coöperation by which labor is made to participate in the fruits of capital—though it remains to be seen how this scheme will operate when losses are to be divided instead of profits, and when the laborer shall claim an equal voice in investing his employer's capital! "Coöperation" should be encouraged in a full and fair trial of its influence upon the condition of the working-man, but the scheme at best is abnormal and of doubtful issue. Rather must we redeem Labor from infamy by recognizing the fact that providential laws are not abolished by socialistic theories, that democratic equalization in government cannot do away with the fundamental constitution of human society which requires that the necessary work of life be classified so that each in doing his part shall serve the whole. This fact fairly recognized is the true basis of coöperation, and would inspire the working classes with "the just pride which will choose to give good work for good wages."

There is hardly a country of the civilized world where labor is less respectable in itself, and less respected in the person of the laborer, than in these United States. "The dignity of labor," forsooth, is the staple of political harangues to working-men; yet the point of dignity is made to consist in the ability to quit labor for something else. The argument to the working-man whose vote is solicited, is, "You are as good as any one, if not a trifle better; for President Lincoln once split rails, Gen. Grant tanned hides, Ben. Wade chopped wood, and Henry Wilson cobbled shoes; so you, too, may rise to be President, General, Vice-President, or Senator,—especially if you will help keep our party in power." The working-man is told not to be ashamed of his position, inasmuch as there is a chance of his getting out of it, and becoming an employer, a capitalist, or even a politician! That one may rise from mere labor of the hands into the sphere of mental labor, and from the condition of labor to that of capital; that

there is here no hereditary and unchangeable status for any man, is a feature of American society that does honor to the democratic principle. But inasmuch as only a small minority of workmen can so rise, to make the opportunity of rising the chief motive to labor, is to disparage labor itself, and to cajole the laborer. Already the feeling that a condition of labor is only to be endured until something better is gained, but should be escaped from as soon as possible, so widely pervades our democratic society, that it is hard to get work of any kind done by American hands. What farmer's son or mechanic's son takes kindly to his father's work, or is willing to be apprenticed to a trade? The feeling that labor is a task to be endured, a bondage to be escaped, and that the working-man is to be esteemed not for his skill in his work but for his capacity to rise above work, has brought labor to a state of disesteem unknown in aristocratic communities. The normal idea which underlies the great providential law of all work—that since society must be served by various forms of manual labor, therefore to do in the best manner the work which is given one in his place to do, is a worthy ambition, that this may be made an honorable serving of God and man in an appointed sphere—this integral relation of labor to the well-ordering of society and the welfare of the nation, which imparts to labor a real dignity, is not recognized by the American people as it is in France, in Germany, and even in England. But a nation cannot permanently thrive which puts labor under a social ban. Legislation cannot change the status of labor; neither combination nor coöperation can lift the laboring man in the social scale, so long as public opinion regards it as essentially servile that one man should work for another, or degrading to work at all. But to make labor honorable as a calling, is to improve the condition of the working-man, in the ratio of his skill and fidelity in his work; and that which is useful and necessary should be made respectable even in a democracy!

VI. But the right building of the nation requires that we study ornamentation as well as stability, beauty as well as strength; and therefore we should assure to WOMAN that *prerogative of honor in domestic and social life*, which we have

in part gained for her by redeeming her from a life of drudgery. While labor is man's primordial necessity, "*woman's right to labor*" is a cry full of evil omen. It marks the deterioration of that manly sentiment which has hitherto accorded to woman in this Republic a position of honor and prerogative unknown in the titled society of the old world. There she has the "*right to labor*"—as shop-keeper, stall-tender, street-cleaner in the cities and towns of France, and as peasant in the fields; there she may labor at the oar upon the canals of Holland; there she may have undisputed right to labor over the vast plains of Germany and the steppes of Russia, digging, hoeing, ditching, and following the plow; there she has the scavenger's right to labor, in Switzerland, Egypt, Syria, gathering with her hands the ordure of animals for tillage or for fuel; there, in Spain and Italy, she has the right to trudge weary miles after the cattle as they browse in the scorching heat or the pelting storm, or to burden her head with loads of wood or grain fit for the back of a camel. It shames me that, in this free Republic, where the sanctity of womanhood has been guarded with a jealousy that the age of chivalry never knew, we are beginning to look upon woman as a creature doomed to labor. Her "*right to labor*" is wide as the world, if she covet that. Let her go forth to labor, if she will, and produce hands and feet and features of corresponding coarseness; but in quitting the gentle occupations of the household, that she may compete with man in every form of labor, she may assert a muscular right, with which she is but imperfectly endowed, at cost of a spiritual prerogative which is hers by nature and by the concession of all noble men. That daily toil for daily bread which is man's inheritance through the fall, was not laid upon woman at the first; and it is no social enfranchisement, but a hardship imposed by a false condition of society, that would put it upon her now. Let woman use her finer faculties in education, art, science, manners, the humanities; let her win here the place of preferment; and when she must perform manual labor for subsistence, let her be encouraged, respected, and remunerated, in this also, as one bravely meeting a hard lot; but let us not dignify with the name of "*right*," a physical necessity that marks an abnor-

mal condition of society. Sir Samuel Baker informs us that in Latooka "women are so far appreciated as they are valuable animals. They grind the corn, fetch the water, gather firewood, cement the floors, cook the food, and propagate the race; but there is no such thing as love." Shall we go back upon our civilization, back upon our Christianity, to the White Nile theory of woman's labor? Such would be the result to woman of that theory of "rights" which makes her equality with man a reason for her "doing everything that man now does."

The equality of the sexes is not *sameness* of endowments and adaptations, but *equality* with *differentia*. The attributes of sex belong to the soul as well as to the body, so that in their intellectual and spiritual natures, much as they possess in common, the man and the woman are also the complement each of the other; and in the distribution of these complementary qualities woman certainly has no cause to envy her partner. Her delicate and beautiful presence, her graces and charms of person and manner, her intuitive affinities for the true, the pure, and the good, her divine faculty of counsel, her all-pervading, all-controlling influence—these are *prerogatives* which woman has no right to vacate by reducing herself to a mere tool of productive industry, a numerical factor of political economy. Physiology demonstrates that woman is not so constituted as to compete with man in labor, since there is an appreciable difference between the two sexes in the proportion of red blood-corpuscles, upon which depend both "*vital activity* and the capacity for *sustained exertion*,"—whether of muscle or of the brain.* But though woman is thus inferior to man in native vital force, a kindly nature has imparted to her a more subtle vivacity and grace, showing that hers are the beautiful ministries of life, and man's its rugged toil; and it is this prerogative of Womanhood that she would sacrifice by

* See Carpenter's "Principles of Human Physiology" sixth London edition, pages 168 and 198. "The *mazima* in the female do not pass much higher than the *mean* of the male, while her *minima* fall far below his; on the other hand, the *mazima* of the male rise far higher than those of the female, whilst his *minima* scarcely descend below her *mean*."

attempting the unequal strife and burden of the "working-day world."

Only at the cost of this same prerogative—the prerogative of ruling in society through the homage of valor to grace, of strength to refinement, of muscle to heart—only by sacrificing this could woman enter the arena of political strife. The delicate laws of her physical organization, the more subtle and beautiful laws of her social and moral influence alike forbid this uncrowning of her Womanhood. One who would claim the right of political action must be equal to serving the State in its demands as a civil organization. Here emphatically rights and duties must be correlative. Since suffrage carries not simply the act of voting but the function of ruling as well—not only declaring one's preference in political affairs, but actually governing the whole community—this cannot be the natural right of any individual, but is a privilege to be accorded by society—by the body politic finding itself in power,—in view of one's competence to serve the State in its rightful requirements, and with a wise and impartial consideration of the needs and welfare of the entire commonwealth. To enter political life argues capacity for civil duty; capacity to serve the State in the jury-box, in the police, in the camp, in the battle-field, in port-surveys and defenses, in the revenue-service, in a routine of official duties that suffer no intermission; and woman cannot do this, cannot trust herself to undertake the service for which she is physically incapacitated, cannot be trusted with it with safety to the commonwealth. Witness, for instance, the protracted and exhausting session of the Senate upon the impeachment of the President! If she would fulfill the sacred functions of her nature, she cannot accept the responsibilities of the public service, for the divine laws of physiology, and the divine constitution of the family, as the perpetual source of human society, can never be set aside. Either the vast majority of women must become wives and mothers, or society and the State must cease to be. But while woman shall continue to fulfill for society that most serviceable, most honorable, and most sacred office of *Maternity*, which is hers by divine right, her very nature must forbid her employment in the public service of the State.

Reverting for a moment to the thought that, in this country, to vote is to participate directly in the *power of governing*, I maintain that the right to vote must rest upon ability to discharge the duties of citizenship in the service of society as a civil organization. This is the only logical foundation upon which the right of suffrage can be based. To base it upon taxation is to narrow all the great concerns of society down to the one point of mercenary interest. One may receive the full value of his taxes in public order and security, without being entitled to vote by reason of his assessment; and, on the other hand, taxes may be most unjust and oppressive, and the public order and safety most lax, where everybody votes, as in New York, and the representatives of the majority levy upon the property of the minority for their own schemes of plunder. To base the right to vote upon the abstract equality of individuals, is to confound natural and personal rights with political powers;—but voting is a *power* in the State which no one can inherit by nature. If man is endowed by nature with the right to vote, if this is a right that inheres in humanity as such, then by what authority can minors and paupers be excluded from the polls, or a term of naturalization or a degree of education be required for admission to suffrage? In the last analysis, the Political Society must determine for itself in whom this power of control over public affairs shall be vested.

Is it asked whence has Society this right? The answer is simply that the Body Politic which possesses the power to rule, *must* rule upon conditions of its own making; it is bound to make these conditions just and fair in view of all the interests of society, but the remedy for injustice cannot be found in admitting everybody indiscriminately to the function of ruling as a “natural right.” The same power in society which regulates suffrage in the case of minors, paupers, and others, can attach to suffrage such conditions and limitations as the general good may require. Hence the natural equality of the sexes has no bearing upon the question of suffrage, which rests on constitutional and other qualifications for the service of society as a civil organization. That the capacity for such service is denied to woman is not a fiction of civil law but a fact of physiology, which no legislation can ever change.

The notion that the equality of the sexes requires the equal distribution and exercise of all civil, social, and personal functions and rights, leads to absurdities the most grotesque and revolting.

But we are now concerned not so much with the abstract question of woman's entering into public life as with the influence of this upon the tone of society in a republican government. The tone of national life, the very continuance of the nation, depends upon the position of woman more than upon any other single fact; and it has happened to woman thus far in the constitution of American society, to be a conservative, elevating, purifying power, by virtue of the prerogative accorded her of ruling by character and influence apart from the contests of numbers. In a country which has no traditions of feudalism and no forms of society nor government to inspire sentiments of veneration and loyalty, the spirit of chivalry—"that nurse of manly sentiment and heroic enterprise"—has found its expression in loyalty to woman. This sentiment, ennobling and refining a democratic people, is of more value to the Republic than all the balances of the constitution. It belongs to the divine harmony of society; for the Creator has entrusted woman to the honor of man in the family and the state, for the culture of the stronger through care and consideration for the weaker. Man looks up to woman with the homage that chivalry renders to the delicate, the beautiful, the spiritual, the true.

But if woman, disdaining her loyal defender, shall enter the lists to contend with man by sheer force of numbers, clamoring for rights, he will say to her, "Stand upon your own strength and fight your own battles, expecting neither loyalty nor chivalry from me." An editor distinguished as much for his courtesy as for his generous sympathy with all enlightened reforms, was besought by a champion of woman's voting to advocate her cause. To her repeated demands of "right," he replied with quiet and cogent argument; but with such pertinacity did she pursue him that he said to her at last, "Madam, I fear if you come to me again in this manner, I shall be compelled to answer you as if you were a *man*!" That saved him further intrusion, and opened her eyes to the possible

future of woman, should she gain the right of being talked to like a man! Sad would be the social state in which men would feel challenged by the position of woman to deal with her on public questions, as they deal with one another.

Even if the ballot could raise woman politically, the nation cannot afford so to degrade its men by divesting them of the sentiments of delicacy, of honor, of loyalty—in a word, of chivalry, and arraying the sexes in the contest of numbers. Woman cannot hope to act for herself in public life and still receive the honorable consideration now accorded to the delicacy of her sex. She must choose between the two; and if she shall elect the latter, she will inevitably find that in what direction soever she forces herself outside the sphere of delicate and chivalrous regard into the contention of labors and of numbers, she is taking a step toward her own degradation. If she can brave the opprobrium, society cannot risk the consequences.

It is assumed that woman will bring to the polls a soothing element and improve the moral results of elections. On the contrary, her greater intensity of feeling for *persons* would bring a keener acrimony into our political campaigns. We cannot forget how the women of the South incited the rebellion and inflamed its hatred and atrocity; nor that woman produced the worst monstrosities of the French revolution; nor can we shut our eyes to the fact that in great cities the *Bridgets* would roll up the majorities of the demagogues, and that Washington would have its Maintenons and Pompadours to add their intrigues to its political corruptions. The history of church elections in which Abbesses had a voice, is a warning here. But the calamity to be shunned is that men, ceasing to respect and honor women in their prerogative of influence, shall fear or court them as an element of numerical power!—for when the spirit of chivalry with its generous loyalty to sex is gone, the glory of the Republic will be extinguished forever.

VII. To give to the national structure its proper finish, the principle of *social selection*, inseparable from human society, should be encouraged in the direction of *CULTURE*. Whatever may be the fate of Mr. Darwin's theory in natural history, the law of "variation by selection" obtains in human society, and

tends to the development of higher forms of life. The spirit of aristocracy, which is found in humanity under all conditions, can never be excluded from democratic society, but should find in that society its regnant and harmonious sphere. An aristocracy of privilege, an hereditary supremacy vested in an order or class, a *political* aristocracy of any kind, is essentially hostile to those rights and liberties which a Republican government makes common to all; and the abolition of *privileged* classes in the State is the great boon which democracy has brought to mankind. Whatever the evils of democracy, improvement is not to be sought by changing the system, so that a hundred would rule the million by "privilege."

But classes will nevertheless exist, by laws inherent in the constitution of all society; and the perfect development of democratic society requires that there be in this classes distinguished by the best material, constituted for the best ends; classes permanent in their structure and influence, but with an ever-changing succession of individual membership, because membership comes neither through birth, privilege, nor favoritism, but through an eligibility open to universal competition. By the constitution of human nature, there are gradations of quality in humanity itself; there is a good, a better, a best; and, by the ordinance of God, the best should have precedence in consideration and influence, and so long as the place of the best is open to self-culture, the advantages of such true, normal aristocracy may be had with none of the evils of privilege or caste.

The most presuming aristocracy the world has ever seen is the Church of Christ, which purports to consist of the elect of God, distinguished from the world by superiority of character, and claiming an inheritance in the kingdom of heaven; yet within itself the church is the most absolute democracy—where all are brethren; and since it is open to any man to enter the church upon adopting its rule of holy life, there is nothing proscriptive in such an aristocracy, while its whole tone is to elevate and refine society.

Like the influence of the church in morals would be the social influence of a guild of the cultivated—what the French style *amés d'élite*—elect spirits drawn together by the affinity

of culture, and controlling taste, manners, opinion, by the prerogative of excellence. It is essential to liberty that there be recognized the principle of social selection, the right of classification in society by the law, not of averages or majorities, but of preferences; and it is no less essential to the perfection of society that this variation by selection be in the direction not of material prosperity—which is little else than a “regulated sensuality”—but of a true and ennobling culture.

It was a mark of decay in Roman society when, as Mommson says, “it was necessary that the burgesses should all be alike, that each of them might be like a king.” Such equality marks a deteriorated condition of intelligence and virtue; for that is hardly a passable state of society in which none are superior.

De Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill, two most sagacious and friendly critics of our social condition, have both commented upon the degrading effects of the passion for physical comforts and for the pleasures of material life, which gives such a “preternatural stimulus to the desire of acquiring and of enjoying wealth, where an entire population are the competitors.” Hitherto an apparent success in that one line has been the chief mark of social distinction—“the hypocrisy of luxury,” as De Tocqueville styles it. Mill frankly notes the same tendency in his own country. “In England as well as in America, it appears to foreigners, as if everybody had but one wish—to improve his condition, never to enjoy it; as if no Englishman cared to cultivate either the pleasures or the virtues corresponding to his station in society, but solely to get out of it as quickly as possible, or if that cannot be done, and until it is done, to seem to have got out of it.”* The remedy for this materialistic or commercial tone of democratic society, Mill would find in an agricultural class, educated and removed by position and taste from “the rage of money-getting;” in a leisured class and a learned class, which shall furnish “a social support for opinions and sentiments different from those of the mass.” To American moralists it has been a matter of congratulation that there existed in this country no

* *Dissertations*, ii., 144.

leisured or spending class; but now that such a class has arisen and is to be, we should set before it such motives to education for leadership and statesmanship as will turn it from house-furnishing and horse-racing as the chief end of life. Society has the right to demand of such a class that they shall be patrons of science and art, the models of culture—a guild of the cultivated—a pattern of the *gentleman*. Above all must the Aristocracy of Letters maintain and justify its conceded rank by a comprehensive regard for the advancement of the Republic in the higher walks of learning. A learned class should be the pride of our Universities, the boast of our people. Men who are willing to devote time, patience, and labor to becoming scholars, should be accounted worthy of the best honors and emoluments of the nation, even as to-day England, whose own public service is so enriched by men of culture, pays her most graceful compliment to the American people in crowning their favorite poet in the realm of letters and of laws—inducting the translator of Dante into the university of Milton. Men of letters must in turn adorn the nation with starry-crowns of light and glory high above the petty ambitions of place and power. Their dignity is that they give light freely to all beneath them, and that by exalting mind they elevate man. That the learning of the clergy and the university should be employed to govern the people through their ignorance, was the theory of the Middle Ages;—that educated Mind should rule the nation by educating the people to sound views, and pure and noble aims, is the theory of a learned class in a Republic. Hence, the existence of such a class, while it confers dignity upon the nation, is not for personal pride and privilege, but for public service. Bunsen lamented that in Germany and in England “the guild of the studious does too little with the object of working upon the nation;” but we in America are making it a practical working-power. That popular education which is so indispensable to the preservation of republican government that I do not argue for it here, can be obtained only through men of higher education, men devoted to learning, bringing to bear upon public questions the calm, clear, sober judgment of minds disciplined to the vocation of the scholar. He who has learned

to read is in a position to be educated by the exercise of his thinking-powers upon the thoughts of thinking men. Not reading, nor schools, nor the press can make sure to the people at large that education for public affairs, which the safety of the State requires in the body of its voters. What they read and what they think about it, is the practical question, and discipline in sound reading and thinking, the true education. After the common school has graduated its millions in the rudiments of knowledge, these must yet be educated by minds trained in the highest forms of thought and the noblest views of truth. As it was the sciences of chemistry, mechanics, and engineering that fought the battles of the country through the hands of artillerists and riflemen; and the science of political ethics that expounded and enforced the obligations of loyalty and patriotism; as it is the science of the mining schools that develops the physical resources of the country; so must educated mind solve for the nation its disturbing problems of finance and trade by guiding the people to sound notions of political economy; so must the men of wisdom guard the State by causing to be understood the principles of ethics by which alone the life of a nation can be maintained.

VIII. And this brings us to the last and highest word of the argument—that, for the preservation of the national structure, *every bolt, strut, stay, tie in it must be JUSTICE*. By the working of those moral laws which mark human society as ordained of God, only that endures which is just, and therefore has right to be. As a Nation we have no choice of what at last shall be, but can only choose whether *we* will last by joining our national life to that which certainly shall be. To this end the *theocratic* principle must be applied to *democratic* forms,* and JUSTICE enthroned as a divine incarnation in all

* For the full enunciation of this principle the author begs to refer the reader to his discourse published by the American Home Missionary Society, May, 1868. Its argument in brief is, (1). A Government is rightful in proportion as it can justify itself to the moral sense of mankind. (2). A Popular Government can be maintained only through reverence for law, which is founded in the moral convictions of the people. (3). The religion of the Bible alone can supply adequate moral sanctions to the laws and institutions of a free commonwealth. An extension of suffrage will not preserve society and the State, unless suffrage is made both intelligent and honest. Education will not secure the purity of the

the institutions of government. The sole alternative for political society lies between a government founded in the divine right of justice and the divine necessity of order, and a despotism vested in the arbitrary will of one, the prescriptive privilege of the few, or the capricious power of numbers. The enduring strength of democracy as a political society must lie in its affinity with theocracy in its governing principle;—the State stripped of all forms and accidents of religion, must yet be born of religion, as in our thought an ordinance of God, and the Nation made conscious of those awful sanctions of right and justice that girdle the world of human action with the world of invisible powers.

Then, with the family made sacred; the mixed populations fused into one; successive generations held by the electric cord of organic and historical life; enterprise favored and labor reputed worthy; womanhood cherished and honored as the crown of the social state; knowledge and culture made the first estates for dignity of service and prerogative of power; and Justice, dictated by allegiance to God, pervading all political forms, institutions, laws, and ruling the souls of men, we shall build upon this broad continent a nation that shall stand, until

“ the great globe itself
And all which it inherit shall dissolve.”

ballot, unless there be also a pure morality in the hearts of the people. Such morality can be maintained only through a devout recognition of the authority of a holy God. The principle of governing in accordance with absolute justice, is the justifying ground of all government, and would be the perfection of any government. A pure Theocracy would be a *People governing themselves in equity, by virtue of the allegiance of each member of the community to the supreme law of righteousness, the will of God.*

ARTICLE III.—THE RENAISSANCE IN CHINA.

As link after link is added to that chain of communication which brings China nearer to us than Europe was before the rise of steam navigation, it is interesting to know that a mental awakening is taking place among the people of China, by which the Chinese mind will be brought proportionally nearer to our own.

The announcement of this fact will be received with distrust by some who are skeptical as to the doctrine of human progress. It will be questioned by others who deride as visionary the efforts of Christian enterprise. Nor will it be readily admitted by that large class who are wont to regard the Chinese mind as hopelessly incrustated with the prejudices of antiquity.

Never have a great people been more misunderstood. They are denounced as stolid, because we are not in possession of a medium sufficiently transparent to convey our ideas to them, or transmit theirs to us; and stigmatized as barbarians, because we want the breadth to comprehend a civilization different from our own. They are represented as servile imitators, though they have borrowed less than any other people; as destitute of the inventive faculty, though the world is indebted to them for a long catalogue of the most useful discoveries; and as clinging with unquestioning tenacity to a heritage of traditions, though they have passed through many and profound changes in the course of their history.

They have not been stationary, as generally supposed, through the long past of their national life. The national mind has advanced from age to age with a stately march; not indeed always in a direct course, but at each of its great epochs, recording, as we think, a decided gain; like the dawn of an arctic morning, in which the first blush of the eastern sky disappears for many hours, only to be succeeded by a brighter glow, growing brighter yet, after each interval of darkness, as the time of sunrise approaches.

The existence in such a country of such a thing as a national mind is itself an evidence of a susceptibility to change; and, at the same time, a guarantee for the comparative stability of their institutions. It proves that China is not an immense congeries of polypi, each encased in his narrow cell, a workshop and a tomb, and all toiling on without the stimulus of common sympathy or mental reaction. It proves that China is not like Africa, and aboriginal America, or even like British India, an assemblage of tribes with little or no community of feeling. It is a unit, and through all its members there sweeps the mighty tide of a common life.

In the progress of its enormous growth, it has absorbed many a heterogeneous element, which has always been transformed into its own substance by an assimilative power that attests the marvelous energy of the Chinese civilization. It has, too, undergone many modifications, in consequence of influences operating *ab extra* as well as from within; and though the process of transmission has often been slow, those influences have always extended to the whole body. Within the bounds of China proper, there is no such thing as the waves of Buddhism or Taoism being arrested at the confines of a particular province; nor is there any district in which the pulsations from the great heart of the empire do not by virtue of a common language and common feeling meet with a prompt response.

Yet the existence of this oneness and sympathy, this nationality of mind, which brings modifications on a vast scale within the range of possibility, necessarily interposes an obstacle in the way of their speedy consummation. Planted on the deep foundations of antiquity, extending over so wide an area, and proudly conscious of its own greatness, its very inertia is opposed to change. In China, accordingly, great revolutions, whether political, religious, or intellectual, have always been slow of accomplishment. Compared with the facility with which these are brought about in some occidental countries, they resemble the slow revolutions of those huge planets on the outskirts of the solar system, which require more than the period of a human life to make the circuit of

the sun, while the little planet Mercury wheels round the center once in a few months.

The great dynastic changes, involving as they do a period of disintegration, and another of reconstruction, have usually occupied from one to three generations, while the growth of those grand revolutions, which resulted in the ascendancy of a religion or a philosophy, must be reckoned by centuries.

A brief review of some of the more remarkable changes that have occurred in the progress of Chinese civilization, will enable us better to understand the nature of the intellectual movement now going on.

To begin with the development of political ideas. Instead of being wedded to a uniform system of despotic government, the Chinese have lived under as many forms of government as ancient Rome or modern France. While the Romans passed under their kings, consuls, and emperors, the Chinese had their *tees*, their *wangs*, and their *hwangtees*. And as France has passed through the various phases of a fental and centralized monarchy, a republic and a military despotism, so China exhibits an equal variety in the forms of her civil government.

When the hand of history first lifts the curtain, two thousand years before the Christian era, it discloses to us an elective monarchy, in which the voice of the people was admitted to express the will of heaven. Thus Yaou, the model monarch of antiquity, was raised to the throne by the voice of the nobles, in lieu of his elder brother who was set aside on account of his disorderly life. Yaou in turn set aside his own son, and called on the nobles to name a successor, when Shun was chosen. Again, Shun, passing by an unworthy son, transmitted the "yellow" to an able minister, the great Yu.

Yu, though a good sovereign, departed from these illustrious precedents, and incurred the "censure of converting the empire into a family estate." The hereditary principle became fixed. Branches of the imperial family were assigned portions of the empire, and their descendants succeeding to their principalities, the feudal system became confirmed.

This, in China, is the classical form of government, and Confucius himself compares the majesty of the sovereign to the polar star, which keeps its steadfast place while all the

constellations revolve around it. It prevailed under the dynasty of Chow, when the classics were produced; and a large part of the classic writings is occupied with questions relating to the balance of power among the feudal lords, and the regulation of their relations to their sovereign. Transplanted to Japan, it exists till the present day, where a war among the nobles is now exciting the attention of the public. But in China it was overthrown completely two thousand years ago, by one of the most sweeping revolutions on the records of history.

Lecheng, an ambitious noble, sweeping all rival princes from the chess-board, dethroned the last degenerate scions of the house of Chow, and proclaimed himself under the title of the First Whangtee. Finding that the literary class were wedded to feudal institutions, he carried on a relentless persecution against the disciples of Confucius; and fearing that the traces of them contained in the Confucian books might lead the people to restore the obliterated principalities, he proceeded to destroy, as far as possible, every vestige of classic literature. His object was to cut the empire loose from the leading strings of antiquity, and to inaugurate a totally new system in the politics of the empire. He further signalized his reign by the erection of that huge barrier on the north—which, to this day, continues to be a wonder of the world. It is only just to add, that the system of centralized power which he introduced, was as firmly established as the great wall itself. The very title of *Whangtee*, first assumed by Lecheng, continues to be that of the emperors of China at the present day.

Under the dynasty of Han, about the commencement of the Christian era, a still more important modification was introduced into the constitution of the empire—viz. a democratic element, in virtue of which appointments to office were not left to the caprice of the sovereign and his favorites. This consisted in testing the capacity of candidates by a literary examination; and it operated so well that it was not only adopted but greatly improved by succeeding dynasties, and continues in force at the present day. The Americans would as soon surrender their ballot-box, as the Chinese that noble system of examinations, which makes public office the reward

of scholarship, and gives every man an opportunity of elevating himself by his own exertions.

Nor are the Chinese less familiar with the idea of change in the region of religious thought, three systems of religion having appeared on the arena of the empire, and struggled for the ascendancy since the sixth century before the Christian era. Confucianism was persecuted under the dynasty of Ts'in; and Taoism and Buddhism alternately persecuting and persecuted, kept up the conflict for ages, each in turn seating its own disciples on the throne of the empire. The last of these is of foreign origin; and its universal prevalence does much to reconcile the people to the introduction of religious ideas from abroad; while it stands forth as a visible proof of the possibility of converting the Chinese to a foreign creed. A leading statesman of China has recently made use of this as an argument that the emperor should not object to the propagation of Christianity. "From the time of Ts'in and Han," he says, "the doctrines of Confucius began to be obscured, and the religion of Budha spread abroad. Now Buddhism originated in India, but many of the Hindoos have renounced Buddhism and embraced Mohammedanism. The Roman Catholic faith originated in the west, but some nations of the west have adopted Protestantism, and set themselves in opposition to the faith of Rome. Whence we see that other religions rise and fall from age to age, but the doctrine of Confucius survives, unimpaired throughout all ages." The writer is careful to disavow any sympathy for Christianity, and he by no means recommends its adoption; but he wishes to assure His Majesty that there is no serious evil to be apprehended even if Christianity should succeed in supplanting Buddhism, as long as the people adhere to the cardinal doctrines of their ancient sage. It is a great thing for the leading minds to acknowledge the possibility of a change even in this hypothetical form.

Aside from these religious revolutions, and altogether distinct from them, are several periods of intellectual awakening, that constitute marked epochs in the history of literature.

The first of these was occasioned by the publication of the Confucian Classics. Another occurred in the time of Mencius, when the ethical basis of the school underwent a searching re-

vision, the great question of the original goodness or depravity of human nature being discussed with acuteness and power. A third and more powerful awakening took place, when the classic books which Lecheng had burned rose, Phoenix-like, from their ashes, or, to speak more correctly, issued, Minerva-like, from the retentive brain of those venerable scholars, who had committed them to memory in their early boyhood.

This was the age of criticism; the very circumstances which roused the national mind to activity, directing its efforts to the settlement of the text of their ancient records. But it did not stop here. Slips of bamboo, and tablets of wood, the clumsy materials of ancient books, gave place to linen, silk, and paper. The convenience and elegance of the material contributed to multiply books and stimulate literary labor.

The great work which laid the foundation of all the existing histories of the empire was produced in this age; as also a dictionary, the pioneer of Chinese lexicography, since followed by more voluminous works, but so complete and lucid that it is still reckoned among standard authorities.

But the grandest of all the revivals of learning, was, as might be expected, that which ensued on the discovery of the art of printing. In the period above referred to, about A. D. 177, the revised text of the sacred books was engraved on tablets of stone, by imperial order, as a precaution to secure it against the danger of another conflagration. Impressions must have been taken from these, and the art of printing thus practiced to a limited extent at that early date; but it was not till the eighth century that it came into general use for the manufacture of books. At that time the number of old works described in the official record of the imperial library, was 53,915, to which were added 28,468, that were characterized as recent. But it was not so much this vastly augmented rate of production that marked the epoch, as the improved character of its original literature. This was eminently the age of poetry; when Letaipe, and Tufu, and a whole constellation of lesser lights rose above the horizon. The Poems of Tang is still recognized as the text-book of standard poetry.

This period was succeeded by another in the reign of the Sung dynasty (960-1279), when the mind of China exhibited

itself in a new development. It became seized with a mania for philosophical speculation, and grappled with the deepest questions of ontology. Chowtze, Chengtze, and, above all, the famous Chuhe, distinguished themselves by the penetrating subtlety and the daring freedom of their inquiries. Professing to elucidate the ancient philosophy, they in reality founded a new one—a school of pantheistic idealism, which has continued dominant to the present hour. The last two dynasties have not been unfruitful in the products of the intellect; indeed, there seems to be no end or abatement to the teeming fertility of the Chinese mind. Less daringly original than in the preceding period, it has yet, under each of these dynasties, appeared in a new style—the writers of the Ming being distinguished for masculine energy of expression, and those of the Ts'ing for graceful elegance. Each period was introduced by a gigantic work, that of the Mings by the codification of the laws of the empire, the Pandects of Yunglo; and that of the Ts'ings by the compilation of Kanghe's Imperial Dictionary, the "Webster unabridged" of the Chinese language. The writers of the Ts'ing (the present) dynasty, are displaying a little independence if not originality in revolting against the authority of Chuhe as an expositor of their canonical scriptures—a reaction against the pantheism, or rather atheism of the Sung philosophers. Whether this tendency is due in any degree to the influence of Mohammedans and Christians, it is certain that from both sources, especially the latter, the Chinese have received powerful impulses in the way of Mathematics and Astronomy.

Enough has been said to show that the Chinese have not maintained through all the ages that character of cast-iron uniformity so generally ascribed to them. Worshipers of antiquity, they certainly are, and strongly conservative in their mental tendencies; but they have not been content, as is too commonly supposed, to hand down from the earliest times a small stock of crystallized ideas without increase or modification. The germs of their civilization, like those of any civilization worth preserving, are not precious stones to be kept in a casket, but seeds to be cultivated and improved. In fact, modifications have taken place on an extensive scale, foreign

elements have from time to time been engrafted on the native root, and the native scholar, as he follows back the pathway of history, fails to discover anything like uniformity or constancy, except in a few of the most fundamental principles. The doctrine of filial piety, carried to the point of religious devotion, extends like a golden thread through all the ages, as the foundation of family ties and social order; while the principle of the divine origin of government, administered by one man as the representative of heaven, and modified by the corresponding doctrine that the will of heaven is expressed in the will of the people, is found alike in every period, as the basis of their civil institutions.

Though not so much given to change as their more mercu-
rial antipodes, it is still true that the constant factors of their civilization have been few, and the variable ones many. Bold innovations and radical revolutions rise to view all along in the retrospect of their far reaching past, and prepare them to anticipate the same for the future. With such antecedents, and such a character for intellectual activity, it would be next to impossible that they should not be profoundly affected by their contacts and collisions with the civilization of Christendom.

In point of fact, the impression has been profound, though it was not immediately apparent. For more than thirty years the West has been acting on China, by the combined influence of its arms, its commerce, its religion, and its science. Some of these influences commenced to operate at a much earlier date, and their effects were by no means insignificant; but of late years, all of them have been combined with an oxyhydrogen blow-pipe intensity, that one would think sufficient to melt a mountain of adamant. They could not, in the nature of things, have been brought to bear on China so effectively at any earlier period, on account of her geographical isolation.

In some respects a great advantage, this was in others a serious drawback. Almost separated from the whole world, as the Romans said of Britain, she had a magnificent arena in which to grow undisturbed, and develop her peculiar culture. The mountains of Thibet rose like a giant breakwater between her, and that tide wave of western conquest, which swept away

the coeval empires of Babylon and Persia ; while an ocean not yet plowed by the keels of civilized commerce marked her eastern shore, and a vast expanse of inhospitable plains stretched away to the North. She grew up of consequence without a rival, a giant surrounded by pigmies, a pyramid in the midst of mole hills. The weak nationalities and wandering tribes by whom she was surrounded, rendered her a willing homage, more impressed by the spectacle of her greatness, than from any dread of her military power. And China, on her part, was accustomed to treat them with condescending patronage or disdainful contempt. Thus, when she first became aware of the existence of the great nations of the West, she judged of them by the tribes on her own frontiers ; and when they approached her by embassies, she employed towards them the forms and language she had been accustomed to use in dealing with her semi-barbarous neighbors. She assumed a tone of superiority, pronounced them barbarous, and demanded tribute.

For a long time they were too remote to cause her great uneasiness, or to do anything that could materially alter this state of feeling. She saw, it is true, the Russians extending their frontiers from the Ural to Kamtschatka, and England pushing her conquests to the banks of the Irrawady. But the fate of scattered nomads and decayed nationalities was no warning to her. Even when those great powers approached her in hostile array, she was still confident of her ability to resist them. Hence the arrogant tone which she assumed in intercourse with them, and until very recently continued to maintain.

It was this arrogance that precipitated the Opium war of 1838 ; and the result did so little to overcome it, that in 1856 a display of equal or greater arrogance brought on another war. For more than three years the Chinese government persisted in applying their old policy to the Anglorench invaders, still hoping to terminate the conflict by their expulsion rather than by conceding the points in dispute. When, however, their last army had been beaten, their emperor had fled, and his palace lay in ruins, the Chinese awoke to the reality of their situation. They opened the gates of their capital, and from that day to this, no serious thought of trying the issue of

another such conflict has crossed the mind of any of their statesmen.

This lesson was decisive—an experience of inestimable value; without which all the attempts of Western nations to benefit the Chinese must have proved like attempting to irrigate the side of a mountain by projecting water from its base.

The effect was immediate. The Chinese were, for the first time, convinced that they had something to learn; and within less than a year from the close of hostilities, large bodies of Chinese troops might have been seen learning foreign tactics under foreign drill-masters, on the very battle grounds where they had been defeated. Arsenals, well supplied with machinery from foreign countries, were put in operation at four important points; one of them employing as many as nine hundred workmen; and navy yards were established at two of the principal sea-ports, where the construction of steam gun-boats, entirely by native mechanics, is now going forward.

But does not all this wear rather an aspect of hostility? Does it not indicate that the Chinese, worsted in the late contest, are preparing for another?

The necessity, we answer, of providing themselves with more efficient means for suppressing their own rebellions, is sufficient to account for it. But, after all, the motive is of little consequence—the important fact is, that the Chinese are learning. With them the day of bows, and arrows, bamboo spears, and lumbering war-junks has passed away, and they intend henceforth to make war like other nations in a Christian style. They mean to be able to keep the peace within their own borders, and to maintain their self-respect in the face of the world.

But they do not stop here—if they did, there might be ground for suspicion. But they are a pacific people, both from disposition and tradition, using war neither as a pastime nor a business, but resorting to it solely as a matter of necessity. As such they are now learning it, and applying themselves at the same time to the cultivation of the arts of peace.

At three of the open ports they have established schools for the study of the languages and sciences of the West; and, in connection with the arsenal at Shanghai, the Mandarins have

employed three gentlemen skilled in the Chinese language to translate works on science and the useful arts.

These institutions, it might be said, are established at important outposts, under the auspices of provincial viceroys, but they are hardly sufficient to justify the conclusion that the central government is adopting an enlightened and liberal policy. But has not the Imperial government at length afforded this evidence, by the university which it has established in the capital for the introduction of Western science; and the embassy it has sent forth to cultivate friendly relations with the nations of the West?

The embassy, and especially the treaties it is now negotiating, are sufficient evidence of liberality in the policy of the government; but the University in which graduates in the schools of Confucius are invited to become pupils, is the most undeniable proof of a great intellectual movement. It was established at the instance of Prince Kung, uncle to the Emperor, and the most influential man in the empire.

Two memorials of the Prince, one containing the proposal, and the other explaining and vindicating it, were laid before His Majesty and published in the official Gazette, after receiving the Imperial sanction, constituting them a charter for the new institution. The second of these papers we translate from the pages of the Gazette, and here insert, as affording a photograph of the attitude of the Chinese mind in relation to these subjects. Four of the ministers who joined the Prince in presenting it, are heads of departments in the government.

Memorial of Prince Kung on the establishment of a College for the Cultivation of Western Science:

Your Majesty's servant and other ministers of the Council for Foreign Affairs, on their knees present this memorial in regard to regulations for teaching Astronomy and Mathematics, and the selection of students.

These sciences being indispensable to the understanding of machinery, and the manufacture of firearms, we have resolved on erecting for this purpose a special department in the Tung-wen College, to which scholars of a high grade may be admit-

ted, and in which men from the West shall be invited to give instruction.

The scheme having met with your Majesty's gracious approval, we beg to state that it did not originate in a fondness for novelties or in admiration for the abstract subtleties of Western science; but solely from the consideration that the mechanical arts of the West all have their source in the science of Mathematics. Now, if the Chinese government desires to introduce the building of steamers, and construction of machinery, and yet declines to borrow instruction from the men of the West, there is danger lest following our own ideas, we should squander funds to no purpose.

We have weighed the matter maturely before laying it before the Throne. But among persons who are unacquainted with the subject, there are some who will regard this matter as unimportant; some who will censure us as wrong in abandoning the methods of China for those of the West; and some who will even denounce the proposal that Chinese should submit to be instructed by the people of the West, as shameful in the extreme. Those who urge such objections are ignorant of the demands of the times.

In the first place, it is high time that some plan should be devised for infusing new elements of strength into the government of China. Those who understand the times, are of opinion that the only way for effecting this, is to introduce the learning and mechanical arts of Western nations. Provincial governors, such as *Tsotsungtang* and *Lehungchang*, are firm in this conviction, and constantly presenting it in their addresses to the Throne. The last mentioned officer last year opened an arsenal for the manufacture of arms, and invited men and officers from the metropolitan garrison to go there for instruction; while the others established in Fuchau a school for the study of foreign languages and arts, with a view to the instruction of young men in ship-building and the manufacture of engines. The urgency of such studies is therefore an opinion, which is not confined to us, your servants.

Should it be said that the purchase of firearms and steamers has been tried, and found to be both cheap and convenient, so that we may spare ourselves the trouble and expense of

home production, we reply, that it is not merely the manufacture of arms, and the construction of ships, that China needs to learn. But in respect to these two objects, which is the wiser course in view of the future, to content ourselves with purchase, and leave the source of supply in the hands of others, or to render ourselves independent by making ourselves masters of their arts, it is hardly necessary to inquire.

As to the imputation of abandoning the methods of China, is it not altogether a fictitious charge? For, on inquiry, it will be found that western science had its root in the astronomy of China, which western scholars confess themselves to have derived from eastern lands. They have minds adapted to reasoning and abstruse study, so that they were able to deduce from it new arts which shed a lustre on those nations, but, in reality, the original belonged to China, and Europeans learned them from us. If, therefore, we apply ourselves to those studies, our future progress will be built on our own foundation. Having the root in our possession, we shall not need to look to others for assistance, an advantage which it is impossible to overestimate.

As to the value to be set on the science of the West, your illustrious ancestor, *Kanghe*, gave it his hearty approbation, promoting its teachers to offices of conspicuous dignity, and employing them to prepare the imperial calendar; thus setting an example of liberality equaled only by the vastness of his all-comprehending wisdom. Our dynasty ought not to forget its own precedent, especially in relation to a matter which occupied the first place among the studies of the ancients.

In olden times, yeomen and common soldiers were all acquainted with Astronomy; but in later ages an interdict was put upon it, and those who cultivated this branch of science became few. In the reign of *Kanghe*, the prohibition was removed and astronomical science once more began to flourish. Mathematics were studied together with the classics, the evidence of which we find in the published works of several schools. A proverb says, "a thing unknown is a scholar's shame." Now, when a man of letters, on stepping from his door, raises his eyes to the stars, and is unable to tell what they are, is not this enough to make him blush? Even if no

schools were established, the educated ought to apply themselves to such studies, how much more so when a goal is proposed for them to aim at?

As to the allegation that it is a shame to learn from the people of the West, this is the absurdest charge of all. For, under the whole heaven, the deepest disgrace is that of being content to lag in the rear of others. For some tens of years the nations of the West have applied themselves to the study of steam navigation, each imitating the others, and daily producing some new improvement. Recently, too, the government of Japan has sent men to England for the purpose of acquiring the language and science of Great Britain. This was with a view to the building of steamers, and it will not be many years before they succeed.

Of the jealous rivalry among the nations of the Western Ocean, it is unnecessary to speak; but when so small a country as Japan is putting forth all its energies, if China alone continues to tread indolently in the beaten track, without a single effort in the way of improvement, what can be more disgraceful than this? Now, not merely not to be ashamed of our inferiority, but when a measure is proposed by which we may equal or even surpass our neighbors, to object the shame of learning from them, and forever refusing to learn, to be content with our inferiority—is not such meanness of spirit itself an indelible reproach?

If it be said that machinery belongs to artisans, and that scholars should not condescend to such employments, in answer to this, we have a word to say. Why is it that the book in the *Chou*, on the structure of chariots, has for some thousands of years been a recognized text-book in all the schools? Is it not because, while mechanics do the work, scholars ought to understand the principles? When principles are understood, their application will be extended. The object which we propose for study to day, is the principles of things. To invite educated men to enlarge the sphere of their knowledge, by investigating the laws of nature, is a very different thing from compelling them to take hold of the tools of the working man. What other point of doubt is left for us to clear up?

In conclusion we would say, that the object of study is utility, and its value must be judged by its adaptation to the wants of the times. Outsiders may vent their doubts and criticisms, but the measure is one that calls for decisive action. Your servants have considered it maturely. As the enterprise is a new one, its principles ought to be carefully examined. To stimulate candidates to enter in earnest on the proposed curriculum, they ought to have a liberal allowance from the public treasury to defray their current expenses, and have the door of promotion set wide open before them. We have accordingly agreed on six regulations, which we herewith submit to the eye of your Majesty, and wait reverently for the Imperial sanction.

We are of opinion that the members of the Hanlin Institute, being men of superior attainments, while their duties are not onerous, if they were appointed to study astronomy and mathematics, they would find those sciences an easy acquisition. With regard to scholars of the second and third grades, as also mandarins of the lower ranks, we request your Majesty to open the portals, and admit them to be examined as candidates, that we may have a larger number from whom to select men of ability for the public service.

Laying this memorial before the throne, we beseech the Empresses regent and the Emperor to cast on it their sacred glance, and to give us their instructions.

The Imperial placet is added with the "vermilion pencil." It says, "Let the measures proposed in the memorial be adopted. Respect this."

This remarkable document shows us the humiliation felt by the Chinese mind, to find itself, on awaking, in the rear of the age; and exhibits in an amusing light the sophistical artifices resorted to by the friends of progress, to avert the odium which their proposed movement was certain to excite. It shows us the two parties in conflict, and acquaints us with the positions occupied by each. The conservatives take their stand within the old intrenchments of pride and prejudice,

while their assailants are attempting to dislodge them by the force of arguments drawn from necessity.

The latter is the party in power; and this paper, designed at once to vindicate the action of the general government, and to refute the narrow views of those who would adhere to the policy of its predecessors, goes forth to the people of the empire, under the seal of their sovereign, and endorsed by governors and viceroys.

The minds that are thus enlightened are few; but they are the most eminent in the State; and when we see the rays of morning glancing on the highest peaks of a mountain range, we may be sure that it will not be long before the light reaches those of lesser elevation, or penetrates to the valleys that lie between them. Under a government constituted like that of China, an immense advantage lies on the side of those in power. Whatever cause they advocate is sure to be respected by the people; and in this case, convinced that ignorance is the bane of their people, they are in earnest in endeavoring to apply the remedy.

Nor are these enlightened views confined to the heads of the government. A growing avidity for books of science is perceptible among the literary classes; some of whom contribute liberally for the publication of scientific works, and feel repaid by the honor of having their names associated with the advancement of learning.

To meet this growing taste for real knowledge, the viceroy of Kiangnan is now bringing out a series of works on scientific subjects, mostly by European authors, employing at a high salary, in the capacity of editor, a learned native, who was instructed by English missionaries. One of the works last published is Ricci's translation of Euclid, enlarged by A. Wylio, Esq., late of the London mission. It contains a preface by the last named gentleman, in which he replies to the common charge that missionaries take advantage of mathematics to propagate Christianity, by admitting the fact, and setting forth the transcendent value of religious truth. This preface is reprinted entire without the alteration of a word; nor does the viceroy, in the introduction from his own pen, bring forward anything to counteract its influence.

The views of the more advanced members of this scholarly class, are well set forth in an essay lately published in a Chinese newspaper by Changluseng, a gentleman of wealth and titular rank, who has lately published two small volumes, one on engineering and the other on chemistry.

As a testimony to the scientific labors of missionaries, as well as an index of intellectual progress, it is of sufficient value to justify us in translating a few paragraphs. He is discussing a question much mooted among the Chinese, that of the advantages and disadvantages of foreign intercourse.

"Commencing," he says, "with the last years of the Ming dynasty, we opened the seaports of Kwangtung to foreign trade, doing a profitable business in tea and silks, receiving in return fabrics of woolen and cotton suited to our wants; as well as clocks, matches, mirrors, and other articles of luxury. But opium came in at the same time, and its poisonous streams have penetrated to the core of the flowery land. The blame of this partly rests on us, but when we go to the root of the evil, it is impossible to exculpate the English from the guilt of originating the traffic."

"Foreigners, with their ships and steamers, have, moreover, monopolized the carrying trade of the seacoast and the great rivers; throwing thousands of seafaring natives out of employ, and causing great distress."

To the advantage derived from the purchase of foreign arms, from their assistance in suppressing the late rebellion, and, above all, from the protection which they extended over the open ports, he does ample justice. Yet in striking a balance sheet, he still concludes that the "advantages derived from foreign commerce are not sufficient to make amends for the evils to which it has given rise. But the benefits which we derive from the teachings of missionaries are more than we can enumerate."

He then recapitulates the publications of missionaries on scientific subjects, commencing with those of the Jesuit fathers of two centuries ago, and coming down to those of the Protestants of the present day; and closes the catalogue with the remark, "all these are the works of missionaries—they are well adapted to augment the knowledge, and quicken the in-

telle of China. Their influence on our future will be unbounded."

But he does not stop with the scientific teachings of missionaries. "China," he says, "is much given to idolatry, which is to us a source of wasteful and foolish practices. Now, Christianity teaches men to renounce the worship of idols, in conformity with the maxim of Confucius, 'that he who sins against Heaven will pray in vain to any other.' Should we attend to these instructions, our women would cease to frequent the temples, and we should waste no more money on idolatrous processions. Monasteries would be converted into private residences, and their yellow-capped occupants would not be seen fleecing the people by their deception. Their sorceries and charms would be laughed at, and this would indeed be a great gain."

The author of these paragraphs has very little sympathy with the spiritual elements of our holy faith, but like many of his countrymen he views it with favor, as a powerful agency, coöperating with the diffusion of science, to emancipate his country from the bondage of superstition.

Such views as these, it is hardly necessary to say, have not yet become the staple of public opinion. The opposition outnumbered the administration, and pamphlets against Christianity and science are more numerous than those in their favor. Still enough, we think, has been said to show that the tide is turning. Chinese statesmen, of both schools, recognize the incipient change. Some exert all their influence to check its progress; while others, who describe their illiberal opponents as *tso tsing kwan tien*, 'looking at the sky from the bottom of a well,' are doing all in their power to help it forward.

There is a word of frequent occurrence in the state papers of the day, which must prove a talisman of might to the progressive party. This is *chungking*, a term allied in signification to that which we have placed at the head of this Article. It relates specifically to dynastic renovations, such as that which occurred in the dynasty of Han, when that illustrious house, reviving after a period of decay, entered afresh on a career of glory. In the present case, the Manchu family, which has

given to the empire some of its most distinguished sovereigns, was reduced to the verge of extinction by the combined influence of foreign wars and domestic rebellion. The late Emperor, Hienfung, having fled to Tartary, and died of chagrin and despair, the victorious Allies strove with laudable moderation to heal the wounds, so nearly fatal, which they had themselves inflicted; and when his infant son, Tungche, succeeded to the throne, they afforded him both moral support and military aid.

With peace abroad, and no longer any powerful enemy at home, the statesmen of China believe (and they have good grounds for the opinion) that their young Emperor comes to power at a most auspicious epoch. Favored with the friendship of powerful nations, and with sources of power unknown to antiquity placed within his reach, it is possible, as they think, and even probable, that his reign, by the splendor of its intellectual progress, may eclipse the military glory of his most illustrious ancestors. They desire to make the present reign the commencement of a new career, and are constantly exhorting one another to coöperate in the work of renovation. This is what they mean by *chunghing*, and when they seek to effect it by the intellectual regeneration of their people, it acquires the full dignity of a national renaissance.

But is it within the bounds of possibility that such a renaissance should be achieved without the whole empire first passing through a period of disintegration? Is it possible that this ancient people, hoary with years, and bowed beneath a load of traditions, should descend into the fountain of youth and emerge with all the freshness of manhood's prime, without undergoing the painful process of dismemberment and reconstruction? Or must they be cut in piecemeal, and thrown into the seething caldron before they can come forth a renovated people?

This is the great problem of the day, the question of "to be or not to be" in the politics of China. But however it may be solved, as it relates to the government, the Chinese people must and will be renovated. Foreign diplomatists and statesmen feel that a mighty change must pass over the people, sweeping away their old superstitions, unchaining them from

the oars of custom, and setting their minds free to labor in productive fields, before they can be qualified to develop the resources of their magnificent patrimony. The most intelligent of them believe that such a change, though gradual in its approach, is certain to take place. Such men as H. B. M. Minister in Peking, whose experience in China dates back a quarter of a century,—such men as the chief of the Chinese Embassy, whose experience extends over seven years; and such men as the Inspector General of Imperial Customs, who has resided in China twice that length of time,—all have faith in the future of China, and favor well devised schemes for the improvement of the Chinese people.

We have adverted to the encouragement which the advocates of progress among the Chinese derive from a prevailing impression that the present is a time favorable for *chungching* or renovation. In addition to this, they have a powerful support in a saying of their sage, expressed in the first sentence of the *Tahio* or great study, that “it is the prime duty of the sovereign to seek the renovation of his people.”

To the renovation of the Chinese people, the most formidable obstacle is the use of opium, a vice of recent growth, for the prevalence of which they have to thank the unscrupulous cupidity of Christian nations. It undermines the physical system, impairs the mental faculties, and smites the moral nature with a kind of paralysis. It impoverishes the individual and the public, and hangs as a dead weight on the prosperity of the State. A little cloud at the commencement of the present century, it has expanded with alarming rapidity, until it casts heavy shadows over the prospect of the future, and on the hearts of the well wishers of China. It threatens to sap the vigor of the Chinese race, a race that has seen the Egyptians and Assyrians laid in their graves, and continued till our own day with unimpaired vitality, sending forth fresh swarms from the old hive, to colonize the steppes of Tartary, and the Islands of the Sea, and to compete with European emigration on our own Pacific coast.

But happily an antidote is in the field. The Chinese have not attempted like the Japanese to weave their code of international intercourse into a net-work which shall admit civili-

zation and exclude Christianity. On the contrary, the government has pledged itself in all their recent treaties to protect the propagators and professors of the Christian religion. Already is Christianity in some localities getting a hold on the popular mind; and though it encounters violent opposition, culminating now and then in a furious outbreak, the imperial power may at any time be invoked for its defense by the representative of a "Treaty power." It is working its way up through the lower strata of society, preparing its triumph from afar, proving itself a moral antiseptic to counteract the growth of corruption; or rather a new principle of life, which will not merely conserve but renovate the Chinese race. To this grand result, the intellectual movement, which it is the special object of this Article to indicate, will prove itself a powerful auxiliary, like the revival of letters in modern Europe, preparing the way for a work of spiritual reform.

Can this renovation, we again ask, be effected under the sceptre of the reigning house? Without venturing a categorical answer, we only say that many propitious circumstances appear to concur in a remarkable manner.

The present is a minority reign; and the influential men who surround the throne, are leaders in this movement to "infuse new elements of strength into the government of China." The Emperor, a lad of thirteen years, may imbibe their spirit, and shape his policy on theirs; and in a few years, when he takes the reins of power into his own hands, he will receive in person, as by treaty bound, the ambassadors of foreign powers. He will thus have an opportunity for acquiring new ideas, such as his fathers never enjoyed.

The government, though rudely shaken and much exhausted, gives unmistakable signs of convalescence. With its growing superiority in discipline and arms, it can smile at the menaces of border tribes, and hold in check the seeds of domestic revolution. China's greatest danger is from the great Powers of the West.

Russia covets her sunny plains and fine harbors, and France would not be averse to accepting China as an offset to British India. But England is too jealous of her great rivals to consent to any encroachment of this nature by either

them. The doctrine of the balance of power, formerly limited in its application to the map of Europe, is now transferred to Eastern Asia; and it is under the shield of this principle alone, that either China or Japan can hope to maintain her independence.

It is possible, however, that powers that hold each other in check from no better motives than mutual jealousy, might at any moment reconcile their differences by agreeing to a Polandlike partition. And here the friendship of the United States becomes of unspeakable value, for incapacitated alike by situation and policy from making encroachments on the territories of China, we are directly interested in preserving the integrity of the Chinese empire. Indeed, so vital is it that we should have for our trans-pacific neighbor a great and independent nation, that we certainly should not fail to give them the benefit of our moral support. We might, indeed, carry it as far as we did on behalf of Mexico; or, in case of necessity, push it to the extent of giving material aid.

In any case it is not much that China would have to ask of us—her own forces, with American officers to lead them, and a few American companies to set them an example, being amply sufficient to repel any European invasion.

It is a grand position for the United States thus to be a key-stone among the great nations of the earth; which, instead of crushing China, combine to extend over her the arch of their power, and to protect her in the career of improvement, on which she has so happily entered.

ARTICLE IV.—THE AMERICAN COLLEGES AND THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC.

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**Inaugural Address of James McCosh, D. D., LL. D., as President of the College of New Jersey, Princeton, Oct. 27, 1868.* New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1868.

The American Colleges have of late been somewhat formally challenged by what is called *the American Public*, to appear before its tribunal, and to give a satisfactory explanation and defense of their system of discipline and study, on penalty of being either nonsuited or condemned. The challenge has been repeated too often, and from too many quarters, to be wholly neglected, however confident the friends and defenders of the college system may be of the goodness of their cause.

It should be remembered, however, that the present is not the only time when this system has been seriously called in question, or when important changes have been proposed in order to bring it into nearer conformity with the so-called spirit of the times, the alleged wants of educated men themselves, and the demands of what is termed public opinion.

In August, 1826, a detailed report was presented to the Board of Trustees of Amherst College proposing very important modifications of its course of study. This provided, among other features, for the addition to the "present classical and scientific four years' course" of "a new course, equally thorough and elevated with this, but distinguished from it by a more modern and national aspect, and by a better adaptation to the taste and future pursuits of a large class of young men, who aspire to the advantages of a liberal education." It also provided for "a department devoted to the science and art of teaching; but more especially, at first, to the education of schoolmasters," and also for "a department of theoretical and practical mechanics." The new department which was to be equally thorough and elevated with the old was to be distinguished by the following features, viz., the greater prominence given to English literature; the substitution of French and Spanish, and eventually of German and Italian, for Greek and

Latin; the study of Practical Mechanics; greater attention to Chemistry, Natural History, to "Modern History, especially the History of the Puritans," to "Civil and Political law, embracing the careful study of American Constitutions." To these might be added "Drawing and Civil Engineering." Ancient History, Geography, Grammar, Rhetoric and Oratory, Mathematics, Natural, Intellectual, and Moral Philosophy, Anatomy, Political Economy, and Theology, were retained in both courses. In conformity with this plan, the studies for this parallel course were assigned to the several terms of the four years' course, text-books were selected, and it was confidently expected that many who aspired to the degree of B. A. would prefer the studies which were so much better suited to modern ideas. The reasons for substituting the modern languages for the ancient, and for giving a wider range in other respects to the studies pursued, were urged with great earnestness by the authors of the plan, and they are very nearly like those which we find in the many publications which have been issued within the last few years advocating a reform of the college system. The views expressed in the Report presented to the Trustees of Amherst College in 1826, and those in the Report of the Committee on Organization presented to the Trustees of the Cornell University in 1866, are strikingly alike. Both assert, in the strongest language, that dissatisfaction prevails extensively with the college system as then and now conducted. Both insist, with assured positiveness, that more valuable results can be attained by providing parallel and special courses of study. The principal differences are, that the Cornell report in its second general course substitutes German for Greek, and in its third, French and German for Latin and Greek, and that it also provides most liberally, and in a very sanguine and hopeful spirit, for optional and special courses, and for a large corps of special and non resident lecturers. The scheme proposed at Amherst never went any further than to be printed in one or two annual catalogues, with the names of a few special students. No person, so far as we are informed, ever received the Bachelor's degree on the modern course of study.

In 1827 Hon. Noyes Darling, a member of the Corporation

of Yale College, introduced a resolution that a committee be appointed "to inquire into the expediency of so altering the regular course of instruction in this college, as to leave out of said course the study of the *dead languages*, substituting other studies therefor, and either requiring a competent knowledge of said languages, as a condition of admittance into the college, or providing instruction in the same for such as shall choose to study them after admittance, and that the said committee be requested to report at the next annual meeting of this corporation." In 1828 the committee made their report, and included "in it two elaborate papers written by President Day and Professor Kingsley," one containing a summary view of the plan of education in the college; the other "an inquiry into the expediency of insisting on the study of the ancient languages."

We need not refer to the changes proposed by President Wayland, in Brown University, and to the reasons by which he enforced their adoption. The scheme which he so carefully elaborated and set in motion, for some reason or other, was soon abandoned. Some very important changes were also proposed and introduced into the university of Vermont, at the instance, and under the sanction of its very scholarly Presidents. The last, however, were not all in the line of modern theories. We have referred to these facts to remind some of our readers that the views which are now so confidently urged are not entirely novel, and that some of them have already been in a certain sense subjected to the test of an actual or at least a proposed experiment.

The distrust of our colleges and of their system of education which is now so freely expressed, has been greatly stimulated, and is likely to be still more effectively reinforced by the zealous and passionate assaults that have of late been made upon the great schools and universities of England. These critical assaults have appeared in almost every possible form, from the ponderous blue-books, that embody the reports of Parliamentary commissioners, down to the spiteful and capricious attacks of titled and untitled demagogues; from the elaborate volume of essays, written by experienced teachers and accomplished Fellows of the colleges at Oxford and Cambridge, down to the

ill-natured and ignorant thrusts of half-educated and conceited sciolists and scientists. It is scarce matter of wonder, in one point of view, that some ill informed persons should imagine that the studies and discipline of the American colleges are the same with those of the English schools and universities, and should draw effective arguments from the imagined uprising of the English people against scholastic traditions, to the propriety and necessity of our doing the same with what are supposed to be similar burdens. It is, however, a matter of wonder that *some* who use such arguments should fail either to see or to confess that the points of difference are so great between the two as to forbid rather than warrant the inferences which are derived from them, or that any one should adopt the motto which Mr. Atkinson has prefixed to his very clever essay—more ingenious than ingenuous as it seems to us—*mutato nomine de te fabula narratur*.

It seems to us that it is only fair for the American assailants of the American colleges to remember that it is but a very small number of the most violent of the English reformers who contend for, or would even suffer any serious diminution from the prominence given to the classics in a course of public education. The Hon. Robert Lowe did, indeed, not think it unworthy of his character to use his fine classical learning and reputation in contemptuously depreciating the study of the ancient languages and the ancient writers, in comparison with the study of the modern tongues and literature. But his was a capricious escapade of a rather uncertain leader, and it should weigh but little when set off against the deliberate utterances of that steady-going wheel-horse among the reformers, John Stuart Mill, himself not a university man, in his inaugural address at the university of St. Andrews. In that address Mr. Mill says: "The only languages, then, and the only literature, to which I would allow a place in the ordinary curriculum, are those of the Greeks and Romans; and to these I would preserve the position in it which they at present occupy. That position is justified by the great value in education, of knowing well some other cultivated language and literature than one's own, and by the peculiar value of those particular languages and literature." p. 22. That Mr. Mill is, withal, as earnest for

reform in all the other particulars which his associates insist upon is evident from another passage which sums up many pages of illustration and argument. "I will say confidently that if the two classical languages were properly taught, there would be no need whatever for ejecting them from the school course, in order to have sufficient time for everything else that need be included therein." p. 16.

Mr. Farrar also, the editor of the very significant and able volume of essays to which we may refer hereafter, says in his lecture before the Royal Institution: "I must avow my distinct conviction that our present system of exclusively classical education as a whole, and carried out as we do carry it out, is a *deplorable failure*." Lecture, etc., p. 18. "That Greek and Latin—taught in a shorter period, and in a more comprehensive manner—should remain as the solid basis of a liberal education, we are all (or nearly all) agreed: none can hold such an opinion more strongly than myself; but why can it not be frankly recognized that an education *confined* to Greek and Latin is a failure, because it is an anachronism?" *Ibid.*, p. 24. These passages must be accepted as decisive by those among us who are willing to learn from their own declarations, what are the real sentiments and aims of the reformers of school and university education in England. It ought not to be necessary to cite them, however, in order to enable many among us to judge for themselves what are the methods and what the studies of these schools. Any well informed man ought to know that they are materially different from the studies and methods which prevail among ourselves. We do not say that our own methods are perfect, or that we have not inherited and retained some of the errors and defects which are so excessive in the English schools; but we do insist that the American colleges should not be confounded with the English public schools or universities, in respect to their defects, as they certainly would not claim to possess all the excellencies which these institutions may fairly assert for themselves.

That there may be no question or mistake in respect to this matter, we will briefly touch upon those features in the English institutions which have been subjected to special criticism in the polemic against them which is now so actively prose-

cuted in the mother country. The first of these is the excessive attention,—in some cases the almost exclusive attention,—which is given to the study of the classics. In connection with this, the methods of learning and of teaching, especially the enforcement of composition, eminently of the composition of Latin verses, have been very earnestly assailed, and somewhat feebly defended. The comparatively little attention given to Natural History and Physics, as well as to the Mathematical, Historical, Moral, and Political Sciences, in the great schools generally, and in the University of Oxford in particular, as well as the preponderance of Physics and the Mathematics at Cambridge, have also been abundantly discussed. The meager requirements for the “pass” examinations in both universities, and the frightful excess to which the coaching and cramming processes are carried in preparing candidates for these examinations, with the decay of the normal efficiency of the tutorial office, and the consequent idleness of seventy per cent.—as it is said—of the residents and graduates of the universities, have been thoroughly discussed and fully exposed. As incidental to these, the excessive development of a taste for gymnastic sports on the one hand, and the systematic indulgence in foolish extravagance or vicious dissipation on the other, have been the subjects of severe comments.

The general neglect of the speculative sciences and of the investigation of principles in their application to all branches of knowledge is also noticed by some very sagacious critics as a defect in the studies of those who read for honors. It is urged with great force that admirable as is the diligence of those who read earnestly, and excellent in some respects as are the results of their reading, yet the absence of a truly philosophical or rhythmical culture is seen in the excessively *sophisticated*—in the sense of the ancient Greeks—character of the culture that is attained, as well as in the very extensive prevalence of one-sided tendencies in the two extremes of ultra anglicanism on the one hand, and of positivism on the other. The compulsory residence of all the undergraduates, the pedantic strictness in the forms and the notorious laxness of the administration of the college system, with the almost entire disuse of the professorial function, and of university freedom, are

topics of almost universal complaint. The remedies earnestly recommended, are the abandonment of the college system, wholly or in part, the allowance of free attendance upon the university lectures to lodgers in the town, and of the freest competition for the valuable honors and emoluments which the universities have in their gift. All the reformers advocate the increase of the number of university chairs, and the immense enlargement of the course of instruction in respect to the subjects treated and the range of investigation. A few insist on the abolition of all religious and ecclesiastical tests, and on a reorganization of the whole system of prizes, honors, and emoluments.

It is obvious that while the discussion of school and university reforms in England must involve a great variety of principles and topics which are of direct application to the changes proposed or effected in the American colleges, it is nevertheless true that the American colleges have in some most important respects either escaped or outgrown not a few of the most important evils under which the English institutions continue to labor. The American colleges give great, perhaps excessive, attention to the physical and practical sciences. They give instruction by lectures as well as by tutors. Their examinations are frequent and severe. They do not neglect the study of the principles of metaphysical, moral, and political science. Their supervision of the manners and morals of the students, and their care for their religious culture, are thought by many to be over strict and excessive.

We return to our subject, "the American Colleges and the American Public;" or, to reverse the phrase, as politeness requires, "the American Public and the American Colleges." The phrase as changed reminds us that it is our first duty to pay our respects to the tribunal before which the colleges are summoned to appear. This tribunal it may be proper for us briefly to characterize without either questioning its jurisdiction or being guilty of "contempt of court."

The tribunal, in the present instance, is both assailant and judge; uniting generally the functions of the two in the person of the same speakers and writers. The tribunal consists, first of all, of a limited class of lecturers and writers known as *educational reformers*, whose stock in trade consists of a scanty

outfit of a few facts imperfectly conceived and incorrectly recited, in respect to the modes of education pursued in the middle ages. It is the profession or trade of these men to assail the colleges of this country as medieval, cloistered, scholastic, monkish. The study of the classics is denounced by the cheap epithets of antiquated, useless, and unpractical. The study of the mathematics,—which these ignoramuses fail to see is itself the most unpractical of all, and which it is lucky that they do not know that Plato commended in such exalted language as tending to withdraw the mind from sense and utility,—is commended as practical by way of contrast, because some mysterious connection is supposed to exist between it and the power to build bridges, to construct railways, and to drive mining shafts. The sciences of nature, as they are called, *i. e.*, the sciences of matter, are regarded as the only sciences which are either real or useful. Physiology from the material standpoint is the only philosophy or psychology that is considered worthy the name. Of literature they have only indefinite or low conceptions as a subject of interest or critical study. A traveling lecturer is, in the view of these men, the model of a university professor. Superficial and second-hand knowledge, exaggerated declamation, paradoxical antithesis, and sensational extravagance are the desired characteristics of university instruction. There are but few of these downright quacks, it is true, but of better and wiser men there are many more than a few, who borrow some of the principles and methods which characterize these charlatans. Some of these are men of whom we had a right to expect better things.

Another portion of the public who are so ready to prejudge the colleges and their system disadvantageously is drawn from that very numerous and most respectable class of self-made men who have risen to eminence without a collegiate education. Many of them take the first rank in our political, commercial, and social life, and their success is a perpetual testimony to the truth, that neither a college degree nor a college education do of necessity secure eminence, and that both united must be followed by that practical training of actual life and contact with men, to which the school and the college are only the introduction. A very large class of these

self-educated men are painfully sensitive of the disadvantages under which they suffer from lack of early scholastic training. Many of them have labored assiduously and with eminent success to correct these disadvantages by careful private studies in the languages, mathematics, and philosophy. As a class they are the most generous supporters of the higher learning and of literary institutions as admirably adapted to prepare for professional and business life.

Others of them indulge a jealous contempt of all disciplinary training whatever, and find in their own success a satisfactory argument for the uselessness of any other than purely practical or useful studies, and a decisive refutation of all that can be urged in the defense of any other. Self-made or self-educated men in this country are also very largely connected with the newspaper press; for the reason that the editor's vocation is one of the most inviting in its rewards to those who have literary or political aspirations; and because it promises success in the shortest time and especially as it itself furnishes an efficient education in the exercise of the mind and the pen in literary essays. It is not surprising that this class of editors should be very ready to accept any misconception of the college system, which is either innocently entertained or ignorantly propagated in the community. It is not even surprising that they should be often tempted to make the colleges and the college system prominent topics of criticism. Many of the colleges are old and respectable from the associations and traditions of their history. They are the objects of love and affection to multitudes in the community. They are the pride and joy of the enthusiastic youth who breathe their exhilarant spirit and participate in their exuberant life. It must also be confessed that they are far from being perfect in their constitution or their administration. Both of these features make them attractive as subjects for extemporaneous criticism and objects of attack. Whether they are regarded as venerable castles, or as wind-mills which largely fill the public eye—and grind proportionally but little corn—the bravery of attacking them is all the same, and it has stimulated many knights of the press to the pleasurable *adventure* of assaulting them. The patent and obtrusive follies of foolish and royster-

ing youth are a very deserving and a very easy theme for severe editorial comments. The aim that could not successfully direct a rifle at a vital point can easily point a blunderbuss at the door of a barn.

Another important element in this varying and shifting tribunal before which the colleges are summoned to answer, consists of the many graduates of these colleges who have received little advantage from their college training, or are unconscious of the advantages which they have received in fact. The question very naturally presents itself at this point, how it can happen if the college system is so excellent itself that so many graduates of colleges are at the present moment so clamorous for college reform? Nay, how is it that they constitute so large and so important an element of the tribunal before which these colleges are summoned to plead their cause? We will endeavor to answer these questions, premising that we ourselves admit and contend that the college system and its administration both require and admit some important changes.

In answer to these questions, we would say in the first place that many college graduates are not aware of the extent of the advantage which they have derived from their public education. All processes that are properly gymnastic and disciplinary perform service and impart benefits of which the recipient is unconscious at the time of receiving them, and which, unless he has given special attention to education as a study, he cannot fully appreciate by subsequent reflection. The mental growth to which they contribute is so slow and insensible, that the fact that growth is achieved and by the means employed, is very rarely noticed at the time of its occurrence. Let it be conceded that some studies must be chiefly disciplinary, it by no means follows because the graduates of colleges are not distinctly aware of the value of the course by which they have been trained, that the course was not the best conceivable for the very persons who are the least sensible of what it has done for them. Again, every system of education supposes docility, coöperation, and effort on the part of the pupil. No scheme of education can be efficient without these. We add also the very obvious but almost for-

gotten truth, that no system, however skilfully framed or wisely administered, has ever been known actually to secure such zeal and enthusiasm as is required for the best effects. We concede that one system of studies and discipline is better fitted than another to awaken and sustain the interest of students. But we venture to assert that there are many college graduates who reproach the college system for not having done more for them, who would not have the hardihood to assert that any selection of studies, any course of discipline, or any wisdom of instructors would have exorcised the indolence and self-indulgence, the careless and irresponsible spirit which possessed them in their college days.

There are others, and these are not few, who were bent on self-improvement in their college life, and were not unwilling to labor, whose want of success was chiefly owing to their very inadequate preparation for its studies. Any course of public education must assume or prescribe some previous knowledge and culture, and those who persist in beginning or continuing their college life without such preparation have only themselves or their friends to blame that the college course benefited them so little.

There are some graduates, however, who were earnest, laborious, and successful in their college studies, who are disposed earnestly to criticise the course which was prescribed, because it did not fit them more directly for the calling or duties of their actual life. Such contend that a more direct adaptation of its studies to the foreseen wants of the student would awaken greater enthusiasm and secure far more vigorous and successful work. It is natural when a graduate comes to any special employment or duty that he should regret that his college studies did not train him directly for it. He may desire to travel or study in a foreign country, or his professional or commercial success would be facilitated if he were master of French, German, or Spanish. He is very likely to exclaim, "Would that the time which I wasted in the tiresome Latin or hateful Greek had been spent in learning the living language which I now have occasion to use!" Or let him painfully feel his deficiencies in the command of a good English style or in familiarity with English literature, and he breaks out into simi-

lar impatient reproach that his Alma Mater did not foresee and provide for his future wants instead of cramming him with Greek and Latin syntax and etymology. Or it may be that he is a manufacturer or a trader, and he would give twice or ten times the cost of his college education if he were a proficient in chemistry, physics, or navigation. Those who make these complaints leave out of view much which they ought to consider, and especially that it is often impossible to foresee what a man's employment in life is to be. Conceding that a college course may be both professional and disciplinary, it might be a worse mistake for a man to have studied German and to find that he needs to use only Spanish, than to have studied Latin and find that he needs either German or Spanish, or to have studied chemistry or physics when he requires a knowledge of English or French literature. These considerations bring us back to the old doctrine so offensive to a few college educated men that the college course is preëminently designed to give power to acquire and to think rather than to impart special knowledge or special discipline. But on this we will not dwell at present, but only remind those who utter these critical complaints that they do not always think of the very great advantage they have gained for acquiring German, French, Spanish, chemistry, physics, and even business judgment and skill, above those who have not been thus disciplined. Most of all, would we ask them to notice whether if their sense of the importance to themselves of German, French, chemistry, etc., had been as keen while they were in college as it is at present, they would not, or could not, have mastered these special studies in addition to the Latin and Greek which the college prescribed. Without such a sense of their importance, their mastery of any of these branches might not have been so complete as they find to be needful, and the imperfect knowledge obtained might have been purchased at the cost of a feebler power to acquire and understand and apply not only these needed branches, but all other knowledge and skill. Why should it be so easy for a man to forget that when in college he was something of a boy, and to cheat himself with the fond persuasion that any system of study would have endowed him with the wisdom and forecast of a

man? Why should reflecting men persuade themselves that a college training can of itself give the wisdom of age to the thoughtlessness of youth, or wake up that enthusiasm for self-improvement which experience only can develop. It is most unreasonable, unjust, and ungrateful, to demand of any system of education or institution of learning that it should place in the bow of the vessel which rushes impetuously before the breeze those glowing "stern lights" which, even for the earnest and wise, shine so sadly and so luridly over the path which has engulfed so many good resolutions, so many vain essays, so many ambitious plans, so many schemes of study, so many promised acquisitions of knowledge and power; which path for the vicious and indolent is but a foaming and dreary waste of ruin.

We repeat the assertion already made that we do not regard the college system as faultless. On the contrary, we believe it to be capable of some very important modifications and improvements. At the same time, we affirm that the principal features by which it is characterized are susceptible of a triumphant vindication even before the somewhat miscellaneous tribunal which we have briefly described. We propose to consider these distinguishing features, and to enquire how far they are capable of vindication, and in what respects the colleges may be improved either in their constitution or their administration. We will consider, first of all, the studies appropriate to the colleges in respect to the selection of topics and the methods of teaching.

The American Colleges have been from the first and uniformly schools of classical study and learning. A knowledge of the elements of the Greek and Latin languages has been required for admission, and the study of the two has been enforced upon all as the condition of receiving the Bachelor's degree. This has been universally true, the few exceptions being too inconsiderable to deserve attention. The enforced study of these languages upon all the students, and for the most of the undergraduate course, is a ground of complaint, and its advocates are required to give anew the reasons for adhering to it. The trustees of the Cornell University, while they shrink from the charge of abandoning or depreciating the study of the classics, have distinctly taken the position that, for the purposes of discipline

and culture, the study of the French and German classics is as efficient as the study of the Greek and Latin, and that an equivalent knowledge of either two should entitle the student to the same college honors. The doctrine is also very extensively taught that it is questionable whether the study of language is better fitted to train and discipline the mind in early life than the study of physics or history; and, granting that it is, that it does not follow that the study of Greek or Latin is essentially to be preferred to that of German or French. In short, the mind of our tribunal, "the American public," is at present undecided and disturbed by the question whether the colleges do not commit a grievous wrong in enforcing classical studies upon all their students, and in giving to these studies especial honor.

We contend not only that the colleges have judged rightly in giving to the study of language the prominence which it receives, and that the Greek and Latin deserves the special preëminence which has been assigned them, but that there are peculiar reasons why they should be even more thoroughly and earnestly cultivated than they have been.

Our first position is, that for the years appropriated to school and college training, there is no study which is so well adapted to mental discipline as the study of language. We argue this from the fact that language is the chief instrument of intelligence. It is thought made visible and clear, not merely to the person to whom thoughts are to be conveyed, but to the person who thinks for and by himself or alone. The earliest discriminations and memories to which we are tasked by nature are those which are involved in the mastery of our mother tongue. It is true the observation of nature, in the education of the eye and the ear, and in the control and discipline of the body, involves a multitude of "object lessons," and imposes much "object teaching," but it can scarcely be contended that the discipline of the senses requires either the *culture* or the *discipline* of the intellect, in the same sense as does that attention to language which is required in learning to speak and write the language first acquired. We assume, because it is not necessary to prove, that the most conspicuously intellectual of the various intellectual acts of infancy and childhood are exercised with language. The slowness and difficulty with which some children learn to

use language is taken as an infallible sign of some defect or late development of intellectual power. The most important part of the knowledge which we acquire is gained through words spoken or written, and the study of nature itself must mainly be prosecuted through books. Natural history, with its curious facts and nice discriminations, geography with its descriptions of distant and unseen lands, of mountains and rivers, and romance with its fairy tales, so exciting and so dear to the child, all presuppose and exercise this same knowledge. The world of words is, in its way, as important and as real to the child as the world of things; and most of the intellectual relations of either things or thoughts can only be discerned by an attention to and apprehension of the relations of words.

As school life advances the intellect is to be tasked and disciplined by special classes of studies, the object of which is to train the intellectual power, and to furnish it with facts and truths. The mind is constrained to reflection and analysis. From acquisition, observation, and memory it proceeds to be trained to the independent judgments of science. What shall be the subject matter upon which its essays are employed? Nature directs, and the experience of many generations has confirmed the wisdom of her intimations, that language is the appropriate sphere of these essays. The mind is not sufficiently matured to study nature in a scientific way. Of *natural history* the mind at this period is capable, but not of the *sciences of nature*. The *facts* of natural history, the experiments of physics and chemistry, do not discipline the mind enough; the *science* of these facts involves a training and rank which the intellect has not yet attained. The mathematics present a most important field, but the field is peculiar and unique. For the sphere and materials of what we call intellectual training we are shut up to the study of language; not exclusively, indeed, for, as we shall show in its place, facts and imaginations should both instruct and relieve the excessive and one-sided strain which the discipline of language involves; but if there is to be discipline in the eminent sense, it must be effected by means of the study of language. Whatever substitute be devised it will fail of imparting that peculiar intellectual facility and power which this study secures.

Assuming that the study of language is the most efficient instrument of discipline, we assert that the study of the classical languages should be universally preferred to any other as a means of discipline in every course of liberal education, and should continue to be made prominent and necessary in the American colleges. When we assert this, we do not assert it as a self-evident or as an unquestioned proposition. It is a fair question to ask, and a reasonable one to be answered, "Why is not French as efficient an instrument of discipline and culture as the Latin, and why may not German be substituted for the Greek, provided each be thoroughly and scientifically studied?" This question is fair and reasonable to answer and discuss, because the *prima facie* evidence is that the one is as good as the other. But this *prima facie* probability is, in our opinion, far from being the self-evident certainty which it seems to be in the judgment of our accomplished and admirable friend President White, when he says "It is impossible to find a reason why a man should be made Bachelor of Arts for good studies in Cicero and Tacitus, and Thucydides and Sophocles, which does not equally prove that he ought to have the same distinction for good studies in Montesquieu and Corneille, and Goëthe and Schiller, and Dante and Shakespeare." *Letter to the New York Tribune.* With all due respect to the President, we think that it is not only easy to find one such reason, but that many very readily suggest themselves. First of all, it is obvious, we think, that the student who makes "good studies" in Cicero and Thucydides will be likely, in the present state of society in this country, also to make "good studies" in Montesquieu, Goëthe, etc., etc. We cannot take so narrow a view of the nature and operation of a literary education as for a moment to consider it as limited to a four years' course. The classical student who is zealous enough to do well, will not, in the present state of knowledge, and with the facilities which he enjoys, be likely to fail to learn one or two of the modern languages also. If he does not do this in college, should he have special occasion to use them for the purposes of study, travel, or business, he will have acquired the power to learn them with comparative ease and rapidity. If he is to acquire several Romanic languages, the thorough study of Latin will even be a positive gain in their acquisition,

so far as time is concerned. Mr. John Stuart Mill goes so far as to assert that the mastery of Latin "makes it easier to learn four or five of the continental languages than it is to learn one of them without it." Mr. Mill would make little or no provision for the study of the modern languages in the university, for the reason that it is to be supposed that a man who is bred a scholar will study some things after he leaves college, and especially such of the modern tongues as he has occasion to use.

They are trite sayings that all modern literature goes back to these languages for its germs and beginnings, and cannot be thoroughly understood without a knowledge of the languages and the life which they reveal; that not only the roots of the languages of modern Europe are to be found in them, but the roots and germs of modern literature are in their literature as well; that much of what we call learning is written in Latin and Greek; that Greek is the original language of the New Testament, which records the beginning of the history of the Christian creed, and the great truths which the church has received; that modern science has constructed its most refined and complicated terminology out of materials derived freshly from both languages, and the Greek in particular. But to all these considerations we shall be met with the reply, that the majority of the men who are educated at college will never become scholars at all, and do not require the education which is fundamental to a scholar's knowledge. We answer that, if this is so, the majority of such persons have even the greater need, and will be likely to make a more efficient use of the power, and discipline, and scholarship which classical study will give them than of the more or less of German and French which they may study in its place. The manifold relations by which a knowledge of the ancient languages and of ancient life are connected with the history they read, the literature which they enjoy, and the institutions under which they live, makes even a scanty knowledge of both to be of constant use and application.

The student of Corneille and Goëthe is also mainly conversant with modern ideas and modern civilization. However exquisite the diction or masterly the genius of his writer,

the sentiments and passions are all modern. But the student of Virgil and of Homer cannot painfully translate a few books of the *Æneid* or the *Odyssey*, without entering into the thoughts and sympathizing with the feelings, and living somewhat of the life, of human beings greatly unlike those whom he has ever known or imagined, whose thoughts and feelings do not repel him by their strangeness so much as they attract him by their dignity and truth, and open to him a new world of sentiment and emotion. The people, into whose life he very imperfectly learns to enter, though in many respects so unlike the men of present times, are yet closely connected with them by the civilization, the arts, the literature, the institutions, the manners, and the laws which the ancients perfected and transmitted. We do not say that to receive such impressions as an imperfect scholarship may impart, is worth all the painstaking which the study of Greek and Latin involves, but we do assert that if these impressions can be superadded to the advantages which come from the discipline which the grammatical study of two languages requires, then this is a sufficient reason why Greek and Latin should be preferred to French and German.

We contend, moreover, and it is generally conceded, that in disciplinary influence the study of the classics is far superior to that of the modern tongues, not excepting the German, which is most nearly akin to the Greek. The regularity and fixedness of the structure, the variety of the inflections, the distinctness of the articulations, the refinement of the combinations, the objective utterances to the mental ear, and the graphic painting to the imagination when coupled with the wealth of thought and feeling, which verb and adjective, which noun and particle enshrine in words and sentences, all combine to give the classic tongues a supremacy over the languages of modern civilization, which all candid and competent judges have confessed. It is not pertinent to claim, that one complicated and artistic language is of itself equally efficient with another for discipline, especially in the beginning of his public studies. It cannot be soberly urged that one dialect, if it be African or Semitic, is as good as another, provided it leads the mind to analyze and reflect. The discipline

which is required for higher education is not a simple gymnastic to the intellect, it is not the training of the curious philologist, or the sharp logician, but it is a discipline which prepares for culture and thought, and which gradually lifts the mind from the hard and dry paradigms of the pedagogue and the enforced syntax of the class-room, to the comparative judgment and the æsthetic culture of the critic and philosopher.

We find, then, the following reasons why what are called "good studies" in French and German should not entitle a person to the Bachelor's degree; and why these studies, however "good" they may be for certain purposes, cannot be as good for the commanding objects for which language and the languages are studied in a course of education.

They are not as good to teach attention to the structure of language and all which such attention involves, and thus to train the student to the intelligent and facile use of English, or to the criticism of the same. They are not as good to prepare the mind to learn other languages than themselves with rapidity, intelligence, and retention. They are not as good to prepare for the comparative judgment of the languages which one may learn. The exercise of such a judgment, whether it is employed for the remoter ends of the philologist, or the more general aims of the reflective thinker, is one of the most instructive employments of the educated man. No man can be a linguist, in the best and most intellectual sense of the word, who is not a classical scholar, because these languages are the best material with or upon which to study language. The student, who has mastered the elements of Greek and Latin, has gone much further in the way to the intelligent knowledge of language generally, than one who has gone much farther in the elements of French and German. This is explained by the fact already adverted to, that the structure of the classical tongues is so complicated yet clear, ramified yet regular, artificial yet symmetrical, objective yet artistic; and that in all these features these languages are preëminent above the modern tongues. Some philologists do not confess this, we know. They persuade themselves that an Englishman can be trained as successfully to the reflective study of language, by the use of his own and one or two modern languages, as by

the aid of the classic tongues. But we think such persons, being always themselves classicists, mistake their own insight and science of such relations, for the insight and science which they imagine their pupils might or do attain. In short, they imagine their pupils see with an eye and reflect with a mind that have been enriched and disciplined by classical study.

Again, such studies cannot be as good for the discipline of the intellect. The study of languages so characterized must be a better training for the intellect than the study of the languages which task the intellect less, from the greater simplicity of their structure and their greater similarity to the mother tongue. We of course assume that the two kinds of languages are taught equally well, and are pursued with equal zeal and spirit. This, we think, is possible.

Studies in the modern languages are not as good as studies in the ancient, for the knowledge of man, which they directly and indirectly impart. The man of the ancient world is a different being from the man of modern life. Stately, artificial, decided, clear in his opinions, positive and outspoken in his aims, objective in his life, positive and sharp in his diction, impetuous in his impulses, grand in his connection with the state, heroic in his virtues and almost in his vices, he stands out in a striking contrast with the man of modern times—the self-cultured Pagan against the self-denying Christian, the self-cultured against the self-sacrificing, the idolater of country and the state against the worshiper of the Father and Redeemer of man. He is always intellectual, impressive, and intelligible, because he is the perfection of the natural and earthly in its purest and noblest manifestations. The man of modern life is weakened and divided, it may be, by the strife of the natural with the spiritual, of passion with duty, of love with selfishness. And yet the classic humanity is not so strange that it repels or overawes us. It moves our common sympathies, while it enlarges our conceptions of what man may become. All that is good in it is the more impressive from its very exaggerated and one-sided character. It also conveys what it has learned or experienced by means of the clear, beautiful, and positive diction which it always employs.

It corrects our special defects of thought, of sentiment, and of action, by the clear rationalism, the simple emotion, the manly behavior which it always sets forth. It even preserves us against its own peculiar errors by the very distinctness with which it avows them, and the consistent energy with which it acts them out. The student of modern literature is always conversant with men, thinking, feeling, and acting like himself. The student of ancient literature is confronted with human beings and a human life, which are in some most important particulars unlike what he has experienced or even conjectured; and yet they were a positive and potent reality.

The modern languages are not as good as the ancient to prepare for the intelligent study of modern history. Modern history and modern literature have their roots in ancient institutions and in ancient life. Modern poetry, philosophy, and art, were, at the first, inspired by the poetry, philosophy, and art of Greece. Modern polity and law were derived from Rome. Modern religion came from Judea, through Grecian and Roman society. To understand the beginning and trace the progress of the new developments which these prime elements of modern history have undergone, we must go back to the beginning, and understand the society and life in which they were first rooted and germinated. We cannot successfully penetrate into the spirit of ancient life without mastering the languages and appreciating the literature in which the ancients have enshrined and perpetuated this life. Our modern educational reformers make much of the study of history, and of the philosophy of history. But what can the teacher of history accomplish with classes who are practically incapable of appreciating the spirit and life of antiquity? How can they judge of his assertions or follow his analyses, to whom the most important elements with which he deals are substantially unknown, and must remain forever unappreciated.

The last reason which we give why studies in the modern are not as good as studies in the ancient languages is, that they do not as efficiently further the intellectual and æsthetic culture of the student. The evidence for this has been furnished in the considerations already adduced. If modern history is rooted in the ancient, much more obviously is mod-

ern thought and modern culture rooted in ancient thought and ancient culture. Its speculation was born of ancient speculation, and still recognizes its parentage, as it agrees with or dissents from the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. The modern materialists scarcely more than illustrate and enforce from modern physics the ancient metaphysics of the Atomists and Epicureans. The modern spiritualists give greater definiteness and authority to the mythical constructions of Plato and the masterly analyses of Aristotle. The images of the Iliad and the Odyssey are as fresh and as quickening as ever, and their rhythm as musical and inspiring as they have been in all the generations since the birth of modern poetry. They have not been superseded by the subjective tendencies of the modern muse. The Greek Tragedies are still pregnant with mystery to the most subjective and questioning of the moderns, who brood over the seeming perplexities of fate and Providence. Allusions to classical images, scenes, events, and personages, are woven into the tissue of all modern writing. Classical art, with its outlines as sharply cut as the faces of a crystal, and yet as graceful as the undulations of the moving waters, has not ceased to be the model of beauty and grace to modern art, because its products have been animated by the living spirit of Christian love, or warmed and elevated by the spiritual graces of Christian faith and hope.

The student who makes "good studies" in modern thought and literature, cannot fail, indeed, of a quickening influence and guidance, but the student who has made good studies in ancient thought, has made himself ready to occupy his life with a far more intelligent and refined appreciation of modern thought and culture. As in the order of the culture of the race, the severe discipline of ancient institutions first prepared the way for the more genial influences of Christian and modern thought and feeling, so in the training of the individual on the most generous scale, the pedagogical period is most profitably spent in the ancient schools, before the pupil enters upon the second stage of thought and conception in which he is to live and act, but which is none the less truly educating, because it is in the wider school of life.

The modern educators, who claim to themselves the merit

and name of being especially broad and enlightened, take, in fact, the narrowest and most limited views of education and of living. They forget that as soon as the student steps forth into life, modern thinking, modern literature, and modern culture will take him almost exclusively into their possession, and will assert supreme control over his education. Under the fair pretence of preparing him for the fields of thought and action on which he is to enter, they confine him from the first to the same round in which he is to walk through life, forgetting that the most efficient preparation for a sphere of action is not always made in that sphere, but that to be prepared most efficiently for the intellectual and æsthetical activity in which we are to be employed, we must be conversant with their germinant forces and their controlling principles.

Against these views it will be urged, that though they are plausible in the ideal, they are impracticable in the real—that it is impossible to bring all the members of a college class to study the classics with sufficient interest and zeal to make them eminently profitable; that while a third of the earnest men will study them with zeal, the remaining two-thirds will study them with reluctance. Or, as President White says, “When I was a student in one of the largest New England colleges, there were over a hundred in my class. Of these, twenty or thirty loved classical studies, and could have made them a noble means of culture; but these were held back by, perhaps, seventy, who dreamed, or lounged, or ‘ponied,’ or ‘smouged’ through—sadly to the detriment of their minds and morals. Consequently the classical professors—as good as ever blessed any college—were obliged to give their main labor to stirring up the dullards, to whipping in the lag-gards—in short, not to the thirty who loved their particular studies, but to the seventy who loathed them.” The Cornell University will not have things so ordered; it will “indulge in no tirades against the classics.” “It will have the best classical professors it can secure—it will equip their departments thoroughly, it will not thwart them by forcing into their lecture rooms a mass of students who, while reciting Greek, are thinking of German, etc., etc.” That is, President White would have us to infer that in his opinion, and, we be-

lieve there are many who agree with him, that "the dullards" and "the laggards," the men who "ponied" and "smouged" in the classics, would have neither been nor done either if they had been allowed to study German instead of Greek, and that the majority of every college class would study the languages with alacrity and zeal, if only they were allowed to study German or French. We do not believe this opinion to be correct, and we think it effectually disproved by the indisputable fact that the men who are *dull* and who *lag* in Greek and Latin, are almost invariably "*dullards*" and "*laggards*" in German and French, in these very same college classes and class-rooms. The few exceptions are explained by the greater maturity of mind and of character with which the study of the modern languages is begun, and preëminently by the better elementary instruction with which it is introduced to the mind, to say nothing of the advantage which has been gained by even an imperfect study of the classics.

Moreover, what was true of the class of President White in respect to the classics was true *eminentiori sensu* in respect to the mathematics, and yet we do not observe that in the scheme of the Cornell University it is proposed to dispense with a thorough study of the mathematics in the several courses, which are different ways to the same degree. Nor is the principle to be admitted that those who are dull in the mathematics are to be excused from studying them because they *long* for the classics, or *long* for history, or it may be, *long* for the lecture courses to the exclusion of recitations. We do not deny that the evils complained of by President White in fact exist. But they are not peculiar to any course of study. We do not despair of a partial remedy of these evils, but are confident that the remedy is not to be found in the substitution of the modern for the ancient languages.

It should always be remembered that the question with which we are concerned relates to the best theoretical selection of studies, and cannot always be decided by the practical results in particular cases. What is best in theory will be best in practice only when it is thoroughly and wisely administered, provided the circumstances are equally favorable. Among these circumstances are to be enumerated—adequate

preparation, by previous study and training, the best methods of teaching and discipline, sufficient time to bring the prescribed course to its completion, and a warm faith in, and enthusiasm for, the value of a study in pupils and students. In some of these respects there is room for great improvement, and this improvement, as we shall show, is to be desired and hoped for in the American colleges. At present we are concerned with the theory of the selection and distribution of the studies.

It may be contended again that if the modern cannot altogether take the place of the ancient languages they may share an equal portion of time and of honor with them. It being conceded that a knowledge of two or three modern languages is indispensable to the scholar who is truly educated, it is urged that the college ought to provide instruction in these languages as a part of its curriculum. In accordance with this view the modern languages have been provided for, more or less definitely and completely, in many of the colleges, and instruction in them is given either in the regular or the optional courses. The advantages are obvious. The student passes from a dead to a living language, as from a Pompeiian to a modern dwelling. The first is artistic and ornate, but its associations are with the past; the second is fresh and fragrant with modern elegancies and comforts. The sense of a certain or possible utility in the language learned awakens a peculiar interest, especially if the student has advanced several stages from school life and school-boy associations and if the interests and responsibilities of manhood have begun to awaken and sober him. The mingling of the ancient and modern in grammatical analysis and in etymological research and literary criticism, is in every respect happy in its influence.

On the other hand, it is to be feared that the time for classical study will in this way be seriously diminished, that the interest in, and estimate of, classical culture will be so far weakened, that the high academical tone will be injuriously lowered, and the most important ends of academical discipline will be in a measure thwarted. A still more serious evil is incident to the elementary character of most of these studies as at present pursued. The college class-room is not a place in which

to drill to French pronunciation or German exercises, and that as long as the instruction in German and French is elementary, it must lower the tone and dignity of the curriculum. The college course retains quite enough of the *dressure* of the pedagogue already and of the subjection of the school boy, and the enforced drill of the French and German professor cannot tend to relieve it of these features. No relief can be devised except to require both French and German—one or both—as preparatory studies, or to make them largely optional, both of which expedients are at present open to serious objections. It certainly is a fair subject of inquiry, whether the study of both languages might not better be treated as an extra or private study, under the direction of a competent professor provided by the college, and whether if the college should furnish such a teacher and encourage attendance upon his lessons, it would not contribute to a more efficient training in both ancient and modern languages. We may return to this topic again.

If the classical languages cannot with propriety be replaced by those of Modern Europe, much less can the study of the English language with any propriety be made a substitute for either or both of them. Very much is said now-a-days, in a loose and general way, about the study of the English language and literature in our colleges. The critical study of English literature cannot be overestimated, so far as the awakening and directing of a taste for the best English authors are concerned. To this should be added an ample and critical study of the history of this literature. It were greatly to be desired that to these should be united the most thorough grammatical and philological knowledge of the language itself, and of its leading dialects through the original Anglo-Saxon, and its various forms of development. But this, which alone is worthy to be compared with any study of the classics for discipline, is a branch of the higher philology, and cannot come within the college course, because it presupposes a somewhat critical knowledge of the classical and some of the modern languages. It cannot, therefore, be urged by any person whose opinions are worth regarding as a possible equivalent or substitute for the study of either. The utmost that can be hoped or desired in this department is the mastery of a

thoroughly scientific English grammar, if such an one were to be had in the English language. But to suppose it possible to subject one's mother tongue to the same reflective analysis which the mastery of a language not vernacular involves, is to overlook the most important psychological fact that a language which is familiar and early acquired cannot be analyzed before the mind has reached its highest maturity, nor unless it has been especially aided by the study of at least one foreign language. This is one of the truths which experience may be supposed to have settled.

We approach what in the minds of many is a much graver question, and that is whether the study of the physical sciences cannot furnish as effective, and perhaps a more desirable, mental discipline than the study of language at all, and whether, therefore, it cannot take its place as a branch of college or university study. It is contended by many that it can and ought. Mr. Herbert Spencer urges very earnestly and in great detail, that all the processes which the study of the languages involve are brought into requisition in the study of nature—that discrimination, combination, and judgment are all tasked as variously and as severely in the generalizations and judgments of physics as in those of grammar and hermeneutics. His argument is more ingenious and plausible than convincing. The author of a very interesting and able Article on "Science in Schools," in a recent number of the *London Quarterly Review*—October, 1867—argues very ably and ingeniously in favor of introducing the Physical Sciences into the school and university curriculum. He contends with Spencer that, if rightly taught and allowed as large a place in the curriculum as the classics, they cannot fail to discipline the mind as effectively as these, for the uses of society and of life. At the same time he has the good sense to see and the boldness to say that unless they can be taught in this thorough method, they might, for all educational purposes, as well not be taught at all. He reasons with masterly and convincing power against the practice of teaching the elements of the sciences by compends or brief courses of lectures as tending only to superficialness and conceit.

Our own opinion may be expressed in the remark that Natural

History should be taught to children and youth in the preparatory school, but Natural Science, with the exception of mathematical and mechanical physics, should be deferred till the very latest period of the college course, and cannot be taught even then with any success, except so far as its fundamental principles, and so to speak, its logical and scientific relations, are concerned. The mastery of its details and even a familiarity with the application of its principles to particulars must, of necessity, be referred to the Special Schools of Technology or Applied Science; that is, it must be made a part of special as contrasted with general or liberal training. For example, Botany and Mineralogy with the elements of Geology, especially Botany, are branches which can be acquired in early life,—which is the observing period,—provided an excited interest can be aroused in their objects. We cannot estimate too highly the habits which are induced by these studies, or the tastes which they awaken and refine. The nice eye for analysis, the attentive eye for research, the enterprise and self-reliance required for open-air excursions, the elevating influences that come from a contact with the purity and beauty of nature, and the habits of ready tact and rapid induction which such studies and researches involve, are all invaluable features of the character, and leave priceless treasures for life. No one can appreciate more highly than we the tastes and aptitudes of the enthusiastic Naturalist, whether seen in their blossom in the youthful votary or in their ripeness in the matured Philosopher. We would therefore insist that these sciences should be studied thoroughly in the preparatory education, so far as they are mainly sciences of observation and of fact. Besides the advantages of which we have spoken, they tend to obviate and correct some one-sided tendencies of the mere student of books and of words. They rub off his pedantry and take down his conceit. They relieve the tedium and monotony of the grammar and the dictionary. We might connect with botany the elements of vegetable physiology, so far at least as the processes of growth and culture are concerned. There is no objection to introduce at this stage the elements of experimental chemistry and perhaps of animal physiology, to awaken curiosity and stimulate wonder and reverence. But

further than this we would not go, because the philosophical or generalizing power is not sufficiently developed to grasp or appreciate the truths or relations of natural science properly so called. Science of any kind cannot be scientifically taught unless it can be scientifically received ; and in order to be scientifically received the recipient must have been trained to discriminate and to generalize, to construct and to judge. The devotee and expert in chemistry, geology, and physiology, is so entranced with the wonders of his favorite pursuit, and so interested in the processes required for successful research and experiment, as well as in the products which these researches and experiments evolve, that he cannot conceive it possible that any mind at any stage of culture should fail to be excited by his own enthusiasm and be stimulated to his favorite labors. He says to himself and to the public : " Only give me the same opportunities which the teacher of words has so long asserted to himself, and the training which I will effect will be as much more complete than any which the old systems have accomplished, as the products are more useful and instructive. Only give me a college in which Chemistry and Physiology, Mechanics and Geography, Mineralogy and Geology shall take the place of the Classics, and I will produce enthusiastic students and splendid philosophers." He tries the experiment, but the difficulty is still encountered to awaken enthusiasm and scientific power in undisciplined or half disciplined minds—to stretch a narrow intellect wide enough to receive a large truth, or to understand and appreciate the manifold reach of philosophical relations.

We venture to say that in every instance in which a scientific education has been substituted for one that is classical or liberal, there have been as many failures of the highest conceivable success as are charged upon the colleges. The classes have contained their due proportion of *dullards* and *laggards*, and this not for the reason that these long for other forms of intellectual activity, but because they self-indulgently dislike any activity at all, or are naturally slow and dull, or have been forced—more usually have forced themselves—into studies for which they are not prepared by the mastery of their elements. Scientific and Technological schools, we are confi-

dent, do not show a better average of diligence or of success, than do the classical and liberal, where everything else is equal. It will even be found that a curriculum consisting exclusively of scientific and useful studies, if equally elementary, equally long, equally thorough and equally remote from any foreseen applications in life, will awaken less interest and zeal and emulation, than a curriculum of exclusively classical and literary subjects, and this for the twofold reason that the study of nature, as natural history, requires special tastes, which are as limited in their prevalence as they are intense in their energy—and that the power to grasp the science of nature is as slow and late in its development, as it is comprehensive and splendid in its rare perfection.

We contend, moreover, that such a training, if it were more uniformly successful in its results, would not as a discipline take the place of that which the study of language imparts and involves, for the reason that it neither requires so subtle a use of the intellect, nor one that is so manifold and various. The Physical sciences do indeed bring us in contact with *nature*, and invite us to discover or contemplate her laws. But Literary studies confront us with *man* as exhibited either in the refined relations of thought and feeling that have been inwrought into the structure of language, or in the expressions of thought and feeling that are conveyed by literature. They are properly and preëminently human and humanizing studies, inasmuch as they continually present man to us in the various workings of his higher nature. Hence they prepare us for that more abstruse and formal study of man, which is the science of the soul in all its forms and applications, as psychology, ethics, politics, law, and sociology. Man and nature are alike the works of God. The science of each naturally leads us to God, but surely neither the mechanism of the masses of the universe, nor the chemistry of its molecules, nor the history of the development of its forces, are *better* fitted to bring us any nearer to Him than the constitution and workings of the soul, with its manifestations in literature, and its developments in human history.

From whatever point of view we regard the study of the sciences, especially those which have been so greatly enlarged

in the present century—as Chemistry, Mineralogy, Geology, and Physical Geography, Zoology, Botany, with Practical Engineering and Practical Astronomy—the only course which is practicable is to teach their fundamental principles in the college, and their details and applications in a special school of Science or of Technology. To attempt any other course is alike disastrous to the interests of Education and of Science. The man who would be accomplished in any of these sciences, must, in a certain sense, become a devotee, sometimes almost a martyr, to its cause. He must accumulate vast stores of facts and details, must reduce them to classified order, must retain them within his grasp, must pursue inquiries and researches of his own, and must be alert to receive and record the reports of those of others. Hence, other things being equal, he has the greater need of a previous general discipline and culture. If he is to be a philosopher, in distinction from a scientific artisan, he will gain more than almost any other class of professional men from a preliminary and classical course such as the college furnishes, for the reason that his subsequent pursuits tend to withdraw him more entirely from the field of general culture. The Scientific School does well to supply these defects, so far as it may, by combining with its more thorough training in the special sciences, instruction and discipline in the languages and literature, in history and philosophy, but it cannot give the breadth and energy which the larger and more liberal discipline of the college is fitted to impart. We are well aware that some of the most distinguished philosophers in the special sense of the term, in the new and the old world, have had no advantages of classical or academical training. We remember that Davy and Faraday began their studies in the laboratory, but these most gifted geninses would have shone no less brightly in the domain of philosophy, had they been disciplined in other directions earlier in life, as they themselves would have been the foremost to acknowledge. If, then, the college teaches the grand sciences of nature, in their principles and leading truths, in their elements and their logic—allowing some range and opportunity for those who have special tastes to cultivate and discipline—and then provides special schools in which

these sciences may be thoroughly mastered in a scientific and technical way, it does all that it ought. To attempt to bring the two curricula into close relations, or to force them into unnatural and incongruous alliances, is to injure both science and discipline, as well as to assume higher functions and a more pretentious name than the college can lawfully claim for itself. That there is no magic—except the magic of pretention—in the name of a university, without a preparation for its appropriate instruction on the part of professors and hearers, we shall endeavor to show in its proper place.

The only branches or departments of study which remains for us to consider, are the Mathematics and General Physics. These two are so closely connected that they may be regarded as one. We have already noticed the fact that the advocates of the so-called useful studies always include in them, both Mathematics and Physics, and that the real or technological schools invariably comprehend in their curriculum the pure mathematics, and often require the study of the most refined branches of the same. But the pure mathematics, both elementary and advanced, are the least *directly practical* of any sciences. It is only because of their necessity as the foundation of the applied sciences and arts, that they are so readily admitted into the circle of practical and useful knowledge. The opponents of classical and humanistic studies are heard occasionally to insist upon the disciplinary influence of the mathematics, and to contrast them with the languages in this respect. Whenever they do this they forsake the ground on which they usually plant themselves, that no studies are to be pursued solely or chiefly for their disciplinary value.

We observe, again, that in our country there are few persons who insist either on the entire disuse of the classics in favor of the mathematics, or on the disuse of the mathematics in favor of the classics. The only representatives of the former view are the guardians of the Academy at West Point. But even they do not hold the opinion that the curriculum in that institution is a model for general education, but only that it is the best adapted as a training for military life. Whether they are wise in this opinion is a question open to discussion. We have no occasion to discuss this question here. The other alternative opinion is held only in limited circles.

The University of Oxford and a few of the great schools of England alone give excessive and almost exclusive prominence to the classics.

It deserves to be noticed that in the colleges of this country the Mathematics and Physics have had the preponderance over the classics, and that of late they have been rather gaining than losing ground. That they ought to be retained and cultivated will be questioned by none. That they ought to be exclusively or chiefly pursued, is believed by few. The precise proportion which they should claim in a curriculum, we will not here discuss. We have already adverted to the fact that were we to estimate the usefulness of a branch of study by the number of persons who pursue it with enthusiasm and eminent success, the mathematics would fall far behind the classics. It was not only true in the college class of which President White was a member, but it is in all college classes, that those who dislike the mathematics greatly outnumber those who dislike the classics; yet the advocates for congenial or utilitarian studies, do not usually recommend that the mathematics should be abandoned, because they are abstruse and unpractical. The reason is obvious: the mathematics are essential that the student may master what is called science, and must be studied whether they are liked or disliked; or the mathematics must be learned in order that the mind of the pupil may be disciplined to that acuteness and self-control which the higher scientific investigations and processes imperatively require. In either view, the principle is admitted by those who profess to reject it, that knowledge and study may be disciplinary when they are not directly useful as acquisitions.

Throughout our discussion, thus far, we have assumed that certain studies may be of the greatest value for discipline which possess no other obvious and direct utility. This is denied or overlooked by many; or at least it is urged that if a study is also useful, this does not hinder it from being also disciplinary. It is also urged that the range of studies which are both useful and disciplinary is so large that no study should be selected for its disciplinary utility alone. We have seen that this rule is not adhered to in the case of the mathematics, even by the

doughtiest champions of utility. We are tempted to add a word here in defense of the opinion that certain studies are to be selected chiefly because of their disciplinary value. Its truth will be more manifest from the consideration that the employments and sports of childhood and youth are chiefly disciplinary and gymnastic in their influence and effect. The acquisition of permanent stores of knowledge is not the best result of the restless sportiveness of childhood, and the unceasing excitements of youth; but it is the sagacity, the self-reliance, the quickness and self-control, and every other good habit which is gathered from those bright and busy years. The school-life of the child and youth is not so valuable for the knowledge which it imparts, as for the power and skill to which it trains. What the boy brings away in his memory, whatever be the subject studied, is worth something; but compared with the many years of study, and the multitude of lessons repeated, these acquisitions are but meager. What he brings in the power to learn, to judge, and to apply are acquisitions that cannot be estimated too highly. The man, when mature, can quickly master the lesson, or analyze the argument, or resolve the problem which would have cost him many a weary hour in his childhood, and he imagines that some method should and may be devised by which the forces of childhood should be more economically utilized. The child, he reasons, has time enough to learn a whole encyclopædia of facts, and it is a pity and a shame that he does not. Only put him wisely to school, and give him the right description of facts, and he will bring away untold treasures for his manhood. Perhaps he may, but if he is not also disciplined to the power to master and hold these facts, of what avail are his lessons and opportunities! By the same method of reasoning it follows that if he learns such facts in such a way as *not* to train his powers to judge, discriminate and reason, his childhood and youth, however richly freighted with facts and information, have been almost wasted.

We contend that if most of the employments and sports of childhood and youth are chiefly valuable so far as they are disciplinary to power and goodness, the presumption is that, in the studies of school and college life, the same principle will hold good. Unless it can be decisively proved that the so-

called useful studies are as efficient in their disciplinary capacity and effect, it forms no objection to a study that its acquisitions cannot be used. Its acquisitions of the nobler sort cannot but be used. They are not recorded in the memory indeed, but they are inwrought and ingrained into the very structure of the intellectual and active powers, and they make themselves manifest, not merely now and then when a fact is to be recalled and a date corrected, but on every occasion on which the man is called to think, speak, or write; to feel, resolve, or act; to deliberate, advise, or inspire.

Thus far our attention has been occupied with the studies pursued in college. We have endeavored to show that the course or curriculum is, in its general features, wisely arranged, and that the prominence given to the classics and mathematics should never be abandoned. These two studies, we believe, must, and ever will be regarded as the great pillars on which any education which deserves to be called liberal must always rest. The so-called colleges or universities which do not require or presuppose these studies may assume the name of a college or university, but they are not true to the meaning and spirit of either.

But while we defend the curriculum of studies that is enforced in the American Colleges, we do not contend that the administration of it is not attended by certain incidental evils against which both instructors and pupils need to be defended by constant alertness and care. There are also many improvements and reforms which can be introduced as the appliances of these colleges are increased, and as the corps of instruction makes progress in numbers, in cultivation, and in devotion to its work. We hope also for very great advances from the improved cultivation of the community and the quickening influences of a higher civilization.

What the colleges need first of all, is a more uniformly adequate preparation on the part of those admitted to their privileges. Any organized institution of learning must prescribe some conditions of admission, whether one curriculum of studies is enforced upon all, whether it provides for many parallel or optional courses, or whether it admits students for a longer or a shorter period. Just so far as it professes to admit all comers

at all stages of preparation, and to teach them any or everything which they need or desire to study, just in that measure is it near the chaotic or amorphous condition, or rather is it like one of those reptiles which were supposed to be produced from the slime of the Nile; the foreparts organized, and the remainder, as Richard Baxter says, "*plain mud.*"

It being granted that some preparation is required by nature and necessity, and ought therefore to be enforced by law, in order that any course of study may be pursued by even a few persons together, it is obvious that the further this preparation is advanced, and the more uniformly it is reached, the higher and more complete is the work which the college can do. If the grounding or drill work in the classics which is essential to any progress or pleasure in the study of the higher relations of the ancient languages and literature, is not attained in the preparatory school, it must be performed in the college. If the elements of Arithmetic, Algebra, and Geometry are not thoroughly mastered before entering college they must in some way be taught and learned afterwards, at whatever cost or disadvantage. If a part of the students are well taught, and a large part are imperfectly prepared, the college course must be adjusted to the average condition of the class, and the disgust, *ennui*, and negligence of some, and the discouragement and disheartening of the others, will be certain to follow. The fact is notorious that the preparatory instruction in this country is not uniformly good, nor is it likely soon to become so. It is not easy for one college alone, nor for many combined, to bring it up to any desired or uniform standard. So many applicants for admission do, in fact, in a good measure, overcome and overgrow the disabilities which are incident to this imperfect preparation, that it is impracticable to arrest many in their course, especially if through poverty or advanced age they have reason for pressing into the college. The gate which is open wide enough to admit such persons, and with no very serious inconvenience to them, must admit others who cannot or will not redeem the promises which they make or the hopes which they excite. A brief or even protracted examination, conducted under the most favorable circumstances, is not always a fair test of actual knowledge, or capacity, or promise.

Least of all is it so when conducted with strangers under the special embarrassments which attend the entrance into college. It may even be unfair and unjust in proportion to its minuteness and fullness, if it is conducted in the inhuman or narrow spirit of a school pedant or a martinet. But the explanation of how it happens that so many enter college without being prepared for its studies does not in the least relieve or remove the evil. It does, however, remove the responsibility from the college itself for doing so much of that school and drill work which it ought not to be obliged to do at all, and for failing to do some of that liberal and intellectual work which is more appropriate to a higher institution. We cannot separate the higher from the lower institutions of the country; nor, again, the education of both from the education imparted by its general culture and its common life. The evils complained of cannot be wholly, nor can they be immediately remedied by one college, nor by all the colleges united. The improvement must come with the general culture of the community. So far as the responsibility rests upon the managers of the colleges, they ought to employ, and combine all their efforts not so much for an ampler as for a better preparation in the classics and the mathematics.

Nor should the improvement be confined to these studies. The capacity of many students to turn the college curriculum to better advantage results from their deficiency in general culture and the discipline and refinement which such a culture involves. The power of a college to impart is limited by the capacity of the student to receive and appropriate its manifold educating influences. The incapacity of the student to receive may arise as truly from his ignorance of English Grammar and Geography, of History and Rhetoric, and even of Natural History, as from his weakness in Arithmetic or the Latin Grammar. Not a few students who are entirely competent to pass the prescribed examination with credit,—of the vulgar rich as well as the vulgar poor,—are so illiterate and uninformed in their general culture, and so unrefined in their tastes, as to be almost incapable of taking that higher polish which the college curriculum and the college life are fitted to impart to a receptive and refined nature. If the colleges are to aim to be-

come more positively refining and liberal in their culture, they will need youths whose general as well as special training has been liberal and refined either at school or at home.

No object seems to us more important or more easily within reach than to elevate and improve the secondary or preparatory schools in these respects, as well as in the thoroughness of their scholarship. The most distinguished and the best endowed of these seminaries have confined their attention and efforts too exclusively to the ends of grounding their pupils in the classics and the mathematics. They have made their curriculum too exclusively a drilling process. Abundant studies in history and geography, especially of the ancient world, ought to be connected with the drill work of the grammar and the blackboard. The analysis of Latin and Greek sentences should be enlivened and made intelligible by the analysis of English sentences and phrases as well. The stiffness and dryness of the ancient classics, especially when painfully and slowly construed, would be greatly alleviated by the concurrent study of a living language. The work of Latin composition would be brought home to the comprehension and made easy and familiar to the associations by the daily practice of French and even of English composition and phrase making. The neglect of all these appliances and conditions of general culture in too many of the so-called classical schools of this country is inexcusable. So long as this neglect continues, the colleges must suffer under reproaches which should not properly rest upon them. The advocates and laudators of our public school system as being so ample and efficient for general culture, ought to inquire how it happens that the system which they assert performs so important a service for the whole community, does not provide the college Freshmen with a more familiar knowledge of the so-called English branches and the English language. Surely the classical schools and the classical colleges are not wholly at fault, that the attainments of so many who have enjoyed the complete routine of the public as well as of the special schools, are so pitifully low when they enter college.

But the call and the opportunity for improvement, and it may be for reform, are not all in the preparatory school. The

colleges themselves, we believe, may do much to improve their methods of teaching the studies of their curriculum. We do not believe that because the first and direct service of this course is disciplinary, that it ought not also to be intellectual and elevating. On the other hand, we contend that, as in the general education of childhood, the disciplinary and enforced should gradually pass over into the intellectual and the voluntary; so in the special education of the college the drill-work should at each successive stage give ampler and still ampler place for the reflective and æsthetic activities of the pupil.

In the mathematics there is less room for such a progress. The pure mathematics can never be anything but a pure gymnastic to sharp analysis, to severe abstraction, and, above all, to persistent and sustained attention. Their charms must always be severe; the lights which they reflect must ever be colorless and dry. The practical uses to which they may be turned in mensuration and physics cannot divest them of that rigid severity which pervades their very essence. The *labor ipse voluptas* in this discipline comes from the consciousness of power and from skill in invention. Upon the principles of the advocates for useful studies the mathematics should not be enforced at all. But even on the principle that many studies are valuable chiefly as a gymnastic—"the *grindstone* theory," as Mr. Atkinson calls it—it deserves to be considered whether the mathematics are not carried too far for their highest efficiency in a general course; whether excessive tediousness and painful drudgery are not sometimes the effects of driving a class into too minute calculations, or vexing them with manifold problems. The *too much* is better than the *too little*, but the danger is that a factitious importance may be attached to these studies which is derived from the axiomatic assumptions of the self-styled men of science that the mathematics are for no reason to be curtailed—that the more the student has of their abstractions the more concrete, practical, and useful is his training. The students not looking at the matter from this point of view, may not be animated with a kindred enthusiasm for a period indefinitely long. We advocate most

earnestly an enforced and a rigorous mathematical discipline, but in a course of general education we would not have it uselessly or injuriously prolonged. Let it terminate when its best disciplinary work is done. The college is not bound to yield to the exactions of the scientists, and prepare all its pupils for the *principia* of Newton or the calculations of Laplace.

The drill-work of classical study may also be exchanged by degrees for those higher enjoyments to which the ancient writers invite when their works are read as literature, or are studied with logical or æsthetic analysis, or are recited with a distinct regard to rhetorical praxis and improvement. Here the question presents itself, whether mere grammatical analysis has not been pushed to a one-sided extreme so as to be over-refined, unnecessarily complicated, and unreasonably prolonged; whether in the modern form in which it is taught, it is not both prematurely enforced and unwisely continued; and whether the importance which is attached to it has not seriously interfered with some more important benefits which might be derived from another method of classical study. We speak of the modern form of classical grammar, and we refer to those etymological analyses and constructions which are better fitted to interest comparative philologists than tyros in the Latin and Greek derivations and paradigms, and to those syntactical rules which are more easily followed by the philosophical grammarian or the metaphysical student of language, than they can be by the less advanced pupil. The modern system is immensely superior to the ancient in its gymnastic results, and, indeed, to those who can compass it, in its logical and psychological discipline. But it is an open question which we desire may be definitely proposed and thoroughly discussed, whether the gymnastic is not sometimes premature and over-driven, and whether in some of its consequences it does not supersede very important influences of classical study, as well as weaken faith in, and enthusiasm for, classical study itself.

Prof. Francis Bowen's remarks upon this point seem eminently worthy of attention. "Formerly we studied grammar in order to read the classics; nowadays the classics seem to be studied as a means of learning grammar. Surely a more

effectual means could not have been invented of rendering the pupil insensible to the beauties of the ancient poets, orators, and historians, of inspiring disgust alike with Homer and Virgil, Xenophon and Tacitus, than to make their words mere pegs on which to hang long disquisitions on the latest refinements in philology, and elaborate attempts to systematize euphonic changes and other free developments of stems and roots." "Classical learning seems to me to have steadily declined in this country of late years, in respect both to the numbers of its votaries and to its estimation with the public at large, just in proportion as its professors and teachers have diminished the time and effort bestowed on reading the classics, in order to enforce more minute attention to the mysteries of Greek accentuation and the metaphysics of the subjunctive mood." *Classical Studies*, pp. 23, 24.

The protest in Great Britain is equally earnest and strong against the use of a cumbrous grammar—whether the old or the new—at the beginning of the study of Latin and Greek, and the continuance of this use so as to displace the extensive reading of classical authors and the acquisition of a copious vocabulary of Greek and Latin words. In the opinion of many, the cause of classical learning is brought into serious danger from the two-fold exposure to verse composition and what is called "high grammar." Matthew Arnold insists that as the result of the present discussions, "for the mass of boys the Latin and Greek composition will be limited as we now limit our French, Italian, and German composition, to the exercises of translation auxiliary to acquiring any knowledge soundly; and the verbal scholarship will be limited to learning the elementary grammar and common forms and laws of the language with a thoroughness which cannot be too exact, and which may easily be more exact than that which we now attain with our much more ambitious grammatical studies." *Schools and Universities, etc.*, p. 266.

In the best American colleges the grammatical analysis is far more minute, comprehensive, and philosophical than it was a generation ago. No one can doubt that as a gymnastic it is far more efficient, and that the student brings away from it a far more perfect discipline, as well as a better grounded

knowledge of the history and structure of the languages themselves. This discipline has been of immense service to those who have taught the languages to others, as well as to all who have proceeded to the study of special or general philology. It is questionable, however, whether it has conduced to a better knowledge of the Latin and Greek literature, or to a warmer enthusiasm for the reading of the ancient authors. It is contended by its defenders that the decline of zeal and activity in these directions is owing to other causes; among which the modern methods of teaching cannot be enumerated. We will not discuss the question here. We observe, however, that since the introduction of the modern system, the lessons in the classics have been materially shortened, and the use of translations has become frightfully prevalent. The lessons must be short, if the whole of each is to be *analyzed* by the student in the class-room. The construing of a short lesson can be easily mastered by the aid of a translation. On the other hand, to read several pages with a translation is onerous, and the indolent and self-indulgent would soon find that it saves little, if any, labor. The superior scholars are soon at home in the more frequently recurring relations of etymology and syntax, and they readily master the short exercises for translation, whether they do or do not resort to an English version. As a consequence, after they reach a certain point of attainment their energies are occupied in other directions. They either tire of classical study, or fail to be inspired with a high literary interest in it. The scholars of a middling rank use translations without scruple, and expend their chief energies upon the ever recurring analysis. By dint of effort they, in a sort, master it, but it is at the sacrifice of what, at a certain stage of the mind's development, is of greater importance to the general scholar. The dull labor on in the same painful round, with scarce a gleam of light. Poor fellows! *They* get little comfort from the grammar, but perhaps they might learn to read their "small Latin and less Greek" with some satisfaction, if there were more of both assigned them. The negligent rely on their tact at improvising, being guided by familiarity with the teacher's oft returning questions, and hastily run over the short lesson of the day with the

help of an English version. Our own opinion is a layman's, and we offer it with diffidence. We would like however that the following experiment should be fairly tried. Let the time of short lessons and of special analysis terminate with the Freshman year or a little later. To grammatical exercises, as a chief matter, and the hopelessly dull or willfully negligent who have failed thoroughly to master them, we would say, "There is a time for all things; the grammar has had its chance for you, and you have had your chance at the grammar." Let both go their own way. They must give way to something better: *χαρέρωσαν*. For the remainder of the course let the lessons be very long in comparatively easy Latin and Greek authors. Let them be so long that the use of translations should be either superfluous or even burdensome. Let the "*ponies*" and the "*pigmies*" who ride upon them, be fairly drowned out by the quantity of the text which is given out to be read. Let the attention be directed to the import of the matter, to the logical connections and transitions of the thoughts, to the peculiarities of diction and to a constant praxis in felicitous and idiomatic English rendering; the possibility being always held in reserve and not sparingly applied, of exposing presumption and neglect by test questions in respect to grammar or meaning. Let the examinations be close upon the instructions and analyses of the teacher, and let rapid and current reading be encouraged, with frequent reviews, for the sake of enlarging one's vocabulary. Let reading by phrases and by the eye, without reconstructing the words after the English order, be recommended and enforced. Let an intellectual spirit, and an æsthetic feeling for the peculiarities in thought and diction of the author read, be earnestly fostered. It seems to us that the experiment deserves to be tried, and that it could not fail to be attended with gratifying success. Should this experiment be thought too radical, it might be tried occasionally, by giving up to it the whole or part of a college term. Or after the end of the Freshman year the two descriptions of lessons and examinations might be interchanged; longer or shorter periods being allotted to each, at the instructor's discretion.

The question also deserves to be considered whether the interests of classical education have not suffered very seriously by

commencing the study of Latin and Greek too early, and thus burdening the school and college life with a sense of tedium and monotony inseparable from early school lessons in languages remote from familiar associations, and from the continuance of lessons in the same language for a period of ten or twelve years. If these studies were delayed to the ages of fourteen or fifteen, and meanwhile the youths were thoroughly drilled in a single living language, and taught to write and speak it correctly and readily, the Latin and Greek themselves would be commenced with very great advantage, and would be prosecuted with a far more intelligent and freshened interest. We are quite certain, that, so far as the objections to the study of the classics have any show of reason, they are derived from imperfect methods of teaching and studying. Such objections can be effectually answered by a change in these methods; and he is the truest friend to classical culture and college discipline who holds himself ready to consider how far such changes are expedient or practicable. Our earnest interest in this matter arises from our desire that a new enthusiasm may be kindled in classical studies. We are especially earnest that the taste for Greek literature, and the interest in the Greek language, should be fostered in the colleges of this country, as one of the essential conditions of a generous and refined culture. The Latin language is so much more perfectly mastered as to need less fostering care.

We are also somewhat alarmed at the spirit of mere routine and mechanical study for present effect in the class and examination room, which seems to be on the increase in our colleges, especially in the oldest and the best. We regard with some anxiety the decay of the enthusiasm in study, and of the love of knowledge for its own sake which seem to attend the operation of the college system. We had intended to discuss this as a separate topic among several others which are appropriate to our theme. But it properly belongs to the consideration of general rather than of special instruction. This subject, with the others of which we had intended to treat, cannot be included within the limits of this Article, and must be deferred to another occasion, if they are discussed at all.

ARTICLE V.—PROF. PORTER'S WORK ON THE HUMAN INTELLECT.

The Human Intellect: with an Introduction upon Psychology and the Soul. By NOAH PORTER, D. D., Clark Professor of Moral Philosophy and Metaphysics in Yale College. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1868. 8vo. pp. 673.

WE hail, with great interest, the publication of an extended treatise by Prof. Porter of Yale College, on the fundamental subject of Psychology.

Such a work, by any competent and careful writer, is always a valuable contribution to the improvement of the public mind; but those who are at all acquainted with the peculiar fitness of Prof. Porter for the task will rejoice that he has attempted it; and will look with confidence for some results of unusual value from the effort.

It is seldom that a successful book of this kind can be the unaided result of individual effort. The difficulties of the work are too great to be overcome by any single hand. The distinctions involved are too numerous, their degrees of importance too varied, their character too subtle, to be all noted, estimated, and discerned aright, from the stand-point of any one observer. Hence philosophy is always written, not so much by individuals, as by schools. Some great and keen observer of intellectual phenomena, impressed with the inadequacy of previous philosophies to express the truths which he so deeply feels in the recesses of his own consciousness, labors after some modes of conceiving them which shall better accomplish the end. Some new forms of thought, or of expression, are adopted,—some improved terminology is devised,—some keener analysis is attempted,—some bolder assertion is ventured. The laboring student prosecutes his analysis to a greater completeness than before, calls in question accepted errors,—gives new prominence to forgotten truths,—and thus builds up a new system of philosophy that startles the

world with the promise of a more happy adjustment of the old disputes.

But how inadequate is the achievement! The new principles are still only imperfectly conceived, even by their author. His accepted rules of philosophizing are only partially carried out; his best distinctions are only half applied. The new system is not, after all, new; it is only an incongruous compromise between the new and the old—new cloth upon the old garment with which our poor humanity was covering its nakedness. Some acute disciple of the new scheme soon discovers the incongruity, and makes haste to supply the defects of his master. He makes wider applications of the novel analysis, gives additional extension to the principles of the system, and enables the world to form a better estimate of its value. Some of his master's eager claims are abandoned as injudicious, some of his concessions are repudiated as unnecessary. The system gathers a consistency which it had lacked before; it begins to present itself in a more complete form. Still, the work is unfinished. Another, and another, disciple arise to carry it on, until, at last, the obscurities are explained, the inconsistencies are removed, and the system stands forth in its full distinctness. A definite judgment can at length be formed of it; and the truth which had at first alarmed by its strange and uncouth form, or which had startled by its lofty pretensions, now, seen in its true garb, and reduced to its proper dimensions, is estimated at its real value; and finds its place in the rising edifice of knowledge.

Something like this history has characterized the advance of the thinking which has now culminated in the philosophical work of Prof. Porter. The best thinking of New England for a hundred years past, is embodied in it. The religious controversies, of which the great Edwards was the originator, were largely philosophical in their character, and stimulated inquiry and provoked opposition, among a large body of writers, scattered widely over the land. The system of the father was energetically defended by the son; and the long residence of the latter at New Haven tended to concentrate and deepen philosophical inquiry there. Active opposition was not wanting, to show the inadequacy of the vindications

which were offered as satisfactory, and to enforce concessions which had at first been really, though not nominally, withheld. The mantle of the younger Edwards fell upon his nephew and pupil, the eminent Dr. Dwight, who came to Yale College as its president in the same year in which the former left the city; and who, with increased liberality of thought, and increased breadth and justness of view, maintained the discussion. The philosophical interest of Dwight was imparted to his pupil, Dr. Taylor, and was by him carried out, with a beautiful enthusiasm, over a far wider field of investigation. At first wholly theological, it gradually became more comprehensive and extended, till many of the most important principles of psychology had received from his penetrating and just appreciation, an elucidation which placed them in a light far more clear than had ever illuminated them before in all the history of speculation. The legacy of his principles and methods, Dr. Taylor left to his son-in-law, the author of the volume before us; and many a pregnant view of philosophical or logical truth, and many a form of keen and pointed expression, throughout the work, attest the faithfulness with which the charge has been appreciated, and the success with which those principles have been applied.

Prof. Porter, however, with whatever cordial appreciation of the labors of his predecessors, is no servile imitator; nor had previous investigation so occupied the ground as to create any embarrassments in the way of his independent investigation. All previous inquiries of this school had been essentially theological; if not exclusively so in their own nature, yet designedly so in their bearing. It remained for him, in the light of whatever principles his predecessors might have truly conceived, to sally forth from the narrower range of theological speculation, and shape his course across the open sea of metaphysical inquiry.

To do this, however, with any hope of success, demanded an education more comprehensive than the narrow discipline of any school could at all supply; and Prof. Porter has well understood the demand. To whatever traditional advantages he may have inherited, he has conscientiously added those of the widest and most varied culture. Appreciating

most fully the distracted condition of philosophical opinion, amid the conflicting views of so many opposing schools, in every thinking nation, he has aimed to fit himself for his task by a complete acquaintance with them all. He has familiarized himself with the German philosophical style and literature, till its most crabbed works are easy to him. Every school of thinkers he has followed in its inquiries, with a patience and profundity of research which have made him fully master of its views. From the earliest to the latest of metaphysical systems, he has unshrinkingly pursued his course, penetrating to whatever secret of truth each one of them might possess, and never leaving it till he had fully appreciated what had stimulated inquiry and encouraged hope among the profound thinkers of the past. He has grappled with each sturdy disputant of our own day in England, and questioned each shadowy spectre that the psychological sorcery of Germany has evoked "from the vasty deep" of metaphysics; and this goodly volume presents us with the results of his labors.

And truly the twelve labors of a Hercules are in it—not one wanting. Here he engages, single handed, some lion or boar that has been wont to range destructively over fair pastures of truth; there he turns the full stream of his acute criticism upon some foul stable where unclean metaphysical cattle have been long heaping up impurities, and sweeps away the whole noxious accumulation; and again, he slays some monster that has been wont to destroy our maidens and our youths, without remorse. No labor has he shunned, and no conflict has he evaded. By honest toil among original authorities, he has possessed himself of whatever truth has yet been given to the world, and understood and mastered whatever error might lurk under its shadow; and he has here given us a singularly brief, clear, and valuable statement of the views of the world's great thinkers, with a logical and philosophical estimate of each, that forms a most useful manual to students of philosophy in gaining an acquaintance with theories, and, at the same time, affords a guidance to opinion that must prove of the highest value in winning the public mind to an acceptance of right views.

But it is time that we should give our readers some particular account of the structure and contents of the book itself.

For the method of the author, then, we may say that he refuses to range himself under the banner of any leader. Perhaps the most brief and comprehensive statement that we can make of his aim and method, is to say that he seeks to combine the merits of the two great schools of recent speculation—the Scotch and the German. He would unite the solid intelligence and the practical views of the one, with the exact method and the scientific aims of the other—the common sense of Hamilton with the critical spirit of Kant.

His philosophy, therefore, is essentially *inductive*. Its aim is, first of all, to ascertain the facts of human experience as given in consciousness. As a philosophy of fact and experience, it may fairly claim whatever of respect our age is wont to accord to that modest, simple, and exact, method, which has wrought such marvels in the study of nature, in every other department. Fundamentally, his is, therefore, a science of the observed facts of human experience.

But facts and phenomena are not the only elements of science. They must be subjected to the mind's most careful scrutiny, and be reduced to their fundamental and elementary terms. The facts thus determined must be classified by their resemblances and differences, and those more general truths developed which we call laws and principles. This orderly arrangement of the facts of the subject, when carried out over the whole range of intellectual phenomena, and elucidating whatever relations of connection and dependence may exist between them, will comply with every demand that inductive philosophy is wont to make of its votaries and must vindicate for the work which embodies it a legitimate claim to a high place among the achievements of science.

But the inductive philosophy, though furnishing the foundation, and the materials, of psychology, is unable to satisfy the demands of thought. Induction can, indeed, ascertain and generalize facts. It can recognize among them certain principles and laws. It can subject them to analysis and to combination. It can infer from a few ascertained particulars

the character of vast and unmeasured aggregates of truth. It can sometimes pronounce on an almost illimitable whole, from the inspection of a single part.

But of the reasons of its processes, it can give no account. They are not inductively ascertained, and cannot be inductively vindicated. The methods and laws by which the mind proceeds in its sweeping generalizations, induction cannot explain. Something more, then, than induction, is necessary to a philosophy which shall compass the explanation of the great principles of scientific belief, and vindicate their justice and authority.

Hence, a new step is indicated in the progress of knowledge. The mind which thus, by some necessity of its thinking, imposes its own forms of conception in the shape of laws, upon the phenomena, next turns its attention to the processes it is employing, and to its methods of employing them. It questions itself in respect to its own principles of procedure. It is unsatisfied in philosophy, however it may rest satisfied in science, with mere facts and laws; it demands, moreover, an account of the grounds on which its very principles rest,—on which its laws themselves are constructed.

Here, then, psychology rises beyond the level of any mere induction, and seeks to give the adequate vindication of the principles of induction itself. It is no longer inductive, but intuitive. Its methods are no longer scientific merely, they are critical. Psychology takes science itself—the very process of scientific coördination—the laws by which the scientific intelligence proceeds, for its subject matter; and it reaches its highest attainable point in giving a rational account of these, and in critically analyzing, to their ultimate elements, the assumptions on which inductions can only humbly proceed.

This philosophical method our author vindicates against the loose and unscientific procedures which sometimes assume to guide psychology, on the one side, and also against the more pretentious methods that set up their claims upon the other. He refers to the metaphysical or constructive philosophy, as it has been called, which attempts to establish a psychology, not by induction, but wholly without its aid. Such are the favorite methods of Germany, methods which have given us the

whole philosophical system of Kant, not as a direct psychological investigation, but as an answer to the inquiry, how synthetic judgments *a priori* are possible—and the yet wider system of Hegel, not as a coördination of observed facts, but as the result of an abstruse metaphysical theory of the development of the conception. These systems—as every system must, which does not rest on the observed facts of consciousness—involve fundamental errors or weaknesses which vitiate their most elaborate processes of logic, and prevent the establishment of a sound and trustworthy philosophy of the intellect.

In his application of this method to the facts of the human mind, Prof. Porter first enters upon a discussion of the physiological relations of the subject, or the relations of the mind to matter. A full presentation of the arguments for, and against, materialism, places the student in a position to form an intelligent and satisfactory judgment upon the question of the materiality or immateriality of the soul. This is followed by a succinct but full account of the relations of the soul to life and living beings, an account which sums up all that is most important in the recent discussions of that subject. The doctrine of a vital force distinct from chemical and mechanical forces, is maintained, in a thorough review of all that the most recent determinations of physiology can offer at present on the subject. Professor Porter shows that it has hitherto proved impossible for physiology to devise any method of conceiving of the great facts of life, which does not recognize and employ the conception of a vital force as a distinct and independent agency. He shows that Herbert Spencer is reduced to the necessity of assuming "*physiological units*," and Carpenter of assuming a capacity in all matter for "*organization*;" terms which imply the existence of some force not reducible to the category of chemical and mechanical forces, and wholly incapable of explanation.

This extended and minute discussion will prove highly interesting and satisfactory to advanced students of the subject, and will furnish to all the opponents of the doctrine occasion for earnest thought. It is not, however, adapted for beginners, and our author has therefore placed it in a fine print at

the close of his more general discussion. This plan, indeed, he has adopted throughout the treatise. The general statements are presented in a large type; the illustration of them in a less conspicuous one; and the detailed, and often controversial, discussion of specific points, in a yet finer type. The beginner has thus before him the main points—those to which his attention is to be particularly devoted—in a conspicuous form, and can pursue his study of them as far into detail as he finds needful, while the advanced student can follow the author into the full statement of his views. The work is thus adapted both for a college text-book and for a philosophical discussion of views.

A valuable feature of the work is found in the author's treatment of the topic of consciousness.

This he regards as two-fold—a primary and a secondary—or the spontaneous, and the reflective, consciousness.

This distinction, though long since recognized, has fallen into neglect among recent writers. Hamilton, in his discussion of the subject, first characterizes consciousness as an immediate knowledge of truth as existing; and then states that it involves memory, since without this the states of the mind could not be classified, and referred to the self. It is evident, however, that these two positions are mutually irreconcilable. Consciousness cannot be a knowledge both of that which is immediately present, and of that which is absolutely past. The statement itself is contradictory.

And yet, in some important sense, these two conflicting views are both alike sound. There is a consciousness which is original and spontaneous, and which is coexistent with the fleeting phenomena of the mind as they take place; and there is a reflective consciousness, which recalls in memory the states of the former, and classifies, compares, and refers them to their source. This latter, however, must, as a knowledge of the past, be carefully distinguished from the real and vital consciousness, which accompanies every act of the mind. The one is momentary, as transient as the fleeting states which it attests. It gives the facts of our experience truly, but only for an instant. In the moment in which we fix our attention upon them, they are gone. Yet they are not utterly gone—

memory can recall, with more or less distinctness, with more or less truthfulness, these fugitive states of our experience; imagination can re-create them, the understanding can digest and arrange them, and from all this labor shall come forth a true, and exact, and ultimately, a complete, representation of the original experience. All that can be represented thus, however, by any one mind, is not the original consciousness of any state, but that which he can recall of it; and this, like memory in other cases, however truthful it may be, is ever inadequate. No one of these experiences, which move across the field of our vision more swiftly than the lightning's flash, can ever be recalled in its whole detail. Something of it—its chief and characteristic features—indeed, we may, and do, reproduce; but even when we do so, it is often in a false order of the phenomena. Hence, the original consciousness, though truthfully giving us all the phenomena of intellectual action, is not within reach of our philosophy. We can but follow at a distance, note the successive flashes which illumine, one by one, the several points of our mental horizon, and draw up, by a labored recollection and imperfect reproduction of our experience, a complete representation of the original.

Now, it is evident that the process of such a philosophical construction is something entirely different from the spontaneous and full, but momentary, consciousness of our original experience. It differs from that original in the great features that it is always fallible, and often mistaken. What, then, is to be thought of a philosophy which, while basing all its doctrines upon consciousness as our only authority, neglects to discriminate between two such different aspects of it, and which builds with this artificial consciousness of memory, as though it were the living and real consciousness of the present moment? Such, however, has been the habit of most of our recent psychological writers—a habit which accounts for some of the weakness of speculation, and for much of the distrust with which speculation is habitually received.

Professor Porter, as we have said, recognizes fully the distinction which we have described, and estimates it at its true value. He draws out the distinguishing characteristics of

these two forms of consciousness, at some length, and with much distinctness; and thus one of the distinctions most fundamental to a sound philosophy of the mind, receives, in his exhibition of it, a clearer and more complete elucidation than has anywhere else been given to it.

In his general grouping of the human faculties, Professor Porter, with most recent writers, discards the old division into the Intellectual and Active powers, and adopts a three-fold division into the powers of Intellect, Feeling, and Will. These, however, he distinguishes somewhat differently from Hamilton, who combines Desire and Will in the third of these groups, under the name of the Conative Faculties. This unfamiliar and unhappy adjustment, which makes the involuntary desire, and the absolutely free choice, to be faculties of the same order, carries its condemnation with it in the outlandish designation which Hamilton gave it. He complains that we have no accepted word to designate the group, and after exhausting the Greek and Latin nomenclatures in his vain search for a name, he can only fall back upon a translation of the cumbrous German, "*Bestrebungs-Vermögen*," the Anglicized reproduction of which gives him the name "conative faculties."

The fact, however, that our language furnishes no name for this grouping of faculties, ought to have suggested to him the idea that the group is not a natural one. Had it been a classification of real value, and of closely related facts, the human mind could not have failed to recognize it. As well might a zoölogist complain that we have no word to designate the group which consists of the Ruminants and the Carnivora; the only reason that we have no such name is that there is no such group. The combination is a wholly artificial one. This artificial connection of faculties, which it is of the highest consequence to distinguish from each other, we are glad that Professor Porter rejects, though the scope of his volume does not lead him to dwell upon the distinction.

In his classification of the properly intellectual faculties, our author follows Hamilton, though again with considerable diversity. After the Presentative Faculty, or the power of original knowledge through the senses, Hamilton has arranged

as coördinate, the Conservative or Retentive, the Reproductive, and the Representative Faculties. The distinctions, however, between them he was unable satisfactorily to vindicate. It is difficult to understand a faculty of Retention which is so entirely distinct from all reproduction of thought that it acts not in consciousness, but outside of it; and Professor Porter's keen analysis presents an additional view which decisively forbids the recognition of it. When a state of our experience is reproduced, however we may call it the same, it is not really so. It is never truly the same, but only a similar state, which we recall. As we cannot then reproduce, in literal truth, any state of the past, it is impossible that we can have retained it; and so the alleged fact of a distinctively retentive faculty vanishes at once.

This supposed faculty of Retention, therefore, together with those of Reproduction and Representation, our author combines under the general name of the Representative, a comprehensive faculty of which Memory and Imagination are simply distinct species.

Subsequently to this, we have the Elaborative faculty, or the faculty of *thought*, that which generalizes, classifies, and systematizes knowledge, in its two great forms of *dianoetic* and *noetic*. The former is that which gives us knowledge through the medium of intervening conceptions—the reasoning power; while the latter is that which furnishes the great intuitions that supply the laws and conceptions which govern the understanding in its work—the Regulative faculty of Hamilton.

In discussing the first of these comprehensive divisions—the Presentative Faculty—Professor Porter enters into an elaborate account of the process of the mind in sense-perception. His account of this subject is very minute and extended, and carries the analysis of the phenomena to great completeness. Prominent among the conditions of perception, is the activity of the mind itself, as the great agent in the process. However the proper antecedents of sensation may affect the physical organ through which perception takes place, there is no result in consciousness without the essential condition of an active exercise of the mind itself. Sense-perception, in every form, is an effect of the mind's own activity, exerted upon materials

supplied by the impress of external objects upon the organs of the body, and particularly upon the nervous system. The striking of the clock, or the tread of passing footsteps, is unheard by the student absorbed in his books; the fatigue of standing is unperceived by the hearer entranced by the orator; even the pain of a wound is unfelt by the soldier excited by the interest of a battle. Unless the mind is in a condition to direct its own attention to the physical antecedents of sense-perception, there is no sensation, and no perception, no translation of those physical conditions into the peculiar and characteristic phenomena of knowledge or thought.

This principle was very distinctly recognized by Dr. Reid, as it had also been by others before him, and with great justness of appreciation in some of its important applications. Its value as a psychological principle is very great. In the more advanced regions of metaphysics it can hardly be overestimated. It is of the highest importance in the elucidation of our idea of causation, and in this relation it has been amply recognized and insisted upon by the better class of the French psychologists, particularly Royer Collard and Maine de Biran. But in this important application to the philosophy of sense-perception, it has received from recent writers scarcely any adequate acknowledgment. The truth is one which it is impossible to deny, when clearly presented, yet scarcely any one of our current treatises makes any distinct allusion to it. The general strain of speculation quietly assumes and repeats that in sensation the mind is passive—a simple recipient of impressions from without. Whole schools of materialistic philosophers, reasoning upon the recent views of the doctrine of forces, coolly construct their theories upon the assumption that external impression is the whole and sole cause, and affords a sufficient explanation, of the phenomena of perception. Other schools hold a physiological view, which accounts for the phenomena of thought, by the growth and modification of nerve cells in the brain: such are Herbert Spencer and Bain. Others, again, like Herbart in Germany, adopt a purely spiritual scheme of the associational philosophy, which, denying all powers or activities in the soul itself, considers thought only a reaction within us against the

impression of objects without, and explains our psychical phenomena by the varieties of combination which arise among similar reactions.

Now, the sufficient answer to all these systems is found in the truth that the mind is an active originator of knowledge and thought, and that all its intellectual states are the products of this, its great and characteristic spiritual endowment. The conception is one of varied applications and of the highest value, and Professor Porter will have performed a service of the utmost utility, if he succeeds in making it familiar.

In pursuing his analysis of the subject, the author enters into a detailed account of the process, the growth and development, and the results in knowledge, of sense-perception. He finds in sensation not only a feeling, or subjective state of pleasure or pain, but a state of knowledge also. We not only feel, but know, in every sensation. The phenomenon is connected with our nervous organization called the sensorium, and every sensation involves a certain knowledge of the soul as connected with this material structure. Moreover, the mind necessarily locates its sensations, fixes them in some definite part of this organism, and these facts give us a knowledge of space relations in sensation.

In perception proper there is more than this. There is always an objective knowledge of the *non-ego*. This latter element—the *non-ego*—is distinguished into several kinds: there is first, the sensorium, the organism of nerves, connected with the body, which is distinct from the pure spirit; there is the body, which is distinguished from the sensorium as something more external; and there is the outer world of matter. The analysis which discriminates, with constant care of accuracy, between these closely related *non-egos*, is a marvel of nicety, and requires a constant stretch of attention to follow it.

The *non-ego* known in perception proper is, however, the same which is known in sensation—the extended sensorium. The difference is, that while in sensation we know the organism as affected, we know the mind as *sentient*; in perception we know the same organism only, but the mind knows itself

as *percipient*. The distinction is, perhaps, rather shadowy, and will hardly be recognized without some patient reflection.

In common with Hamilton and McCosh in England, and with Müller and the physiologists in Germany, Professor Porter confines our original knowledge of the *non-ego* to a knowledge of our own sensorium, as affected in sensation; and makes all our specific knowledge of external objects to consist in what have been called the *acquired perceptions*. The large and constantly increasing field assigned, in modern psychology, to this method of knowing, here reaches its limit. It becomes probable that the original element of all our knowledge of the outer world, does not involve even the smallest perception of anything external to ourselves, but only of that extended sensorium in which the mind and the body are conjoined. All our knowledge of anything beyond this, is the result of processes of observation and induction, carried on in our earliest years, and gradually advancing from the smallest conceivable minimum of distinct knowledge in an infant's consciousness, through discriminations of constantly increasing power and extent, to the distinct cognition of the visible realities which surround us. The complex process by which this vast structure of knowledge is built up upon its obscure and hidden foundation, is traced with the keenest analysis and the most patient thought, till the completed result stands fully before us. We are told, in the light of the best physiological researches, how the obscure muscular and vital sensations, which take place within us, and whose very existence has been but recently recognized in our analysis, give to the infant the fundamental knowledge of its own sensorium; how subsequently it comes to distinguish, by touch, the existence and extent of its own body; how it passes from this to the recognition of another *non-ego*, which, though extended, like the body, is wholly external, and gives no answering sensation when touched by the hand, as every part of the body infallibly does; how it learns to recognize visibly its own hands, the measures of all its other knowledge of distance or depth; how from the measure of the hand and the body, combined with the intimations of color and form given to the sight, it learns

to set up a field of view, in which near objects take their appropriate places; how another, and another, acquisition of the same kind, enable it gradually to extend its visual perceptions to remoter distances; till, at length, the whole landscape, to the far horizon, is intelligibly conceived and projected before it, and the mind learning how to use one class of perceptions to supply the defects of another, becomes so prompt and rapid in judging, that the acquired perceptions of sight, of sound, and of smell, can hardly be distinguished from the original, and the external world asserts its reality, and displays its character, with complete distinctness, and with irresistible power, to us.

This account of sense-perception, the most extended and elaborate which our English philosophy contains, is followed by a critical history of speculative opinion on this topic. The author sketches, in a brief summary, the whole literature of the subject, from the early Greek philosophers to those of the present time; and notes the advancing clearness of opinion which marks the history, together with the erroneous suggestions which have come in at different periods to mislead speculation. As he comes down to the writers of our own time, his expositions become more full; and every great writer who has influenced philosophic views is critically expounded and weighed. The chapter gives a most interesting and lucid statement of all the important theories; and affords to the student an intelligent estimate which is of the highest value. It condenses into a brief compass an amount of learning which is second only to that of Hamilton; and displays a vigor of grasp which must give the author a very high rank among our philosophic authorities.

This discussion of sense-perception is followed by an equally complete account of the memory and the imagination, as parts of the great Representative faculty. The account is full and clear, and discriminates usefully the several principles by which, as some say, ideas are associated in the mind, but as our author prefers to say, the mind associates ideas. This mode of conceiving still keeps prominent the activity of the mind in the process; though in some of his expressions relating to the phantasy or lower form of imagination, the idea

of a passivity seems to be expressed in a way not quite consistent with that leading conception. There is, we believe, a mental activity in exercise, even when the pictures of external things pass dreamily before the mind's listless eye, no less than when the mind nerves itself for effort, and labors to adjust and complete some difficult conception. But this is a minor matter.

This discussion of the reproduction of the ideas of our sense-perception, is followed by another, in which the author gives account of the process of elaborative thought. This, too, is very comprehensive. He describes the process by which the mind forms *concepts*, or universal ideas. Sense-perception gives us only individual objects, and the representative faculty can only reproduce these; before our knowledge can rise to its highest forms, these ideas need to be generalized, so as to represent not individuals, but classes of things. The process by which our more elementary knowledge undergoes this fruitful change, is described at length, the nature of the concept fully explained, and its use in reasoning pointed out with great clearness.

Professor Porter here enters into a careful discussion of the nature of the reasoning process, both deductive and inductive; and holds a vigorous argument with Mr. John Stuart Mill. It will be remembered that Mill maintains a peculiar view of the syllogism, and contends that we do not, in deduction, derive a particular conclusion from a general truth; but that the general truth is only the formula, according to which we have drawn particular conclusions before, and may at any time do so again. The truth that "all men are mortal," is not a general truth from which we derive the specific truth that "A. B. is mortal;" because we can know enough to affirm that all men are mortal, only by recognizing previously the mortality of each individual. In opposition to this view, our author shows that the basis of deduction is quite different from either of those which are here suggested. We do not infer, either, according to a mere general formula, or from a mere general fact; but upon the conviction of a reality which goes much deeper into the nature of things. The judgments that "all swans are white," and that "all swans eat," were at one time equally true in the experience of men; but the latter

rests on a basis of conviction very different from that which supports the former. We may call it the relation of premise to conclusion; that reason which governs thought. We infer that the swan of Australia will eat, with a confidence with which we cannot infer that it is white. The ground of this certainty of assurance lies in the fact of our belief that a casual relation is expressed in the general truth. Without this, inference must always be uncertain. The truth that "all magnets attract iron," means more when employed in reasoning, than it explicitly declares. It is taken to mean that there is a causative connection between the two terms, which gives a validity to the syllogism by which we conclude from the universal to the particular truth, that "this magnet attracts iron."

In regard to induction, our author maintains a similar controversy with the same great school of thinkers. He endeavors to show—as indeed Mr. Mill's concessions render it quite practicable to show—that upon the current theory of induction, which views it as the mere registration of phenomena, it is quite impossible to give any satisfactory account of the process. The inductive philosopher is evermore compelled to assume premises which affirm the uniformity of all the operations of nature, and the unvarying similarity of that future of which we can have had no experience, to the familiar past of our knowledge. In assigning causes, he is obliged to assume a law of parsimony, for which he can show no reason. That uniformity of operation which his principles assert, must be believed, before any induction can be made; when causes are suggested, the one simple cause is to be preferred to the many conspiring or conflicting ones. Why these assumptions are always to be made, the inductive reasoner cannot explain. It sometimes happens that a universal conclusion rests absolutely upon a single observation. Only one specimen of a mineral is analyzed to determine the chemical composition, only one crystal is measured, to decide the form, of all the individuals of a new species. The specific characters of a new animal or plant are confidently announced from an examination of a single individual. Even when numerous observations have been made to ascertain a truth, the objection yet remains

that but a few of the innumerable facts of nature have been accurately examined; and that it is only by assuming that those which have been investigated are types of all the rest, that we can extend our conclusion a single step beyond our enumeration of particulars. In all cases, the general uniformity of nature has to be postulated, before the inductive process can be made available for an extension of our knowledge beyond the limits of our actual observation.

Now, of this principle, on which induction absolutely rests, it can offer no vindication. Every inductive generalization of science arises from it, and depends upon it. The principle itself is wholly incapable, therefore, of inductive proof. The inductive reasoner must find the vindication of his philosophy, outside of the limits of his science; and in philosophical principles wholly different from those that induction can establish.

Such principles Prof. Porter endeavors to point out. He maintains that we have a belief of causation in nature; and that on this ground we are able at once to affirm the universality of nature's operations. The same cause will of course produce the same effects; and when we have once established the causal connection between an antecedent and a group of phenomena, we are abundantly justified in extending our conclusion to all similar causes throughout the realm of nature. In the same manner, we believe in an intelligent author of nature, whose operations are intelligible to us on the ground of the similarity of our intellectual natures to His. As our intelligence always prefers few and simple arrangements to more complicated ones, we attribute the same intelligent preference to Him as the guiding principle of His great operations. We are thus enabled to vindicate our preference of the few and simple, over the supposition of many and involved causes; and to justify those methods of procedure to which scientific induction owes the whole possibility of its achievements, but which it is unable to vindicate.

The whole discussion of the reasoning process is full of acute discrimination, and will do much both to suggest inquiry and to disseminate just views.

The account upon which our author next enters, "of Intui-

tions and of Intuitive Knowledge," constitutes, perhaps, the distinguishing feature of the work. The great importance of the subject, embracing as it does the fundamental principles of human knowledge and belief,—the confused and unscientific state of opinion, even among thinkers of generally just views,—and the vehement opposition of what is perhaps the most active and persistent school of English psychologists,—all contribute to impart great interest to the discussion. Prof. Porter aims not only to enumerate the several truths which may be affirmed as intuitions, but to give to the whole discussion a strictly scientific character, by the employment of those critical methods which constitute the highest form of philosophical knowledge. He shows that there are—recognized under a great variety of names, and in all the history of philosophy—certain primary, fundamental judgments of our intelligence, which we term first principles. These judgments are not first in the chronological order of our acquisitions, nor are they ultimates to which we can trace back, as to original premises, all our reasoning; they are principles which stand "*first in the order of rational or logical importance*;" and are distinguished as original, necessary, and universal,—qualities which serve as criteria to test their reality.

He then proceeds to show the method of their development in the mind. Reverting to one of the earlier determinations of the work, he reminds us that all knowledge is a knowledge of *Being*, and of its *relations*; that is, of some existing thing, together with the circumstances which serve to distinguish it from other things. The process of our knowing is then sketched analytically as follows:

First, we know certain concrete and individual things; next, we know them under relations of form, color, properties, means, ends, &c.; then, we abstract and generalize, and know the relations by themselves, as roundness, redness, past and future, power, adaptation; further, we critically examine the process of generalization itself, and thus discern these relations to be the fundamental elements of all philosophical or scientific knowledge; and lastly, we know the correlated objects of these relations, the infinites of space and time, and the absolutes of causation and adaptation.

Our author then tests these ultimates, and determines them to possess those characters of necessity and universality which are the proper criteria of primary truths.

Next follows a critical history of speculative opinion on this subject, which deals with all the modern theories of intuitive truth, particularly with those of Kant and Hamilton. He describes and censures by assumptions wholly groundless and gratuitous, the procedure by which these and other writers first exclude the possibility of any *knowledge* of these realities; and then endeavor to bring them back into our possession by a principle of *Faith*.

These intuitive truths, thus vindicated as of our absolute knowledge, are then classified as constituting three distinguishable groups, viz. the *Formal*, the *Mathematical*, and the *Real*.

Of these, the first, the Formal intuitions or categories, are those which enter into all forms of our knowledge. The first great idea is that of *being*, the most fundamental of all, as applicable to everything which exists, and the most abstract of all possible concepts. When conceived abstractly, it is wholly indeterminate; and can neither be defined nor represented by any image to the mind. For this reason it has been represented by Hegel as wholly void of content of meaning. His starting point is, that the conception of being in the abstract, is equal to *Nothing*. Against this view, Prof. Porter contends that the conception is not without signification; that it derives its meaning from the concrete things of which it is affirmed; and that it has really the most extensive meaning of all our conceptions, however it may be incapable of analysis. His strictures upon Hegel's view, and his indication of the point at which it wanders from the true conception of being, form a fine, ingenious criticism, and afford a happy and satisfactory reply to a great and pregnant error.

Other categories of the formal class are those of substance, and attribute, and of diversity, and identity.

The second class of categories, or the *Mathematical*, embraces the intuitions of Space and Time, in which bodies exist and endure. These conceptions give us the relations of *here* and *there*, of *now* and *then*; relations which become

generalized, and are affirmed of many objects. These concepts are discussed under two forms, as concepts of *magnitude*, with its elements of point, line, surface, solid, &c., and as concepts of *number*, with its elements of the unit, the sum, the difference, &c. The application of mathematical conceptions to material phenomena, is shown to take place, as Trendelenburg has proved, by means of motion.

Space and time are then shown to be infinite and unconditioned, while beings and events are limited and conditioned. These infinites cannot be conceived as limited, except in connection with extended bodies and occurring events, to which limitation of course belongs. Extension and duration cannot be conceived to pertain to Space and Time, *per se*, but only to objects and events. This truth, the author applies in a very instructive and useful way. He shows that the antinomies of Kant, and the contradictions of Hamilton, alleged to arise from our conception of these infinites, grow out of the attempt to construe space and time to the imagination, by means of conceptions of magnitude and duration, which do not belong to them. It is not out of the infinites themselves that such contradictions emerge, but out of the vain attempt to bring them under the measurements of quantity, under which we are wont to conceive of limited objects and events occurring in them.

Upon the third class, that of the *Real* Intuitions, Professor Porter bestows much attention. He announces the principle of Causation as follows: "Every event is produced by the act of some agent or agents, which, with respect to the effect, are called its cause or its causes." He reasserts the distinction which Mill has assailed, between a cause and the conditions of its activity, called occasions; tests the truth of his statements by the criteria of primary cognitions; vindicates the conception against the doctrine of a merely uniform sequence, as maintained by Hume and Mill; and discusses Hamilton's whole *Conspectus* of theories of Causation. The view of Maine de Biran, the most suggestive and accurate to be found in the whole range of speculation, is exhibited with some detail; and is accepted substantially as to the origin of the idea in our mental experience. The method, however, by

which that writer would extend the conception of causation from the sphere of our own experience, over the whole realm of nature, by a "natural induction," is not deemed satisfactory. It exhibits no sufficient ground for the transfer of the conception from the world within, to that without us. Some *a priori* law, or necessity of thought, can alone give validity to the process; and this we have, in a direct intuition of causation.

In prosecuting his inquiry into these great intuitions of reality, Professor Porter next maintains that the mind intuitively knows a "final cause" as pervading all existence: the principle of adaptation is "*a necessary and a priori truth.*" This affirmation of a design in nature, he holds to be, not a conviction derived from experience, but an *a priori* law of thought; a truth which finds, not its origin, but only its confirmation, in observed facts.

The chief ground on which this assertion rests, is found in the fact already adverted to, that it is absolutely necessary to any rational view of the universe by the human mind, and must be assumed as the only basis of inductive generalization. The great axiom of science must be, that "in the universe, objectively considered, there is an intelligent and wise adaptation of powers and laws to rational ends, and that the same is true of the relation of the universe to the knowing mind." This thesis he defends at length against all supposable objections, and enforces with great copiousness of illustration. His argument to this end will command attention, and the suggestion is worthy of great respect. We could most earnestly wish it true. It would afford the happiest simplification of our theories, and give a most gratifying distinctness and certainty to our views. We have some doubts, however, of its correctness, and cannot feel sure that the claim can be so substantiated as to demand acceptance for the idea with the authority which belongs to the primitive and necessary affirmations of our intelligence. Should future thinkers coincide in the adoption of this view—provided that it is not as a resource to reasoners driven from the field of *a posteriori* thinking—it will be greatly to our author's honor to have suggested and vindicated it.

Of the nature of the infinite, Prof. Porter does not hold with Hamilton that the conception is a purely negative one. It is negative only in form. He deems it a positive and real element of our knowledge, though stated, as all knowledge may be, under a negative aspect or relation. We can, he thinks, have a positive knowledge of the infinite; and, against Herbert Spencer, he maintains that we not only can know *that* it is, but also *what* it is. His argument on this latter point, we have no doubt will be esteemed valid and conclusive by the great body of thinkers.

In concluding our notice, which has run beyond the limit originally assigned it, we feel that we have expressed but inadequately the appreciation in which Professor Porter's work deserves to be held. We lay down the volume with a sentiment of respect and admiration for his earnest zeal, and his wide attainments, which we have seldom felt towards an American author. In comprehensiveness of plan, and in elaborate faithfulness of execution, the work is far before any other in our language. The only error of any magnitude which we have noticed, amid all its ample variety of illustration, occurs upon page 596, in a statement which describes the fossil animals discovered by Cuvier in the Paris basin, as *predacious*, and refers them to the *drift* or *alluvium*; otherwise the author's judicious handling of the topics discussed, is as conspicuous as the vigor of his grasp. There is, moreover, an impartiality of statement in the discussion of theories hostile to his own, and a discrimination of the elements of truth that mingle with the errors he opposes, which must ensure confidence and give weight to his strictures.

For such a labor of years, and such an example of enthusiasm in the pursuit of abstract truth, the author's countrymen may well be proud of him. We suspect that their grateful appreciation of an aim so high and so well sustained, will rank him, perhaps, foremost among our American scholars, in the loftiest and most difficult walk of investigation.

ARTICLE VI.—THE PRESBYTERIAN DISRUPTION OF
1838.

A History of the New School, and of the questions involved in the disruption of the Presbyterian Church in 1838.

By SAMUEL J. BAIRD, D. D. Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger. 12mo. pp. 564.

IN Dr. Samuel J. Baird's "History of the New School," there is much more than the writer is probably aware of. While it purports to give only the history of one party, its chief value is that it gives an interior view of the history of the other party. At the same time it illustrates, in a beautifully unconscious way, the ineradicable infirmities, not indeed of the Presbyterian polity abstractly considered, but of the concrete system which bears that name in Scotland and in the United States. The industrious and earnest author of this volume, with no thought of exhibiting anything else than the portentous heresies and the nefarious intentions of "the New School," is all the while, from first to last, spreading before his readers the most abundant materials for a judgment concerning the practical value of that ecclesiastical polity which we find portrayed in a certain other volume known as "the Presbyterian Book." It is to be hoped that his work will obtain a wide circulation; so that the lessons which it gives, on the pending question of "Presbyterian Reunion," may be inwardly digested by all who have any part to perform in that transaction.

We are far from certifying the accuracy of this History in all its details, especially when the author undertakes to represent the actions and motives of Congregationalists or New School Presbyterians. When he tells us what the men of his own party, contemporary with himself, have said and done, and how they felt, we rarely find occasion to distrust his testimony. But, in other cases, his ignorance sometimes, and sometimes his partisan or sectarian prejudice, overcomes his good intentions, and causes him to deviate from historical

truth. As we proceed we may have occasion to indicate some instances of his inaccuracy. The value of the book, however, does not depend on the exactness of its statements concerning the doctrines, the actions, or the motives of men obnoxious to the author's dislike. Its usefulness may even be the greater, if the evident fact is that the author's ecclesiasticism, in its combination with his theology, has made it impossible (at least in the sense of moral inability) for him to avoid such misrepresentation of facts and of persons. Just for that reason do we commend the book to the careful attention of all who have any interest in the inquiry whether the proposed return of the excised New School Presbyterians to an organic union with the body from which (to their great relief) they were expelled thirty years ago, will be likely to result in peace and in the edification of the body of Christ. In a former Article we ventured to suggest that the old breed* of heresy-hunters is not yet extinct. To any New School Presbyterian, simple enough to entertain a doubt on that point, we say, read Baird's "History of the New School," and judge whether it would be a pleasant thing for you to be where he could assail you with an ecclesiastical prosecution.

It is not our purpose, then, to controvert Dr. Baird's theological propositions, nor to inquire how far his interpretations of the Bible and of "the standards" are accepted by representative men in his own "denomination." Nor do we intend to correct, otherwise than incidentally, the historical errors into which he has fallen here and there. Whoever may write the history of the conflicts which brought about the disruption of the Presbyterian body thirty years ago—whether we have the Old School version of the story by Dr. Baird or Dr. Hodge, or the New School version of it by Dr. Gillett—the main facts are the same in every version; and the light which they shed not only on the pending question of Presbyterian reconstruction, but on all schemes for bringing the churches of Christ into an organized and governed unity, is essentially the same.

What caused that "disruption of the Presbyterian Church

* The word was oddly misprinted "creed." See *New Englander*, 1868, p. 662.

in 1838?" The simplest answer to the question is the only reasonable answer. Is there anybody at all acquainted with the leading facts, who does not know what caused that disruption? The Presbyterian Church was torn asunder because, from the beginning, it had included two parties who could not permanently walk together in the bonds of that organization. What was called the Old School party, could not, without ceasing to be itself, live under the rule of a New School majority. On the other hand, the New School party, after having been for a little while *in* the majority, though never themselves the majority, had found that liberty for them, with their construction of the constitution and "the standards," and their interpretation of the Bible, was thenceforth impossible under a government controlled by their adversaries. So deep, on both sides, was the conviction of the impossibility of continued union in one organization, that, at the time of the violent disruption, the only question actually pending was, how to agree on terms of disunion.

What were the two parties whose discordance made disruption inevitable? It is not enough to say that the names by which they were called indicate a theological difference. Large theological differences among "evangelical Christians" are not inconsistent with Christian friendship and fellowship, nor—as Tract Societies and many other organizations prove—with Christian coöperation. Nor is it enough to say that there was between the two parties a difference of national origin and of ecclesiastical traditions;—the one being for the most part of Scotch descent, with traditions of a national Presbyterianism and of "the Solemn League and Covenant," and its heroes and martyrs; and the other a New England element, with traditions from the Mayflower. Outside of that particular organization, there is no desperate incompatibility between Scotland and New England. We must analyze a little more carefully, if we would fully understand the causes of the disruption.

In our reading of the history, the Presbyterian organization in this country seems to have included, from the beginning, two elements which could not but generate, in the progress of events, an irrepressible conflict. Whether we take Dr. Baird's

version of the story, or that given by the New School historian, Dr. Gillett, we get the same fundamental facts. From the formation of what is denominated in the work before us, "the General Presbytery"—a presbytery without a name, without geographical boundaries, and without responsibility to any superior judicatory, without any formally adopted constitution or confession of faith, and apparently without any representatives of church-sessions—there seems to have been, in the organization, an element, on the one hand, which we may designate as sectarian or "denominational," and, on the other hand, a more catholic element. On the one hand, there were men whose theory was exclusively Presbyterian, and who thought only of propagating in the colonies the full system of the church of Scotland, with as little modification as possible. On the other hand, there were men whose ecclesiasticism was less rigorous; who thought more of the gospel as the power of God to salvation than of church government after any particular pattern; and who accepted Presbyterianism because, not finding any objection to it in the precepts or the precedents of the New Testament, they thought it a convenient arrangement for Christian communion and coöperation. It need not be assumed that all who came from Scotland and the North of Ireland were of one sort, nor that all from New England were of the other sort, nor even that the difference between one sort and the other was always discernible. To some extent, doubtless, the tendency to rigid sectarianism, and the tendency to a larger comprehension—might coexist in the same mind for a season, and the ascendancy of either might be determined by external influences. Sometimes a man who was trained in the strictest sect, becomes truly catholic by the force of his Christian sympathies; and sometimes one whose youth was full of large aspirations after the communion of the saints, becomes, in later years, by the force of party movements, and by association with men of narrow views, a stiff sectarian. Our position is, not that there were among the founders of the Presbyterian organization in this country theological differences to be compromised, nor that some of them were Scotchmen and some New England men, but that from the first there was a sectarian tenden-

cy and a catholic tendency working against each other, consciously or unconsciously—like the flesh lusting against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh.

To make this plain, we need, perhaps, no other facts than those which Dr. Baird has given us. He, himself, while perfectly confident that all the members of "the General Presbytery" were intensely and only Presbyterian, according to the Scotch system, brings out the fact that their union, under the name of a presbytery, was as informal at first as an association of Congregational ministers, and had no other basis than their fraternal confidence in each other, and no other aim than to help each other in their common work of evangelization. He quotes from John Thompson, a member of that body, what seems to us an explicit recognition of this fact. "As far as I know," said Thompson, "we have not any particular system of doctrines composed by ourselves or others, which we, *by any judicial act of our Church*, have adopted to be the articles or confession of our faith," etc. "It is true, as I take it, we all generally acknowledge and look upon the Westminster Confession and Catechisms to be our confession, or what we own for such, but the most that can be said is that the Westminster Confession of Faith is the confession of the faith of the generality of our members, ministers, and people." Dr. Baird presents the case fairly enough when he says, in connection with his quotation from John Thompson: "Certain brethren, who knew each other as Presbyterians of the Westminster Confession, and who had been accustomed to meet and consult together, occasionally and informally, as on occasion of Andrews' ordination [to the pastorate of the church in Philadelphia, 1702] now found the interests of the cause of Christ to demand more formal and stated deliberations, and, therefore, determined to meet annually, for the transaction of business, without alluding to the circumstance—or, perhaps, even in their own minds adverting to it—that they were, in fact, marking the lines of a new and distinct division of the camps of Israel." In other words, they did not undertake to create a sect (the short English word for that sonorous euphemism "division of the camps of Israel"); it did not even occur to them that they were doing so. On the

contrary, they were intent on forming a society for evangelization. Our author says, "The distinct design of the fathers of our Church, in organizing themselves into a presbytery, was the erection of an evangelical society—an executive organ for the propagation of the Gospel." So liberal were their views, that they did not feel themselves called to testify against those English Presbyterians who had just abdicated, as our author thinks, every distinctive principle of Presbyterianism by uniting with the Independents under the "Heads of Agreement," planned by Increase Mather of New England. They did not hesitate to enter into communication and correspondence with the London Dissenters as partakers with them in the business of "evangelizing these colonies;" nor do they seem to have intimated—as Dr. Baird would surely have done—that their own platform differed in any important respect from that of the brethren whom they entreated to help them in "carrying on so necessary and glorious a work." The curious reader may find all these things stated by our author incidentally, rather than purposely, in his first and second chapters. See pp. 23, 24, 47-51.

In 1716, the annual meeting of ministers which had called itself "the Presbytery," and which our author denominates "the General Presbytery," had become sufficiently numerous and extensive to divide itself into "subordinate meetings or presbyteries," and to assume for itself the higher style of "Synod." Yet, in so doing, they seem not to have thought of making or adopting any sectarian constitution or standards by which they were to be distinguished and separated from other recognized "divisions of the camps of Israel." They simply assigned six of their number "to meet at Philadelphia or elsewhere as they shall see fit,"—six others "to meet at New Castle or elsewhere as they shall see fit,"—and three others "to meet at Snowhill or elsewhere." Fifteen ministers being thus distributed into three presbyteries, the record proceeds: "And in consideration that only our brethren, Mr. McNish and Mr. Pumry [Pomroy] are of our number upon Long Island, at present, we earnestly recommend it to them to use their best endeavors with the neighboring brethren that are settled there, which, as yet, join not with us, to join with them

in erecting a fourth presbytery." The names of the fifteen assigned to three presbyteries, as well as of the two who were to constitute the fourth as soon as they could find a Long Island Congregationalist "to join with them," are indicative of something broader than a Scotch sect, and of divergent tendencies likely to exist in the Synod. Scotchmen (or Scotch-Irish) and Welshmen, Englishmen and New England men,—some educated at Glasgow, some at Harvard College, and some among Dissenters in England,—however united in a common work of evangelization, were not likely to be in all things perfectly and permanently unanimous. The fact of their union, under the name of presbyteries and synod, is proof that some of them had more of the catholic than of the sectarian spirit.

Before the year 1727, there does not appear to have been even a proposal that the Synod should require of its members a subscription to any prescribed confession of faith. The Arianism of the eighteenth century was beginning to be formidably developed in Ireland, and the Presbyterians of that country did not know how to counteract it without insisting on an unqualified acceptance of the Westminster standards of doctrine. Some Irish Presbyterians in this country very naturally thought that there could be no security for the gospel unless the same course were taken here. In 1726, the agitations among Irish Presbyterians resulted in a synodical act, not only imposing the Westminster Confession on all candidates at their ordination or licensure, but also excluding from the Synod all members who refused to subscribe that document as the confession of their faith. The next year an Irish minister, the John Thompson above mentioned, proposed that something of that sort should be done by the American Synod. Jedediah Andrews, the New England minister of a Presbyterian congregation in Philadelphia (the first predecessor of Albert Barnes in that congregation), gave an account of the proposal in a letter to Dr. Colman of Boston, April, 1729: "We are now likely," said he, "to fall into a great difference about subscribing the Westminster Confession of faith. An overture for it, drawn up by Mr. Thompson, of Lewestown, was offered to our Synod, the year before last, but

not then read in the Synod. Measures were taken to stave it off; and I was in hopes we should have heard no more of it. But last year it was brought again, recommended by all the Scotch and Irish members present; and being read among us, a proposal was made, presented and agreed to, that it should be deferred till our next meeting for further consideration. The proposal is that all ministers and intrants should sign it [the Confession], or be disowned as members. Now, shall we do it? They will certainly carry it by numbers. Our countrymen say they are *willing* to join in a vote *to make it the confession of our Church*; but *to agree to making it a test of orthodoxy and term of ministerial communion, they will not*. I think all the Scotch are on one side, and all the English and Welsh on the other, to a man." p. 60. Doubtless the "Scotch" in his use included the Scotch-Irish, as "the English" (or "our countrymen") included himself and others from New England. The words which we print in *italics* show that the objection of the English and Welsh ministers was not to the theology of the Westminster Confession, but to the use of that formulary as a test, and to the proposal to exclude from "ministerial communion" every man who might be unwilling to subscribe it as the confession of his faith.

In another passage of the same letter, Andrews seems almost to have had a glimpse of the excision a hundred and ten years afterwards. We take this, as well as the former quotation, from Dr. Baird, for in this part of the story we intend to make him our sole authority. "Some say the design of this motion is to spew out our countrymen, they being scarce able to hold way with the other brethren in all their disciplinary and legislative notions. What truth there may be in this I know not. Some deny it; whereas others say there is something in it. I am satisfied, some of us are an uneasiness to them, and are thought to be too much in their way sometimes; so that I think it would be no trouble to lose some of us." p. 65. The writer of the letter (as Dr. Baird expressly takes notice) was not troubled about any doctrinal difference between the Scotch or Scotch-Irish ministers and those whom he called his "countrymen." In his view it was only from some "disciplinary and legislative notions" of "the other brethren" that

mischief was likely to arise. Men who were perfectly agreed in adopting, *verbatim et literatim*, every theological statement of the Westminster Confession, might differ widely on the "disciplinary and legislative" question, whether to set up that formulary as a graven image in the house of God, and to require God's ministers to bow down before it under pain of being excluded from the temple. Those whose theory of discipline and legislation in the church was not derived from the Westminster Assembly, but was maintained in that assembly against a powerful majority by the five "Dissenting Brethren," and whose ecclesiastical descent was not from any national church, but from the martyrs and confessors of the English "Separation," had inherited a prejudice (somewhat violently expressed by men who were hanged in the reign of Elizabeth for their fidelity to the New Testament) to prescribed and imposed forms, whether of worship or of doctrine. They were unable to see why the arguments against a prescribed and imposed liturgy were not equally valid against the "disciplinary and legislative notion" of compelling a Christian man to profess his faith and his understanding and reception of the Christian doctrines in any one form of words, by whomsoever prescribed and imposed. Whether that prejudice was reasonable is not now the question. In its bearing on prescribed forms of doctrinal belief, it seems to Presbyterians quite unreasonable. To Episcopalians it seems no less unreasonable in its bearing on a prescribed liturgy.

We are further indebted to our author for a quotation from a man much more distinguished than Andrews. Jonathan Dickinson, born in Massachusetts, educated at Yale College, the Presbyterian minister of Elizabethtown, in New Jersey, and afterwards the first president of the college now at Princeton, was much the ablest theologian in the Synod, and his orthodoxy was beyond the reach of suspicion. He was as far as Andrews from approving the proposal to set up the Westminster Confession as a test. He—as Dr. Baird represents him—"insisted that Laish" (to which Thompson in his overture had likened the colonial Presbyterianism) "will not be bettered by the wall of subscription; that her true defense consists in a thorough examination of candidates on the work of grace in

their hearts; in reviving discipline, bringing offenders to account, and being diligent in preaching the whole counsel of God. He urges that the Synod had already a bond of union in the general acknowledgment of the truth, and that the enforcing of subscription is the fruitful cause of controversy and division. Subscription, therefore, is not necessary to the being or the well-being of a church, unless hatred, variance, emulation, wrath, strife, sedition, and heresies are necessary to that end." p. 66.

Our readers may see, now, what we mean by a sectarian tendency on the one hand and a catholic tendency on the other, in the Presbyterian body at that early day. The catholic tendency was adverse to all divisive discipline and legislation, and sought to bring into Christian fellowship and coöperation as many as possible of those whom Christ had received into a spiritual union with himself. The sectarian tendency demanded some standards and tests, contrived by man's wisdom, which should answer the great purpose of marking off a "distinct division of the camps of Israel." What Thompson in his overture called "our church," was not intended to be simply Christ's church and nothing more or less. It was to be enclosed with walls and bulwarks, which should separate it not only from the unbelieving world, but also and with equal carefulness from other Christian churches occupying, or that might occupy, the same territory. The catholic tendency would receive to "ministerial fellowship" any man in whose case there was sufficient evidence that God's providence and Spirit had qualified him for the ministry, and that the head of the catholic church had called him to that work. The sectarian tendency would require him also to subscribe the Westminster Confession as the confession of his faith, and, if he could not do so, would send him to exercise his ministry in some other "denomination."

The quotations which Dr. Baird has given us from Andrews and Dickinson have a value which he does not seem to have observed; yet we do not understand how he failed to observe what the bearing of these quotations is on the interpretation of the decree which Presbyterians generally call "the Adopting Act" of the Synod in 1729. The language of

the record, when compared with the language used by those in whom the catholic tendency predominated, is, to us, a demonstration that the result of the protracted consideration was a compromise in which much was conceded to the scruples of men who had objected to the proposal.

What the Synod did in that matter is recorded in two acts which our author, in professed conformity with the record, distinguishes as "the Preliminary Act" and "the Adopting Act;" but which Dr. Gillett in his work, written from the opposite point of view, comprehends under one title, "the Adopting Act." It is significant that "the affair concerning the confession" was referred to a committee of eight members, Andrews and Dickinson being placed at the head. The paper reported by that committee and unanimously adopted, is intelligible only when we remember the position of those who objected to the principle of a prescribed and imposed confession. The act is in these words:

"Although the Synod do not claim or pretend to any authority of imposing our faith upon other men's consciences, but do profess our just dissatisfaction with, and abhorrence of, such impositions, and do utterly disclaim all legislative power and authority in the church, being willing to receive one another as Christ has received us, to the glory of God, and admit to fellowship in sacred ordinances all such as we have grounds to believe Christ will at last admit to the kingdom of heaven; yet we are undoubtedly obliged to take care that the faith once delivered to the saints be kept pure and uncorrupt among us, and handed down to our posterity, and do, therefore, agree that all the ministers of this Synod, or that shall hereafter be admitted into this Synod, shall declare their agreement in, and approbation of, the Confession of Faith with the Larger and Shorter Catechisms of the Assembly of Divines at Westminster, as being, in all the essential and necessary articles, good forms of sound words and systems of Christian doctrine, and do also adopt the said Confession and Catechisms as the confession of our faith. And we do also agree that all the presbyteries within our bounds shall always take care not to admit any candidate of the ministry into the exercise of the sacred function, but what declares his agreement in opinion with all the essential and necessary articles of said Confession, either by subscribing the said Confession of Faith and Catechisms, or by a verbal declaration of their assent thereto, as such minister or candidate shall think best. And, in case any minister of this Synod, or any candidate for the ministry, shall have any scruple with respect to any article or articles of said Confession or Catechisms, he shall, at the time of his making said declaration, declare his sentiments to the presbytery or Synod, who shall, notwithstanding, admit him to the exercise of the ministry within our bounds, and to ministerial communion, if the Synod or presbytery shall judge his scruple or mistake to be only about articles

not essential and necessary, in doctrine, worship, or government. But if the Synod or presbytery shall judge such ministers or candidates erroneous in essential and necessary articles of faith, the Synod or presbytery shall declare them incapable of communion with them. And the Synod do solemnly agree that none of us will traduce or use any approbrious terms of those that differ from us in these extra essential and not-necessary points of doctrine, but treat them with the same friendship, kindness, and brotherly love, as if they had not differed from us in such sentiments." pp. 60, 61.

This was followed by another transaction in which the members of the Synod, with one exception, eighteen in number, "after proposing all the scruples that any of them had to make against any articles and expressions in the Confession of Faith and Larger and Shorter Catechisms of the Assembly of Divines at Westminster," "unanimously agreed in the solution of those scruples, and in declaring the said Confession and Catechisms to be the confession of their faith, excepting only some clauses in the twentieth and twenty-third chapters, concerning which clauses the Synod do unanimously declare that they do not receive those articles in any such sense as to suppose the civil magistrate hath a controlling power over synods with respect to the exercise of their ministerial authority, or power to persecute any for their religion, or in any sense contrary to the Protestant succession to the throne of Great Britain."

Dr. Baird devotes a whole chapter to the task of proving that "the Preliminary Act" (which we have given at full length) was *not* "a compromise," was *not* "ambiguous in its terms," and was *not* "designed to admit of considerable latitude of doctrinal sentiments among the ministry of the church." He insists that Thompson (author of the overture which was "staved off" in 1727, postponed in 1728, and finally acted on in 1729) and his party gave up nothing of their demand, and that Dickinson and Andrews, with the English and the Welsh, gave up all their objections. The "Act" itself, as we read the record, tells us a different story.

What the Scotch and Irish members of the Synod had been understood to demand, and what the English and Welsh members had opposed, was the imposing of the Westminster Confession on all ministers and candidates for the ministry as the text of orthodoxy. Thompson's position, as understood, was

the purely sectarian one: "If we have no confession which is ours by synodical act, or if any among us have not subscribed or acknowledged the confession" [in every phrase and word of it, "as the confession of their faith"], "then, first—There is no bar provided to keep out of the ministry those who are corrupt in doctrinals;" and, "secondly—Those that are in the ministry among us may propagate gross errors and corrupt many thereby, without being discovered to preach anything against the received truth, because" [on the supposition that we have no prescribed and imposed formulary of doctrine] "the truth never was positively received among us." p. 62. In his view, the Synod, with all the churches which it represented—so long as it had only the Holy Scriptures and the promise of Christ's presence, and the truths of the gospel written in the experience of living souls by the work of the Holy Spirit, and the confidence of the members in each other's orthodoxy—was like a city without bars or gates, incapable of defending itself against any intruder. The thought that the Scriptures, unsupplemented, might be profitable and sufficient "for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness," and that "the man of God," having those Scriptures, though not sworn to any prescribed and imposed form of words, might be "perfect, thoroughly furnished to all good works," even in a synod, was out of his range. The thought that a preacher of false doctrine might be tried and convicted with only the Bible for a standard, was foreign to his mental habits. The thought that a presbytery might examine a candidate for licensure or for ordination, and pass judgment on his doctrinal soundness without stretching or clipping him on the iron bedstead of a prescribed formulary, was a thought with which he had never been familiar, and which he could neither originate nor accept. Familiar only with traditions from national churches, and with that necessity for uniformity—doctrinal or liturgical—which results from the nature of ecclesiastical institutions endowed and established by the State, he could not grasp the conception of the great Church of Christ, free, and catholic, existing in organized congregations of believers, each congregation responsible to every other under the law of comity and love, and

each owing to any other such recognition and confidence, or such admonition and rebuke, as may be demanded by their actual relations of neighborhood or of intercourse. Hence his demand, that a certain document drawn up by the Westminster Assembly about the middle of the preceding century, should be imposed on every minister of the Presbyterian Church in these colonies, and that every minister, however orthodox, who, through any misunderstanding of terms or any unusual conscientiousness, might refuse to accept that voluminous formulary as the confession of his faith, should be required to enlist in some other "division of the camps of Israel."

Did Andrews misunderstand "all the Scotch and Irish members" in the Synod of the preceding year? Recollect his words in his letter to Colman: "We are now likely to fall into a great difference about *subscribing* the Westminster Confession of Faith." "The proposal is that all ministers and intrants should *sign it or be disowned as members.*" "Our countrymen say *they are willing to join in a vote to make it the confession of our Church*; but to agree to *making it a test of orthodoxy and term of ministerial communion, they will not.*" Did Dickinson misunderstand the intention of the overture? His position was that doctrinal soundness must be maintained not by requiring *subscription* to a prescribed confession, but by thorough examination of candidates, by reviving discipline, by bringing offenders to account, by diligently preaching the whole counsel of God. He maintains that the Synod had been, and might continue to be united, without insisting that every man should set forth his doctrinal system in the same invariable words, and that "*the enforcing of subscription is the fruitful cause of controversy and schism.*"

How, then, were Andrews and Dickinson, and others of their way of thinking, induced to vote unanimously with their Scotch and Irish brethren? How was the more catholic element which desired to receive into fellowship all true and orthodox ministers of Christ harmonized with the more sectarian element which could have no sense of safety without subscription to every phrase and syllable of a prescribed confession? Let the record which we have copied on a preceding

page, give the answer to this question. What was it which the Synod unanimously voted at the recommendation of a committee in which the opposition to the original overture was largely represented?

1. There was a distinct profession that "the Synod do not claim or pretend to any authority of imposing our faith on other men's consciences," "and do utterly disclaim all legislative power and authority in the church." Let the extent of this disclaimer be considered. Church-power is not legislative, but only judicial and administrative, applying and executing the principles which the one Head of the Church has given in the Scriptures. This is the basis of all true catholicity. Christ's catholic church is distinguished from the world by its obedience to the laws of Christ. A sect is ordinarily distinguished from other sects by its acts of legislation supplementary to the Scriptures. Its "standards," contrived by human wit and skill, and set up as law by its own authority, are designed to distinguish it not from the world only, but from other sects which are supposed to have standards of their own.

2. With equal distinctness the Synod made profession of "being willing to receive one another as Christ hath received us to the glory of God," and of readiness to admit to church fellowship "all such as we have grounds to believe Christ will at last admit to the kingdom of heaven." This is certainly the catholic principle; and we frankly testify that whatever violations of this principle may be laid to the charge of some Congregational churches, the standards of Presbyterianism are not imposed on private members of the church as a test of fitness for communion, but are imposed on ministers, elders, and deacons, as a test of fitness for office.

3. "*Subscription*" to the Confession and Catechisms is not exacted. "*Subscribing* the Westminster Confession" was that about which Andrews had feared their falling into "a great difference." The "enforcing of *subscription*" was what Dickinson had denounced as the fruitful cause of controversy and division. The rule established by the Irish Synod, in 1698, was that no man be licensed to preach the gospel till "he *subscribe* the Confession of Faith, *in all the articles there-*

of, as the confession of his faith." Nothing like this appears in the record before us.

4. Instead of enforcing subscription to the Confession "in all the articles thereof," the act provides that all ministers in the Synod, then and thereafter, "shall declare their agreement in, and approbation of, the Confession, &c., as being *in all the essential and necessary articles*, good forms of sound words, and system of Christian doctrine;" and that no candidate shall be licensed by any presbytery, unless he "declares his agreement in opinion with *all the essential and necessary articles* of said Confession, *either* by subscribing the said Confession of Faith and Catechisms, *or* by a verbal declaration," "as such minister or candidate shall think best." All this differs from what Andrews and Dickinson had objected to, almost as widely as a "Directory" for public worship differs from a prescribed and imposed book of "Common Prayer."

5. The candidate who has "any scruple with respect to *any article* or articles of said Confession or Catechisms," is required to "declare his sentiments to the presbytery or Synod," so that those who are to receive him as a fellow-worker in the ministry of the Word, may know not only what particular articles he rejects or is in doubt of, but also what his own opinions are on the subject of each questionable article; and it is distinctly provided that the judicatory before whom he makes his declaration, "shall, *notwithstanding*, admit him to the exercise of the ministry within our bounds, and to ministerial communion;" if they "judge his scruple or mistake to be only about *articles not essential and necessary*, in doctrine, worship, or government." In other words, the candidate is to express freely, and in his own way, his agreement, or the extent of his agreement, with a recognized formulary of doctrine; and thereupon the presbytery (for the canon is to be executed, ordinarily, by presbyteries only) is to pronounce judgment, rejecting him if he is "erroneous in essential and necessary articles of faith," but otherwise admitting him. This is almost an imitation of the "Pacific Act," adopted by the Irish Synod in 1720, and sharply censured by our author;—an act which declared "that if any person, called upon to subscribe, shall scruple any phrase or phrases in the Confes-

sion, he shall have leave to use his own expressions; which the presbytery shall accept of, providing they judge such a person sound in the faith, and that such expressions are consistent with the substance of the doctrine."

6. As an ecclesiastical body sustaining relations to the ministers and congregations under its government, to other churches everywhere, and to "them that are without," the Synod adopted the Westminster symbols as its own in the words, "We do also adopt the said Confession and Catechisms as the confession of our faith." This is just what Andrews had said, that he and his "countrymen" would readily consent to: "They are willing to join in a vote to make it the confession of our Church." In New England, as long ago as 1648, the Synod which framed the Cambridge Platform, adopted the Westminster Confession, "judging it to be very holy, orthodox, and judicious in all matters of faith," and therefore freely and fully consenting thereunto "for the substance thereof," by a unanimous vote. "We do, therefore, think it meet," said they, "that this Confession of Faith should be commended to the Churches of Christ among us, and to the honored court, as worthy of their due consideration and acceptance." After the same manner, in the Synod of 1680, the same Confession of Faith, with some slight modifications taken from the Savoy Confession, was "owned and consented to by the elders and messengers of the Churches;" and in that form it was commonly known as the New England Confession. At a still later date, the same Confession was "owned and consented to by the elders and messengers of the Churches in the colony of Connecticut," as represented in Synod at Saybrook. Thus the men of Congregational antecedents, among the founders of American Presbyterianism, while they had a traditional testimony to maintain against prescribed and imposed formularies, were familiar with the idea that a Synod,—or meeting of ministers and other messengers delegated from churches—might give its testimony to the fact that a certain summary of doctrines was according to the Scriptures, and that those doctrines were actually held and maintained by the constituent churches.

Such was "the Preliminary Act," adopting the West-

minster formularies, in general terms, as the Synod's public confession of its own faith or system of Christian doctrine, and prescribing the manner in which they should be used at the licensure or ordination of candidates for the ministry and at the admission of ministers to membership in the Synod; but not imposing them, in all their phrases, on anybody. It was followed, as we have said, by another act which our author calls "the Adopting Act." That act prescribed nothing additional to what was prescribed by the Preliminary Act. Considered as an act of the Synod, it was simply a recognition and putting on record of the important fact that eighteen ministers (whose names are given), being all the ministers, save one, that were present in that meeting, did then and there comply with the rule just enacted. Every one had liberty to propose whatever scruples he had as to the meaning or the truth of any article or expression in what had been adopted as the Synod's confession of its faith; and when all the scruples proposed had been considered, and the Synod, according to its rule, had judged them "to be about articles not essential and necessary," the record was made—not that the Synod had in any way modified or restricted the liberty conceded by the Preliminary Act—but that eighteen individual ministers, then present as members of the Synod, "have unanimously agreed in the solution of those scruples, and in declaring the said Confession and Catechisms to be the confession of their faith" as individual ministers, "excepting only some clauses in the twentieth and twenty-third chapters," concerning which their scruples were insoluble. Thereupon the Synod saw fit to put itself right on the record by declaring, "for substance," that the obnoxious clauses were to be taken in what is now called a Pickwickian sense:—"concerning which clauses, *the Synod* do unanimously declare that they do not receive those articles in any such sense" as that which (sometimes at least) they were supposed to bear.

We hold, then, that in those proceedings by which the Westminster formularies were made standards of doctrine for American Presbyterianism, the presence of a catholic element desiring to open the door for all true ministers of Christ is manifest, and over against it the presence of a sectarian ele-

ment desiring rather to build up "a snug little Zion" into which none should be admitted but such as could accept the prescribed form of words, "whole and entire," without scruple and without hesitation.

Dr. Baird attempts to justify his interpretation of the Adopting Act as modifying and restricting the apparent liberality of the Preliminary Act, by quotations from the records of the following year. But the attempt breaks down under the pressure of nothing more than those quotations. It appears that some of the rigidly sectarian men were not pleased with the prescribed manner of assenting to the Standards. In deference to them the following record was made :

"Whereas, Some persons have been dissatisfied at the manner of wording our last year's agreement about the Confession, etc., supposing some expressions not sufficiently obligatory upon intrants:

"Overtured, That the Synod do now declare that they understand these clauses that respect the admission of intrants or candidates, in such a sense as to oblige them to receive and adopt the Confession and Catechisms, at their admission, in the same manner and as fully as the members of Synod did, that were then present:—Which overture was unanimously agreed to by the Synod." p. 88.

What we see in this record is only an instance of that undefined and really compromising policy which American Presbyterianism has often, not to say generally, used in regard to this question of subscription. If it was the unanimous understanding and intention of the Synod that the Confession and Catechisms should be not merely accepted by all "intrants and candidates" in the manner prescribed by the Preliminary Act, but adopted and sworn to, word for word, with the sole exception of some clauses relating to the civil magistrate—if, as Dr. Baird thinks, the standards were to be adopted by every individual minister, "without reservation except as to the designated clauses"—certainly there was nothing to hinder them from saying, unanimously, just that thing. But instead of saying that thing, what did they say? They put upon their record a reference to the record of the preceding year, and said that intrants or candidates must receive and adopt the standards "in the same manner and as fully as the members of the Synod did that were then present." Turning back to that record of 1729, we find that "the members of the Synod that were then present," had the opportunity of

“proposing *all* the scruples that *any* of them had to make against *any articles and expressions*” in the symbolical books, and that, after considering what each had to offer, they “unanimously agreed in the solution of those scruples”—which implies that each one’s explanation of the sense in which he agreed with the rest “in declaring the said Confessions and Catechisms to be the confession of his faith,” was satisfactory to his brethren. But in that free discussion it came out that “some clauses in the twentieth and twenty-first chapters”—clauses entirely eliminated from the revised and amended edition now used by American Presbyterians—were rejected by every one of them, and, if not formally disavowed, would expose the whole body to reproach and shame, and therefore the Synod unanimously declared (as the individual members had done) that those clauses were to be regarded as excepted from the standard. Willingly or unwillingly it was assumed, and put upon record, that already, less than a century from the date of the Solemn League and Covenant, American Presbyterianism had become wiser, on one momentous point of doctrine, than the Presbyterianism of the Westminster Assembly itself. “The world moves” in spite of the inquisition; and the Westminster Assembly, with all its zeal against Prelacy on the one hand, and Independency and religious liberty on the other, did not mark the *ultimatum* of theological knowledge.

As if to demonstrate what was meant by that indefinite phrase, “in the same manner and as fully as the members of the Synod did that were then present,” another of Dr. Baird’s quotations from the record of 1730 shows in what manner an “intransigent” was actually received at that meeting. A Welshman, who had withdrawn in some disaffection three years before, “desired to be received as a member again.” In order to his reception, it was necessary that he should “receive and adopt the Confession and Catechisms in the same manner and as fully as the members of the Synod did” in 1729. Accordingly the record informs us that “he having proposed *all* the scruples he had to make about *any* articles of the Confession and Catechisms, *etc.*, to the *satisfaction of the Synod*, and declared his adopting the Westminster Confession of Faith and Catechisms agreeably to last year’s Adopting Act”—

that is with an express repudiation of the clauses repudiated by the Synod—"he was unanimously received in as a member again." The concession which had been made to the Welshmen and the "countrymen" of Andrews and Dickinson, because of their inherited prejudice against all prescribed and imposed forms, was not withdrawn.

In 1736 was enacted the "Explanatory Act." There was a suspicion abroad "that the body had adopted latitudinarian principles;" and by what sort of men such a suspicion was likely to be cherished, any reader tolerably acquainted with the history of Presbyterianism can judge for himself. "We understand," said the Synod in 1736, "that many persons of our persuasion, both more lately and formerly, have been offended with some expressions or distinctions in the first or Preliminary Act of our Synod," &c. Therefore, "in order to remove said offense, and all jealousies that have arisen or may arise in any of our people's minds on occasion of said distinctions and expressions, the Synod doth declare that the Synod have adopted, and still do adhere to, the Westminster Confessions, Catechisms, and Directory, without the least variation or alteration, and without regard to said distinctions." Then, by way of showing that this was the meaning and true intent" of the Synod in its "first adopting of said Confession, that Explanatory Act proceeds to recite the record of the Adopting Act; after which it closes with the "hope and desire that this, our Synodical declaration and explication, may satisfy all our people as to our firm attachment to our good old received doctrines contained in said Confession, without the least variation or alteration, and that they will lay aside their jealousies that have been entertained through occasion of the above-hinted expressions and declarations, as groundless."

Such being the Explanatory Act, it surely needs to be itself explained. Dr. Baird evidently thinks so, and his explanation is, that when, in the Adopting Act, the Synod expressly excepted some clauses of certain chapters in the Confession, and instead of adopting the doctrine that the civil magistrate may lawfully proceed against those who publish or maintain such erroneous principles or practices as either in their nature or in the manner of publishing or maintaining them are

“destructive to the external peace and order which Christ hath established in the church,” squarely denied that the civil magistrate “hath power to persecute any for their religion”—and instead of confessing or professing that it is the duty of the civil magistrate to convoke synods, to be present in them, and to take care that they do nothing against the truth, repudiated the idea “that the civil magistrate hath a controlling power over synods with respect to the exercise of their ministerial authority”—they verily thought they were giving to the Westminster Confession its original meaning!” “The members,” quoth he, “denied the repudiated sense of the specified articles to be their true meaning—a denial in which they were sure of being sustained by the common voice of their people.”

If the Explanatory Act can receive no better explanation than this, it is a sad and most convincing instance by which to show the perilous tendency of prescribed and imposed formularies. Is it consistent with “simplicity and godly sincerity” to deny the obvious and notoriously historical meaning of a formulary, and, in the same breath, to make profession of receiving and adopting it “without the least variation or alteration,” and to impose it on others in all its phraseology as a test of soundness in the faith? The attempt of Tractarian Anglicans to maintain that the articles of the Church of England may be accepted and subscribed in a meaning consistent with the Roman Catholic dogmas, is not more dishonorable or dishonest than the attempt to maintain that the Westminster formularies as they proceeded from the Westminster Assembly did not assert the sinfulness of “tolerating a false religion,” or that they did not concede to the civil magistrate all that “control over synods with respect to the exercise of their ministerial power” which is implied in his being bound to take care that they do nothing against the truth; or that they did not affirm his legitimate power to persecute for their religion all heretics whose religion is made up of such opinions and practices “as are contrary to the light of nature or to the known principles of Christianity.” Yet this dishonest and dishonorable attempt is what Dr. Baird in his interpretation of the Explanatory Act imputes to the fathers of American Presbyterianism. They professed that they ad-

hered to the Westminster standards without the least "variation or alteration;" and at the same time they renewed the declaration that they did not receive certain articles of those standards in the sense which the words were notoriously intended to bear—"a denial," says our author, "in which they were sure of being sustained by the common voice of their people." Alas for the people, if the necessity of standing up for the Confession and Catechisms had brought them to that pass! According to this Old School historian's explanation of the Explanatory Act, the people whom that Synod had organized as a sect, were so ignorant, or else had so little regard for honesty, that they could be relied on to sustain the denial of a historic fact, as palpable as that the Westminster formularies are Calvinistic and not Arminian.

But this Explanatory Act declares that the Synod "have adopted and do still adhere to" not only the doctrinal formularies of the Westminster Assembly, but also the "Directory" for the performance of public worship and the administration of church government; and that phrase, "without the least variation or alteration," describes the manner in which the Directory, not less than the other standards, was adopted and is adhered to. But Dr. Baird himself on a preceding page (p. 70), has insisted on the fact that the Directory was *not* "adopted absolutely without reservation," but only acknowledged "to be 'agreeable in substance to the Word of God' and therefore" recommended "to be observed 'as near as circumstances will allow and Christian prudence direct.'" Did the Synod in declaring that it had adopted and still did adhere to the Directory "without the least variation or alteration," mean nothing more than that it had acknowledged that body of rules for public worship and church government "to be agreeable in substance to the Word of God, and founded thereupon," and had recommended it "to be observed as near as circumstances will allow, and Christian prudence direct?" Then how does the Synod's declaration that it had adopted and did still adhere to the Confession and Catechisms "without the least variation or alteration," mean anything contrary to the fact, that, inasmuch as those formularies were the Synod's confession of its faith, every minister of the Synod should, at

his admission, declare his agreement in and approbation of them "as being, *in all the essential and necessary articles*, good forms of sound words and systems of Christian doctrine." We must assume that the authors of that Explanatory Act were reasonably honest, and did not mean to say what they knew to be untrue; and therefore we must assume that they did not mean to deny what stands so plainly on their records, namely that every minister or candidate for the ministry, desiring admission to the Synod, might freely declare his conscientious hesitation about any phrase or proposition in the Confession or in either Catechism, and, having thus made confession of his faith virtually in words of his own choosing, might be received, if his doubts or errors should be judged "to be only about articles not essential and necessary."

It seems to us that the interpretation of the Explanatory Act must be found by inquiring for the reason of it. How was it that many persons of the Presbyterian persuasion had been "offended with some expressions or distinctions in the First or Preliminary Act?" We cannot doubt that the practice of the Synod, or of some presbyteries, in the admission of ministers and candidates—a practice which virtually permitted the candidate to make his own statement of his doctrinal views, and then required the presbytery to judge whether his scruples or errors were a rejection of anything essential or necessary—had occasioned misunderstanding and consequent misrepresentation. Our historian, we believe, does not mention the fact that the Irish Presbyterians, then coming over so rapidly, were familiar with a rule which required every candidate for the ministry to "*subscribe* the Confession of Faith, in *all* the articles thereof, as the confession of his faith;" but that fact, if we mistake not, was the occasion of their being offended with those "expressions or distinctions in the Preliminary Act," which permitted a less rigorous method of assenting to the Confession of Faith. Irish Presbyterians inferred that the Synod was not firmly attached to "the good old received doctrines contained in said confession." The Explanatory Act, as we understand it, was designed to remove that offense. It affirms that the Synod has adopted, and still adheres, to the Westminster Standards, "without the least variation or altera-

tion." The Synod itself—the ecclesiastical judicatory representing and governing a confederacy of Christian congregations—had made those standards its own. (The repudiated clauses about the civil magistrate were evidently not the occasion of any misunderstanding, and therefore there was no need of mentioning them as an exception.) In the Confession and Catechisms was the Synod's platform of doctrine; and no minister could become a member, nor could any candidate be ordained or licensed, without declaring either by subscription or by word of mouth, to the full satisfaction of the presbytery, his agreement with that platform "in all the essential and necessary articles." Thus interpreted, the Explanatory Act is an honest manifesto; and we have no doubt of its literal truth. At that time there were probably no indications of a difference between the theology of New England and that of Scotland. The difference between Dickinson and the most orthodox Irish Presbyterian was not about any point of orthodoxy, but only on the question how to maintain orthodoxy. Men of one sort had no confidence in any enforced subscription to a prescribed formulary. Men of the other sort had little confidence in anything else. The method described in the Preliminary Act, and followed in the Adopting Act and in other instances on record, was a compromise between the two: a public and formal Confession of Faith adopted by the Synod and set forth as its own summary of Christian doctrine; subscription to that standard form for any who choose to testify their orthodoxy in that way; but for any candidate to whom the language of the formulary is in any measure unsatisfactory, full freedom to express every scruple, and to lay upon the presbytery the responsibility of judging whether his doctrine is essentially divergent from the recognized orthodoxy of the formulary.

We will not venture to say that in every such compromise between a Christian desire to recognize in every practicable way the unity of Christ's catholic church, and a consciously laudable desire to mark off and encompass with ramparts, a "distinct division of the camps of Israel," the sectarian tendency always gets the advantage. But such seems to have been the result of that compromise which introduced the Westminster

formularies as the established standard of orthodoxy for American Presbyterianism. The schism of 1741 was not caused by theological disputes; yet, inasmuch as the Old Side or excising party charged the New Side or excised party with doctrinal errors, both parties were naturally induced to assert and reassert their adherence to the standards. A difference, however, in this respect, may be found. The Old Side section, in which the sectarian element predominated, fell back immediately upon the rigorous Irish rule of subscription, namely, "that every member of this Synod, whether minister or elder, do sincerely and heartily receive, own, acknowledge and *subscribe* the Westminster Confession," &c.; and it was "ordered that every session do *oblige* their elders, at their admission, to do the same." The New Side, for the refutation of "false reflections," made and recorded immediately after the exclusion, a declaration "that we do adhere *as closely and fully* to the Westminster Confession," &c. "*as ever the Synod of Philadelphia did*, in any of their public acts or statements about it." Another and more formal "Declaration," soon afterwards, affirmed more positively: "We believe with our hearts, and profess to maintain with our lips, the doctrines summoned up and contained in the Confession," &c., "as the truths of God revealed and contained in the Holy Scriptures,—and do receive, acknowledge, and declare the said Confession of Faith and Catechism to be the confession of our faith," &c. But when the New Side section (almost entirely Irish at first, and excised for Celtic enthusiasm and disorder) had been reinforced by the adhesion of nearly all the New England men with Dickinson for their leader, and the new Synod of New York had thus been constituted, the position taken in regard to the standards was simply,—“They agree that the Westminster Confession” &c. “be the public confession of their faith, *in such manner as was agreed unto by the Synod of Philadelphia in the year 1729.*” This was surely something less than a rigorous and undeviating enforcement of *subscription* to the letter of the prescribed formularies.*

* Dr. Gillett mentions a fact which seems to have escaped the researches of Dr. Baird. When Samuel Davies (afterwards President of Nassau Hall) was in

On the whole, it may be said, in regard to that division, that while there was no appreciable difference between the two Synods in their theology, there was a difference in their ecclesiasticism. The Old Side, or Philadelphia Synod, was more thoroughly Presbyterian after the Scotch model. In the New York Synod, the leading ministers—perhaps the majority—were men to whom the entire organization of presbytery and synod was only the most convenient method of extended Christian fellowship and of coöperation in the service of Christ. Born and educated in New England, or among the English or Welsh Dissenters, they had given up their own ecclesiastical forms in a simply catholic spirit, and had accepted Presbyterianism as better than any effort to propagate a Congregational sect, and in the hope that the organization under which they placed themselves might prove to be something more comprehensive than a merely Presbyterian sect. Dr. Baird has illustrated the catholicity of their ecclesiasticism, by some quotations (made for another purpose) from a correspondence between the two Synods in order to a union. The Old Side Synod had said in reference to one of the proposals offered by the New Side, "How is this consistent with . . . your declared sentiments that no difference in judgment, in cases of plain sin and duty, and opinions relating to the great truths of religion, is sufficient reason why the differing member should be obliged to withdraw, unless the said plain duty or truth *be judged by the body to be essential* in doctrine or discipline." Rigid Presbyterianism, such as the Old Side stood for, had no such "declared sentiments." The argument was only *argumentum*

England, soliciting aid for the college, he was met with the objection that the American body which he represented "would admit none into the ministry without subscribing the Westminster Confession." His answer to that objection is conclusive as to the New Side Synod. "I replied that we allowed the candidate to mention his objections against any article in the Confession, and the judicature judged whether the articles objected against were *essential to Christianity*, and if they judged they were not, they would admit the candidate notwithstanding his objections." Hist. of Pres. Ch. I., 130. Shall we say that this practice was terribly lax and latitudinarian? Or shall we say that it proceeded from a truly catholic spirit, and from a loyalty that would not sacrifice to a lifeless image of Christian doctrine set up in the church of the living God?

ad hominem. It was intended as a fling at the catholicity (or, as Dr. Baird might say, the latitudinarianism) of the New Side, and as a reminder of former discussions about the manner and measure in which conformity to the standards should be exacted. What was the reply of the New Side Synod when thus reminded of their "former professed sentiments?" Instead of retracting anything or attempting to show that they were as sectarian in spirit as the brethren with whom they were seeking to be reconciled, they said frankly, "This, we must own, is an important article with us, which we cannot any way dispense with; and it appears to us to be strictly Christian and Scriptural, as well as Presbyterian; otherwise, we must make everything that appears plain to us a term of communion, which, we apprehend, the Scripture prohibits. And it appears plain to us that *there may be many opinions relating to the great truths of religion that are not great themselves*, nor of sufficient importance to be made terms of communion. Nor can these sentiments 'open the door to an unjustifiable latitude in principles and practices' any more than the apostolic prohibition of receiving them that are weak to doubtful disputations. What is plain sin and plain duty, in one's account, is not in another's; and the Synod has still in their power to *judge what is essential* and what is not." p. 114.

After seventeen years of separation the two parties came to an agreement, and the Synod of New York and Philadelphia was constituted. Our author's quotations show in what terms the standards were referred to as the basis of reunion. "Both Synods, having always approved and received the Westminster Confession of Faith and Larger and Shorter Catechisms as an orthodox and excellent *system of Christian doctrine*, founded on the Word of God, we do still receive the same as the confession of our faith, strictly enjoining it on all our members and probationers for the ministry, that they teach and preach according to the form of sound words in said Confession and Catechisms, and avoid and oppose all errors contrary thereto." * * * "No presbytery shall license, or ordain to the work of the ministry, any candidate, until he . . . declare his acceptance of the Westminster Confession and

Catechisms as the confession of his faith." Here we observe, though not for the first time in these records, the use of the phrase "system of doctrine," and we cannot but regard the word *system* as emphatic. The standards, instead of being represented as simply the truth and the whole truth, or as identical with the divine word, are approved and received "as an orthodox and excellent *system* of Christian doctrine, *founded on the Word of God.*" Such phraseology might have come from the New Side. But, when the imperious injunction is laid on all ministers that they teach and preach according to the prescribed formularies, and avoid and oppose all errors contrary thereto, the tone is that of the Old Side with its rigorous demand of unquestioning assent to precomposed forms. Evidently it was expected either that the ministers would be controlled in their thinking by the authority of the Synod, holding what they were ordered to hold and nothing else; or that if any minister should be led by the Spirit of God to the clear knowledge of some truth which the Westminster Assembly did not understand, he would go over to some other "division of the camps of Israel."

It seems probable that, from the time of the union of the two Synods (1758), the old prejudice of the English and Welsh Dissenters and of the New England men against imposed confessions of faith, and with it a demand for such a mode of assent to the standards as should not shock that prejudice too severely, was disappearing. After the revolutionary war, the need of new arrangements for the government of what was likely to be the most considerable ecclesiastical organization on this side of the Atlantic, was recognized, and in 1788 (simultaneously with the adoption of the Constitution of the United States) the Synod was expanded into a "General Assembly" of representatives from presbyteries, under a formal "Constitution of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America." In that constitution, the Westminster standards were modified by purging out the doctrine of persecution and putting in the doctrine of religious liberty; and a formula of assent to those standards was introduced which entirely excludes the statement of any scruple regarding any article. To every candidate for licensure or for ordination

as bishop, elder, or deacon, the question is proposed, "Do you sincerely receive and adopt the confession of faith of this Church, as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures?" To that question he must give an unqualified affirmative answer, or the proceeding is arrested.

In one respect this formula of assent differs significantly from the subscription exacted in Scotland and Ireland, and originally demanded here by the Scots Hibernians before the date of the Adopting Act. We refer not to the fact that the ceremony of "subscribing" is omitted, but to the more important fact that the candidate is required to receive and adopt the Confession and Catechisms not as, "in all the articles thereof," his own confession of his own faith, but only "as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures." The candidate is to judge for himself whether he can answer "the constitutional questions" with a good conscience. If, after passing the ordeal, he is chargeable with preaching or teaching any doctrine inconsistent with the standards, he can be accused and tried before the proper judicatory; and, if convicted, he can be censured according to the degree of his non-conformity, by simple admonition, by suspension, by putting him out of his ministry, or by excommunication,—as the presbytery, in the first instance, or the Synod and General Assembly, if appealed to, may decide. Under this system, there was room for the catholic tendency to exert itself, and opportunity at the same time for the sectarian tendency to produce fruit after its kind.

Before the era of our national independence, there were many fears that the British Parliament might attempt to impose upon the colonies the ecclesiastical establishment of England. The Presbyterians in the middle and southern colonies, and the churches and pastors of New England, had a common interest in the matter; and, for a few years, delegates from the General Association of Connecticut and from the Synod of New York and Philadelphia met yearly in a formal "Convention," to consult for the common interest. Such intercourse had augmented the force of the catholic tendency. The feeling that the Congregational Churches of Connecticut, as represented by their pastors in the General Association,

and the Presbyterian body represented by the Synod, were divided from each other more by a geographical line than by sectarian hostility or competition, was gaining strength on both sides.

It was therefore quite natural that the General Assembly, at its second meeting under the constitution of 1788, took measures to establish a closer correspondence with New England through the General Association of Connecticut—then the only institution of that name and character. Attempts to establish similar relations with the Associate Reformed Presbyterians and with the Dutch churches, were unsuccessful, partly, at least, because of the supposed latitudinarianism of the body represented by the General Assembly; but this attempt was immediately successful. A few years later (1801), the intercourse thus established resulted in the “Plan of Union,”—a very simple scheme which had been agreed upon by the General Association and the General Assembly, to prevent collision in the new settlements, and under which a Congregational church might have a Presbyterian pastor, or a Presbyterian church might have a Congregational pastor, or a church might be organized consisting partly of Presbyterians and partly of Congregationalists, without very seriously compromising the ecclesiastical principles of either party.

The Unitarian defection in eastern Massachusetts was just beginning to be manifest, and had already caused a vague reaction among Orthodox Congregationalists—and especially among the pastors of Connecticut—toward a more stringent government not merely *in* the churches but *over* the churches. We confess our conviction that the Connecticut fathers who founded or consented to the “Plan of Union,” were not unwilling to see all the churches that were to be gathered by their missions pass under the jurisdiction of the General Assembly. No doubt they acted in that truly catholic spirit which, fixing its regard on the higher and general interests of the gospel, rises above the range of sectarian (or, as our New School Presbyterian friends would rather have us say, “denominational”) interests. Yet, with our knowledge of what was then a prevalent feeling among the Congregational pas-

tors of Connecticut, we are constrained to think that the authors of the "Plan" did not adequately appreciate the relations of New Testament Congregationalism in church government to Christian truth and Christian liberty; and that therefore they were the more willing to coöperate with their Presbyterian brethren outside of New England in a policy that was likely to bring the churches of "the new settlements" under the jurisdiction of classical and synodical assemblies.

Be that as it may, the result of the intercourse and coöperation, through a series of years, is well known. It was understood that the great Presbyterian organization was willing to absorb and assimilate the Congregational emigration from New England; and though New England people, settling a new township, would often assert their liberty, and frame their ecclesiastical arrangements according to their own traditions, they had, even in such cases, no "denominational" zeal, and were easily brought into a loose, but gradually more stringent, relation to the presbyteries. Missionaries from New England had nothing of the prejudice which their fathers had against imposed forms of doctrine; and finding no stumbling block in the carefully liberal phraseology of the "constitutional question" about the Confession of Faith, they entered unhesitatingly into a connection with presbyteries that gladly received them. Thus the great Presbyterian Church grew year by year; and as it grew in strength it was growing in the catholicity of its spirit. Ministers and people of that connection were more and more relied on for generous coöperation with other evangelical Christians in the cause of their common Christianity. The catholic element was growing relatively stronger, but the sectarian element was still powerful.

In New England, there had been, since the time of the elder Edwards, much inquiry and discussion on the great themes of evangelical religion. The names of Bellamy, Hopkins, Edwards the younger, West, and Smalley, attest the fact that the impulse which "the great awakening" gave to religious thought, and the exigencies of conflict with Arminian formalism in its progress toward Unitarianism, had a stimulating influence on the leading divines of the Congregational churches in this country, and put them upon fresh and earnest investi-

gation of old themes. The doctrine of the fall and its consequences, the doctrine of sin and its relation to God's will and counsel, the doctrine of man's impotence to save himself, and of God's sovereignty in saving sinners, the doctrine of Christ's sacrifice and of the atonement which he has made, and the doctrine of regeneration by the Holy Spirit, were diligently reconsidered in their various bearings; and some fresh definitions and illustrations of old truths were brought out in the din of discussion. An eager study of theological questions became characteristic of the New England clergy everywhere—save, perhaps, within the immediate influence of Harvard College. Debates on fate and free-will, and how actions can be certain beforehand in the counsel and purposes of God and yet be the free actions of responsible souls—debates on the nature and the means of regeneration, and on the difference between the inability which is natural and therefore fatal, and that which is willful and therefore moral—debates on “unregenerate doings,” and on the reasonableness of urging an impenitent hearer with arguments and motives to immediate repentance, instead of putting him upon the use of means and telling him that he must wait for God's time—debates on the union of justice with mercy in the Divine forgiveness of sinners, on the distinction between distributive and general justice, and on how it is that the death of Christ is a satisfaction to the justice of God—debates on the connection between the first sin of the first human pair, and the universal sinfulness of the human race, on federal headship, and on the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity and of Christ's righteousness to believers—were the employment of ministers in their frequent meetings, and were given to the public in occasional pamphlets or volumes, and at last in evangelical and theological magazines. A portion of Edwards on Original Sin—namely, the peculiar and startling doctrine of personal identity which that work propounds—was new, and was thought by its illustrious author to be an improvement on the theology of preceding writers. So some of his successors thought that they had made improvements in the manner of stating and defending “the system of doctrines taught in the Holy Scriptures;” and their new views and illustrations of

old doctrines (whether really new or only supposed to be new) were called "the New Divinity." That new theology was not elaborated nor propagated without controversy. At home it was obnoxious to "Old Calvinists," but much more obnoxious to "Old Arminians" gently and drowsily sliding down the inclined plane through Arianism toward modern Unitarianism. But the most thinking and earnest theologians of New England agreed with Bellamy on the Divine permission of sin, with Hopkins on the nature and essence of virtue, with Smalley on the distinction between natural and moral inability, with West on the nature of moral agency, and with the younger Edwards on the relation of the atonement to the justice of God; they crowned with their admiration that clear-minded expounder of New England theology to English Dissenters, the Baptist Andrew Fuller; and before their preaching and their pamphlets or more ponderous treatises, the old Calvinism waned and the old Arminianism disappeared.

It became, in the course of events, pretty well understood throughout the Presbyterian Church, that New England theology had its own way of expounding and vindicating the doctrines of the evangelical system, a way differing somewhat from that of the Scotch theology or the Dutch. Of course the old Scotch theology was alarmed not only at the audacity of those Yankees in assuming the possibility of their knowing something which the Westminster Assembly did not know, but even more at the earnest freedom with which theological questions were discussed as if the Confession of Faith had not settled and formulated every doctrine long ago. Thus there came to be, even before the beginning of the present century, two theological tendencies within the Presbyterian enclosure—one, sternly conservative of formulas; the other, free to inquire after truth, confident in the expectation of learning by inquiry, a little self-conceited perhaps in the consciousness of having learned something; and perhaps a little disrespectful toward human standards, though profoundly and devoutly deferent toward the authority of the Scriptures. The emigration of Congregationalists into the Middle and Western States carried with it the New England way of thinking in theology, and of preaching the gospel; and in proportion as Congrega-

tional ministers and churches under the Plan of Union, came into connection with presbyteries, the New England theology obtained a footing in the Presbyterian Church. The consequence was that, early in the present century, there were, in the ministry of that growing organization, two sorts of men distinguishable in respect to the breadth and freedom of their theology. Something of that kind will be found, almost inevitably, under any method of association among ministers of the Gospel. Not only will there be differences of opinion, more or less important, on particular questions in the science of religion, but there will be also, more or less clearly manifested, differences of tendency in theological thinking; a conservative tendency, and a reforming and progressive tendency; a tendency to accept old formulas as too sacred to be questioned, and a tendency to inquire anew and to derive truth fresh from the living fountain of God's inspiration in the Scriptures. Looking at the theological relations of the two forces in the Presbyterian body, one more sectarian, the other more catholic, we may say—and we trust we may say without offense—that the more sectarian element became, for the most part, conservative in theology, as was very natural, while the more catholic element was inclined not only to tolerate, but to accept, some of the New England explanations of the system known as Calvinism.

Let us not be understood as implying that there is, in the nature of things, some sure connection between the New England theology and a catholic or tolerant ecclesiasticism. Without affirming or denying anything on that point, we may say that men who held the New England Calvinism were under a necessity of demanding toleration for themselves in the Presbyterian Church, and therefore of putting themselves into an alliance with the catholic rather than the sectarian tendency. The question of their being tolerated or excluded was in reality the old question of *subscription* to the standards in distinction from an acceptance of them as containing the *system* of doctrine taught in the Scriptures. What was the meaning of the required assent to those formularies on the part of a candidate for ordination or for licensure? When Gardiner Spring, who still survives, laden with years and honors,

presented himself to the presbytery of New York for ordination—a young man holding the same views with his father, Dr. Samuel Spring of Newburyport—did he, by giving an affirmative answer to “the constitutional question” concerning the Confession of Faith, forswear himself? A man of catholic spirit might reasonably vote to tolerate the New England theology—the Hopkinsianism, as it was called—of such a young man as Gardiner Spring was, without admitting that Dr. Emmons, or Mr. Spring’s father, or the younger Edwards, was a more sound or more enlightened theologian than Turretin. With such men the question whether Hopkinsianism was in fact a contribution to Theology, and the question whether it should be tolerated in the Presbyterian Church, were not one question but two.

Dr. Baird (we take pleasure in making the observation) recognizes clearly this distinction between men who held the New England theology, and men who without holding it were willing to tolerate it. The “Moderates,” as he calls them, (being himself a decided Immoderate,) are almost his greatest aversion. For example, in 1817, the General Assembly had occasion to take notice of what the Philadelphia Synod had done in directing its presbyteries “to call to an account all such ministers as may be suspected to embrace any of the opinions usually called Hopkinsian,” and, in a minute reported by Dr. Miller of the Princeton Seminary, expressed “regret that zeal on this subject [strict conformity to the standards] should be manifested in such a manner as to be offensive to other denominations, and especially to introduce a spirit of jealousy and suspicion against ministers in good standing.” Of this record our Immoderate author says that it “exhibits the policy of the Moderates, who were for some years the dominant party in the Church;” and he improves the opportunity to brand Dr. Miller as “the prince of peace men.” He has a slight opinion of “peace men,” though the Prince of Peace hath said, “Blessed are the peacemakers.” Far better is it, in the sight of Him who is the very God of peace, to make peace among those who love our Lord Jesus Christ, and to maintain it in all Christian methods, than to be the chief captain in a narrow and contentious “division of the camps of

Israel." We could almost wish that Dr. Baird, growing year by year in grace and in the knowledge of Christ, may live till somebody may call him, in his venerable age, a Moderate and a Peace-man—though perhaps the wish may seem to resemble the Spanish benediction, "May he live a thousand years!"

Those Moderates or peace men—men in whom the Old School theology was combined with what we have called the catholic tendency—held the balance of power in the General Assembly of 1817; as men of that sort seem to have done as far back as the date of the Adopting Act, or the time of the General Presbytery. Hopkinsianism was regarded as an erroneous deviation from the old form of Calvinism; but the New England influence in eastern New Jersey, and in the city of New York, and in "the new settlements," where Congregationalists from Connecticut were rapidly presbyterianized under the Plan of Union, was adding strength to the Presbyterian body every year. The hope of building up in this country a great and comprehensive Presbyterianism, catholic in its spirit and American in its vigor, had always been largely dependent on the coöperation of the New England churches. Such was the feeling which, in the General Assembly of 1817, gently rebuked the Synod of Philadelphia for its superserviceable zeal against Hopkinsianism. Meanwhile the sectarian tendency was constantly active. It was strong in Philadelphia, then as now the headquarters of "the denomination." It was strong wherever the ministers and the people, through prejudice against Yankees, or by any other cause, had been hindered from accepting intelligently and heartily the idea of coöperating with the New England churches to build up not a sect but the kingdom of Christ.

But even in Philadelphia there were men who, though neither born nor educated in New England, were far from sympathy with the zeal of their synod against Hopkinsian errors. One of these was Dr. James P. Wilson, long the "Presiding Presbyter," as he sometimes wrote himself, of the First Presbyterian Church in that city,—in some respects the foremost man of his day among the Presbyterian clergy of the United States. Proposing in his old age to lay down his

office, he had some influence among his people in their choice of his successor. His thoughts were turned towards Dr. Nathaniel W. Taylor, who had been ten years pastor of the First Church in New Haven, and eight years professor of Didactic Theology in Yale College; but finding that Dr. Taylor could not be removed, he directed the attention of his people toward a much younger man, then less known than now, Albert Barnes. Mr. Barnes was not born in New England, though his parents were. Nor was he educated in New England, though Hamilton College, which counts him among its most distinguished graduates, was at that time almost a New England institution. He had studied theology under Drs. Alexander and Miller at Princeton, and had been four or five years the beloved and successful pastor of a Presbyterian church in New Jersey. The "mother church" of Presbyterianism in Philadelphia and in the United States, after so much of inquiry and consultation as was deemed necessary, invited Mr. Barnes to become the successor of Dr. Wilson. Perhaps almost any other church might have called him without any considerable agitation consequent. But, though he had learned theology at Princeton, and had been ordained by the Presbytery of Elizabethtown, he was tainted with Hopkianism; and who could foresee the consequences if a man holding such opinions should become pastor of that church? During the progress of these proceedings Dr. Wilson had died; and if Mr. Barnes could be kept out, perhaps some other man of a different theology might come into the vacancy. The time had come for a war in which all the weapons provided by the Presbyterian system of government should be used against the New England theology.

Mr. Barnes had just printed a sermon such as New England pastors were often preaching in defense of the evangelical or Calvinistic orthodoxy against Arminian objections. The call which the First Church had made was presented, as the Form of Government requires in such cases, to the Presbytery of Philadelphia, in April, 1830, and permission was requested, in due form, to prosecute the call before the Presbytery of Elizabethtown. Opposition to the request was made on the ground that Mr. Barnes had preached and published in that sermon

erroneous doctrines. After long debate, the opposition was out-voted, and leave to prosecute the call was given, the minority putting their protest upon the record. On the 18th of June, the Presbytery was again assembled to receive Mr. Barnes into its membership, and to direct in regard to his installation. Here was opportunity to renew the combat. After a conflict continued through several days, Mr. Barnes was received; and on the 25th of June he was installed.

The minority made complaint to the Synod of Philadelphia, the next higher judicatory, the same which, fourteen years ago, had required its presbyteries "to call to an account all such ministers as may be suspected to embrace any of the opinions usually called Hopkinsian." After two days of debate in the Synod, the Presbytery was condemned for not allowing Mr. Barnes to be examined on his sermon before receiving him; and was authoritatively "enjoined" to hear the protesting minority and to "decide on their objections to the orthodoxy of the sermon," and, furthermore, "to take such an order, on the whole subject, as is required by a regard to the purity of the Church, and its acknowledged doctrines and order." Thus the battle was carried back from the Synod to the Presbytery, and there it was waged with various fortune. Could the sermon be found guilty of heresy, by any orderly or equitable proceeding, without first putting the author on trial, and giving him all the advantages for his defense which "the Book" secures to defendants in such cases? The majority (for the balance of parties had been reversed since the former proceedings) decided for the more convenient method of condemning the sermon without giving the author opportunity to defend himself against definite charges. A condemnation of the sermon was obtained without much difficulty, the author refusing to defend himself when he was not on trial. The result was a "complaint" from the minority to the General Assembly, and, after another meeting, a "reference of the whole case" to the Assembly by the Presbytery. All the ponderous and creaking machinery of Presbyterianism was necessary to the grinding of so great a grist as that which had come to the mill.

The General Assembly of 1831 was in some respects a very

provoking affair to the party represented by our author,—the Immoderates—the sectarian party—the party opposed to any toleration of theological differences. Never had an avowed Hopkinsian been made Moderator of that high court. But the Moderator in 1831 was Dr. Beman, in whose little book on the Atonement, as our author testifies with orthodox abhorrence, “the scheme of the younger Edwards is explicitly developed and defended;” and the only other candidate nominated or voted for was Dr. Gardiner Spring, whose hereditary and notorious Hopkinsianism in theology had not (certainly at that time) been purged away. The case of Mr. Barnes came on in the regular course of judicial business. According to the programme reported by the Judicial Committee, all the papers and documents pertaining to the case were read, including the famous sermon.* The next thing, in regular order, would have been to hear the parties, namely, the complaining minority and the Presbytery. But Dr. Miller, “the prince of peace men,” interposed with a motion for a committee, who, with the consent of the parties, should take the whole affair into consideration, and report what the Assembly ought to do. He offered that motion, as he said, “with a view to save time, prevent angry and useless discussion, and with the hope that an amicable adjustment of the whole difficulty might be effected.” The consent of the parties was necessary, and (after a little hesitation on the part of the gentlemen who represented the Presbytery) was yielded. Dr. Miller was, of course, the chairman of the committee, and with him were associated three doctors as little tainted with New England as he was, two who were pretty widely known as Hopkinsians, one younger minister who had studied at Andover and settled in South Carolina, and two lay elders—one with a Connecticut name, from the region of fair Wyoming, the other with a Scotch name, from the city of Charleston. The tenth member

* The session was held in the First Church, and Mr. Barnes, though not a party in the case, was called upon to read the sermon. Happening to be in the pulpit, when the pamphlet was handed to him, he read it from that position to a great and seriously attentive congregation. After the reading, a recess was had for a few moments, and Dr. Spring, in going out, remarked to one who had been in the same pew with him, “I stand or fall with that sermon.”

of the Committee was one of the delegates from the General Association of Connecticut; for as a matter of courtesy between the Assembly and the Association, delegates from either body had always, till that time, been accustomed to serve on important committees in the other.* We mention these particulars, because, in this part of the story, we are not simply following Dr. Baird, but are telling some things which have not been told in print before.

In the meeting of that committee, the Connecticut delegate, having told them that he regarded himself as in some sort a stranger there, and his appointment as an act of courtesy toward the body which he represented rather than a recognition of his personal fitness to judge in such a matter, and that, therefore, their report, whatever it might be, must be made without counting his vote, took the liberty of suggesting the very obvious view that the question to be fairly met and settled in disposing of the case was nothing else than the question whether and how far the Presbyterian Church can permit a minister to dissent from any theological statement contained in its doctrinal formularies. Dr. Miller, immediately, with one of his blindest smiles, yet not without some transient expression of anxiety in his countenance, replied that it would be unwise and dangerous to raise such a question; and nothing more was said on that point. At that first interview, they

* The committee were, Dr. Miller, Dr. Matthews (of Indiana), Dr. Lansing, Dr. Fisk, Dr. Spring, Dr. John McDowell, Mr. Bacon, Mr. E. White (of South Carolina), Mr. Jessup (the late Judge Jessup), and Mr. Napier. Two of the ten are still living. If there was any want of fairness in naming the committee, it was that the Immoderates were not represented. On the question of holding or rejecting the New England theology, the committee was equally divided.

Dr. Baird, with a too characteristic haste of inference in regard to the designs and motives of persons not acting with his party, says that "to aid in the management of Mr. Barnes' case, the Rev. Mr. Bacon, one of the New Haven gentlemen, was commissioned as delegate from the Association of Connecticut." The truth is, as Dr. Baird might have known, if he had not been too hasty in his eagerness of imputation, Mr. B. was appointed by the General Association, in June, 1830, just before the date of Mr. Barnes' installation, and could not have been appointed at any later date. Something more than a human faculty would have been necessary to foresee, in June, 1830, not only that Mr. Barnes' case would come before the General Assembly in May, 1831, but also that the management of it could be aided by a young man so little conversant with such affairs.

seemed to be well agreed in thinking that what they were appointed for was, to evade and indefinitely postpone that dangerous question rather than to answer it. What the report should be, in substance, was settled in a very harmonious, but devoutly serious conversation, and Dr. Miller's draught was afterwards agreed to with only some slight alteration, and was presented, we believe, as the unanimous report of the committee. Certainly it was *almost* unanimously adopted by the Assembly. The Presbytery was complimented for its "conscientious zeal for the purity of the Church;" the sermon was judged to contain "a number of unguarded and objectionable passages;"* and the opinion was delivered that, "espe-

* Some readers may be curious to know just what the heresies were, which the Presbytery found in that sermon, and for which Mr. Barnes has been made a standard bug-a-boo among Old School Presbyterians, but which, in the opinion of Dr. Miller and other "peace men" of 1831, were sufficiently censured by calling them "unguarded and objectionable passages." We therefore give the Presbytery's official and solemn statement of what they were, condensing it from the final deliverance drawn up by Dr. Ashbel Green.

I. In regard to Original Sin.

"1. He denies that the posterity of Adam are responsible for Adam's first sin which he committed as the federal head of his race. Thus, page 6, 'Christianity does not charge on men crimes of which they are not guilty. It does not say *that the sinner is held to be personally answerable for the transgressions of Adam or of any other man.*'"

"2. In accordance with the above doctrine, he affirms, p. 7, that 'Christianity affirms the fact that in connection with the sin of Adam, or as a *result*, all *moral agents* will sin, and sinning will die.' "The public, federal, or representative character of Adam is thus denied, contrary to the explicit statement in answer to the 22d Q. of Large Cat."

"3. He declares, p. 7, 'that the notion of imputing sin is an invention of modern times,' contrary to Con. of F., Chap. VI., 3."

"4. In p. 5, he admits that his language on the subject of Original Sin, differs from that used by the Confession of Faith on the same subject, and then accounts for this difference on the ground of the difficulty of affixing any clear and definite meaning to the expression, 'We sinned *in* him, and fell *with* him.'"

"This whole view of the doctrine of Original Sin, is, in the opinion of the Presbytery, obscure, perplexed, fruitful of dangerous consequences, and, therefore, censurable."

II. On the doctrine of Atonement.

"1. At p. 11, he says, 'This atonement was for all men. It was an offering made for the race. It had not respect so much to individuals as to the law and perfections of God. It was an opening of the way of pardon, a making forgiveness consistent, a preserving of truth, a magnifying of the law, and had no particular reference to any class of men.'"

cially after the explanations" which Mr. Barnes had made, "the Presbytery ought to have suffered the whole to pass without further notice."

The wise men of that Assembly thought that a great difficulty had been disposed of, and were devoutly thankful. It was thought that much had been gained for evangelical truth and freedom, and for the catholic influence in the Presbyterian body.

"2. At p. 11, he says, 'The atonement of itself secured the salvation of no one,' and again, 'The atonement secured the salvation of no one, except as God had promised his Son that he should see of the travail of his soul, and except on the conditions of repentance and faith.'"

"3. At p. 10, he unequivocally denies that Christ endured the penalty of the law. 'He did not, indeed, endure the penalty of the law, for his sufferings were not eternal, nor did he endure remorse of conscience; but he endured so much suffering, bore so much agony, that the Father was pleased to accept of it in the place of the eternal torments of all that should be saved.'"

III. On Ability, natural and moral.

"In discoursing on human ability, the sermon contains expressions which do not seem to be well judged. In p. 14, it is said, 'It is not to any want of physical strength that this rejection is owing, for men have power enough, in themselves, to hate God and their fellow-men, and it requires less physical power to love God than to hate him;' and on the same page he represents man's inability as solely in the will; and on p. 30, that men are not saved simply because they *will not* be saved."

IV. On Conformity to the Standards.

"P. 6, he says, 'It is not denied that this language varies from the statements which are often made on this subject, from the opinion which has been entertained by many. And it is admitted that it does not accord with that used on the same subject in the Confession of Faith and other standards of doctrine.' And again, p. 13, 'The great principle on which the author supposes the truths of religion are to be preached, and on which he endeavors to act, is, that the Bible is to be interpreted by all the honest helps within the reach of the preacher, and then proclaimed as it is, let it lead where it will, within or without the circumference of any arrangement of doctrines. He is supposed to be responsible not at all for its infringing on any theological system; nor is he to be cramped by any frame work of Faith that has been reared around the Bible.'"

V. On Justification.

"It is not satisfactory that the sermon says that 'Christ died in the place of sinners,' that it speaks of the 'merits of the Son of God, the Lord Jesus Christ,'—of 'the love of Christ,' of 'putting on the Lord Jesus Christ,' of being 'willing to drop into the hands of Jesus, and to be saved by his merit alone,' of God 'sprinkling on the soul the blood of Jesus, and freely pardoning all its sins,' since this language may be used, and is actually used by some who explicitly deny that Christ took the law place of sinners, bore the curse of God's law in their room and stead, and that they are saved only by the imputation to them of his perfect righteousness."

Had not the supreme judicatory taken a most important step in the way to a comprehensive union? Had it not pronounced distinctly and with unexpected unanimity against the narrow and divisive notions of the Philadelphia Presbytery? Was it not fairly settled that a minister holding such views in theology as Mr. Barnes held, might, with a good conscience, and without incurring the charge of perjury or hypocrisy, profess to "receive and adopt the Confession of Faith as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures?" Alas! they had not learned, what many good and wise men have not learned even now after thirty-eight years more of history, that the sectarian element in Presbyterianism—the element which instead of seeking the union of Christians as Christians, seeks to divide Christians from Christians—is mighty and will prevail. From the General Assembly of 1831, and particularly from its decision in the case of Mr. Barnes—a decision so well intended, so unanimously adopted, so thankfully rejoiced in—begins the story of that disruption which Dr. Miller and his brother Moderates were so desirous to avoid, and at which they trembled as they seemed to see its shadow in the distance.

How strong the Moderates were at that time, as distinguished from the Immoderates, and how large and catholic was the policy which, in one degree or another they favored, Dr. Baird may tell us. "The spirit of Moderatism was occupying almost all the high places of the Church which were not possessed by the New School; presiding, with few exceptions, over all our colleges; filling our influential pulpits; and occupying the chairs of instruction in our seminaries,—ready always to cry 'Peace!' and to frown upon the first indications of any such active zeal for the truth as threatened to disturb the sinister tranquillity which they so fondly cherished."—"The authors of the policy dazzled their imaginations with visions of a national church, as comprehensive in its embrace as the ambitious 'national societies' by which it was to be developed, and which were to shine and thrive in the light of its greatness. The churches of New England, the Presbyterian Church, the Reformed Dutch, the Scotch, German, and Associate Reformed,—these all, were to be included. [How much like Mr.

George H. Stuart's Pampresbyterian Convention !] And not these alone. Prospects undefined and boundless opened to the imaginations of the patrons of these schemes. But the magnificent conceptions thus pictured to fancy were to be realized at the expense of all that is worth holding dear in the Presbyterian Church,—her Scriptural and saving faith, and her divinely originated and symmetrical order." pp. 339, 340. That is to say, if the Presbyterian Church should become so comprehensive, it would no longer exhibit in its theology and in its administration, the sectarian narrowness which men like Dr. Baird delight in. The "divinely originated and symmetrical order" would be wrecked and ruined, if lay delegates from the brotherhood of a Congregational church, and lay delegates from a Presbyterian church session should be admitted into the same classical or synodical assembly. And what would become of the "scriptural and saving faith," if men like Albert Barnes and Lyman Beecher could be ministers in the same ecclesiastical connection with Dr. Baird, and not be vexed and badgered with prosecutions for heresy?

We regret our inability to avail ourselves of our author's assistance in showing how the sectarian element was roused, stimulated, invigorated, and kept at work till the disruption was accomplished. A discriminating reader of his pages can discern by what methods of systematic and continued agitation, of appeals to blind and unteachable prejudice, of cabals and conventions, the crusade was carried on—how the Moderates were scared, crowded, taken captive, inoculated with sectarian zeal, and at last made leaders in the great act of ex-cision. Yet the discriminating reader will take heed not to believe too easily the author's heedless intimations—sometimes expressed, and sometimes only suggested—concerning the aims and motives of men who happen to differ from him, especially if the difference is on some point of theology. In particular, if he remembers that Dr. Baird holds a different theory from that held at Princeton concerning the imputation of Adam's first sin to all mankind, he will be on his guard against the impression which otherwise he might receive concerning the Princeton professors, as if they were never more than half-hearted in the cause of Old School orthodoxy, from the time

when Dr. Miller wanted toleration for Hopkinsians in 1817, until the time when Drs. Miller, Alexander, and Hodge, in 1836, were brought into the movement for disruption, by a hint that in case of their continued hesitation, the means were in readiness to establish a rival Old School Seminary. The cautious reader will believe—as we believe most firmly—that those good men at Princeton, in their final adhesion to the Act and Testimony movement, as well as in their long reluctance, were actuated (to say the least) by no more selfish or less worthy motives than those which inspired the authors of the movement. As it was with all the Moderates, so it was with them. They held the old theology as they understood it; they were hearty in their special affection for that portion of Christ's church in this land which was called the Presbyterian Church, and in their admiration of all its peculiar arrangements; but, at the same time, they had catholic sympathies and aspirations. For a long while they were in a strait betwixt two, the catholic element and the sectarian being coördinate in their minds—which is about as much as can be expected of good men in the present condition of organized Christianity. At last, when they saw that the schism would come, which they had feared, and that there was no help, they succumbed to the sectarian tendency, and went (where else could they go?) with the Old School party.

The moral of the long story is not very recondite. Can Presbyterianism, as constituted by the Presbyterian Book, be really catholic? Can the disunited Presbyterianism be reunited without including Dr. Baird and the rest of the Immoderates? Can Presbyterianism, just as it is—just as it will be after the proposed reunion—cease to breed and bring up men of that sort, narrowly sectarian, contentious, litigious, men to whom a fight in an ecclesiastical assembly is a high religious enjoyment, and who are always desiring to excommunicate somebody for some dissent from their theological traditions? If there is to be a free, harmonious, catholic Presbyterianism in our country; must not its builders dig deeper and clear away more of the rubbish?

ARTICLE VII.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

LIDDON'S *BAMPTON LECTURES ON THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST*.*—This book has already passed through several editions, and has received great praise from the religious press. This praise is partly just, and partly not. The writer has respectable, though not first-rate, qualifications as an exegete. He is well read in the literature pertaining to his subject. His pages swarm with citations, references, and sometimes with episodal observations. A great amount of interesting information relating to modern theology, especially the German schools, is interspersed in his discussion. The discussion itself, we must confess, has somewhat disappointed us. It is unnecessarily drawn out. It attempts to be exhaustive, and becomes rather exhausting. There is not a strong, manly grasp of opposing systems and opinions. There is too much of the slightly solemn, gently patronizing, churchly tone, for our taste; and too much of it for the best effect of the book upon those outside of the author's ecclesiastical and theological fold. No minister can read this volume without receiving from it much instruction; but he will have good reason to regret that, being so good, it is not better. The late Dr. Robinson was once asked if Ellicott was not an excellent commentator? "A good commentator," was the reply. "But is he not a *devout* commentator?" "Yes, devout," replied the blunt Doctor, "after the English fashion: he begins all the designations of God, and all the pronouns referring to God, with capitals." There is a species of Anglican, ecclesiastical devoutness which is easily marked in not a few productions of really excellent men, but which wears a provincial and not wholly pleasing aspect. We observe that Mr. Liddon, who is censorious respecting all works of the class of "*Ecce Homo*," is very deferential and laudatory in his remarks upon Mr. Gladstone's eulogistic essay on the last named book. Mr. Liddon is evidently on the track towards a bishopric.

* *The Divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ; Eight Lectures Preached before the University of Oxford, in the year 1867, &c.* Second Edition. Rivington, London, Oxford, and Cambridge. 1868. 8vo. pp. 535.

SMEATON ON THE ATONEMENT.*—This is the first installment of an elaborate treatise on the Atonement, exegetically considered. The writer is possessed of a fair amount of critical and historical learning; but he is unhappily so far destitute of the critical and historical spirit that dogmatic prepossessions constantly sway his interpretation. The desperate task of proving the theology of the covenants, and the dogma of limited atonement, by the philological, scientific exposition of Scripture, is confidently undertaken. Of the character of much of this exposition, the reader may judge by one instance. He insists that the phrase, “gave His only begotten Son” (John iii., 16), means, “gave to a sacrificial death”—that is, he reads his doctrine between the lines of the text; but we do not see that he has any comment on the term “world” in the clause, “He so loved the *world* ;” a clause which, fairly considered, utterly overthrows his theory of restricted atonement. There is much in this volume that is deserving of attention, and in parts it is entitled to commendation. But it is written with the Scotch diffuseness, and might be compressed into half its present compass without the loss of anything material to the discussion. More than this, it is disfigured by the old Scotch dogmatism, and a certain supercilious asperity of tone towards the schools of thought which the author considers latitudinarian. He deserves thanks for affixing to his book good indexes.

NEW TRANSLATION OF MULLER ON THE “CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF SIN.”†—We are thankful that this is not the “former translation,” even though it were “diligently revised.” A more nearly worthless translation than that which Mr. Pulsford made of Müller’s great work, it would be difficult to find. Yet the translator took great pains. He failed partly on account of the inherent difficulties of his task, and partly on account of his special inaptitude for the peculiar business of a translator. Perhaps we ought not to call his translation worthless, for we believe that the mean-

* *The Doctrine of the Atonement, as taught by Christ himself: or the sayings of Jesus on the Atonement, exegetically expounded and classified.* By Rev. GEORGE SMEATON, Professor of Exegetical Theology. New College, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1868. 8vo. pp. 460.

† *The Christian Doctrine of Sin.* By JULIUS MULLER, Professor of Theology in the University of Halle. Translated from the German of the Fifth Edition by the Rev. William Urwick, M. A. In two volumes. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1868. pp. 417, 440.

ing of his author was seldom directly misapprehended. The trouble was that his rendering was barbarous, and frequently unintelligible to all except those whose knowledge of the German tongue enabled them to conjecture what must have stood in the original work. The Messrs. Clark have shown a praiseworthy degree of enterprise in procuring an entirely new translation of this invaluable treatise. Mr. Urwick has succeeded pretty well in his very difficult labor. Of course, the thought must lose something of its freshness and force, and, not unfrequently, the shade of meaning vanishes, in the process of being converted into English. But we have compared the translation with the original in various places, and have found it to be in the main correct, at the same time that it is perspicuous and readable. It is gratifying that a translation which is, on the whole, entitled to confidence has at length been produced. We notice one strange and unlucky omission. Says Mr. Urwick in his preface: "Instead of the long, dreary table of contents at the beginning of each volume, he (the translator) has divided each chapter into sections," &c. This "long, dreary table of contents" is a full, thorough analysis of the contents of the work, written by Dr. Müller, and in the highest degree serviceable to his readers. To leave it out was a sad blunder.

GROPINGS AFTER TRUTH.*—This is a book very instructive in respect to several points. First of all, it is instructive in respect to the amiable weakness of the author, who seems to have possessed from childhood a sort of stubborn discontent with the faith of his parents, without the capacity wisely to appropriate what was good in it, and to reject what was defective or bad. Whatever was over-stiff in the theological system in which he was nurtured, or over-severe in its practical views of the Christian life, or over-strained in its views of conversion, or over-driven in its views of revivals, is set down as Calvinism or Protestantism, pure and simple. Every feature of it must be received with equal confidence, if any are accepted, and, if any are rejected, the whole system of doctrine and duty must fall. Second, it is instructive in regard to the singular logic which Catholic reason-

* *Gropings after Truth: A Life Journey from New England Congregationalism to the one Catholic and Apostolic Church.* By JOSHUA HUNTINGTON. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1868.

ers allow themselves. That a sect among Protestants, say the Congregationalists, should labor under peculiar defects, ought not to surprise a liberal-minded Catholic who is acquainted with the history of the past, or the actuality of the present, in his own church. He knows there is bigotry, and narrowness, and superstition, and asceticism, and even revivalism, in his own communion, and that many a Catholic youth, for one or all these causes, is darkened, perplexed, bewildered, and staggered with doubt, as young Huntington confesses himself to have been. That Huntington's sponsor, Rev. Augustine F. Hewit, should allow his neophyte brother to draw the inference, that because of certain exorcences or errors Protestantism is false, when a similar inference might as properly be derived from similar errors among the sects and schools in the Catholic church—is, to us, surprising beyond explanation. To argue, or even to intimate, that in the "One Catholic Apostolic Church," there *are* no such errors, because, according to its theory (it having an infallible head) there *ought not to be*, is to be guilty of a still grosser weakness.

Third; this book is very instructive in respect to the weakness of its positive reasonings from the Scriptures with which the author (more likely his reverend father in his name) seeks to support his newly accepted faith. These reasonings are too unnatural to have been suggested by the writer's own thinking, and too forced to have been derived from any other source than his newly accepted interpreters. The gratuitous character of the assumptions which underlie these interpretations, in respect to the nature of the church and the necessity of an infallible dictator of the true faith, and the unexegetical and violent character of the interpretations of individual proof-texts, are very conspicuous. The moderately thoughtful and scantily instructed Protestant who studies this argument, will be moved with any feelings rather than those of respect for these arguments, or for the intellects of those who propound or accept them.

Fourth: this book is well fitted to lead serious Protestants to reflect on the one sided excesses to which their own system is sometimes carried by over zealous, narrow minded, and uninstructed teachers. While we cannot but pity the mental sufferings of the ingenuous but "groping" youth described in this volume, we ought to be none the less alive to the useful lessons taught in his account of the doctrinal and practical aspects of Orthodoxy, as he found or rather as he interpreted it. It is the glory of Protestant

Christianity, that it can learn wisdom by its own mistakes, that perceiving they are such, it can abandon and outgrow them. If this is the prerogative of Protestantism in general, it is specially that of New England Congregationalism, from which it has cost the author so long a life journey to escape. When he comes to record his experience of the longer or shorter life journey which he shall have made within the so-called "One Catholic and Apostolic Church," it may be that that record will include sadder and bitterer disappointments than those which filled so much of his earlier life with gloom.

THE HOLY COMMUNION.*—If any of our readers are curious to know how a learned Catholic Divine would defend the doctrine of Transubstantiation by the aid of Thomas Aquinas, Sir William Hamilton, and Dr. Mansel, we advise them to read this volume. The perusal of it will give the reader a far more correct, perhaps a more charitable view of the better class of the Romish clergy than generally prevails, without increasing his respect for the Sacramentarian system, or the church of which this system,—in the doctrine of the Mass,—is the chief corner stone.

MÖHLER'S SYMBOLISM.†—The two "epoch-making" books which have appeared in Germany during the last generation are Strauss's "Life of Jesus" and Möhlér's "Symbolism." The ability of Möhlér's work called out rejoinders from the most distinguished of Protestant theologians, including Nitzsch and Baur; and a theologic ferment was excited which proved highly salutary to theological science. Möhlér was, in truth, not only an able, genial writer, but also a truly learned scholar. Belonging to the more liberal school of Catholics, his work has been more or less an object of suspicion and adverse criticism within the limits of his own church. It has been felt that in describing the Catholic system, he has, to some extent, idealized it. On the contrary, he has failed

* *The Holy Communion. Its Philosophy, Theology, and Practice.* By JOHN BERNARD DALGAIRNS, Priest of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri. III Third Edition. New York: The Catholic Publication House. 1868.

† *Symbolism; or Exposition of the Doctrinal Differences between Catholics and Protestants, as evidenced by their symbolical writings.* By JOHN ADAM MÖHLER, D. D., Dean of Würzburg, Translated with a Memoir of the Author. By JAMES BURTON ROBERTSON, Esq. Third Edition. New York: Catholic Publication House. 8vo. pp. 504.

to do justice to Luther, a man whom, of all others, it is easy to misrepresent. Möhler's book, whatever its defects may be, is one of the most interesting and plausible of all the expositions and defenses of the Catholic theology. Mr. Robertson's *Memoir of Möhler* (who died at the age of forty-three), adds much to the value of the present edition. "Symbolism," we may add, is not the apposite translation of the German *Symbolik*. We need in English the word *Symbolics*; and so for *Dogmatik*, the term *Dogmatics* would be the appropriate rendering.

MORAL USES OF DARK THINGS.*—This volume is made up of a series of Essays on those arrangements and events which make up what is called the night or dark side of nature and Providence;—such as *Night and Sleep, Want and Waste, Bad Government, Oblivion or Dead History, Physical Pain, Physical Danger*, etc., etc. The topics are various and rather oddly grouped together, but they are all brought fairly within the reach of the arguments of the gifted author, and made to yield material for the illustration of salutary and elevating moral truth. As the author very justly observes, the books which treat professedly upon Natural Theology draw the most of their illustrations from physical ends or design, rarely and scantily recognizing those which are moral. He finds, also, some advantages, and that very justly, from the independent character of these Essays, and from the freer and less methodical treatment which they allow. The gloomy and depressed spirit that is burdened at times by the 'heavy weight of sorrow and suffering which prevail in the earth, may find comfort in the cheerful lights which Dr. Bushnell casts upon this gloom. The struggling soul may gather courage from the inspiriting hopefulness of his temper. All classes of readers who love Christian and manly thoughts when expressed in the diction and colored by the lights with which poetic genius knows how to invest familiar truth, will welcome and appreciate this volume.

NEWMAN HALL'S SERMONS.†—The visit of Newman Hall to this country was memorable to himself and to his friends. His pres-

* *Moral Uses of Dark Things.* By HORACE BUSHNELL. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1868. New Haven: Judd & White.

† *Sermons.* By Rev. NEWMAN HALL, D. D., of London. (With a History of Surrey Chapel and its Institutions. By Dr. HALL. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1868. New Haven: Judd & White.

ence brought with itself new and exhilarating sensations, his sermons were most refreshing to the thousands of Christian hearers who hung upon his lips, and his addresses upon the relations of England to America were admirable illustrations of his various power. The Christian manhood of the man, and the ardent devotedness of the Pastor, were themselves a perpetual sermon, inspiring and admonitory. Wherever he went his presence was a perpetual benediction, and, at his departure, he was followed by the thanks and the prayers of thousands who had been helped and lifted upward by his inspiring Christian words.

This volume consists of sermons and addresses which he delivered when in this country; not all of these, indeed, for a few had been previously published, but the larger portion of all. They are all interesting in themselves as examples of simple and earnest preaching, and of direct familiar speaking, and they will be read with interest by thousands among us. The account of Surrey Chapel, and its institutions, is very instructive and inspiring for the example of Christian enterprise and success which it presents.

The volume is embellished with a truthful and spirited portrait of Dr. Hall.

JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE'S SERMONS.*—This is a second edition, with additions, of a volume of sermons previously published under the same general title; this being the text of the first discourse. Among the added discourses is one entitled, "*God save the Commonwealth of Massachusetts?*" Turning to this from curiosity, we were amply rewarded by finding the following: "Why are the people of Massachusetts so different from those of Connecticut? They had at first the same origin, the same institutions, the same religion, the same climate, soil, occupations. Yet how different they are! Massachusetts is intellectually active, Connecticut more slow. One is progressive, the other conservative. The one is hospitable to all new ideas, the other is reluctant to accept them. Why should the Unitarians have a hundred churches in Massachusetts, and only one in Connecticut? Why should Massachusetts lead the Nation in the great movements for the abolition of slavery, for temperance, criminal reform; and Connecticut

* *The Hour which cometh, and now is.* Sermons preached in Indiana-Place Chapel, Boston. By JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE. Boston: William V. Spencer. 1868. New Haven: Judd & White.

take so little interest in these matters? Why should Massachusetts be the firm, uncompromising radical leader of the Republicans in politics, and Connecticut waver uncertainly between one political party and the other? Who can tell? Somehow each State has its own intellectual and moral character; each State has its soul, and the two are always and inevitably as different as any two men are different. Their souls are different. That is all that we can say."

"The Religion of Massachusetts, differing in doctrines, has always involved two principles,—the freedom and independence of each church, and the application of religion to human life." "Whenever Massachusetts has been intolerant in her religion, it was because she wished to be practical in her religion. Whenever she has become vague, abstract, metaphysical, and impractical in her religion, it was from following too far the other impulse towards intellectual freedom. This is certain, that Massachusetts religion is as distinct as Massachusetts politics. It may call itself Orthodox or Unitarian, Methodist or Episcopal; *but Massachusetts Orthodoxy is not like Orthodoxy elsewhere: it is more free and practical.*"

Musing on this passionate outbreak of our excellent friend,—who, with all his goodness, may not superabound always in good sense,—we could not but think of a similar utterance recorded in the parable beginning: "And the Pharisees stood and prayed, saying, O Lord, I thank thee that I am not as other men are," etc., etc.

Despite the Massachusetts narrowness and self-admirationism of this sermon, the volume has a great many fresh and free thoughts,—narrowed occasionally by that provincial type of religionism which calls itself *par éminence*—liberal,—but which are usually catholic and Christian, as well as fresh and earnest.

PROF. SHEPARD'S SERMONS.*—These sermons are thirty-one in number, on various evangelical and practical subjects, and selected, probably, as at once likely to interest Christian readers generally, and characteristic of the preacher, prefaced by a loving yet discriminating Memorial Discourse. Prof. Shepard was well

* *Sermons.* By the late Rev. GEORGE SHEPARD, Professor in the Theological Seminary, Bangor, Me., with a Memorial by Prof. D. S. TALCOTT. Boston: Nichols & Noyes. 1868. 12mo. pp. 368. New Haven: Judd & White.

known in the northern part of New England as one of the most effective preachers of his time, and is understood to have been also successful in his office as a teacher of sacred rhetoric. Without having heard him preach, we have often heard of him as making much account both in his theory and practice of those qualities of composition that fit it to be spoken to an assembly, such as directness, perspicuity, and vivacity. His ideal of style for the pulpit was that it should be, as we believe he was wont to express it, "*catapultic*." Under these impressions we have looked into this volume with the more interest, and have found them fully justified. His printed sermons, besides the wholesome truth, discriminating thought, and earnest purpose that belong to all good preaching, are remarkable examples of the spoken style as distinguished from that of the philosopher or the essayist. It is evident that in preparing them, as the memorial tells us, "he remarked once in private," "he always had in imagination his hearers all before him." Such is the structure of his sentences, fitting them to be uttered in the manner of address, and to be readily taken up in their full force by the hearer, we seem to hear while we read. In this view they deserve to be studied by young ministers who write and read their sermons, for the language that may be allowed in a book where it can be dwelt on and recurred to, may be ineffectual and really incomprehensible when it has to be seized in the passing moment. This merit may indeed, through excess, degenerate into a fault, when the same sentences come deliberately under the eye. We observe here and there something like negligence or rudeness, not to say uncouthness, in the phraseology, needing the speaker's voice to justify it. If the author had prepared them for the press, he might well have studied elegance more, or at least neatness, without loss of power over the reader. Besides this marked excellence, these sermons are to be commended for originality and freedom in their plans, and the handling of their subjects. They are not straitlaced, doctrinally or rhetorically. The author was not hampered by his own homiletics. Nor was he an imitator even of the divines whom he most revered. Without assailing or omitting the New England faith, he has furnished a new and desirable type of New England preaching. It seems as if such a man could not well be spared. Let us hope his pupils will furnish his fit successors.

THE KINGDOM OF SATAN.*—In one of Charles Kingsley's Sermons, he expresses his regret at hearing some people deny the existence of Satan, since nothing pleases Satan better than the skepticism which leaves him an open field, without resistance, for his operations. The last devise of Satan, Mr. Kingsley adds, is to *sham dead*. We remember to have heard Tholuck say, after preaching a discourse on the personality and influence of Satan, that if he had delivered that sermon twenty years before, his windows would have been broken by his vexed and indignant auditors. Changes take place rapidly in what is called the "consciousness of the age." The question is one of fact and evidence, and cannot be determined by the mere prejudice of skeptically disposed minds. Some aspects of the subject are considered in a vigorous manner in the little volume of Mr. Blauvelt. We do not agree with all his interpretations, although we appreciate the sincerity and force exhibited in his discussion.

MCCLEINTOCK AND STRONG'S CYCLOPÆDIA, VOL. II.†—An Encyclopædia which aims to embrace the entire field of theological science will inevitably be open to criticism for what it omits, to say nothing of positive errors and faults. Yet such works, provided pains are taken to avoid mistakes, have a value which every scholar knows how to appreciate. They furnish at once information on an infinite variety of points, and thereby take the place of many books, besides saving the time of the investigator. The Editors of this extensive and important work are competent scholars in their respective departments. In the present volume they have the opportunity, under the articles "Calvin" and "Calvinism," to illustrate the temperate and impartial spirit in which they discuss controverted themes. They write from the Methodist or Arminian stand-point, but with a disposition to do full justice to the opposing system.

THE AMERICAN REPRINT OF SMITH'S BIBLE DICTIONARY.—We record the progress made in the great Biblical work which Professor Hackett and Mr. Abbott are now giving to the American

* *The Kingdom of Satan*. By AUGUSTUS BLAUVELT. New York: P. S. Wynkoop & Son. 1868.

† *Cyclopædia of Biblical, Theological, and Ecclesiastical Literature*. Prepared by the Rev. JOHN M'CLINTOCK, D. D., and JAMES STRONG, S. T. D. Vol. II., C. D. New York: Harper Brothers. 1868.

public. We have received the thirteenth number, the last article of which is *Jordan*. The learned editors present on almost every page the evidences of that thorough attention and excellent judgment which they have brought to their arduous task. Mr. Abbot's bibliographical articles would of themselves render this edition almost indispensable to thorough students. In both fulness and accuracy they are altogether unrivaled; for German articles of this kind are quite meagre in their notices of English literature. There is far too much of superficial literary work done in this country; and this makes it the more agreeable to be able to point to the labors of the accomplished editors of this work.

THE GATES AJAR.*—This brief story is full of pathos, genius, and theology. It is what the Germans call "a story with a tendency;" in other words, a story designed to establish and enforce an opinion. But notwithstanding this, it is not without great merit in plot and character. Perhaps the most remarkable feature is the truth and power with which the feelings are portrayed of one who has lost a nearest and dearest friend. The skill with which the doctrine of the story is defended, and the narrowness of extreme Orthodoxy is set forth and illustrated, is admirable in its way, and is at times irresistible. The gentle and human Christian faith and hope, which are everywhere inspired,—a faith and hope which walk firmly in the rough pathway of earthly duty and sacrifice, while yet the sufferer constantly looks serenely and almost seraphically into the world of spirits—give to the book its crowning grace and its surpassing excellence. The defects which a critical judgment might detect, are lost sight of in the comparison with its manifold excellencies.

THE WORSHIP OF JESUS.†—There is a slight error in the title page of this well-printed pamphlet. The word *Church*, in common usage, implies some recognition of Christ, superior to any which we find upon these pages. If the argument of this pamphlet is valid, and the conclusion which it seeks to establish is true, the writer ought not to be called a minister of a Church in any recog-

* *The Gates Ajar*. By ELIZABETH STUART PHELPS. Boston: Fields, Osgood, & Co. 1869.

† *The Worship of Jesus in its Past and Present Aspects*. By SAMUEL JOHNSON, Minister of the Free Church at Lynn. Boston: William V. Spencer. 1868.

nized sense of the appellation. The only rational worship, according to his teachings, is the worship of Principles.

FAIRBAIRN ON THE REVELATION OF LAW IN SCRIPTURE.*—We regret that we are shut up to only a very brief notice of this elaborate work. It is among the early fruits of an endowed lectureship, commemorative of Dr. Cunningham, the first Principal of the New (or Free Church) College, Edinburgh. The author, on his appointment, was "at liberty to choose his own subject within the range of Apologetical, Exegetical, Pastoral, or Historical Theology," and he was allowed two years, or three, we know not which, for the preparation of not fewer than six lectures. He selected a subject which might have led him into the field which the Duke of Argyle has partly explored in that suggestive little volume, "The Reign of Law ;"—a field which will soon become, if, indeed, it is not already the battle ground between scientific atheism and intelligent religion. But instead of discussing the reign of law (or what is called law) in the action of physical forces, he only touches on that theme in the beginning of his first lecture, and then passes to the consideration of law in the more proper meaning of the word—law as a rule prescribed to the free activity of an intelligent and voluntary power. The main subject, then, of these lectures is the revelation of law as recorded in the Scriptures—law, imposed on man at his creation in his innocence—law through the ages of preparation which preceded the giving of the Decalogue—law in the discipline of the chosen people under a Divine tutelage—law in its relation to the work of the Redeemer, to the gospel of salvation by grace, and to the Christian Church.

PHILOSOPHICAL.

BAIN'S MENTAL SCIENCE.†—This work is an abridgment of the

* *The Revelation of Law in Scripture*: Considered with respect both to its own nature, and to its relative place in successive dispensations. The third series of the "Cunningham Lectures." By PATRICK FAIRBAIRN, D. D., Author of "Typology of Scripture," &c. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1869. 8vo. pp. 484.

† *Mental Science*: A Compendium of Psychology, and the History of Philosophy. Designed as a Text-Book for High Schools and Colleges. By ALEXANDER BAIN, M. A., Professor of Logic and Mental Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen, etc., etc. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1868. 12mo. pp. 527. New Haven: Judd & White.

two elaborate treatises by which its author has become so well known to students of Philosophy; viz., "The Senses and the Intellect," and "The Emotions and the Will." This, with a treatise on Ethics, which is announced by the Messrs. Appleton, as already in press, are published in a single volume in England, under the title of "Mental and Moral Science; a Compendium of Psychology and Ethics." The American reprint of the First Part is furnished with an introduction by the indefatigable Prof. E. L. Youmans—the well known advocate and disciple of Herbert Spencer, and the *avant courier* in general of a certain type of *advanced thinkers*. In this introduction, after giving due credit to such eminent men of the present and past generation as "Sir Charles Bell, Marshall Hall, Sir Benjamin Brodie, Drs. Laycock and Carpenter, Sir Henry Holland, Herbert Spencer, and others," he observes that "while the authors here enumerated have been mainly occupied with the physiological elucidations, there was still wanting the thinker, who, taking up the whole subject in an impartial spirit, and giving due weight to what is valuable in both the old statement and the new, should incorporate all the needed elements into a harmonious, comprehensive, and unitary scheme of Mental Science. Professor Bain has proved to be the man for this undertaking."

As a Physiologist of the conditions of the Sense-Experiences, Professor Bain ranks deservedly very high. "His Senses and the Intellect," in this respect, is a very able and exhaustive treatise. It is, indeed, the ablest and most complete in the English language. As a *Mental* Physiologist, or Philosopher, or Psychologist, however, he ranks very low indeed—far lower than some who are affiliated with his own school; e. g., Dr. Thomas Brown and John Stuart Mill—for the simple reason that he has not succeeded in forming for himself, certainly not in conveying to others clear and well defined conceptions of the nature of the human mind, and its distinctive functions.

In order to test the truth of this assertion, we turn to page 82 of the treatise before us. Here, if anywhere, we should expect to find some doctrine or opinion upon this most important point. But we are disappointed. Only such vague and indefinite statements as the following meet us: "The functions of Intellect, Intelligence or Thought, are known by such names as Memory, Judgment, Abstraction, Reason, Imagination." "The primary attributes of Intellect are, (1). Consciousness of Difference;

(2). Consciousness of Agreement, and (3). Retentiveness." But what is Consciousness, in the usage of Prof. Bain? To this we can find no answer in the way of a formal definition. We only learn that it is used as synonymous with human knowledge and experience, and that it is indiscriminately applied to states of feeling, intellect, and will, as generic to them all. Professor Bain even uses *feeling*, *discrimination*, and *consciousness*, interchangeably. He asserts that "*Discrimination or feeling of Difference*, is an essential of intelligence." An author who uses language in so loose and uncertain a fashion, cannot expect to command the confidence of his readers, for he does not use words with sufficient precision to enable them to understand what he really means. He further asserts: "The attribute named Retentiveness has two aspects or degrees. First, the persistence or continuance of the mental agitation, after the agent is withdrawn. When the ear is struck by the sound of a bell, there is a mental awakening, termed the sensation of sound; and the silencing of the bell does not silence the mental excitement; there is a continuing, though feebler consciousness, which is the memory or idea of the sound." This, if it means anything definite or intelligible, is the same with the doctrine of Hume, "that a sensation is an impression, which impression, when it is weaker, becomes a remembrance, and when it is weakened still further, becomes an imagination." Similar haziness of language prevails in all the leading definitions.

The fact is, the book, so far from being an outgrowth of the Inductive Philosophy, is a result of a metaphysical theory assumed, *a priori*, viz. that all the so-called intellectual processes can be explained by the principle of association, and can be referred to changes in the state of the brain. This, with the author and his school, has the force of an intuition and necessary truth—an axiom not to be set aside.

We commend to his consideration, as an objection to this particular Intuition, his own first objection to the doctrine of innate ideas and "principles," "that it presumes on the finality of some one analysis of the mind." No set of philosophers more perfectly exemplify the operation of such a presumption than the modern associationalists of the school of J. S. Mill and Bain. They not only presume on the finality of some one analysis, but they presume on the finality of one in particular, viz. "The Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind," published in 1829, by James Mill.

To this presumption, we reply with the argument of Mr. Bain pp. 182-3; granting that for the present all these phenomena can be resolved by the law of association—it may be that in future some other law may be discovered which will supersede their own.

Mr. Bain is not only an Associationalist but he is also a Cerebralist. He continually refers to changes and phenomena in the brain as the ultimate explanations of mental events and mental phenomena. But his language is at times so peculiar, and at times so indeterminate and vague, that it is difficult to ascertain whether what he is describing is a condition of the brain as known to the senses, or a condition of the soul as experienced by consciousness. At times he uses the language of the consistent materialist; at times he adopts those spiritual conceptions and terms which are dictated by the universal consciousness and are imprinted upon the universal language of the race. The consequence is that the reader is left in a continual muddle of uncertainty as to his real meaning.

Apart from the fundamental defects which are inseparable from the underlying principles of his psychological philosophy, this work is not without merit, for the variety of illustrations which it contains of important phenomena, and the ingenious analyses with which it abounds. Its philosophy we are forced to regard as superficial and erroneous.

MARTINEAU'S ESSAYS.*—Mr. Martineau is, in our opinion, by far the most brilliant as well as one of the ablest philosophical of critics in Great Britain. The principles and direction of his philosophy are also such as we, in the main, approve and accept. He is theistic and spiritual, as opposed to the atheistic, pantheistic and positive tendencies of the times. As a critic he is acute, logical, and analytic, while, as a writer, he is always eminently attractive for the copious and yet chaste style which he employs, and the abundant illustrations and allusions in which he abounds.

Most of the papers collected in this volume have been known to comparatively few American readers, having been published in periodicals which have had a very limited circulation in this country. They are all of permanent interest and value to the philosophical student and literary critic. We give the titles as a sufficient voucher for our assertion: Whewell's Morality; Whew-

* *Essays: Philosophical and Theological.* By JAMES MARTINEAU. Vol. II. Boston: William V. Spencer. 1868. New Haven: Judd & White.

ell's Systematic Morality; Morell's History of Modern Philosophy; Soul in Nature; Kingsley's Phæton; Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy; Kingsley's Alexandria and her Schools; Theory of Reasoning; Plato: his Physics and Metaphysics; A Plea for Philosophical Studies.

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

HALL'S HISTORY OF VERMONT.*—A very important contribution has been recently made to the local history of New England, in a volume entitled the *Early History of Vermont*, by Hiland Hall.

As the author is much more widely known in the political than in the literary world, we would say to our readers, that he has been a Judge of the Supreme Court and a Governor of Vermont, besides having represented the State for ten years in Congress. He is also well known at home as a learned investigator of the local history, and would be generally acknowledged, we presume, as the ablest man in the State to perform the task he has undertaken. The Vermont Historical Society received a new and vigorous impulse under his presidency.

The title of the book hardly does justice to its contents. It implies too much, and declares too little. It leads us to expect a general history of the State, reviewing the origin and progress of all the institutions of society. But the author has undertaken what is in some respects a more difficult, though a more restricted task. He has investigated with a surprising degree of thoroughness, a boundary dispute which was protracted for more than a century. The key-note of the book is given in the opening sentence, which reads as follows:

"The State of Vermont, as an independent Commonwealth, struggled into existence through a double revolution. The early inhabitants of the State revolted against the Province of New York, to which the territory had been annexed by the arbitrary will of the King, and they united with their brethren of the other colonies in their armed resistance to the demands of the mother country. It is my purpose to inquire into and state the causes which produced the former revolution, and to take some note of its progress from its commencement to its final consummation in the acknowledgment of the independence of the State of New York, and its consequent admission as a member of the Federal Union."

* *The History of Vermont from its discovery to its admission into the Union.* By HILAND HALL. Albany: Joel Munsell. 1868. 8vo. pp. 521.

To this clearly defined purpose the author strictly adheres, and while it prevents him from giving a general history of the institutions of the State, it enables him to write an elaborate monograph on a dispute which came very near involving the New Yorkers and the Green Mountain boys in an open war, two or three years prior to the outbreak of the war of National Independence. Into all the resources of the disputed jurisdiction, the writer enters with the enthusiasm of a true antiquary, and the patience of a well trained lawyer. We need hardly say that he takes the Vermont view of the points at issue, and that he seems to us to have made out a very strong case for the side of which he is the advocate.

Among the topics incidentally discussed at some length, is the capture of Ticonderoga and the comparative services of Benedict Arnold and Ethan Allen. Mr. Hall claims the chief share of the glory for Allen, and in making up his narrative derives some important information from the journal of Edward Mott and other illustrative papers recently printed by the Connecticut Historical Society. There are few men who are competent to judge this elaborate and special treatise in all its details, but the marks of patient research and critical acumen are so abundant in every chapter that we have no doubt the book will always be an authority on the topics of which it treats.

CONNECTICUT DURING THE WAR OF 1861-'65.*—To the multitude of volumes that are yet to be written relating to the participation of Connecticut in the great war for the preservation of the Union and the overthrow of slavery, this volume is a timely and an admirable introduction. Its authors have performed their task with excellent skill and judgment. "With enormous labor" they have "gathered facts with diligence and care from official reports, diaries, scrap-books, newspapers, private letters, personal interviews, and every available source, seeking corroboration as

* *The Military and Civil History of Connecticut during the War of 1861-1865*; comprising a detailed account of the various Regiments and Batteries, through march, encampment, bivouac, and battle; also instances of distinguished personal gallantry, and biographical sketches of many heroic soldiers; together with a record of the patriotic action of citizens at home, and of the liberal support furnished by the State in its executive and legislative departments. By W. A. CROFFUT and JOHN M. MORRIS. Illustrated. New York: Published by Ledyard Bill. 1868. pp. 891.

far as practicable." That they should, from such a mass of material, all so intensely interesting, and presenting so many temptations to diffuseness, or the undue prominence of individuals or particular events, have produced a history so symmetrical, containing so much and omitting so little, whether of public action or of private heroism, is a remarkable evidence of their fidelity, impartiality, and skill. Yet none could be more impressed than themselves with the fact that any work of this kind, embraced in a single volume, however bulky, must necessarily be cursory and incomplete. They say in their Preface :

"Connecticut sent to the struggle fifty thousand soldiers in her own regiments, and probably half as many more in the regiments of other States. A simple catalogue of their names and muster would fill two books as large as this, while a complete chronicle of the service of all her faithful sons would require a volume for each. * * * * Keenly will the friends of many noble men feel that we have failed to portray the self-denying lives and valiant deeds of their heroes, but they cannot feel it more keenly than we do now. Many even of the worthy are nameless here ; for their story has never been told us, and it is unrecorded. The whole cannot be written."

So much has the history of Connecticut grown within the last eight years ! Ten years ago, and all that was exciting in her annals for the two centuries of her existence would scarcely fill three hundred pages, and now the thousand (nearly) before us can give but an outline of those five tremendous years into which she condensed a hundred of agony and glory. It is impossible to read this record of heroic achievement and self-sacrifice, familiar as it is already in most of its details, without the deepest emotion, and nothing is more certain than that its interest will increase with every passing year.

The volume, as a manufacture, is highly creditable to the publisher, and the portraits with which it is copiously illustrated, are far from being the caricatures which usually disfigure works of this class. So far as we have been able to judge from a somewhat extended acquaintance among the originals, they are of remarkable correctness, and add materially to the value and interest of the book. We close this notice with an extract from one of the final paragraphs of the work :

"The first great martyrs of the war—Ellsworth, Winthrop, Ward, and Lyon, were of Connecticut stock ; a Connecticut General, with Connecticut regiments, opened the battle of Bull Run and closed it ; and a Connecticut regiment was marshaled in front of the farm house at Appomattox, when Lee surrendered to a soldier of Connecticut blood ; a Connecticut flag first displaced the palmetto

upon the soil of South Carolina; a Connecticut flag was first planted in Mississippi; a Connecticut flag was first unfurled before New Orleans; upon the reclaimed walls of Pulaski, Donelson, Macon, Jackson, St. Philip, Morgan, Wagner, Sumpter, Fisher, our State left its ineffaceable mark."

LIFE OF JOHN A. ANDREW.*—This volume comprises an Article first printed in the North American Review, with several important documents appended. It was written by the military secretary of Gov. Andrew. We have read it with great interest and it has elevated our views of the moral and the mental greatness of one who did knightly service for his country and his kind.

BEARDSLEY'S HISTORY OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN CONNECTICUT.†—The second concluding volume of Dr. Beardsley's work maintains the character of the first. It brings down the history of Episcopalianism in Connecticut from the death of Bishop Seabury, in 1796, to the death of Bishop Brownell, in 1865. We recognize with pleasure the courtesy and the more than ordinary candor with which the author has narrated the fortunes and progress of the religious organization in which he is an honored member. If we were to tell the same story, we should doubtless give a different version of it in many passages; and, indeed, we are tempted to promise a review of it. But we refrain.

HELLES LETTRES.

THE NEW-ENGLAND TRAGEDIES.‡—It is well that a man of genius should be enterprising in the exercise of his powers; that he should try them in different directions, in order that he may thoroughly develop what he has in him, and do all that he is

* *Sketch of the Official Life of John A. Andrew, as Governor of Massachusetts*, to which is added the valedictory Address of Governor Andrew, delivered upon retiring from office, January 5, 1866, on the subject of reconstruction of the States recently in Rebellion. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1868. New Haven: Judd & White.

† *The History of the Episcopal Church in Connecticut*, from the death of Bishop Seabury to the present time. By E. EDWARDS BEARDSLEY, D. D., Rector of St. Thomas' Church, New Haven. Vol. II. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 8vo. pp. 465.

‡ *The New-England Tragedies*. By HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW. I. John Endicott. II. Giles Corey of the Salem Farms. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1868. 12mo. pp. 179. New Haven: Judd & White.

capable of doing for the instruction and entertainment of his fellows. And it is just that for any good and worthy work which he may do, he should receive the grateful acknowledgments of his readers, even though they should find it less to their taste than other works which he has given them before. Yet, on the other hand, it is right that the reader should declare his preference, saying that he thinks this work inferior to others of the same author and why he thinks so. In doing this, he is not only exercising his own faculty of criticism; he is acting in the interest of the author himself, who needs above all things an intelligent and discriminating audience. The author, too, as he writes for the public, must judge from the honest utterances of public opinion, how far he has accomplished his object, how far he has made the impression which he sought to make upon the minds of men.

It is in this spirit that we speak,—without any disposition to deny or disparage the real excellence of these “New England Tragedies,”—when we say that they seem to us not only less pleasing than other works of Mr. Longfellow, but inferior in merit to most of them. The volume before us contains two dramatic pieces, one founded on the persecution of the Quakers in Massachusetts during the early times of the colony, the other on the fate of Giles Corey, who, in the great Salem frenzy, being accused of witchcraft and refusing to plead, was crushed to death, by the *peine forte et dure*, for his contumacy. Both dramas, from the nature of their subjects, turn upon the religious beliefs of the New-England people two hundred years ago. This, in itself, is not to be complained of; in the life of those times, religion was too prominent a feature to be omitted from any just representation of that life. But it will be observed that these pieces are occupied with perversities and malignities which had no peculiar connection with the religious faith of the Puritans; which, in fact, were common at that time to all bodies of Christian believers. We readily acquit Mr. Longfellow of any disposition to do injustice to the fathers and founders of New-England. He says himself in the Prologue to Giles Corey:

And ye who listen to the tale of woe,
Be not too swift in casting the first stone,
Nor think New-England bears the guilt alone.
This sudden burst of wickedness and crime
Was but the common madness of the time,
When in all lands, that lie within the sound
Of Sabbath bells, a witch was burned or drowned.

But when these shades of error and evil, which belonged to our fathers no more than to all their contemporaries, and which appeared among them only in a limited and occasional manner, are made prominent throughout the book and form the leading features of the whole delineation, what impression will be left on the mind of the average reader? Will he not think, or *feel* (if he does not think it) that they were narrow, bigoted, and fanatical beyond the rest of men?

It will probably be felt by most readers that the dramatic motive in these works is of a somewhat repulsive character. The actors in a religious persecution may indeed be actuated, as Sir Thomas More was, by a sincere, though mistaken, desire to preserve human souls from the ruin threatened by the propagation of false doctrines. But where the differences of doctrine are small between persecutors and persecuted, and where the penalties are not the rack and the stake, but the stocks and the whipping-post, the subject seems to lack something of tragic elevation and dignity. But the difficulty is much greater in the second piece, where the leading characters are the victims of vulgar and brazen-faced imposture. Mr. Longfellow has made no effort to soften the matter, as perhaps he might have done without violence to historic truth, by representing the young girls who bring the lying charges of witchcraft, as acting under a species of hallucination,—a disordered imagination resulting from extreme nervous excitement, by which the merest fancies are made to assume the appearance of reality,—so that, while deceiving others, they may have been, to some extent at least, deceived themselves. As painted here, they are simply liars,—conscious, deliberate, and malignant liars. It would seem that the author himself is not unaware of the repulsiveness of his subjects, and that he has sought to relieve it, in one piece, by the generous though wayward buoyancy of spirit of his hero, Giles Corey, and more successfully, in the other, by the bluff salt-sea humor of Captain Simon Kempthorn of the Swallow.

It should be said, however, that the tragic impression is less sombre and harrowing than one might suppose from the character of the plots. This is owing to the sketchy nature of the treatment. The action is indicated rather than fully developed. The leading points are presented one after another in a rapid outline, but are not dwelt upon long enough to gain full possession of the mind. The minute touches, the copious details, which take hold

upon the feelings, are wanting here. A simplicity, approaching near to bareness, reigns over the whole composition. It is apparent that the poet has put himself under systematic and severe restraint. He has rigorously suppressed those graceful ingenuities of thought, those apt quaintnesses of expression, those pleasing *conceits* (if we may use the word in a good sense), which flow so naturally from his pen. Probably he has thought them inconsistent with the aims of dramatic poetry. He has desired to sacrifice his own individuality, to merge himself in the mind and life of his *dramatis personæ*, to think what they might have thought, and say what they might have said, in the conditions to which they were subject. If he had fully succeeded in doing this, he would have evinced a dramatic genius for which we might well afford to spare the lyrical beauties of his former compositions. He has evidently studied to distinguish the persons whom he brings forward by characteristic traits, well marked and constantly maintained; and in some cases,—that of Governor Endicott, particularly,—he has given us striking figures. But his conceptions of character are not deep and vital. He can represent particular qualities,—gentleness, dignity, hypocrisy, bigotry, and others; but he cannot make the man as a whole, in his individual distinctness and completeness, act and speak himself out through the dramatic dialogue. His development of character is labored and imperfect; not free, spontaneous, natural, shaping every utterance by a pervading but unconscious power, as in the works of true dramatic genius.

We had designed to add, as a kind of offset for these unfavorable criticisms, two or three passages from the work itself, which seemed to us, as we read them, peculiarly interesting and striking. But they would require more space than could well be afforded; and most of our readers will be ready to believe, without seeing them, that any work of Mr. Longfellow's having this extent must contain much beautiful and admirable poetry.

THE EARTHLY PARADISE.*—Mr. William Morris was known to most readers of poetry, when this book appeared, as the author of "The Life and Death of Jason." He had, indeed, published many years ago a volume of minor poems, but it had gone into oblivion with countless other like attempts, and he was

* *The Earthly Paradise*; a Poem by WILLIAM MORRIS. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1868. New Haven: Judd & White.

greeted as a new poet on the appearance of the "Jason." By it, however, he gained at once a place among the leading poets of the day, perhaps among the standard poets of the language. Since the time of Chaucer, it was agreed by critics, there has been no such telling of a story in verse as this. For that is what the poem is—a simple narrative of the old Greek fable in such dress as the imagination can give it without making it a new story. The characteristics of that style—simplicity, sustained elevation and life, adequate *Motivirung* (there is no English word for this), and harmony of details—all these it has in a high degree.

"The Earthly Paradise" follows quick after the "Jason," a second venture in almost the same field. Instead of one story, it is a collection of stories, taken alternately from the Greek mythology and the legends of Northern Europe. To introduce and link together these stories, the poet has imagined a company of Norsemen to come, after long fruitless wandering in search of a Paradise on earth, to some unknown city of Greek origin, where they are kindly received and find the only Paradise possible on earth in a peaceful life brightened by these ancient glories of the imagination, "the gentle music of the bygone years," which they tell to one another at certain monthly festivals. It is a happy conception, though less simple and natural than that of the *Canterbury Tales*, less striking than that of the *Decameron*. The prologue will strike most readers at first as tedious and uselessly drawn out, but a second reading will give a different impression. It reveals, perhaps even better than the rest of the book, the resources of the author's imagination, and admirably fulfills the purpose declared on the first page, to carry the reader back from the realities of to-day to the unbounded possibilities of six hundred years ago, to the time of scanty knowledge and abundant faith.

Of the stories which follow, our own, and, we indulge ourselves in believing, the author's favorites are *Atalanta's Race*, *Cupid and Psyche*, and *Pygmalion*, and of these three, the second one is by far the best in itself and in the form Mr. Morris has given it. The only fault to be found with it is that it has too much of modern ornament or machinery, more, we think, than either of the other classical stories. The obtaining of an oracle by Cupid, the wonders of the palace to which he brought Psyche, the "*charmed knife*" and a "*lamp of hallowed oil*,"—such things

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are foreign to the story as told by Apuleius. But in this and in all these classical stories there is one characteristic feature for which, though in strictness a departure from the originals, Mr. Morris has our hearty thanks, and that is the moral purity with which they are told. Of merely sensual love and praise of physical beauty they are, of course, full, as is all mythology, but they are free from wanton impurity of the "Laus Veneris" stamp.

We are tempted to add a word as to the choice of stories which Mr. Morris has made. Those from the Greek mythology are well known and fascinating in themselves, and as well adapted to this use as those which Hawthorne selected and told so charmingly for children in his "Wonder-book" and "Tanglewood Tales." The Norse legends one might imagine to have been chosen in part because they were so little known. We are sure the fairy stories of Northern Europe could have furnished many more interesting and valuable than the "Writing on the Image" and the "Watching of the Falcon." Perhaps it was the author's plan to select such stories as should best give an impression of the difference between the classical and the Germanic or European mythologies, but on that principle would not such stories as that of Undine, of King Arthur, or of Frithiof, have deserved a place in the list? Yet, in spite of these few weak parts, the book, as a whole, has the strength and freshness, the pure atmosphere of nature, which belongs to these immortal stories as the spontaneous poetry of our race in its infancy. It can hardly be, we fear, a popular book for all readers, but to all who love good poetry and have time for its quiet enjoyment, it deserves to be heartily commended.

YESTERDAY, TO-DAY, AND FOR-EVER.*—This poem has been greatly praised in some of the English papers and Reviews, and its republication in this country was heralded by very warm and almost extravagant commendations. We have read parts of it with great interest, and with equally great disappointment. It is a religious poem, the scene of which is laid in the spirit world. Its themes are indicated by the titles of its several books. In Book I., or, "The Seer's Death and Descent to Hades," the narrator,

* *Yesterday, To-day, and For-Ever*: A Poem in Twelve Books. By EDWARD HENRY BICKERSTETH, M. A. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1869. New Haven: Judd & White.

i. e., the Seer describes his dismissal from the earth, the scene at his own death-bed, and his introduction to the world of spirits. Accompanied by his guardian angel, he is conducted by gradual and preparatory approaches to the immediate presence of The Redeemer. On his way his guide instructs him in respect to the world into which he has just been introduced. Book II.: "The Paradise of the Blessed Dead" gives us a detailed description of Heaven; and Book III. is devoted to "The Prison of the Lost," as both fell under the observation of the Seer and were explained by his attendant. In Book IV. "The Creation of Angels and of Men," is narrated after the manner pursued in "The Paradise Lost." In a similar way "The Fall of Angels and Men," and "The Empire of Darkness," are set forth in Books V. and VI. The History of "Redemption" is recounted in Book VII. The five remaining books discuss and describe "The Church Militant," "The Bridal of the Lamb," "The Millennial Sabbath," "The Last Judgment," and "The Many Mansions," upon the theory of the "Chiliasts," or "Ante-Millennial Adventists." Indeed the entire poem, theologically regarded, is an exposition of their doctrine.

As a poem, it has been, we think, greatly over-praised, and for two reasons; (1) that which some call the Evangelical, but which we prefer to call the Christian feeling, by which it is pervaded, is so positive and earnest; and (2) the diction is remarkably flowing and easy to be followed, having a pleasant rhythmical quality. More briefly expressed, the work is both Christian and readable. But when we look at it as a poem; apart from these features, we find it open to grave exceptions. Its Christian themes are not poetically treated, the imagery being to a very great extent either second-hand or dim and shadowy. We are tempted to add that we do not believe that this class of Christian themes are capable of being treated in any other form of poetry than the lyrical. The themes and the feelings which they excite are too subjective—in more than a single sense of this much used term—to allow any other. The diction is not eminently poetical, for this also is, to a great extent, borrowed and common-place. It also lacks that condensation, sharpness, and individuality, as well as that wealth of suggestive power which invariably characterize the genuine poetic diction as distinguished from the factitious. We can only throw out these hints in respect to the merits of a work which is fitted for many reasons to be useful, and which will be read, as it deserves to be, for its many excellencies; even though among these the poetic is not attained in any preëminent degree.

LUCY LARCOM'S POEMS.*—This volume of genuine New England life, in its literal truth, sacrificing benevolence, ardent patriotism, and fervent piety, as such a life is gilded and transformed by genuine poetic feeling, ought to be welcomed in hundreds of New England Homes. The authoress is, first of all, sincere and earnest, and writes from a strong and feeling heart; next she has the poet's eye, and does not lack "the gift of numerous verse."

MISCELLANEOUS.

"AB-SA-RA-KA"† is the Indian name for a vast region lying west of Nebraska, in the eastern part of the Rocky Mountains, to which the absurd or meaningless name of "Wyoming" has been recently attached. Ab-sa-ra-ka refers to the tribe of *Crow* Indians, who inhabited the territory, and is literally translated "the Home of the Crows." This original, significant, and euphonious name it is one object of this book to make familiar and popular. We hope that success may follow the attempt.

Another object of the volume is to record the observations and experience of a lady who accompanied her husband to that region in 1866-7, while he was officially engaged in the defense of the new route from Fort Laramie to Virginia City in Montana. We presume that it is revealing no secret to say that the writer is Mrs. M. J. Carrington, the wife of Col. H. B. Carrington, of Connecticut, Colonel of the 18th Regiment, U. S. Infantry, who was the commandant of the expedition.

A third object of the volume is to furnish an authentic and semi-official account of the massacre by Indians of three officers and seventy-eight soldiers, which took place December 21, 1866, in the neighborhood of Fort Philip Kearney. Various distorted accounts of this transaction appeared at the time, and it is a satisfaction to have at length a responsible version of the transaction. In the text of the volume we have a full narrative of the incidents connected with this Indian outrage, and in the appendix a report of the Special Commissioner of the Government, who made an official inquiry into the history of the massacre. Col. Carrington-

* *Poems*. By LUCY LARCOM. Boston: Fields, Osgood, & Co. 1869. New Haven: Judd & White.

† *Ab-sa-ra-ka*: or, the Home of the Crows. Being the experience of an Officer's Wife on the Plains. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott. 1868. 12mo. pp. 284. New Haven: Judd & White.

ton's reputation appears to us completely vindicated by this public document.

Everything pertaining to frontier life, and especially in reference to the Indian warfare, is now so interesting, that this unpretending volume will doubtless be widely read.

RECENT WORKS ON EDUCATION.—We are sorry that we cannot speak with very strong commendation of a work on the "*First Principles of Popular Education and Public Instruction* ;" * by Superintendent S. S. Randall of New York. The writer's aim and spirit are good. He believes in the American system of Public Education, and desires to see it improved and advanced. To its service he has devoted fourteen years of official labor in the city of New York. But he either lacks the sagacity to discover or the disposition to discuss the questions most disputed among the friends and the opponents of public instruction. For example, the matter of Religious Instruction is already forced upon our attention by the persistent efforts which the Roman Catholics are once more putting forth to secure the public moneys for denominational purposes. The *Tablet*, a Roman Catholic newspaper in New York, has come boldly out in defense of a policy which has been unavowedly and covertly pushed by the Catholic leaders ever since they began to possess political power.

How shall this claim be met? Shall the public school be regarded as a place for secular instruction only, and shall all reading of the Bible, prayer; and Christian instruction be omitted? Or, shall an effort be made for Protestants and Catholics to agree in this country, as in Ireland, upon certain books of Christian instruction and devotion to be used in all the public schools? Or shall there be a religious service at the opening of the school, the attendance upon which shall be optional, as in some parts of Germany? Or shall the Catholic demand for denominational schools, aided as in England by the public money, be acceded to? This is a live discussion, on which we need arguments and illustrations, but Dr. Randall passes it by with a few common places on the importance of teaching Christian morality to the young—a theme which no one disputes, at least in public.

So with every other topic of the volume. There are given the

* *First Principles of Popular Education* ; by S. S. RANDALL. New York : Harper & Brothers. 12mo. pp. 255. New Haven: Judd & White.

plain common-sense and common-place opinions of the friends of public schools, but there is nothing quickening nor suggestive to one who wishes to investigate with thoroughness one of the most important questions of the age.

Dr. John S. Hart, Principal of the State Normal School at Trenton, has published a manual for teachers, entitled "*In the School-room*."* It is not a profound book—hardly coming up to the dignity of a work on the Philosophy of Education, as the second title might lead us to expect; but it is a book very well adapted to inspire and instruct young teachers. Good sense, varied and prolonged experience as an instructor, a hearty sympathy with the difficulties and trials of the inexperienced, and a fervent religious spirit, are the characteristics of the writer. The examples and illustrations which abound in his pages are not the hackneyed traditional stories, but are for the most part anecdotes derived from the author's personal observations. We could wish that some of the chapters had been elaborated, so that their precepts might produce a stronger impression on the mind of the reader. But, on the whole, we do not know a better book to place in the hands of a young lady or a young man who is perplexed and discomfited by the care of a school-room. To parents also, and all who are interested in the mental training of young children, the book may be recommended. There is nothing (so far as we have noticed) controversial in the discussions, or sectarian in the religious views brought forward by the author.

RESOURCES OF THE PACIFIC SLOPE.†—Mr. J. Ross Browne, who holds at present the enviable and responsible position of American Minister to China, has been for some time past a Commissioner of the United States Government for the collection of Mining Statistics and other particulars illustrative of the resources of the Pacific Coast. His second and final report to the Secretary of the Treasury was published by Congress last spring, and now the Appletons have given to the public an edition of the same document, and apparently from the same stereotype plates. It consti-

* *In the School-room*. Chapters in the Philosophy of Education. Philadelphia: Eldridge & Brother. 12mo. pp. 276. New Haven: Judd & White.

† *Resources of the Pacific Slope*; a classical and descriptive summary pertaining to the States and Territories west of the Rocky Mountains. With a sketch of the settlement and exploration of Lower California. By J. Ross Browne, aided by a Corps of Assistants. 8vo. pp. 678, 200. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

tutes (exclusive of the appendix) an octavo volume of nearly seven hundred pages, exhibiting more fully than any other work the present condition of California, Nevada, Arizona, Utah, Idaho, Washington Territory, Oregon, and Alaska. There is an obvious lack of digestion of the materials brought together; information important and trivial being presented in an overpowering mass, from which it is a labor to select the particulars bearing upon any one especial theme. This difficulty might have been lessened by the publication of a good alphabetical index, in addition to the rather meagre summary of contents which is now given. The value of the report would also have been increased by a scientific collation of the facts presented, the elimination of errors, the pointing out of deficiencies, and the preparation of general or summary statements. As it is, the different geographical districts have been described by different persons, who have had their various notions respecting the proper character of the work. At the same time, we must acknowledge that with these drawbacks the volume is a very remarkable and valuable compendium of our present knowledge of the Pacific Coast, and that many of the ablest statisticians of that region have contributed to its completeness.

Appended to the principal document is a valuable history of explorations in Southern California from 1592 to 1867, by a well-known bibliographer of California, Mr. Alexander S. Taylor. The researches of this gentleman into the history of the Pacific Coast of North America have thrown great light upon the past, and are deserving of the highest encouragement. Mr. Gabb's report of a scientific expedition to Lower California in 1867 is also given.

THE IDEAL IN ART.*—Taine's Philosophy of Art is, in his own opinion, somewhat peculiar, and he claims for it the merit of originality. Some features of this theory are apparent in the present treatise, but they are not obtrusive, nor do they detract from the unity of the impression which it makes upon the reader. The discussion abounds in interest, the historical allusions are ample, and the critical sketches of individual works of art, as well as of individual artists and schools of art, are very instructive. Taine's skill as a writer needs no notice or commendation from us.

* *The Ideal in Art*; by H. TAINÉ. Translated by T. DURAND. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1869.

INAUGURATION OF DR. McCOSH.*—This handsome pamphlet contains the very able and interesting inaugural address of President McCosh, with the various congratulatory and other orations which were delivered at his induction to the office of President of Nassau Hall. They were all worthy of the occasion. The theme of the Inaugural was "Academic Teaching in Europe," and in selecting and treating this theme, the very able and excellent author showed his wisdom and ability. The information furnished is timely and trustworthy, at a time when the subject of higher education is so earnestly discussed on both sides the ocean. In confining the most of his suggestions to European institutions, the author showed both modesty and tact. Some few of these suggestions have a less direct application to the colleges of this country than the author perhaps supposed, but the most of them are of general service and serve to confirm our belief that the country has gained a treasure in acquiring so eminent and so excellent a scholar and divine. We most heartily congratulate the College of New Jersey on the acquisition.

LOOMIS'S TREATISE ON ALGEBRA.†—The fact that this work, after many years' use as a college text-book, and a sale of over 60,000 copies, has, in the present edition, been carefully revised, and, for the most part, re-written by the author, with the aid of the criticisms and suggestions of many experienced professors who have used it, will sufficiently commend it to the experience of all who are in search of the best text-book in this branch of mathematics. It exhibits preëminently the characteristic qualities of Professor Loomis's other works—conciseness, clearness, and logical method. The examples appear to be well chosen, and are abundant throughout the volume, with a classified collection of over two hundred additional ones at the end. To many, the assurance that the proof sheets have all passed under the critical eye of Prof. H. A. Newton, will be a further guarantee of the high character of the work.

* *Inauguration of James McCosh, D. D., LL. D., as President of the College of New Jersey, Princeton, October 27, 1868.* New York, Robert Carter & Brothers. 1868.

† *A Treatise on Algebra.* By ELIAS LOOMIS, LL. D., Professor of Natural Philosophy and Astronomy in Yale College, and author of a "Course of Mathematics." Revised edition. New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers. New Haven: Judd & White.

THE MATERIA MEDICA IN ITS SCIENTIFIC RELATIONS.*—This is a candid, comprehensive, and, as it seems to us, a rational discussion of a subject which all schools of medical theorists acknowledge greatly needs a thoroughly scientific treatment.

PLAIN THOUGHTS ON THE ART OF LIVING.†—Most of these essays were originally delivered as lectures. They were afterwards rewritten and printed in the *Springfield Republican*, and were received with great favor. They abound in wise suggestions, which are conveyed in a fitting, familiar style, which is relieved of common place, and yet is level to the comprehension of the large class of persons whom they were designed to benefit. They deserve a wide circulation.

ESSAYS ON THE PROGRESS OF NATIONS.‡—This is the continuation of a work, the first volume of which was published several years ago. It has been laboriously prepared, and embodies a vast number of valuable facts, arranged under many heads. There is no special sagacity or philosophical power exhibited in the generalizations and method of the book. It contains, however, a vast aggregation of valuable facts, clearly described and expressed.

PLYMOUTH PULPIT.—Messrs. J. B. Ford & Co. (No. 164 Nassau street, New York) are publishing, in pamphlet form, Mr. Beecher's Sermons, with his "direct consent and authorization," week by week, as they are preached. A number of the "Plymouth Pulpit" appears each Saturday, on paper suitable for binding and preservation, at the price of only eight cents a single copy, or \$3 a year. Besides the sermon, each number contains Mr. Beecher's prayer, as phonographically reported by Mr. T. J. Ellingwood.

* *The Materia Medica in its Scientific Relations.* New Haven, Conn. 1868.

† *Plain Thoughts on the Art of Living*; designed for Young Men and Women. By WASHINGTON GLADDEN. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1868.

‡ *Essays on the Progress of Nations, in Civilization, Productive Industry, Wealth, and Population.* Illustrated by Statistics of Mining, Agriculture, Manufactures, Commerce, Banking, Internal Improvements, Emigration, and Population. By EZRA C. SEAMAN. Second Series. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1868. New Haven: Judd & White.

SCOTIA'S BARDS.*—This is a new and beautiful edition of the best of the books of "selections" from Scottish poetry. As announced in a prefatory note: "It is a Scottish book all over. The tartan waves on the pinnacle of the introductory page; the thistle stands guard over the gates of the preface; and the bagpipe plays an adieu at the finis."

ANALYSIS AND PROOF-TEXTS OF DR. JULIUS MÜLLER'S SYSTEM OF THEOLOGY.†—We call the attention of our readers to this very valuable synopsis of Proof-Texts. Though it was designed originally for the use of theological students, it is of equal value and probably of greater interest to clergymen and studious laymen. The titles, under which the texts are arranged, give, in brief sentences, the statements and arguments which comprehend the theological system of its eminent author. Though brief and condensed, it is very far from being abstract or dry. On the contrary, it is fresh and interesting, and suggests many new and comprehensive views of Christian truth. The pamphlet may be had of the publisher. Single copies thirty cents; four copies for one dollar; twenty-five copies for five dollars.

OUR LIFE IN CHINA.‡—This is a neat and unadorned narrative of missionary experience among the Chinese. Without pretending to romantic interest, it keeps the attention awake by a perpetual variety, as it details the trials and successes of the missionary, in the regular work of an established station, and in the various emergencies incident to the occupation of new posts. Its scenes shift from the seacoast to the interior, from the South to the North, and (an interesting episode not indicated in the title) from China to Japan. Instructive glimpses of the people of both countries will reward the general reader, while those interested in missions will find in it much useful information touching the

* *Scotia's Bards.* The Choice Productions of the Scottish Poets, with Brief Biographical Sketches. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1869. 8vo. pp. 568.

† *Analysis and Proof-Texts of Dr. Julius Müller's System of Theology.* By HENRY B. SMITH, D. D. Reprinted from the "American Presbyterian and Theological Review." New York: J. M. Sherwood, 654 Broadway. (At Charles Scribner & Co's). 1868. 8vo. pp. 47.

‡ *Our Life in China.* By HELEN S. C. NEVIUS. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. New Haven: Judd & White.

methods and results of missionary labor among the nations of the far East. A marked feature of this little work is the view it gives of the condition of Chinese women and of the efforts for their conversion.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

Watchwords for the Warfare of Life. From Dr. Martin Luther. Translated and Arranged by the Author of "Chronicles of the Schonberg-Cotta Family." New York: M. W. Dodd. 12mo. pp. 380. [These "Watchwords" have been all freshly translated from Luther's own German or Latin, by Mrs. Charles, and are arranged under appropriate headings; as, Part I., Words for the Battle Field; Part II., Words for the Day's March; Part III., Words for the Halting Places; Part IV., Words for the Wounded; Part V., Words of Victory].

The "*First*," "*Second*," "*Third*," "*Fourth*," and "*Fifth, or Senior Year*" of the Graduated Sunday School Text-Books. Five volumes. 16mo. By Charles E. Knox, author of "A Year with St. Paul." New York: Anson D. F. Randolph. [These are the excellent volumes referred to in an article on "Sabbath School Instruction" in the "New Englander" for January, 1866].

Isaiah; with Notes, Critical, Explanatory, and Practical, designed for both Pastors and People. By Rev. Henry Cowles, D. D. 1869. 12mo. pp. 552.

The Works of the Rev. John Howe, M. A.; with Memoirs of his Life. By Edmund Calamy, D. D. Complete in two volumes. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. Royal 8vo. pp. 1276.

Conversations of Jesus Christ with Representative Men. By William Adams, D. D., Pastor of Madison Square Church, N. Y. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York. 12mo. pp. 290.

Studies of Character from the Old Testament. By Thomas Guthrie, D. D., Editor of the *Sunday Magazine*. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1869. 12mo. pp. 329.

The Pearl of Parables; Notes on Luke xv., 11-32. By the late James Hamilton, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1869. 16mo. pp. 274.

Wind-wafted Seed. Edited by Norman Macleod, D. D., and Thomas Guthrie, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1869. 12mo. pp. 448.

The Life of God in the Soul of Man. Boston: Nichols and Noyes. 1868. 16mo. pp. 128.

Reason and Revelation; or the Province of Reason in Matters Pertaining to Divine Revelation Defined and Illustrated. By R. Milligan. R. W. Carroll & Co., Cincinnati. Large 12mo. pp. 445.

The Christian's Present for all Seasons; containing Devotional Thoughts of Eminent Divines, from Joseph Hall to William Jay. Selected and Edited by A. A. Harsha, M. A., with an Introductory Essay on Devotion by W. B. Sprague, D. D. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York. 12mo. pp. 566.

Sermons by Rev. H. W. Beecher, Plymouth Church. Selected from Published and Unpublished Discourses, and Revised by their Author. Harper & Bros., New York. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 284, 286.

The City of God. By E. H. Nevin. J. E. Barr, Lancaster, Pennsylvania 12mo. pp. 252.

Gleanings among the Sheaves. By Rev. C. H. Spurgeon. Second Edition. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1869. 16mo. pp. 229.

The Protestant Episcopal Church: What She Has, What She Lacks, and What is Her True Position with Reference to Other Churches. New York: N. Tibbals & Co. 1868. 8vo. pp. 26.

Are there Romanizing Germs in the Prayer Book? 8vo. pp. 43. [To be obtained at the office of "*The Episcopalian*," New York].

No Romanizing Germs in our Prayer Book. By a Presbyter of the Protestant Episcopal Church. Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen, & Haffelfinger. 1868. 8vo. pp. 86.

Revidenda; or a Brief Statement of those Things in the Liturgy which should be Revised and Altered, together with a Short History of the Prayer Book, and the Revisions it has already undergone. 8vo. pp. 32. [To be obtained at the office of "*The Episcopalian*," New York].

The Theocratic Principle; or Religion the Bond of the Republic. A Sermon in Behalf of the American Home Missionary Society, Preached in the Broadway Tabernacle Church, New York, May 10th, 1868. By Joseph P. Thompson, D.D. LL.D. 8vo. pp. 27.

Inaugural Address of the Smith Professor in the Special Course, Andover Theological Seminary. August 6th, 1868. Warren F. Draper, Andover. 8vo. pp. 32.

The Baptist Movement of a Hundred Years Ago and its Vindication; a Discourse Delivered at the One Hundred and Twelfth Anniversary of the First Baptist Church, Middleborough, Mass., July 16, 1868, by David Weston. Gould & Lincoln: Boston. 8vo. pp. 32.

Report on the Composition and Quorum of Installing Councils; Approved by the General Association of Connecticut, at Clinton, in June, 1868. Case, Lockwood, & Brainard: Hartford. 8vo. pp. 16.

The Sunday Law Unconstitutional and Unscriptural; an Argument Presented in Committee of the Whole in the Massachusetts Legislature. Second Edition. By Nathaniel C. Nash. Boston. 8vo. pp. 23.

Proceedings of an Ex-parte Council held at the First Congregational Church, Washington, D. C., November 18th to 20th, 1868. King & Baird: Philadelphia. 8vo. pp. 16.

The Division Because of Christ; Being a Report to his Parish of the Proceedings of the Recent Conference in New York. By J. W. Thompson, D. D. Nichols & Noyes: Boston. 8vo. pp. 30.

Reflections Upon the Theories of God in Christ and Vicarious Atonement. Boston: J. E. Tilton & Co. 8vo. pp. 24.

Hymns by Francis Turner Palgrave. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph. 1868. 24mo. pp. 46.

The Heritage of Peace; or Christ our Life. By T. S. Childs, D. D. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph. 1868. 24mo. pp. 166.

Saint Paul; A Poem. By Frederick W. H. Myers. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph. 1868. 24mo. pp. 45.

The Layman's Breviary; or Meditations for Every Day in the Year. From

the German of Leopold Schefer. By Charles T. Brooks. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1868. 16mo. pp. 452.

The Star of Bethlehem. Beautifully Illustrated. American Tract Society, New York.

Irony in History; or Was Gibbon an Infidel? By Rev. James Macdonald, D. D. From the "Bibliotheca Sacra," July, 1868. Andover: W. F. Draper.

Letters on the Divine Trinity. Addressed to Henry Ward Beecher. By B. F. Barrett. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 16mo. pp. 180.

Where is the City? Second edition. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 16mo. pp. 349.

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

The Invasion of the Crimea; Its Origin and Progress down to the Death of Lord Raglan. By A. W. Kinglake. Vol. II. New York: Harper & Bro's. 12mo. pp. 682.

History of the American Civil War. By J. W. Draper. Vol. II. New York: Harper & Brothers. 8vo. pp. 614.

First Reprint of the Ohio Valley Historical Series. Historical Account of Bouquet's Expedition Against the Ohio Indians in 1764; with Preface, by Francis Parkman, author of "Conspiracy of Pontiac," and a Translation of Dumas' Biographical Sketch of General Bouquet. Cincinnati, Ohio: Robert Clarke & Co. 1868. 8vo. pp. 162.

Cameos from English History; from Rollo to Edward II. By the Author of "The Heir of Redclyffe." New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 475.

Landmarks of History, in Three Parts. Part I. Ancient History from the Earliest Times to the Mahomedan Conquest. Part II. Mediæval History from the Mahomedan Invasion to the Reformation. Part III. Modern History from the Beginning of the Reformation to Our Times. Three volumes. By Miss Yonge. Second American Edition, Revised and Enlarged. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1868. 12mo. pp. 252, 223, 478.

The Dutch Reformation; A History of the Struggle in the Netherlands, for Civil and Religious Liberty, in the Sixteenth Century. By W. Carlos Martyn, author of "A History of the English Puritans," "A History of the Huguenots," etc., etc. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York City. 12mo. pp. 323.

Life and Letters of Madame Swetchine." By Count De Falloux, of the French Academy. Translated by H. W. Preston. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1868. 12mo. pp. 369.

Life of George Stevenson and of his Son, Robert Stevenson, Comprising a History of the Invention and Introduction of the Railway Locomotive. By S. Smiles. New York: Harper & Brothers. 8vo. pp. 501.

Recollections of a Busy Life. By H. Greeley. New York: J. B. Ford & Co. 8vo. pp. 624.

The Captured Scout of the Army of the James. A Sketch of the Life of Sergeant Henry H. Manning, of the Twenty-Fourth Massachusetts Regiment. By Chaplain H. Clay Trumbull. Boston: Nichols & Noyes. 12mo. pp. 60.

Memorabilia in the Life of Jedidiah Morse. By his Son, S. E. Morse. Boston: A. W. Locke & Co. 12mo. pp. 24.

TRAVELS.

Reminiscences of European Travel. By A. P. Peabody. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 16mo. pp. viii., 316.

Cape Cod and All Along Shore. Stories by C. Nordhoff. New York: Harper & Brothers. 12mo. pp. 235.

Letters from Eden; or, Reminiscences of Missionary Life in the East. By Rev. C. H. Wheeler, Missionary in Eastern Turkey. American Tract Society, 28 Cornhill, Boston. 16mo. pp. 432.

Travels and Adventures in South and Central America. First Series: *Life in the Llanos of Venezuela.* By Don Ramon Paez. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1868. 12mo. pp. 473.

BELLES LETTRES,

Among the Hills, and Other Poems. By J. G. Whittier. Boston: Fields, Osgood, & Co. 16mo. pp. 100.

Under the Willows, and Other Poems. By J. R. Lowell. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 16mo. pp. 286.

If, Yes, and Perhaps. By E. E. Hale. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 16mo pp. 296.

Prince Eugene and his Times. By Mrs. Clara Mundt (Louise Muhlbach). New York: D. Appleton & Co. 8vo. pp. 316.

Goethe and Schiller: an Historical Romance. By Mrs. Clara Mundt (Louise Muhlbach). Translated by C. Coleman. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

Home Stories. By Mrs. Alice B. Haven ("Cousin Alice"). New York: D Appleton & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 372.

Ruby's Husband. By Marion Harland. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 392.

Fior d' Aliza. By A. De Lamartine. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 16mo. pp. 240.

Constance Aylmer. A Story of the Seventeenth Century. By H. F. P. New York: C. Scribner & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 347.

Callamura. By Julia Pleasants. Philadelphia: Claxton, Ramsen & Haffelfinger. 1868. 12mo. pp. 464.

Madame De Beaupre. By Mrs. E. Jenkin. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1869. 16mo. pp. 278.

The Hermits. By Rev. C. Kingsley. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 12mo. pp. 335.

"I Will," and Other Stories. By "May." New York: P. S. Wynkoop & Son. 1868. 12mo. pp. 191.

The Orphan's Triumph; or, The Story of Lily and Harry Grant. By H. K. P. Author of "The Kemptons," "Paul and Margaret," etc. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1869. 16mo. pp. 295.

Paul and Margaret, the Inebriate's Children. By H. K. P. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1869. 16mo. pp. 178.

Geneva's Shield: A Story of the Swiss Reformation. By Rev. W. M. Blackburn, Author of "Ulrich Zwingli," "William Farel," etc. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1868. 16mo. pp. 325.

Daughters of the Cross: or, the Cottage and the Palace. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York. 12mo. pp. 228.

Anchored. By the Author of the *Climbers*. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York: 12mo. pp. 271.

Mark Steadman; or, Show Your Colors. From the London Tract Society. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York. 16mo. pp. 204.

Marryatt's Works. [The Messrs. Appleton are publishing an excellent edition, in large type, of the very popular novels of Capt. Marryatt. There are to be twelve volumes, at the price of fifty cents each. Six volumes have already appeared; including "*Japhet in Search of a Father*," and "*Peter Simple*"].

MISCELLANEOUS.

Happy Thoughts. By F. C. Burand. [This First Volume of the "*Handy Volume Series*," to be published by Messrs. Roberts Brothers of Boston, is a non-descript! It is the most thoroughly laughter provoking book of the season. The misadventures of the charmingly naive city-bred hero who has been driven by the intense summer heat of the town to try the fresh air, the cool breezes, the tranquil ease, and the "gold fish" of the country, are described with a peculiar humor which is unlike anything with which we are acquainted].

The New England Tragedies in Prose. By Rowland H. Allen. I. *The Coming of the Quakers*. II. *The Witchcraft Delusion*. Boston: Noyes & Nichols. 1869. 12mo. pp. 156. [We have not yet found time to examine carefully this little volume; but we mention it now, as it seems to be a reliable historical account of the events which Mr. Longfellow has made the themes of his late work, and to give just the information which the readers of his "*Tragedies*" will desire to obtain].

The Atlantic Almanac. 1869. Edited by Donald G. Mitchell. [This is the prince of Almanacs. It is edited by one of the most popular of American authors; and the entire contents, both of the literary and artistic departments, have been prepared expressly for it].

Wood-Side and Sea-Side. Illustrated by Pen and Pencil. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1869. 8vo. pp. 96.

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Sloan's Architectural Review and Builder's Journal. An illustrated monthly. Conducted by Samuel Sloan, Architect; assisted by Charles J. Lukens. Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen, & Haffelfinger. [Six numbers of this Journal have appeared].

Fragments of Political Science on Nationalism and Inter-Nationalism. By Francis Lieber, LL. D. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 8vo. pp. 23.

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T H E
N E W E N G L A N D E R.

No. CVII.

A P R I L, 1869.

ARTICLE I.—THE SAN KIAU, OR THE THREE RE-
LIGIONS OF CHINA.

THE religious experience of the Chinese is worthy of attentive study. Detached at an early period from the parent stock, and for thousands of years holding but little intercourse with other branches of the human family, we are able to ascertain with a good degree of precision those ideas which constituted their original inheritance, and to trace in history the development or corruption of their primitive beliefs. Midway in their long career, importing from India an exotic system, and more recently coming in contact with Mahometanism and Christianity, we are enabled to observe the manner in which their indigenous creeds have been affected or modified by foreign elements.

In their long experience, each of the leading systems has been fairly tested. The arena has been large enough, and the duration of the experiment long enough, to admit of each system working out its full results; and these experiments are

of the greater value, because they have been wrought out in the midst of a highly organized society, and in connection with a high degree of intellectual culture.

In their views and practices, the Chinese of to-day are polytheistic and idolatrous. The evidence of this strikes the attention of the voyager on every hand. In the *sanpan*, that carries him to the shore, he discovers a small shrine, which contains an image of the river god, the god of wealth, or *Kwanyin*, the goddess of mercy. His eye is charmed by the picturesqueness of pagodas perched on mountain crags, and monasteries nestling in sequestered dells; and, on entering even a small town, he is surprised at the extent if not the magnificence of temples erected to Chinghwang, the "city Defender," and Confucius, the patron of letters. Heaps of gilt paper are consumed in the streets, accompanied by volleys of fire-crackers. Bonzes modulating their voices with the sound of a wooden rattle fill the air with their melancholy chant; and processions wind through narrow lanes, bearing on their shoulders a silver effigy of the "dragon king," the god of rain.

These temples, images, and symbols, he is informed, all belong to *San kiau*, three religions. All three are equally idolatrous, and he inquires in vain for any influential native sect, which, more enlightened or philosophical than the rest, raises a protest against the prevailing superstition. Yet, on acquiring the language and studying the popular superstitions in their myriad fantastic shapes, he begins to discover traces of a religious sentiment, deep and real, which is not connected with any of the objects of popular worship—a veneration for Tien or Heaven, and a belief that in the visible heavens there resides some vague power, who provides for the wants of men, and rewards them according to their deeds.

Personified as Lautienye—not heavenly father, as it expresses the Christian's conception of combined tenderness and majesty, but literally "Old Father Heaven," much as we say "Old Father Time;" or designated by a hundred other appellations, this august but unknown Being, though universally acknowledged, is invoked or worshiped only to a very limited extent. Some, at the close of the year, present a thank-

offering to the Great Power who has controlled the course of its events; others burn a stick of incense every evening under the open sky; and in the marriage ceremony, all classes bow down before *Tien* as the first of the five objects of veneration.*

When taxed with ingratitude in neglecting to honor that Being on whom they depend for existence, the Chinese uniformly reply—"It is not ingratitude, but reverence, that prevents our worship. He is too great for us to worship. None but the Emperor is worthy to lay an offering on the altar of Heaven." In conformity with this sentiment, the Emperor, as the high priest and mediator of his people, celebrates in Peking the worship of Heaven with imposing ceremonies.

Within the gates of the southern division of the capital, and surrounded by a sacred grove so extensive that the silence of its deep shades is never broken by the noises of the busy world, stands the Temple of Heaven. It consists of a single tower, whose tiling of resplendent azure is intended to represent the form and color of the aerial vault. It contains no image, and the solemn rites are not performed within the tower; but, on a marble altar which stands before it, a bullock is offered once a year as a burnt sacrifice, while the master of the Empire prostrates himself in adoration of the Spirit of the Universe.

This is the high place of Chinese devotion; and the thoughtful visitor feels that he ought to tread its courts with unsandaled feet. For no vulgar idolatry has entered here—this mountain top still stands above the waves of corruption, and on this solitary altar there still rests a faint ray of the primeval faith. The tablet which represents the invisible Deity is inscribed with the name of Shangte, the Supreme Ruler; and as we contemplate the Majesty of the Empire prostrate before it, while the smoke ascends from his burning sacrifice, our thoughts are irresistibly carried back to the time when the King of Salem officiated as "Priest of the Most High God."

The two characters *yu* and *hwang*, which are prefixed to the title of Shangte, do indeed betray the fact, that the simple

* The other four are the earth, the prince, parents, and teachers.

grandeur of the original idea has been somewhat affected by the influence of Taoism ; still, the other two characters point back unmistakably to the object of China's earliest and purest devotion.

The writings and the institutions of the Chinese are not like those of the Hindoos and the Hebrews, pervaded with the idea of God. It is, nevertheless, expressed in their ancient books with so much clearness as to make us wonder and lament that it has left so faint an impression on the national mind.

In their books of History, it is recorded that music was invented for the praise of Shangte. Rival claimants for the throne appeal to the judgment of Shangte. He is the arbiter of nations, and, while actuated by benevolence, is yet capable of being provoked to wrath by the iniquities of men. In the Book of Changes he is represented as restoring life to torpid nature on the return of Spring. In the Book of Rites it is said that the ancients "prayed for grain to Shangte," and presented in offering a bullock, which must be without blemish, and stall-fed for three months before the day of sacrifice. In the Book of Odes, mostly composed from eight hundred to a thousand years before the Christian era, and containing fragments of still higher antiquity, Shangte is represented as seated on a lofty throne, while the spirits of the good "walk up and down on his right and left."

In none of these writings is Shangte clothed in the human form and debased by human passion like the Zeus of the Greeks. There is in them even less of anthropomorphism than we find in the representations of Jehovah in the Hebrew Scriptures. The nearest approach to exhibiting him in the human form, is the ascription to Shangte of a "huge footprint," probably an impression on some mass of rock. But how far the conception of the Supreme Ruler was removed from gross materialism, may be inferred from that line in one of the ancient Odes, *Shangte wu sheng wu hui*—"God has no voice or odor," i. e. he is imperceptible by the senses. And the philosopher Chuhe says in his Commentary on the Ancient Classics, that "Shangte is *te*," i. e. a principle of nature. Educated Chinese (for instance the celebrated Seu) on em-

bracing Christianity, assert that the Shangte of their fathers was identical with the Tienchu, the Lord of Heaven, whom they are taught to worship.

There is, therefore, no need of an extended argument, even if our space would admit of it, to establish the fact, that the early Chinese were by no means destitute of the knowledge of God. They did not, indeed, know him as the Creator, but they recognized him as supreme in providence, and without beginning or end.

Whence came this conception? Was it the mature result of ages of speculation, or was it brought down from remote antiquity on the stream of patriarchal tradition? The latter, we think, is the only probable hypothesis. In the earlier books of the Chinese, there is no trace of speculative inquiry. They raise no question as to the nature of Shangte, or the grounds of their faith in such a being, but in their first pages allude to him as already well known, and speak of burnt offerings made to him on mountain tops, as an established rite. Indeed, the idea of Shangte, when it first meets us, is not in the process of development, but already in the first stages of decay. The beginnings of that idolatry, by which it was subsequently almost obliterated, are distinctly traceable. The heavenly bodies, the spirits of the hills and rivers, and even the spirits of deceased men, were admitted to a share in the divine honors of Shangte. The religious sentiment was frittered away by being directed to a multiplicity of objects, and the popular mind seemed to take refuge among the creatures of its own fancy, as Adam did amidst the trees of the garden, from the terrible idea of a holy God. A debasing superstition became universal. Such was the state of things prior to the rise of the Three Religions.

In order to understand the mutual relations of these three systems—in other words, to understand the religious aspects of China at the present day, it will be necessary to give separate attention to the rise and progress of each. We begin with Confucianism.

There are two classes of great men, who leave their mark on the condition of their species—those who change the course of history, without any far-reaching purpose, much as a fall-

ing cliff changes the direction of a stream ; and those, again, who, like skillful engineers, excavate a channel for the thought of future generations. Preëminent among the latter stands the name of Confucius. Honored, during his life-time, to such a degree, that the princes of several states lamented his decease like that of a father, his influence has deepened with time and extended with the swelling multitudes of his people. Buddhism and Tanism both give signs of decay, but the influence and the memory of Confucius continue as green as the cypresses that shade his tomb. After the lapse of three and twenty centuries, he has a temple in every city, and an effigy in every school room. He is venerated as the fountain of wisdom by all the votaries of letters, and worshiped by the mandarins of the realm, as the author of their civil polity. The estimation in which his teachings continue to be held, is well exhibited in the reply which the people of Shantung, his native province, gave to a missionary, who, some thirty years ago, offered them Christian books: "We have seen your books," said they, "and neither desire nor approve of them. In the instructions of our sage, we have sufficient, and they are superior to any foreign doctrines that you can bring us."

Born B. C. 551, and endowed with uncommon talents, Confucius was far from relying on the fertility of his own genius. "Reading without thought is fruitless, and thought without reading idle," is a maxim which he taught his disciples, and one which he had doubtless followed in the formation of his own mind. China already possessed accumulated treasures of literature and history. With these materials he stored his memory, and by the aid of reflection digested them into a system for the use of posterity.

Filled with enthusiasm by the study of the ancients, and mourning over the degeneracy of his own times, he entered at an early age on the vocation of reformer. He at first sought to effect his objects by obtaining civil office, and setting an example of good government ; as well as by giving instruction to those who became his disciples. At the age of fifty-five, he was advanced to the premiership of his native state ; and in a few months, the improvement in the public morals was manifest. Valuables might be exposed in the street without being

stolen, and shepherds abandoned the practice of filling their sheep with water before leading them to market.

The circumstance that led him to renounce political life, is worth recording. The little kingdom of Lu grew apace in wealth and prosperity, and the princes of rival states, in order to prevent its acquiring an ascendancy in the politics of the empire, felt it necessary to counteract the influence of the wise legislator. Resorting to a stratagem similar to that which Louis XIV. employed with Charles II., they sent to the prince of Lu, instead of brave generals or astute statesmen, a band of beautiful girls who were skilled in music and dancing. The prince, young and amorous, was caught in the snare, and giving the reins to pleasure abandoned all the schemes of reform with which he had been inspired by the counsels of the sage. Disappointed and disgusted, Confucius retired into private life.

Thwarted, as he had often been, by royal pride and official jealousy, he henceforth endeavored to attain his ends by a less direct but more certain method. He devoted himself more than ever to the instruction of youth. His fame attracted young men of promise from all the surrounding principalities. No fewer than three thousand received his instructions, among whom five hundred became distinguished mandarins, and seventy-two of them are enrolled on the list of the sages of the empire. Through these and the books which he edited subsequent to this period, there can be no doubt that he exerted a greater influence on the destinies of the empire than he could have done had he been seated on the imperial throne. He won for himself the title of *Su Wang*, "the unsceptered monarch," whose intellectual sway is acknowledged by all ages.

Confucius understood the power of proverbs, and incorporating into his system such as met his approval, he cast his own teachings in the same mould. His speeches are laconic and oracular, and he has transmitted to posterity a body of political ethics, expressed in formulæ so brief and comprehensive, that it may easily be retained in the weakest memory. Thus, *kuin chieng fu tsz fu fu hiungte pung yiu*, are ten syllables which every boy in China has at his tongue's end. They contain the entire frame-work of the social fabric—the "five

relations" of sovereign and subject, parent and child, husband and wife, brother and brother, friend and friend, which, according to the Chinese, comprehend the whole duty of man as a social being. And the five cardinal virtues, benevolence, justice, order, prudence, and fidelity, so essential to the well-being of society, Confucius inculcated in the five syllables, *jen è lé che sin*.

The following sentences, taken from his miscellaneous discourses, may serve as illustrations of both the style and matter of his teachings:

"Good government consists in making the prince a prince, the subject a subject, the parent a parent, and the child a child."

"Beware of doing to another what you would not that others should do to you."

"He that is not offended at being misunderstood, is a superior man."

"Have no friend who is inferior to yourself in virtue."

"Be not afraid to correct a fault—He that knows the right and fears to do it is not a brave man."

"If you guide the people by laws and enforce the laws by punishment, they will lose the sense of shame and seek to evade them: but if you guide them by a virtuous example and diffuse among them a love of order, they will be ashamed to transgress."

"To know what we know, and to know what we do not know, is knowledge."

"We know not life, how can we know death?"

"If I should say the soul survives the body, I fear the filial would neglect their living parents in their zeal to serve their deceased ancestors. And if I should say the soul does not survive the body, I fear lest the unfilial should throw away the bodies of their parents and leave them unburied."

"The filial son is one who gives his parents no anxiety but for his health."

Filial piety, Confucius taught, is not merely a domestic virtue, but diffuses its influence through all the actions of life. A son who disgraces his parents in any way is unfilial,—one who maltreats a brother or a relative, forgetful of the bonds of

a common parentage, is unfilial. This powerful motive is thus rendered expansive in its application like piety to God in the Christian system, for which, indeed, it serves as a partial substitute. It is beautifully elaborated in the *Hiao king*, the most popular of the Thirteen Classics.

Virtue, Confucius taught with Aristotle, is the mean between two vices, and this theory is developed by his grandson in the *Chungyung*, the sublimest of the Sacred Books.

The secret of good government, he taught, consists in the cultivation of personal virtue on the part of the rulers; and the connection between private morals and national politics is well set forth in the *Ta hio*, or Great Study.

This brief tractate is the only formal composition, with the exception of an outline of history, which the great sage put forth as the product of his own pen. "I am an editor, and not an author," is the modest account which he gives of himself, and it is mainly to his labors in this department that China is indebted for her knowledge of antecedent antiquity.

The spirit in which he discharged this double duty to the past and future may be inferred from the impressive ceremony with which he concluded his great task. Assembling his disciples, he led them to the summit of a neighboring hill, where sacrifices were usually offered. Here he erected an altar, and placing on it the edition of the sacred books, which he had just completed, the gray-haired philosopher, now seventy years of age, fell on his knees, devoutly returned thanks for having had life and strength granted him to accomplish that laborious undertaking, at the same time imploring that the benefit his countrymen would receive from it might not be small. "Chinese pictures," says Pauthier, "represent the sage in the attitude of supplication, and a beam of light or a rainbow descending on the sacred volumes, while his disciples stand around him in admiring wonder."

Thales expired about the time Confucius drew his infant breath, and Pythagoras was his contemporary; but the only names among the Greeks which admit of comparison with that of Confucius, are Socrates and Aristotle, the former of whom revolutionized the philosophy of Greece, and the latter ruled the dialectics of mediæval Europe. Without the discus-

sive eloquence of the one or the logical acumen of the other, Confucius surpassed them both in practical wisdom, and exceeds them immeasurably in the depth, extent, and permanence of his influence.

It is not surprising that when missionaries attempt to direct their attention to the Saviour, the Chinese point to Confucius and challenge comparison; nor that they should sometimes fail to be satisfied with the arguments employed to establish the superiority of Jesus Christ. But the thoughtful Christian, who has studied the canonical books of China, can hardly return to the perusal of the New Testament without a deeper conviction of its divine authority. In the Confucian classics he detects none of that impurity which defiles the pages of Greek and Roman authors, and none of that monstrous mythology which constitutes so large a portion of the sacred books of the Hindoos, but he discovers defects enough to make him turn with gratitude to the revelations of the "Teacher sent from God."

Disgusted at the superstitions of the vulgar, and desirous of guarding his followers against similar excesses, Confucius led them into the opposite extreme of scepticism. He ignored, if he did not deny, those cardinal doctrines of all religion, the immortality of the soul, and the personal existence of God, both of which were currently received in his day. In place of *Shangte*, "Supreme Ruler," the name under which the God of Nature had been worshiped in earlier ages, he made use of the vague appellation *T'ien*, "Heaven;" thus opening the way on the one hand for that atheism with which their modern philosophy is so deeply infected; and, on the other, for that idolatry which nothing but the doctrine of a personal God can effectually counteract. When his pupils proposed inquiries respecting a future state, he either discouraged them or answered ambiguously, and thus deprived his own precepts of the support they might have derived from the sanctions of a coming retribution.

We may add, that while his writings abound in the praises of virtue, not a line can be found inculcating the pursuit of truth. Expediency, not truth, is the goal of his system. Contrast with this the gospel of Christ, which pronounces him the

only freeman whom the "truth makes free," and promises to his followers "the Spirit of Truth" as his richest legacy.

The style of Confucius was an ipse-dixit dogmatism, and it has left its impress on the unreasoning habit of the Chinese mind. Jesus Christ appealed to evidence and challenged inquiry, and this characteristic of our religion has shown itself in the mental development of Christian nations. Nor is the contrast less striking in another point. *Illius dicta, hujus facta laudantur*, to borrow the words of Tully in comparing Cato with Socrates. Confucius selected disciples who should be the depositories of his teachings; Christ chose apostles who should be witnesses of his actions. Confucius died lamenting that the edifice he had labored so long to erect, was crumbling to ruin. Christ's death was the crowning act of his life; and his last words, "it is finished."

It was a philosophy, not a religion, that Confucius aimed to propagate. "Our Master," say his disciples, "spake little concerning the gods." He preferred to confine his teachings to the more tangible realities of human life; but so far from setting himself to reform the vulgar superstition, he conformed to its silly ceremonies and enjoined the same course on his disciples. "Treat the gods with respect," he said to them, but, he added, in terms which leave no ambiguity in the meaning of the precept, "keep them at a distance," or, rather, "keep out of their way." A cold sneer was not sufficient to wither or eradicate the existing idolatry, and the teachings of Confucius gave authority and prevalence to many idolatrous usages which were only partially current before his day. Confucianism now stands forth as the leading religion of the empire.

Its objects of worship are of three classes—the powers of nature, ancestors, and heroes.

Originally recognizing the existence of a Supreme personal Deity, it has degenerated into a pantheistic medley, and renders worship to an impersonal *anima mundi*, under the leading forms of visible nature. Besides the concrete universe, separate honors are paid to the sun, moon, and stars; mountains, rivers, and lakes.

Of all their religious observances, the worship of ancestors is that which the Chinese regard as the most sacred. As

Æneas obtained the name of "pius" in honor of his filial devotion, so the Chinese idea of piety rises no higher. The Emperor, according to the Confucian school, may worship the Spirit of the Universe, but for his subjects it is sufficient that each present offerings to the spirits of his own ancestors. These rites are performed either at the family tombs or in the family temple, where wooden tablets, inscribed with their names, are preserved as sacred to the memory of the deceased, and worshiped precisely in the same manner as the popular idols.

The class of deified heroes comprehends illustrious sages, eminent sovereigns, faithful statesmen, valiant warriors, filial sons, and public benefactors—Confucius himself occupying the first place, and constituting, as the Chinese say, "one of a trinity with Heaven and Earth."

Like Confucianism, Taoism is indigenous to China, and coeval with the former in its origin, it was also coheir to the mixed inheritance of good and evil contained in the more ancient creeds. The Taoists derive their name from *Tau*, "Reason," and call themselves Rationalists, but with a marvelous show of profundity nothing can be more irrational than their doctrine and practice. Their founder, *Li-erl*, appears to have possessed a great mind, and to have caught glimpses of several sublime truths; but he has been sadly misrepresented by his degenerate followers. He lived in the sixth century B. C., and was contemporary with, but older than Confucius. So great was the fame of his wisdom that the latter philosopher sought his instructions; but, differing from him in mental mould as widely as Aristotle did from Plato, he could not relish the boldness of his speculations or the vague obscurity of his style. He never repeated his visit, though he always spoke of him with respect and even with admiration.

Lantsz, the "old Master," is the appellation by which the great Taoist is commonly known, and was probably given him during his lifetime to distinguish him from his younger rival. The rendering of "old child" is no more to be received than the fiction of eighty years' gestation invented to account for it.

Lantsz bequeathed his doctrines to posterity in "five thousand words," which compose the *Tau teh king*, the Rule of

Reason and Virtue. In expression this work is extremely sententious; and in the form of its composition semi-poetical. It abounds in acute apothegms, and some of its passages rise to the character of sublimity; but so incoherent are its contents, that it is impossible for any literal interpretation to form them into a system. Its inconsistencies, however, readily yield to that universal solvent—the hypothesis of a mystical meaning underlying the letter of the text. The following passage appears to embody some obscure but lofty conceptions of the True God :

“ That which is invisible is called *ye*,
 That which is inaudible is called *he*,
 That which is impalpable is called *wei*,
 These three are inscrutable, and blended in one;
 The first is not the brighter; nor the last the darker.
 It is interminable, ineffable, and existed when there was
 nothing.—

A shape without shape, a form without form,
 A confounding mystery!
 Go back, you cannot discover its beginning,
 Go forward, you cannot find its end.
 Take the ancient Reason, to govern the present,
 And you will know the origin of old.
 This is the first principle of *Tau*.”

Some European scholars discover here a notion of the Trinity, and combining the syllables *ye*, *he*, and *wei*, for which process, however, they are unable to assign any very good reason, they obtain *yehewei*, which they accept as a distorted representation of the name Jehovah. Lautsz traveled in countries to the west of China, where it was supposed he may have met with Jews, and learned from them the name and nature of the Supreme Being. Whatever truth there may be in these conjectures, it is certain that some native commentators recognize in the passage a description of Shangte, the God of the Chinese patriarchs; and the three syllables, of which the name is composed, are admitted to have no assignable meaning in the Chinese language.

Here we find a connection between the degenerate philosophy of after ages, and the pure fountain of primeval truth.

In fact, this very Shangte, though they have debased the name by bestowing it on a whole class of their *Dii superiores*, is still enthroned on the summit of the Tauist Olympus, with ascriptions more expressive of his absolute divinity than any to be met with in the canonical books of the Confucian school. At the head of their Theogony stands the triad of the *San tsing*, the "Three Pure" ones; the first of whom is styled "The mysterious sovereign, who has no superior;" "the self-existent source and beginning," the "honored one of Heaven."

He is said to have created the "three worlds;" to have produced men and gods, to have set the stars in motion, and caused the planets to revolve. But, alas! this catalogue of sublime titles and divine attributes is the epitaph of a buried faith. The Tauists persuaded themselves that this August Being, wrapped in the solitude of his own perfections, had delegated the government of the universe to a subordinate, whom they style *Yu hwang* Shangte. The former has dwindled into an inoperative idea, the latter is recognized as the actual God; and this deity, who plays mayor of the palace to a *roi faineant* is regarded as the apotheosis of a mortal by the name of Chang, an ancestor of the present hierarch of the Tauist religion. It is painful, after discoursing to them of the attributes of the True God, to hear the people exclaim, "that is our Yuhwang Shangte."

In its philosophy, this school is radically and thoroughly materialistic. The soul itself they regard as a material substance, though of a more refined quality than the body it inhabits. Liable to dissolution, together with the body, it may be rendered capable of surviving the wreck by undergoing a previous discipline; and even the body is capable of becoming invulnerable by the stroke of death, so that the etherealized form will, instead of being laid in the grave, be wafted away to the abodes of the genii. It is scarcely possible to represent the extent to which this idea fired the minds of the Chinese for ages after its promulgation, or to estimate the magnitude of its consequences. The prospect of a corporeal immortality had for them attractions far stronger than a shadowy existence in the land of spirits; and they sought it with an eagerness amounting to frenzy. The elixir of life became the

grand object of pursuit, and alchemy, with its foolish failures and grand achievements, sprang directly from the religion of Tan.

The leading principle of Tauism, of which their dogma concerning the human soul is only a particular application, is that every species of matter possesses a soul—a subtile essence endowed with individual conscious life. Freed from their grosser elements, these become the genii that preside over the various departments of nature. Some wander at will through the realms of space, endowed with a protean facility of transformation—others, more pure and ethereal, rise to the regions of the stars, and take their places in the firmament. Thus the five principal planets are called by the names of the “five elements” from which they are believed to have originated, and over which they are regarded as presiding. The stars are divinities, and their motions control the destinies of men and things—a notion which has done much to inspire the zeal of the Chinese for recording the phenomena of the heavens.

A theogony like this is rich in the elements of poetry; and most of the machinery in Chinese works of imagination is in fact derived from this source. The *Liauchai*, for example, a collection of marvelous tales, which, in their general character may be compared to the *Metamorphoses* of Ovid, is largely founded on the Taouist Mythology.

In accordance with the materialistic character of the Tauist sect, nearly all the gods whom the Chinese regard as presiding over their material interests, originated with this school. The god of rain, the god of fire, the god of medicine, the god of agriculture, and the *lares* or kitchen gods, are among the principal of this class.

A system which supplies deities answering to the leading wants and desires of mankind, cannot be uninfluential; but, in addition to the strong motives that attract worshipers to their temples, the Tauist priesthood possess two independent sources of influence. They hold the monopoly of geomancy a superstitious art which professes to select on scientific principles those localities that are most propitious for building and burial; and they have succeeded in persuading the people that they alone are able to secure them from annoyance by evil

spirits. The philosophy of Tan has thus not only given birth to a religion, but degenerated into a system of magical imposture, presided over by an arch magician who lives in almost imperial state, and sways the sceptre over the spirits of the invisible world as the Emperor does over the living population of the Empire.

As a religion, Buddhism seems to enjoy more of the popular favor than Tanism; though the former professes to draw men away from the world and its vanities, while the latter proffers the blessings of health, wealth, and long life.

It is rarely that we find a Buddhist temple of any considerable reputation, that is not situated in a locality distinguished for some feature of its natural scenery. One situated in the midst of a dusty plain, not far from the gates of Tientsin, seemed to us, when we first visited it, to present a striking exception to the general rule. Subsequently, however, a brilliant *mirage*, which we frequently saw as we approached the temple, furnished us at once with the explanation of its location and its name. It is called the temple of the "sea of light;" and its founders no doubt placed it there in order that the deceptive mirage, which is always visible in bright sunny weather, might serve its contemplative inmates as a memento of the chief tenet of their philosophy—that all things are unreal, and human life itself a shifting phantasmagoria of empty shadows.

Sequestered valleys enclosed by mountain peaks, and elevated far above the world which they profess to despise, are favorite seats for the monastic communities of Buddhism. But it is no yearning after God that leads them to court retirement; nor is it the adoration of Nature's Author that prompts them to place their shrines in the midst of his sublimest works. To them the universe is a vacuum, and emptiness the highest object of contemplation.

They are a strange paradox—religious atheists! Acknowledging no First Cause or Conscious Ruling Power, they hold that the human soul revolves perpetually in the urn of fate, liable to endless ills, and enjoying no real good. As it cannot cease to be, its only resource against this state of interminable misery is the extinction of consciousness—a remedy which

lies within itself, and which they endeavor to attain by ascetic exercises.

Their daily prayers consist of endless repetitions, which are not expected to be heard by the unconscious deity to whom they are addressed; but are confessedly designed merely to exert a reflex influence on the worshiper—i. e. to occupy the mind with empty sounds and withdraw it from thought and feeling. Tama, one of their saints, is said thus to have sat motionless for nine years with his face to the wall; not engaged, as a German would conjecture, in “thinking the wall,” but occupied with the more difficult task of thinking nothing at all.

Those in whom the discipline is completest, are believed to have entered the *Nirvana*—not an elysium of conscious enjoyment, but a negative state of exemption from pain. Such is the condition of all the Budhas, who, though the name is taken to signify supreme intelligence, are reduced to an empty abstraction in a state which is described as *pu sheng pu mie*, “neither life nor death;” and such is the aspiration of all their votaries. Melancholy spectacle! Men of acute minds, bewildered in the maze of their own speculations, and seeking to attain perfection by stripping themselves of the attributes of humanity!

As a philosophy, Buddhism resembles stoicism in deriving its leading motive from the fear of evil. But while the latter encased itself in panoply and standing in martial attitude defied the world to spoil the treasures laid up in its own bosom, the former seeks security by emptying the soul of its susceptibilities and leaving nothing that is capable of being harmed or lost—i. e. treating the soul as Epictetus is said to have done his dwelling house, in order that he might not be annoyed by the visits of thieves. It dries up the sources of life, wraps the soul in the cerements of the grave, and aims to convert a living being into a spiritual mummy, which shall survive all changes without being affected by them.

This is the spirit and these the principles of esoteric Buddhism, as enunciated by those members of the inner circle, whose wan cheeks and sunken, rayless eyes indicate that they are far advanced in the process of self-annihilation. In their

external manifestations they vary with different schools and countries, the lamas of Tartary, and the shamans of Ceylon, appearing to have little in common.

To adapt itself to the comprehension of the masses, Buddhism has personified its abstract conceptions and converted them into divinities, while to pave the way for its easier introduction, it readily embraces the gods and heroes of each country in its comprehensive pantheon.

In China, the Nirvana was found to be too subtle an idea for popular contemplation, and in order to furnish the people with a more attractive object of worship, the Buddhists brought forward a Goddess of Mercy, whose highest merit was that having reached the verge of Nirvana, she declined to enter, preferring to remain where she could hear the cries and succor the calamities of those who were struggling with the manifold evils of a world of change. From this circumstance she is called the *Tsz'pei Kwan-yin*, the "merciful goddess who hears the prayers" of men.

This charming attribute meets a want of humanity, and makes her a favorite among the votaries of the faith. While the Three Budhas hold a more prominent position in the temple, she occupies the first place in the hearts of their worshipers. Temples of a secondary class are often devoted especially to her; and in the greater ones she almost always finds a shrine or corner where she is represented with a thousand hands ready to succor human suffering, or holding in her arms a beautiful infant, and ready to confer the blessing of offspring on her faithful worshipers—in this last attitude resembling the favorite object of popular worship in papal countries.

In the Sea-light Monastery, above referred to, she appears in a large side hall, habited in a cloak, her head encircled by an inscription in gilded characters, which proclaims her as the "goddess whose favor protects the *second birth*." This language seems to express a Christian thought; but in reality nothing could be more intensely pagan. It relates to the transmigration of souls, which is the fundamental doctrine of the system; and informs the visitor that this is the divinity to whom he is to look for protection in passing through the suc-

cessive changes of his future existence. Within the mazes of that mighty labyrinth, there is room for every condition of life on earth, and for purgatories and paradises innumerable besides. Beyond these, the common Buddhist never looks. To earn by works of merit—which play an important part in the modified system—the reversion of a comfortable mandarinatè, or a place in the “paradise of the western sky,” bounds his aspirations. And to escape from having their souls triturated in a spiritual mortar; or ground between spiritual millstones in Hades; or avoid the doom of dwelling in the body of a brute on earth; constitutes with the ignorant the strongest motive to deter them from vice—those and a thousand other penalties being set forth by pictures and rude casts to impress the minds of such as are unable to read.

Budhism was little known in China prior to the year A. D. 66. At that time the Emperor *Mingte*, of the Han dynasty, is said to have had a remarkable dream that led to its introduction. He had seen, he said to his courtiers, a man of gold, holding in his hand a bow and two arrows. They recognizing in these objects the elements of Foh, the name of Budha, as it is written in the Chinese language, and calling to mind a saying ascribed to Confucius, “that the Holy One is in the West,” expounded the dream as an intimation that the Buddhist religion ought to be introduced from India. The Embassy thus sent to the West, by imperial command, in quest of a foreign religion, was, it is thought, incited by some indistinct rumor of the appearance of our Saviour in Judea; and it is interesting to speculate as to what the condition of China might have been, if the Embassadors, instead of stopping in India, had proceeded to Palestine. As it is, the success of Budhism demonstrates the possibility of a foreign faith taking root in the soil of China.

The San Kian, or Three Religions, have now passed in revision. We have viewed them, however, owing to the limits of our space, only in outline, neither allowing ourselves on the one hand to follow out those superstitious practices which attach themselves to the several schools like the moss and ivy that festoon the boughs of aged trees, nor, on the other, to

enter into a minute investigation of those systems of philosophy in which they have their root.

The fact that each takes its rise in a school of philosophy, is significant of the tendencies of human thought.

The Confucian philosophy, in its prominent characteristics, was ethical, occupying itself mainly with social relations and civil duties, shunning studiously all questions that enter into ontological subtleties, or partake of the marvelous and the supernatural.

The philosophy of Tan, as developed by the followers of Lautsze, if not in the form in which it was left by their Master, may be characterized as physical. For the individual it prescribed a physical discipline; and without any conception of true science, it was filled with the idea of inexhaustible resources, hidden in the elements of material nature.

The Buddhist philosophy was preëminently metaphysical. Originating with a people who, far more than the Chinese, are addicted to abstruse speculations, it occupied itself with subtle inquiries into the nature and faculties of the human mind, the veracity of its perceptions, and the grounds of our delusive faith in the independent existence of an external world.

These three philosophies, differing thus widely in their essential character—one being thoroughly material, another purely ideal, and the third repudiating all such questions and holding itself neutral and indifferent, yet exhibit some remarkable points of agreement. They agree in the original omission or negation of religious ideas; and they coincide no less remarkably in evolving each, from its negative basis, a system of religion; and in contributing each its quota to the popular idolatry.

Confucius “seldom spoke of the divinities,” and taught his disciples to “keep them at a distance;” and yet the forms of respect, which he enjoined for deceased ancestors, led to their virtual deification, and promoted, if it did not originate, the national hero worship. Like the modern apostle of positivism, professing to occupy himself wholly with positive ideas,—like him, he was unable to satisfy the cravings of his spiritual nature without having recourse to a religion of humanity.

The Buddhist creed denies alike the reality of the material

world and the existence of an overruling mind; yet it has peopled an ideal universe with a race of ideal gods, all of whom are entities in the belief of the vulgar.

The Tauist creed acknowledges no such category as that of spirit in contradistinction from matter; yet it swarms heaven and earth with tutelar spirits whom the people regard as divine.

We see here a process directly the reverse of that which certain atheistic writers of modern Europe assert to be the natural progress of the human mind. According to them, men set out with the belief of many gods, which they at length reduce to unity, and finally supersede by recognizing the laws of nature as independent of a personal administrator. The history of China is fatal to this theory. The worship of one God is the oldest form of Chinese religion, and idolatry is an innovation. Even now new idols are constantly taking their place in the national pantheon; and so strong is the tendency in this direction, that in every case where philosophy has laid the foundation, idolatry has come in to complete the structure.

It is incorrect to assert that any one of the San Kiau is a State religion to the exclusion of the others—though the Confucian is sometimes so regarded on account of its greater influence with the ruling classes, and its marked prominence in connection with state ceremonials. Not only are they all recognized and tolerated, but they all share the imperial patronage. The shrines of each of the three religions are often erected by imperial munificence; and their priests and sacred rites provided for at the imperial expense with impartial liberality.

Not only do they coexist without conflict in the empire, but they exercise a joint sway over almost every mind in its immense population. It is impossible to apportion the people among these several creeds. They are all Confucians, all Budhists, all Tauists. They all reverence Confucians and worship their ancestors—all participate in the "feast of hungry ghosts," and employ the Buddhist Burial Service; and all resort to the magical devices of the Tauists to protect themselves against the assaults of evil spirits, or secure "good luck" in business.

They celebrate their marriages according to the Confucian rites, in building their houses, and in cases of alarming illness they ask the advice of a Taoist ; and, at death, they commit their souls to the keeping of the Buddhists. The people assert, and with truth, that these religions, originally three, have become one ; and they are accustomed to symbolize this unity by erecting *San kiau tang* temples of the Three Religions, in which Lantsze and Budha appear on the right and left of Confucius, as completing the triad of sages. This arrangement, however, gives great offense to some of the more zealous disciples of the latter ; and a few years ago a memorial was presented to the Emperor, praying him to destroy the *San kiau tong*, which stood near the tomb of their great teacher, who has no "equal but Heaven."

This feeling is only a faint echo of a determined opposition which for ages withstood the advance of the rival systems ; and which has now been overcome to such an extent that they hold a coördinate place in the popular mind, and receive nearly equal honors at the hand of the government.

The effects of this coalition may be traced in their literature, as well as in the manners and customs of the people. Of this, one example will suffice ; though we might go on, if space permitted, to show how freely the later works of each school appropriate the phraseology of the others, and to point out the extent to which the general language of the country has been enriched by a vocabulary of religious terms, chiefly of Buddhist origin, all of which are incorporated in the Imperial Dictionary, and pass as current coin in the halls of the literary tribunal.

In the collection of Tales, above referred to, there is a story which owes its humor to the bizarre intermixture of elements from each of the Three Religions.

A young nobleman, riding out, hawk in hand, is thrown from his horse and taken up for dead. On being conveyed to his house, however, he opens his eyes and gradually recovers his bodily strength ; but to the grief of his family, he is hopelessly insane. He fancies himself a Buddhist priest, repels the caresses of the ladies of his harem, and insists on being conveyed to a distant province, where he affirms he has passed his

life in a monastery. On arriving he proves himself to be the abbot; and the mystery of his transfiguration is at once solved.

The young nobleman had led a dissolute life, and his flimsy soul, unable to sustain the shock of death, was at once dissipated. The soul of a priest who had just expired happened to be floating by, and led by that desire to inhabit a body, which some say impelled the devils to enter the herd of swine, it took possession of the still warm corpse.

The young nobleman was a Confucian of the modern type. The idea of the soul changing its earthly tenement is Buddhist. And that which rendered the metamorphosis possible, without waiting for another birth, was the Taoist doctrine that the soul is dissolved with the body, unless it be purified and concentrated by vigorous discipline.

It is curious to inquire on what principles this reconciliation has been effected. Have the three creeds mingled together like gases in the atmosphere, each contributing some ingredient to the composition of a vital fluid;—or blended like the rays of the spectrum, each imparting its own hue, and all concurring in the production of pure light? Alas! it is not a healthy atmosphere that supplies the breath of the new-born soul in China; and no pure or steady light cheers its opening eyes; yet each of these systems meets a want; and the whole, taken together, supply the cravings of nature as well perhaps as any creed not derived from a divine revelation.

The three religions are not, as the natives thoughtlessly assume, identical in signification and differing only in their mode of expression. As we have already seen, it is hardly possible to conceive of three creeds more totally distinct, or radically antagonistic; and yet, to a certain extent, they are supplementary. And to this it is that they owe their union and their permanence.

Confucius gave his people an elaborate theory of their social organization and civil polity; but when they looked abroad on nature with its unsolved problems, they were unable to confine their thoughts within the limits of his cautious positivism. They were fascinated by mystery, and felt that in nature there were elements of the supernatural which they could not ignore, even if they did not understand them. Hence, the rise of

Tauism, captivating the imagination by its hierarchy of spirits and personified powers, and meeting in some degree their longing for a future life, by maintaining, though under hard conditions, the possible achievement of a corporeal immortality.

With the momentous question of existence suspended on this bare possibility, Buddhism came to them like an evangel of hope, assuring every man of an inalienable interest in a life to come. It gave them a better psychology of the human mind than they had before possessed; afforded a plausible explanation of the inequalities in the condition of men; and, by the theory of metempsychosis, seemed to reveal the link that connects man with the lower animals on one hand, and with the gods on the other. No wonder it excited the popular mind to the pitch of enthusiasm, and provoked the adherents of the other creeds to virulent opposition.

Tauism, as opposed to it, became more decidedly material, and Confucianism more positively atheistic. The disciples of the latter especially assailed it with acrimonious controversy—denying, though they had hitherto been silent on such questions, the personality of God, and the future life of the human soul.

Now, however, the effervescence of passions has died away—the antagonistic elements have long since neutralized each other, and the three creeds have subsided into a stable equilibrium, or rather become compacted into a firm conglomerate. The ethical, the physical, and the metaphysical, live together in harmony. The school that denies the existence of matter; that which occupies itself wholly with the properties of matter; and that, again, which denounces the subtleties of both, have ceased their controversies. One deriving its motive from the fear of death, another actuated by a dread of the evils attendant on human life, and the third absorbed in the present, and indifferent alike to hope or fear, all are accepted with equal faith by an unreasoning populace. Without perceiving their points of discrepancy, or understanding the manner in which they supplement each other, they accept each as answering to certain cravings of their inward nature, and

blend them all in a huge, heterogeneous, and incongruous creed.

It would be interesting to inquire, had we sufficient space, what have been the intellectual and moral influences of these several systems, separate and combined. They have, it is true, given rise to various forms of degrading superstition, and supporting, instead of destroying each other, they bind the mind of the nation in three-fold fetters; still, we are inclined to think that each has served a useful purpose in the long education of the Chinese people. But in the providence of God, the time has now come when they are offered a better faith—one which is in every part consistent with itself and adequate to satisfy all their spiritual necessities. Will they receive it?

The habit of receiving such contradictory systems has rendered their minds almost incapable of weighing evidence; and they never ask concerning a religion “is it true?” but “is it good?” Christianity, however, with its exclusive and peremptory claims, has already begun to arouse their attention, and when the spirit of inquiry is once thoroughly awakened, the San Kian, or Three Creeds, will not long sustain the ordeal.

NOTE.—As the reader may be at a loss to reconcile some of the statements in the foregoing Article, it may not be amiss to remind him that each of the Three Systems appears under a two-fold aspect, first as an esoteric philosophy, and afterwards as a popular religion. Thus a chief object of the discipline, enjoined by the founder of Buddhism, was the extinction of individual consciousness; yet the Chinese embraced it as their best assurance of a future life. What the philosopher was anxious to cast away, the populace were eager to possess.

The object of the foregoing Article is rather to set forth the *San Kiau* in their mutual relations, than to furnish a detailed account of each; for which, indeed, the limits of a single Article would be quite insufficient. If, however, our readers should be desirous of making more extended researches in this direction, they will find much information on the subject in the following works:

Nevius's "China and the Chinese."

Doolittle's "Social Life of the Chinese."

Hardy's "Eastern Monachism."

St. Hilaire's "Budhism."

F. D. Maurice's "Religions of the World."

Edkins's "Religions of China," Trübner & Co., London.

Culbertson's "Darkness in the Flowery Land."

Mr. Nevius's work contains much fresh and original information on many subjects. The little book of Mr. Edkins is specially valuable on account of the view it gives of the doctrines of the Chinese as embodied in written documents; and that of Mr. Culbertson as an exposition of the superstitious practices of the people.

ARTICLE II.—FALSE DEFINITIONS OF FAITH, AND THE TRUE DEFINITION.

THE primary lesson of practical religion, the essential condition of personal salvation, faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, is, at this day, after eighteen centuries of theologizing, a matter of such doubtful question that not only different schools of theology, but different theologians of the same school, are at variance upon it. On many subjects, after much division, there has come to be recognized a common view, generally accepted, from which sects or individuals vary. On this, the prime question of practical religion, there is no generally accepted view. So far are men from agreeing as to what is true on this point, that they are not even agreed as to what is orthodox.* And one of the saddest things about the matter is, that there is no controversy about it. For there is one sadder thing than even the sharpest of controversies, and that is the indolent difference of Christian ministers on matters of fundamental importance, with no controversy.

* TILLOTSON, Sermon on Heb. xi. 1: "Most who write upon this subject have marvelously puzzled themselves with the various acceptations of this word, inso-much that some have undertaken to enumerate above twenty distinct significations. Hereby, instead of clearing the notion of faith, they have involved it, and made it more intricate, and have made men believe that it is a notion very remote from common understanding."

WOODS, Vol. III., p. 79: "Although the language of Scripture is very intelligible, there are few subjects on which more obscure and erroneous opinions have been entertained."

SIMON, Sermon on Heb. xi. 1: "The nature of faith is little known."

WATSON, Inst. Part II., Ch. xxiii: "So many distinctions have been set up,—so many logical terms and definitions are found in the writings of systematic divines, and often, as Baxter has it, 'such quibbling and jingling of a mere sound of words,' that the simple Christian has often been grievously perplexed."

GODWIN, J. H., on Christian Faith. Congregational Lecture, London, 1862; p. 5: "The unsatisfactory character of some discussions respecting Faith has rendered many persons averse to all speculation on the subject. . . . Not a few have been painfully perplexed, through ignorance of what was enjoined, when they were directed to *believe in Christ*, and the injury occasioned by erroneous views of this subject has not been small."

Of the various definitions of faith that are current among Christian teachers, it is not possible that all should be true. But there is no need of uncertainty which of them is the true one. There are certain tests of the true definition of the word, which we propose to state distinctly, and then to bring up to them, one by one, the current false definitions, that the falsehood of them may be exposed; and afterwards the true definition, that its truth may be made manifest.

I. The Tests of a True Definition of Faith.

1. The true definition of *faith* must express the natural meaning of the word under the limitation with which it is construed in the Scriptures, and no other.

To admit some special and unusual definition of the word *faith* into our theology, is to accuse the offer of the gospel of being a fraud upon common people. It is to represent it as an offer made upon a certain condition, which being fulfilled in its obvious meaning, the promise is to be repudiated.

What we want, therefore, is the definition, not of "justifying faith," nor of "saving faith," nor of "spiritual faith," nor of "evangelical faith," but simply of *faith*. To incur the conditions of salvation with such limitations as these, is to impute to God slackness concerning his promises. Our only right even to demand of one who has received the promise "whosoever believeth shall be saved," that his faith shall be a "*living* faith," is this that a dead faith is not faith, but only the appearance of it?

2. The true definition of faith, as it is used in the Scriptures, must express such an act as implies Obedience, Repentance, and Love to God, not in its more or less remote antecedents or consequences, but in itself. Salvation is promised in the Scriptures to faith always, and to faith exclusively. The offer of salvation on condition of faith, is made both positively and negatively. "He that believeth shall be saved, he that believeth not shall be damned." In like manner salvation is promised to repentance and obedience and love—to each of them always, and to each of them exclusively. Obviously, then, we cannot read the New Testament intelligently and

consistently, with any definition of faith that does not make faith practically to involve the other conditions of salvation.

3. The true definition of faith must be such that we can see it to be illustrated in the examples of the saints both of the Old and of the New Testaments, who have obtained witness of their faith, God testifying that they believed; and also in the phenomena of the Christian life down to our day.

4. The true definition of faith must describe such a free, voluntary act, that all men may be exhorted to it, and that the failure to obey the exhortation may be imputed to every one who refuses to believe, as his own sin.

We are now ready to consider severally, under the application of these tests,

II. *The current False Definitions of Faith.*

We enumerate several of the more important of them, beginning with the most formidable, the most plausible, the most widely prevalent, perhaps the most mischievous :

They are—

1. That Faith is the assent of the intellect to religious truth.
2. That Faith is a peculiar sort and degree of the assent of the intellect to religious truth.
3. That Faith is a firm conviction of one's personal salvation.
4. That Faith is equivalent to trust in God, together with all those subjective antecedents and concomitants of trust in God which are commonly included under the term "religious experience."

1. That *Faith is the assent of the intellect to religious truth* is the definition accepted, with some variations of statement, by all Roman Catholic theologians,* and by a multitude, per-

* PERRONE, *Prælect. in Compend. Redactæ*, Louvain, 1846, I., 238: "Fides est assensus liber quem præbet intellectus, divina gratia preventus et adjutus, ex imperio voluntatis a gratia pariter excitatæ, veritatibus divinitus revelatis, ob Dei ipsius revelantis auctoritatem."

Id. II., 198: "Fides quæ ad justificationem requiritur, non est fiducia in divinis promissionibus, sed firmus assensus ad ea omnia quæ Deus revelavit."

happens the majority, of Protestants.* It seems, at first view, to be confirmed by the application of the first test, in that it does seem to express the natural meaning of the word Believe.

But the moment we come to the second test, it breaks down. The assent of the intellect to religious truth does not necessarily involve in itself Repentance, Holiness, Love to God.†

Holding this as the definition of Faith, good men are at their wits' end to vindicate the good faith of God's word, which promises in so many words that whosoever believeth shall not perish, but shall have everlasting life; and then, in the very face of this promise—this broad, unlimited promise, uttered only on the single condition of faith—declares that except we repent we shall all perish, and that without holiness

Id. II., 199: "Patrum unanimis consensus est, necessariam ad justificationem esse fidem dogmaticam seu historicam, ut eam vocant adversarii."

For the "consensus patrum" on this point, this standard Jesuit theologian refers to Bellarmine, *De Justific.* lib. 1, c. 9.

See also Roman Catholic theologians generally.

* CHALMERS, Notes on HILL, 210, (Ed. N. Y.): "I am not fond of admitting in faith anything more than the intellectual act of believing, or of viewing it in any other light than as a simple credence of the truths of revelation, in as far as these truths are or may be known to us."

Id. 422: "This [saving] faith, in its proper elementary character, is belief and nothing else, and the exercise of faith is just a believing exercise. It is just a holding of the things said in the gospel to be true."

WILSON, JOHN M., in Edition of Ridgeley's Divinity, (Carters, N. Y.) p. 124: "Faith or belief, understand it as we may and apply it as we will, seems to be just assent to evidence,—counting true propositions or statements submitted to the judgment."

PEARSON on the Creed, London, 1835, p. 16: "The true nature of the faith of a Christian consists in this, that it is an assent unto truths credible upon the testimony of God delivered unto us in the writings of the apostles and prophets."

TILLOTSON, Sermon on Heb. xi. 6: "Faith is a persuasion of the mind concerning anything. . . . Its seat is the mind—the understanding."

CARSON on the Atonement, 142: "The faith of anything is neither more nor less than the belief of it; and the belief of anything is the conviction that the mind has of its truth, and implies no disposition about it, either good or bad."

† It is curious to see how the reasoning of some theologians on this point follows the line of beauty. True belief of the doctrines of the Gospel is surely followed by holiness; which is proved by the lives of believers. A sinful life proves one not to be sincere in holding the doctrines of the Gospel, because such belief is followed by holiness. See Carson on Atonement, 127–193, and Chalmers, Notes on Hill, 209–212, 422, 423. We do not count this patent fallacy among the means of avoiding the difficulty under consideration.

no man shall see the Lord. Men are driven to this dilemma :— either they must adhere to the doctrine of justification by faith only, repudiating the other demands of the Scriptures, and maintaining an antinomian orthodoxy ; or they must reject the doctrine of justification by faith only, and save the interests of holiness by sacrificing the credit of the divine promises. It is the latter course which has been adopted by the Roman Catholic Church, and by many Protestant theologians, including some of New England schools.* And it becomes us, whenever we are tempted to denounce either of these for abandoning the *articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesiæ*, to consider from how frightful an alternative they have reacted ; and seriously to question whether it is not better, with Rome and Romanizing “ New School ” men, to abandon the preaching of faith as the sole condition of salvation, rather than, with Scotchmen and Englishmen, to maintain it under such a definition as makes faith practically separable from repentance and holiness. If we accept the Romish definition of faith, we need to supplement it with the Romish doctrine of justification.

Try this same definition, now, by the fourth of the tests which we have named,—that the true definition of faith must describe a free, voluntary act, such as all men may be exhorted to,—such as a man must be to blame for not performing.

* See an admirably frank Article in the *Congregational Review* for May, 1868, from the pen of President Magoun of Iowa College. “ Either [unbelief or disbelief] may be the leading form [of selfishness]. They *were* such with the Jews. They are not with those brought up under Christian privileges ; nor is it true at all to say that unbelief is *now* the parent of all sin. . . . ‘ Only believe ’ is *not safe advice* to a sinner whose selfishness has not concentrated in rejection of Christ, as that of many Jews did.” 216. So in preaching the gospel to the heathen ; “ there may be found devout religious men among them. . . . *In such exceptional cases*, the missionary may preach to them ‘ Only believe. ’ Or they may be under conviction of sin, not having yet repented, and need first to be told how to repent. . . . The gospel . . . *does not fall into the blunder* and confusion of thought of telling men, however impenitent, to come to Jesus to be accepted and have faith.” 217, 218. “ The saving of the soul depends on two things, and one comes before, and the other after, as their several objects require ; repentance, antecedent ; . . . and faith consequent.” 212.

It is impossible to accept these statements, without feeling that our Lord and his apostles were addicted to a very reckless and “ blundering ” way of promising salvation on the sole condition of faith.

Can the definition of faith which declares it to be the assent of the understanding to religious truth, bear this test? Every one who is familiar with the conflict between Christianity and rationalism knows how perilously the good cause labors under stress of controversy at this point:—how such men as Henry Brougham* declare it as a self-evident proposition that a man is no more responsible for his belief than he is for the color of his skin; and such Christian apologists as Richard Whately and Henry Rogers yield the point, and, in contradiction of all the implications of the gospel on this subject, declare it to be the keystone of ethical truth “that all we are really responsible for is honest investigation and conscientious pursuit of what we deem truth.”† Plainly, a mental act to which men cannot be urged and exhorted and commanded, and for the failure of which they cannot be condemned, is not what the Bible means by faith on the Lord Jesus Christ. The palpable failure of this definition of faith to meet this scriptural test is not in the least relieved by the arbitrary distinction drawn by Roman Catholic and some other theologians,‡ between faith as the assent of the understanding to truth, upon authority, and knowledge as assent to truth upon demonstration or evidence. Authoritative testimony is only one kind of evidence, and the action of the intellect in receiving truth upon this kind of evidence, is nowise different from its action in receiving truth upon any other kind of evidence.

We come back, now, with some suspicions in our mind, to reëxamine the plausible claim which this definition makes, to have passed the first-named test, and to express the natural meaning of the word under the limitation with which it is construed in the Scriptures. The constant limitation with which the word Believe is qualified, either expressly or implicitly, in connection with the offer of salvation in the gospel, is this, “on the Lord Jesus Christ.” Now we deny, as a simple matter of lexicography and the usage of speech, that the

* Address at his inauguration as Provost of the University of Glasgow.

† “Reason and Faith.” From the *Edinburgh Review*, October, 1849. Republished by Crosby, Nichols, & Co. p. 359.

‡ *Perrone*, *Prælectt. Theol.*, I., 238, II., 198. Ed. Louvain, 1846. *Rogers's Reason and Faith*, 341, 342. *Ridgeley*, II., 107, note.

word Believe, in such a grammatical construction with the name of a person, signifies the assent of the intellect to truth,—except as this sense has been forced upon it in the course of centuries of theological sophistication; and claim, on the contrary, that the obvious and natural meaning of the phrase is something entirely different. But we do not undertake, at present, the details of a philological argument on this question.

The point on which we have just been insisting is shiningly illustrated when we come to apply the last test of a true definition of faith, to wit, that it must correspond with the acknowledged examples of faith in the Scriptures and in the experience of the Christian Church. What are these dogmas to which all those who are saved by faith have given intellectual assent, from the days of righteous Abel until now? They are “all things that God has revealed”—is the sweeping statement of Romish Theology, followed up by a catalogue of them in detail. But it evades the troublesome consequences of this statement by the contrivance of a *fides implicita*, which is no intellectual assent to truth at all, but only the state of mind in which one would believe if he had occasion. Our Protestant writers feel the difficulty as well, without so ready an escape.* They go toiling through the Old Testament endeavoring to find in all the old heroes of faith the tenets of their own theology.† The clothing of our first parents in skins is made to prove their belief of the doctrine of vicarious sacrifice; and the scarlet thread from Rahab’s window is forced to testify to her theological soundness on the necessity of atone-

* Dr. Macknight would seem to know no other faith, as a Christian grace, than a *fides implicita*. “The faith,” says he, “by which men under the new covenant are justified, consists in a *sincere disposition* to believe what God hath made known.” Again, “faith does not consist in the belief of particular doctrines, but in such an earnest desire to know and to do the will of God, as leads them conscientiously to use such means as they have for gaining the knowledge of his will, and for doing it when found.” “Abraham’s faith consisted in an *habitual disposition to believe and obey God*.” Quoted in *Carson on Atonement*. 141.

† It is curious, by the way, and instructive, to observe how those theologians who are fiercest for extreme statements of the divine perfection of the Scriptures are, at the same time, most tenacious of interpretations like these, which imply that the Scriptures are defective in their statement of the very essential things in their histories, and require to be supplemented by an extensive system of guesswork under “the analogy of faith.”

ment. But not even with such exegesis as this, is it possible to ascribe to these ancient worthies, any more than to multitudes of modern saints, a reception of *all* true Christian doctrines; when, therefore, it becomes necessary to say *what* doctrine must be believed in order to salvation, then questions arise. One says, with painful eagerness, "only the fundamental doctrines;" and if any person, interested in the stricter definition of the condition on which the issues of eternity hang, asks for specifications, every man is ready with his own favorite dogma to push it into the place of honor. One will say, the articles of the Nicene Creed;* another, the Athanasian statement of the Trinity;† a third, who is styled by his admirers "the Jonathan Edwards of the nineteenth century,"‡ declares it to be the doctrine of limited atonement, declaring, in good round terms, that "the thing that a man believes for eternal life is that Christ died for the sins of all believers"—and for nobody else; while writers with whom we are more familiar, hold that the doctrine of general atonement—"the doctrine that Christ died for our sins,—is the precise object of saving faith."§ But after granting to all these the utmost license in selecting each his favorite dogma as the condition of salvation, we cannot probably find one of them who will confidently claim that it has been held by all who have been saved in the days of the Bible history and since.

2. The second false definition of faith is a modification of the first. It holds that faith is still the assent of the intellect to truth; but that the faith to which the promise of salvation is given is a peculiar sort of faith, a peculiar quality or intensity of intellectual assent, to be distinguished as "saving

* See, for example, the platform of the Christian Union Association, 1867.

† See the "damnatory clauses" of the Athanasian creed, "*Quicumque Vult*": "Whosoever will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the catholic faith; which faith except one do keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly. The catholic faith is this: " &c., &c., &c. "This is the catholic faith, which except a man believe faithfully, he cannot be saved."

‡ Carson on the Atonement, 144.

§ Sacramental Sermons, by J. W. Alexander, p. 222. See also President Magoun, in *Congregational Review*, May, 1868

faith." Thus a very noted and excellent preacher,* after stating the dogma which he declares to be "the object of saving faith," adds "the man who believes this *with a spiritual apprehension of what he believes* is a saved man." Such artificial limitations to the simple gospel condition of faith on the Lord Jesus Christ, are naturally enough proposed by conscientious men who fear the antinomian consequences of promising salvation simply to all who believe—with intellectual assent. They are intended to guard the divine promises from being appropriated by evil and unworthy men to their own perdition, by inserting in the condition a saving clause. But they are set aside at once on applying to them the first test of a true definition of the faith of the gospel—that it must express the simple meaning of the words used, with no other limitation than that with which they are construed in the Scriptures. When God promises, "whosoever believeth shall be saved," no man may dare to say that this does not mean whosoever believeth, but "whosoever believeth with a saving faith," or "whosoever believeth with a spiritual apprehension of what he believes"—lest in so saying he charge the Faithful Promiser with a mental reservation and a fraud.

3. The third false definition of faith makes it equivalent to an undoubting confidence in one's personal salvation through

* Rev. J. W. Alexander, D. D., *Sacramental Sermons*, p. 222. This implication that there is something specially intense, or otherwise peculiar, in the convictions of truth which constitute faith, is found in many theologians, both Romish and Protestant, who do not include it in their definitions. The "*certitudo fidei*" is presented as something far more certain than other certainty. On this distinction turn some important questions of Tridentine theology.

A vast emphasis is commonly laid, even by writers who ought to know better, on the expression, "with *the heart* man believeth unto righteousness." So the Rev. Abel Stevens, LL. D., in *South Church Lectures*, N. Y., 1866, pp. 146, 147: "Evangelical or saving faith takes in intellectual faith, indeed, but transcends it by comprehending *also the heart*. . . . We all understand what is meant by the heart—it implies our affections as contrasted with our pure intellectiones." The exegete is misled by transferring to the writings of Luke the usage of the time of Fowler and Wells. There is no trace in the Scriptures of our popular distinction between *head* and *heart*. In the New Testament the heart means *the mind*, as distinguished from the body; and when the affections and emotions are to be specially indicated, it is done (according to the phrenology of those days) rather by the word *σπλάγχνα*, mistranslated *bowels*.

faith. Probably there are very few who would accept this definition at the present day. Conybeare, indeed, in his famous Article on Parties in the Church of England,* imputes to the so-called Evangelicals of that body that they insist on the formula, "I believe that I am justified by faith," as expressing the condition of salvation. But Dr. Pusey, an equally competent witness, declares, in speaking of that same party, "I never met with any who held the Lutheran doctrine of justification, that 'justifying faith is that whereby a person believes himself to be justified.'"† But the admitted fact that for nearly a century, and that the most formative and critical century in the history of Protestant theology, this was the generally accepted statement of Protestant writers, both Lutheran and Calvinist,‡ makes it proper to speak briefly of it.

It fails on every test of a true definition.

(1.) It is in no sense the fair and natural meaning of the words Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, but an arbitrary interpretation forced upon those words by a polemic exigency.§

(2.) It represents a so-called "faith," which in no wise involves repentance and holiness, but, on the contrary, is the favorite "faith" of the most impious and immoral fanatics.

(3.) It is widely at variance with the history and experience of God's church, which shows us the most divinely approved examples of faith, in believers who were sadly burdened with misgivings concerning their personal salvation.

(4.) But when we come to the final test, Is it a free act, to which any man may be exhorted, and for failing in which he may be condemned, the absurdity and folly of this definition become so apparent as to fill one with amazement that it

* *Edinburgh Review*, Oct., 1853.

† *Eirenicon*, p. 15.

‡ No further citation is necessary in verification of this statement than a reference to the exhaustive essay of Principal Cunningham on "The Reformers and the Doctrine of Assurance," in the volume of his essays entitled "The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation," especially on p. 119.

§ For the history of this dogma, see the Article above cited from the work of Principal Cunningham.

could ever have obtained currency in the Christian Church. To exhort a man to this act of faith, is to exhort him to be convinced, not by evidence but by inducements of what is acknowledged to be a present falsehood, in order that, through his believing it, it may become a truth. To condemn a man for unbelief, under this definition, is to hold him guilty for not believing to be true what the very fact of his condemnation declares to have been false. This definition represents Christianity as a cruel Sphinx, setting insoluble riddles to all passers-by, and devouring them for not furnishing impossible answers.

4. The fourth false definition of faith describes it as not merely an act of trust, but as including those antecedent and concomitant states of the intellect and the emotions which are commonly summed up under the title "religious experience." This definition, set forth in the following terms by the American Tract Society, is declared by that representative body to be the accepted theology of the "Evangelical" Church :

"WHAT IS IT TO BELIEVE ON CHRIST? It is to feel your need of him; to believe that he is able and willing to save you, and to save you now; and to cast yourself unreservedly on his mercy, and trust in him alone for salvation." *

If, now, we ask ourselves, under the first test of a true definition of faith, does this protracted three-fold process correspond with the natural, obvious meaning of the words "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ," as they were uttered under the promise of salvation to Jews and heathen alike by the authority of the Holy Spirit, we are compelled to answer in the negative. It is one thing to say that the emotional experience and the intellectual conviction here described are implied as *antecedents* to the act of faith on Christ, but it is a different and a very unhappy thing to teach that they are a *part* of the act itself. No usage of the word, outside of theology, can be justly alleged in vindication of this definition.

In fact, when we come, next, to compare it with the examples of faith in the Bible, we find that when (as in the case of the Philippian jailer, Acts xvi., 31) the feeling of need and the necessary intellectual conviction are already present, the

* Tract number 857. "What Is It to Believe on Christ?"

demand of the gospel is not for a part of the act of faith, but for the whole of it.

And so when we ask, is the faith thus defined a voluntary act, to which all men may be exhorted under force of inducements of reward and penalty and with the alternative of personal guilt,—the answer again is no! You cannot procure a certain condition of the emotions by offering a reward for it. You cannot produce a conviction of the understanding by threats of damnation. Do not let us impute “to God’s wisdom unto salvation,” the clumsy expedients into which we fall ourselves. God’s way is to convince the intellect in the only way in which an intellect was ever yet convinced, by reason and evidence; to move the feelings, not by commanding one to agitate himself, but by those appliances which affect the heart; and to use the tremendous sanctions of the divine government to sway the free determination of the will.

But we know that the question will be put,—“since these conditions are the constant antecedents of faith, is there, after all, any practical harm in including them in the definition of it?”

We answer, first, that there is *no good* in it, of any kind, whether practical or theoretical. When you have gone through with your description of the necessary antecedents of faith, you come to an equivalent word—“trust”—to which all these things are just as necessarily antecedent as they are to faith: so that your definition has tangled up within itself an endless coil,—an infinite series—of antecedents, through which the inquirer for salvation would never make his way to the thing itself, to all eternity.

Secondly, the practical harm of the definition is this. It perplexes plain minds by a complex definition of a simple act. It encourages and justifies professed believers in computing the evidence of their faith by the intensity of their preliminary experience, rather than by their daily life of faith and acts of faith. It obscures, while professing to illuminate, the straight gate, for those who seek it. It takes away from the impenitent man the burden and guilt of willfully neglecting a simple duty,—to comfort him with the complacent feeling that he is

an unfortunate person, not altogether to blame for not having happened to be hit by a religious experience.

We have spent much time, now, in the consideration of some of the false definitions of faith. Happily, the true definition is so simple, so exactly and obviously correspondent with the conditions to which we are limited by the Scriptures, and so accordant with the consciousness of believers, that it requires little more than a just statement.

TO BELIEVE IN THE LORD JESUS CHRIST IS TO TRUST ONESELF TO HIM.* The very simplicity of the act makes it difficult to define it otherwise than thus by the use of a synonym. But whatever further illustration of the meaning of the word may be required, will come, in the process of testing this definition.

(1.) This is the natural and obvious meaning of the words as they would be understood by those to whom they were preached. Sometimes the word translated Believe stands in such construction that it cannot bear any other meaning: as when it is said (the reflexive pronoun being expressed, John ii. 24) that Jesus *did not intrust himself*—*οὐκ ἐπίστευεν ἑαυτὸν*—to the Jerusalem Jews. But in general we may say

* One of the best and soundest statements of any of the systematizers on this subject, is to be found in the work of the Wesleyan, Watson. Naturally enough, preaching is in advance of theology in the return toward Scriptural truth; and many of the most useful preachers of the present day are explicit in the definition of faith in a contrary sense from the theologians of their own schools.

Spurgeon viii. 28: "Here lies the essence of saving faith, to rest yourself for eternal salvation upon the atonement and righteousness of Jesus Christ, to have done once for all with all reliance upon feelings and upon doings, and to trust in Jesus Christ and in what he did for your salvation."

N. L. Rice, D. D., in "South Church Lectures," N. Y., 1865, p. 178: "Faith is simply the act or exercise of a helpless being trusting in one who is able to help. For the purposes of justification, it is the act of a guilty being, trusting in the righteousness of another."

Some of the most felicitous statements concerning the act and object of faith are found, as might be expected, in the writings of Dr. Bushnell. The growth of just views of the object of faith as a **PERSON**, and not a proposition, stands, no doubt, in close connection with the prevailing direction of recent theology to the study of the life and person of Jesus Christ—the best "improvement in theology" since the Reformation.

that wherever the word Believe is in construction with the preposition *in* or *on*, either expressed or understood, it loses that meaning of "intellectual assent" which it bears when alone, and acquires the meaning of trust, or personal reliance, or self-committal. And for the justice of this statement (having no space here for an induction of particulars) we refer to the Greek Lexicon, to the Concordance of the Greek Testament, and to the usage of the English language as well as of the Greek.

This meaning is the only one in which the word can be construed with its object. "The Lord Jesus Christ" is not a doctrine concerning his own person; is not a theory of the atonement; is not a series of fundamentals in theology; is not a code of religious truth. And yet they who have misunderstood the words *believe on*, have been compelled to substitute one or another of these things as the object of Christian faith for the Lord Jesus Christ himself.*

(2.) The act of Faith—of intrusting oneself for salvation to the Lord Jesus Christ—includes, not as a remote consequence but in itself, Repentance, Obedience, Holiness, and whatever things beside are demanded in the Scriptures as conditions of salvation: and so the consistency and good faith of the word of God in promising salvation to "whosoever believeth," while yet demanding these other conditions, is maintained. The act of obedience to God, when expediency, or passion, or worldly fear are soliciting the soul to disobedience, is the act of faith; the life of holiness is the life of faith. So spake Peter (1 Peter iv. 19) to the martyr churches of Asia Minor,—“Let them that suffer according to the will of God commit the keeping of their souls to him *in well doing*, as unto a faithful

* The annotator of Ridgeley's Body of Divinity, in contradicting the text of his author, says, with 'marvelous unconsciousness how directly he is contradicting the language of the Scriptures: "As to faith being an 'act of trust or dependence on him who is its object,' Dr. Ridgeley uses language inconsistent with himself. *The object of faith is not a person, but a proposition or a statement.* . . . Trust, on the other hand, has reference entirely to a person. The difference between it and faith, in fact, is just that the one has a person and the other has a statement for its object. The two are quite distinct in their nature,—faith being an act of the understanding, and trust an act of the heart. Vol II., p. 125.

Creator" It is in the act of doing right that they do make choice of the safe keeping of God, rather than of the tender mercies of the wicked, and intrust their souls—their lives—to his charge. The words are almost a translation of those which David spoke to men in like trouble, in the thirty-seventh Psalm: "Fret not thyself because of evil-doers; *trust the Lord and do right,*" and you will be taken care of. There are not two conditions prescribed here, but one. It was *in doing the right* instead of the wrong, that one put himself, at once, in peril from evil-doers, and in charge with the Lord. So in the great classical instance of faith, which is the example, illustration, and specimen of faith to all generations—the case of Abraham—what was that faith which was counted to him for righteousness? It is written (Gen. xv. 6) "he believed in Jehovah"—literally, he *rested* upon him, or more exactly, perhaps, he *caused* something to rest upon him, or *built* upon him [Hiphil בִּיהַדָּה אָמֵן]. Not merely that he thought probable or certain that the promise would come true, but that he *ventured himself* upon God. So he committed himself to God when by faith he gat himself out of his country, and from his kindred and from his father's house, and went out not knowing whither he went. So he ventured all upon God when that inexplicable summons came, obedience to which was the highest act of trust. He ventured upon God when, in the early dawn, he went forth to cleave the wood for the burnt offering; and all that weary three days' journey to Moriah, at every step he rested all his weight on God. So when he neared the journey's end, and climbed the mountain side with Isaac, bearing the fire and the knife, his faith was not the conviction of his mind what God would do; it was not the purpose of his mind what *he* would do; it was, moment by moment, what he *did*. Even then he might have faltered in his act, and having ventured thus far upon God, he might have failed to venture all, and his faith would then have been an imperfect, an unfinished faith,—a purpose to trust God wholly, but a purpose unfulfilled. But he did not falter. Having trusted in God, he trusted him to the end. He stretched forth his hand to slay his son. In that supreme act, he cast forth upon God's hands the treasure of his heart, the hope of his race, the token

and earnest of God's promise,—he flung himself, with his whole weight, on God's almightiness and faithfulness and love. In that act his faith became an actual thing,—it was “made perfect,—and the Scripture was fulfilled which saith, ‘he trusted in Jehovah, and it was counted to him for righteousness.’” You see, then, that it is by works—by the *act* of faith—that a man is justified, and not by a faith that does not act,—which is not faith, but only the dead corpse or effigy of faith.*

(3.) This principle of a personal trust in God is the one common principle which we find through all the catalogue of true believers commenced in the eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and stretching from antediluvian Enoch and Abel down through ages of light or of barbarism to the latest of those who, in the kingdom of Christ, have obtained a good report through faith. It is the tie which binds into one the practical religion of the Old Testament and of

* For a full consideration, in this sense, of the faith of Abraham, see “Christian Faith, its Nature, Object, Causes, and Effects; by John H. Godwin.” London: 1862. pp. 29-37. This judicious treatise exhibits the necessary connection between Christian Faith, or Trust, and holiness of life, as follows:

“The term Trust expresses a more complex condition of mind [than belief]. It may, like belief, have respect to propositions, persons, and facts; but wherever there is an exercise of trust, there is not only some truth to be believed, there is also some good to be desired, and some course to be chosen. We may believe, when what we believe has no possible connection with our conduct. If there be sufficient evidence of truth and reality, there is all that is necessary for Belief. But we cannot *trust* a proposition, person, or fact, unless they are some way or other connected with our choice. There must be some ill to be removed or avoided, some good to be preserved or attained: and for these ends there must be something to be done or not done. There must be some occasion for the exercise of choice, or there can be no Trust. We *believe* that Xerxes invaded Greece, and that the orbits of the planets are elliptical; but we cannot *trust* to these propositions, because there is nothing to be desired or chosen in consequence of our belief of their truth. We may *believe* that a physician is able to remove sickness; but we cannot *trust* him, unless we, or some for whom we have to act, need to be restored to health. We may *believe* that a plank is strong enough to bear our weight, or a boat large enough to convey us safely across a stream; but we cannot *trust* to them unless we have occasion to use them; and *we trust to them by using them*. . . . There may be Belief, and no desire or choice; and if these exist, they are distinct from belief or consequent to it. But there cannot be Trust without choice, nor choice without some kind of desire; and *the choice is not distinct from the trust*.” Pp. 9, 10.

the New. Only turn to the English concordance and you will be satisfied. The word *trust*, in the Old Testament, occurs two hundred and twenty-five times,—it is the synonym of piety, holiness, acceptableness with God.* In the New Testament it almost disappears from use. In the Old Testament, the word Faith is found but *twice*, and *Believe*, perhaps, two score times. In the New Testament they are used nearly seven hundred times, and stand as the synonyms of all holiness. This is not because God has changed, or altered the conditions of his favor; but because we in our translations have changed from one word to another; and, unhappily, in changing the word have commonly let slip the meaning.

This one principle of common trust in a common Saviour is that which at this day, in every land, penetrating through the walls of sect and the divisions of opinion and the variations of religious experience, knits together all true believers into the unity of that one Holy Catholic Church, which is the communion of saints.

(4.) Finally, the condition of salvation, thus defined, is a voluntary act, and therefore a just condition, a practicable condition for every man, for every child. Demanding this, God is no longer presented to the world as one who would fain bribe or terrify the human intellect into a partial or biased decision of questions of evidence; nor as one who would extort the instantaneous exercise of emotions over which he has given no immediate control; but only as the stern enforcer, and the infinite rewarder of every man's simple duty towards a faithful Creator.

Have you never felt the point of that scoff against modern Christianity, that instead of teaching men that they must "be

* The Hebrew words which are usually employed to denote *faith*, *trust*, *confidence*, *reliance*, are from these four: 1. אָמֵן; 2. בָּטַח; 3. חָסֵה; 4. שָׁעַן. Of these, the primary meanings, as stated by Gesenius, are—1. to support; 2. to lie down; 3. to flee; 4. to lean on. In the Septuagint, *παραβῶ* is commonly used for the first, and *πέποιθα* for the others. They do not appear to differ in their signification more than the four English words; agreeing in this, that all, in common usage, denote more than *belief*." See Godwin on Christian Faith, Appendix, p. 323.

converted and become as little children," it has taken to teaching little children that they must be converted and become like grown people? This scoff loses its point, when the faith which you preach is the child's own faith, the leaning of the weaker on the stronger, of the foolish on the All-wise, of the sinful on the Infinitely Merciful, of the wavering on him that is Faithful and True:—the faith to which the wise and mighty find it hard to bow themselves, but which suffers little children to come unto the Lord, and in the mouths of babes and sucklings doth perfect his praise. Salvation by this faith is a salvation for every man. When the mind is weak and ill-instructed and cannot "understand all mysteries and all knowledge," it can yet trust, and so be saved. When evil habits have seized and bound one, and imperious passions do so dominate above the will as to leave no hope of successful struggle against them,—when life is shortening up moment by moment, and the issues of eternity are compressed within the compass of an hour,—when the sick and bewildered brain swims, and the intellect staggers in the vain effort to grasp new thoughts and arguments,—then this gospel, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved"—"Fear not; only believe"—comes to us, to every man, bringing great salvation. Having this promise, in the utmost conscious weakness, and ignorance, and sinfulness, one can rest confident in the arms of Him who is made to us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification. Having this, the frightened soul that is shuddering on the giddy verge of eternity may compose itself to perfect peace, and, unperplexed with difficult and painful thoughts, may lean the aching head upon the bosom of the Lord,

"And breathe its life out sweetly there."

Thanks be to God for so great salvation, accessible to every creature! How shall we escape if we neglect it?

Only a few words remain to be said. Some are ready, perhaps, to complain of us for taking so much space in the needless demonstration of what no one doubts. But so long as the Scriptural definition of faith continues to be dropped out of the standard dictionaries of our language; so long as the

secular error on this point continues to be imbedded in the traditions and formularies of Christian churches, so long it cannot be needless to enforce the truth with line on line and precept upon precept.

For—ponder it well—if this doctrine of faith is right, the usage of Congregational churches concerning what they call “Confessions of Faith” is ALL WRONG. The very name of these documents is a misnomer. They are not “Confessions of Faith” but Articles of Doctrine. Sprung from that false theology which held faith and orthodoxy to be the same, they tend to perpetuate it; and to reduce the thoughtful men of our own day to the sad alternative which divided the theologians of Luther’s time—the choice between the peril of anti-nomianism, and the rejection of justification by faith. They warn away from the very threshold of our church-fellowship those thoughtful believers on the Lord Jesus Christ, whose very conscientiousness of opinion makes them hesitate at swearing in the words of human masters; while they offer no obstacle to the approach of those who hold an orthodoxy without faith; and of those unthinking novices, who solemnly and publicly, and calling God to witness, profess to believe the traditionary tenets of their sect, without knowing the arguments with which they are either gainsaid or defended.

The restoring of faith to its proper place in our conceptions, would, let us hope, do something to restore sound doctrine to its proper dignity. It is a lamentable, but a most natural reaction from that use of doctrine by which it has been set up as the test of church fellowship and the condition of salvation, to those silly sneers at sound and sober theology, which disfigure some of the most popular and eloquent Christian teaching of the day. For very conscience’ sake, because, forsooth, we must use our summaries of doctrine as a ritual for the induction of members into our churches, we have been compelled to cut them down to the most meagre and diplomatic statements, which any Christian might hold, and yet to confess, when we have done all, that there are some Christians that do not hold them. If we could but have *Confessions of Faith* that should read like those of ancient times, “*I believe on,*” instead of “*we*

believe that ;”* then we might expect a freer use of popular *statements of doctrine* that should present the truth of Christ without trimming, and retrenchment, and diplomatic double meaning.

* The structure of “the Catholic creeds” is historically significant. In the Apostles’ and Nicene Creeds, there are only three Articles of Faith: “*I believe on the Father ;*” “*I believe on the Son ;*” “*I believe on the Holy Ghost.*” Then follow certain things which the Christian “believes,” “confesses,” and “expects.” From time to time, as the fashion of dealing with dissidents by anathema instead of argument grew in favor, item after item was inserted parenthetically under the second and third articles of faith, by which to entrap heretics in the act of confessing their faith. By and by, when the parentheses had outgrown the creed, the Athanasian method was adopted—“these dogmas are the Christian faith; hold them or be damned”—a method which is more or less illustrated in the Confessions of the Reformation and of modern Congregational and New School Presbyterian Churches, but which reaches its perfection in the doctrinal decrees of the Council of Trent.

This distinction in the language of the early creeds, in the use of *in* before *Deum*, but not before *Ecclesiam*, is noted by Calvin (*Inst.* IV. i. § 2). “*Ideo credere in Deum nos testamur, quod et in ipsum ut veracem animus noster se reclinat, et fiducia nostra in ipso acquiescit: quod in Ecclesiam non ita conveniret quemadmodum nec in remissionem peccatorum, aut carnis resurrectionem.*” He refers to Augustine and other early authors who give the same sense.

The same sense was insisted on in the early Waldensian catechism, long before the Reformation. “A dead faith is, to believe that there is a God, and to believe those things which relate to God, and not believe in him.”

“*Qu. Dost thou believe in the Holy Catholic Church ?*”

Ans. No; for it is a creature; but I believe there is one.”

[Quoted in Milner’s Church History, Century XIII., Chap. iii.]

ARTICLE III.—YALE COLLEGE AND THE LATE MEETING OF THE ALUMNI IN NEW YORK.

Yale College in 1868. Some Statements respecting the late progress and present condition of the various Departments of the University, for the information of its Graduates, Friends, and Benefactors. Prepared by the Executive Committee of the Society of the Alumni. New Haven: 1868.

Reports of the Meeting of the Yale Alumni Association of New York, held on the 29th of January, 1869. New York Times, and Tribune, of Jan. 30, 1869.

THE graduates of Yale College, who reside in several of our larger cities, and in their immediate neighborhood, have recently formed a number of "Alumni Associations" for the purpose of keeping alive and perpetuating their interest in one another and in the College. In Boston and Philadelphia at the east; and in Cincinnati and Chicago at the west, these associations have held annual meetings for two or three years past, and with most satisfactory results in the cultivation of mutual acquaintance and good feeling. On the 29th of January of the present year, the Alumni in New York assembled, for the first time, at a public dinner, and, under very favorable circumstances, inaugurated their association, which is to be, of course, by far the largest in the country. The nearness of New Haven to the city of New York, and the abundant openings, which are found in that city, for young men entering every department of professional or business life, have led large numbers of Yale graduates, for many years past, to establish themselves there. Every class, indeed, as it leaves the College, sends many of its members to represent it in the metropolis, and the tendency thitherward increases continually and rapidly. It is said that, already, about five hundred may be enrolled as members of the New York Association. The assembling together

of so large a body of liberally educated men, who, however widely separated they may be in their present employments, are yet all bound together by common sympathies and memories running back into the past, is an event of no little interest in itself. But when we think of the relations which they sustain to the University where they received their education, and of the good which they may be led to do in its behalf as their affection for it is quickened and strengthened, their meeting gathers around itself an interest of another sort. These gentlemen are in one of the great centres of commercial life. Many of them are men of prominence and reputation, who may not only bear witness, by the very position which they hold, of the excellence of the College from which they came, but also may, through their influence upon others, help the College, both directly and indirectly, in many ways. Many of them, also, have already acquired or are now rapidly acquiring wealth, and the spirit of generosity awakened in them may lead to most happy results in coming time. We are glad, then, both for their own sake and for the sake of the institution which we all love, that any means have been devised, in these recent years, to bring together the graduates, and to make them feel that they belong to Yale College.

The late meeting in New York was attended by about two hundred and fifty persons, including, in addition to a large company of graduates residing in the city, a few of the prominent benefactors of the College and the President, together with eleven of the Professors, who, in response to a cordial invitation, had gone from New Haven in order to be present. The President, was received with marks of esteem and affection, which were unmistakable and universal, and which to those who are daily witnesses of the faithful and disinterested spirit in which his great abilities and acquirements are devoted to the service of the College, must have been in the highest degree gratifying. The greatest good feeling and enthusiasm prevailed, and the words of the various speakers, so far as allusion was made to the College, were words of warm interest in their Alma Mater. The meeting differed, however, from others which have been held elsewhere in one important respect—namely, in that reporters for the Press were present,

who, on the following morning, gave to the public much of what had been said. These reported remarks of different persons have since led to considerable discussion, both among the graduates and in other quarters; and, as they referred to subjects of importance to the future well-being of the College, it is a matter of much moment that the questions should be properly understood. Discussion, in itself, is not an evil. It is only when it proceeds on mistaken grounds, or involves serious unfounded complaints, or betrays a want of appreciation of the necessities of the case, that it becomes an injury to the cause which it is professedly designed to aid. That the great body of the graduates of Yale have anything at heart, in their feeling toward the College, but the warmest affection and the most earnest desires for its good, we do not believe. The exceptions are very rarely, if ever, to be found. With equal confidence we believe, that the greater portion of them meet every subject connected with the institution with as much freedom from prejudice and as much candor, as they have in their consideration of any subject whatever. But we believe there are erroneous views in the minds of a certain number of persons, both within and without the circle of the Alumni, which, in some cases, are diligently spread abroad, and, in general, are in danger of being hastily accepted; and we believe that it is for the highest interests of the institution, that, when these subjects are forced upon us as they now are, they should be carefully cleared of all such erroneous views. Sometimes such views arise from that want of accurate acquaintance with the facts, which is always and necessarily found, in greater or less degree, among those who are not daily familiar with them. Sometimes they are owing to mistaken notions on the general subject of education, or are the result of a too ready yielding to what is called the spirit of the age. But, whatever may be their origin, they are still errors and are injurious, and, as such, should be carefully avoided. We propose, in the present Article, to refer to those topics which were suggested at the meeting at New York, in connection with one or two others, and to ask the attention of our readers to some things which we deem of importance in the consideration of them.

I. PROPOSED CHANGE IN THE CORPORATION.

The first of these points has reference to a change in the Corporation of the College, suggested by President Woolsey. This change involves the removal from that body of the six members of the Senate of the State of Connecticut, who now have a place in it by virtue of the office which they hold, and the appointment of an equal number of graduates of the college, who shall retain their position for at least six or eight years. It is said, that long experience shows that the State Senators do not attend the meetings of the board with any regularity, and as they seldom enter the Senate for more than a single year, owing to the firmly-established principle of rotation in office, and to other reasons which it is not important to mention, they are not able to become acquainted either with their own duties, as members of the Corporation, or with the condition or wants of the College. These gentlemen, thus, are of little benefit to the institution. They cannot serve its interests, in any considerable degree, if they would. They become, of necessity, scarcely more than nominal members, and the burdens and responsibilities devolving upon the board are left to their associates, who are permanently in it. If, on the other hand, their places were supplied by as many persons, selected from among the graduates, who should be chosen for a term of years, and should be reëligible after that term had expired, there would be a reasonable hope of advantage both from their deep interest in the College where their education had been received, and from their trained judgment on all questions of importance to its continued prosperity. They would be punctual and regular in their attendance. They would have views "at once enlightened and conservative." They would be earnest in devising and in carrying out all good measures, and would be in every way "a new strength to their Alma Mater." The plan, with its advantages, as thus set forth, was first presented to public notice in an Article in the *New Englander*, in Oct., 1866, and seems to have been suggested to the mind of its distinguished author by a somewhat similar change then lately introduced at Harvard University. Its renewed presentation, at the late meeting of which we now speak, shows that the reflec-

tion which he has given to it since that time has not altered his view of its advisableness and practicability. Any suggestion on a subject connected with the interests of the College, which comes from such a source, will, of course, be received with most respectful consideration. Its author has been familiar, for more than twenty years, with its governing Board as President of the College, and, for a much longer period, he has known its interior life, and studied its wants. And, at the same time, he is known by all acquainted with the institution to be one who rarely, and only in the exercise of his most matured judgment, brings forward proposals of this character affecting its vital interests. It will be interesting, therefore, to notice the reason, and, so far as he has ever given any intimation, the only reason, which has induced President Woolsey to think of this change;—and, in connection with this point, some general considerations which have a bearing upon the subject may be appropriately presented.

The sole reason, then, which has led to his suggestion of the change now proposed, is the one we have mentioned—namely, the fact that graduates of the College, as members of its Board of Trustees, might be expected to be more interested in its welfare, and more qualified to do it good in an intelligent way, than those who, in the chances of political life, become, for a single year, members of the State Senate. We do not speak in his behalf, or with any knowledge of his views, beyond what is conveyed in his published remarks on the subject, but we think all judicious persons, whose attention is turned to this matter, will be impressed by this fact, and will find in it a conclusive answer to much that has been inconsiderately said by certain advocates of the new arrangement.

We propose to notice, briefly, a few points which some persons, who are dissatisfied with the present state of affairs, are disposed to urge. In the first place, it is said that the College is unfortunately *in the hands of a few Connecticut ministers*. Sometimes the word “Puritanical” is added, in order to give a rhetorical emphasis to the expression. Since the year 1792, this has not been the fact, so far as the constitution of the Board is concerned. There have been eight lay members and ten clerical members, and for years past—to say nothing of the

six Senators—the Governor and Lieutenant Governor of the State have been active, efficient, and valuable persons to the College. If the lay members attend the meetings, they have the same voice as their clerical associates, and if they do not attend, the clerical members, as reasonable men, are influenced, in proper measure, by the views and judgment of that body of persons who are most intimately connected with the College as its Faculty of Instruction. That they are Connecticut ministers is no more objectionable—and, for an obvious reason, far less so—than if they were Pennsylvania ministers. That they are Puritanical ministers is a mere charge appealing to the baser passions of men, and is unworthy of notice. That they are ministers is a fact. And why should they not be? The Colleges of our country—certainly those of New England—were originally designed to be both literary and religious institutions—places where true learning could be gained, and where all who entered them might be pointed to Christianity and to God. That they have been kept so has been the glory of New England in the past, and, when they cease to have both these characters, they had better be sunk in the ocean than remain to curse the country. But what class of men is there in the community who have been in all the past, and, so far as we can judge, will be in all the future, more safe guardians of these two interests together than Christian ministers? By the very necessities of their profession, they are compelled to be better educated men than the majority of those around them. They learn more thoroughly than most other persons to appreciate the value of scholarship and sound learning, and, in almost every place, they are, by the spontaneous choice of their fellow-citizens, placed among the number of those who care for the educational interests of the people. Who can doubt, that—on the grounds which are connected with learning only—they ought to have a share in the direction of all such public institutions? And when we add to these interests those of the Christian religion, who can doubt that a College is safer for all time if at least one-half its governing Board are members of this honored profession? But just this is the constitution of that Board which controls the affairs of Yale College. The reformers of the day who would exclude these

ministers altogether, as some of them openly intimate that they would, are no wise well-wishers to the cause of learning consecrated by religion; and, we may add, they hardly understand the true interests of the former better than those of the latter. But it is said, that ministers are likely to be slow or behind the age. Some of them are so, no doubt, but so are some lawyers and a good many other laymen;—and that ministers, as a class, are behind the age, and are not as ready for every wise-progressive step, in morale or education, as any class of men, is a charge which all the recent history of New England disproves, and which the discussions of the great questions of reform which have lately agitated the country ought forever to silence. It is said, however, that learning and religion are not all that a College needs;—it needs money also, and ministers know nothing about money. Wealthy and large-minded laymen are necessary for financial management. Our only answer to this question is, that the history of Yale College proves the opposite. The statement of President Woolsey, made at Boston and repeated in New York, speaks volumes on this point. He says the Corporation of Yale College have never lost a cent during all the history of the College,—that they can find every dollar in the treasury which has ever been entrusted to their keeping. How many bodies of wealthy and intelligent laymen can say the same of the moneys belonging to institutions of which they have had charge for a long period of years? “By their fruits ye shall know them.” When the facts are known, the Connecticut ministers begin to appear in a pretty favorable light. But nothing is easier than to speak depreciatingly of them, or, indeed, of anybody else, without knowing the facts. But, again, it is said, that though they may have taken reasonable care of the funds which they happened to receive, they have done nothing to increase them. We call for the facts here again. It is well known to every one who has investigated this matter at all, that the age of large gifts to literary institutions—except, indeed, in rare cases—is one of comparatively recent beginning. Thirty or fifty years ago, large fortunes were not common, and the collecting of such sums as a College needs was a work of immense difficulty. And yet, more than

thirty years ago, one hundred thousand dollars were raised by a wide extended effort under the direction of the College Corporation,—(and their agent, we may add, was a minister,)—and as new departments of the College were established, from time to time, when they were needed, funds were gathered in for their support. And what has been the history of the past ten or twelve years? Hundreds of thousands of dollars have been raised—so large a sum, indeed, that Yale College has become to many minds an institution rolling in wealth, with no farther needs. Certainly this history—recent and more remote—does not present the appearance of inactivity or incapacity on the part of those who govern the College. The clerical gentlemen, so much complained of, have, at least, had the wisdom to appoint College officers who have raised a large part of this money; and they have known how to take care of it and use it well, when it has been raised. Just at the close of a period of ten years, during which the College has received a million of dollars, largely gathered in by its own officers, is a time when it is not very becoming in any one to find fault with the governing board as a body of Connecticut ministers, who are unfit to get or to use any large amount of money. Well might President Woolsey say, as he did at New York, that it was from no want of confidence in the existing Board, that he offered his proposition for a special change in its constitution. And well might such a man as Governor Buckingham, whose knowledge of money and its noblest uses is surpassed by that of no man living, bear testimony to the efficiency of the body with which he had been so long connected;—a testimony which, we may add, in his case, was given not only in words, but in the more emphatic way of intrusting, before he left it, twenty-five thousand dollars to its keeping.

From what has been said in some quarters, of late, it would seem to be supposed that these ministers in the Corporation of Yale College are persons who have no connection at all with the Alumni, and no common sympathies with them. The graduates have been shut out,—so it appears to be claimed,—ever since the beginning, from any influence in the institution, and now, at last, they ought to find a place in its government.

But the fact of the case is precisely the opposite of this representation. The fact is this,—that, as soon as the College had been in existence long enough to have any graduates of age or standing, the choice of members of the Board of Trustees began to be mainly limited to those who were graduates of the College, and, during the last hundred and thirty years, there have been only twelve persons in the clerical part of the Corporation, who had not received their education at Yale. The clerical gentlemen are members of the body of Alumni, all of them, and have never been anything else. The Faculty of Instruction have been, from the beginning, almost exclusively graduates of the College. The control of the College, in every department of its interests, has thus been entirely in the hands of those who represent the graduates in so far as they belong to their number and are wholly of them. And we are not aware that any evidence has ever been furnished, in the history of any institution in the country, that the graduates of other professions are, on the whole, wiser or more disinterestedly devoted to its welfare, than those who have chosen the profession of the ministry. The true question to be considered should not be lost sight of, and the mistaken ideas which are being spread abroad should be cleared away. The question is not, whether the graduates should now, for the first time, find a place in the governing Board of the College, but whether, having substantially already in their possession the clerical portion of the Board—to say nothing of the Faculty of Instruction—they should also take that place which has, for sixty or seventy years past, been held by the State Senators. Is it best for the College that this change should be made? Will the College be better governed and cared for, if, in addition to the clerical members who are already of the Alumni, it has the six other members of the Board chosen from among the graduates in different sections of the land, than if, as at present, these six members are officers of the State where the College is located?

In the second place, it is urged by many persons who favor changes of the kind under discussion, that Yale College needs *to become a national institution*, and that to this end its governing Board should be composed of representatives, not from

Connecticut only, but from all parts of the Union. We agree with all persons who think that Yale College should be, in the future, if possible, the first and best University in the country; and that, as its doors should be open to students from every section, so students from the most distant parts of the land should gladly come to it. But in order to its having a national character, it does not need to be governed by representatives from Missouri or California. For the highest interests of all public institutions of learning, unconnected with the general government, it is undoubtedly desirable that they should be managed by small bodies of well qualified men, whose residence is in the vicinity of the institutions. A gentleman residing in Chicago or Cincinnati cannot—however excellent his judgment and abilities may be—as successfully perform the duties of overseeing a College in Maine, as one who is within a day's journey of the place where it is located. He needs to be near at hand, not only that he may come readily at its call, but that he may be surrounded constantly by the influences and sympathies of its neighborhood. Our fathers founded this College for the Colony of Connecticut, and very wisely they did not put its management into the hands of Massachusetts or South Carolina, but of Connecticut men. They knew that it would be fostered and cherished most by those nearest to it, and that those who were called to watch over its welfare should be where they could see it. It has grown, indeed, far beyond their highest thought of its future, and has extended its influence far and wide over the country and the world. But its home is in Connecticut still, and, until it ceases to have its home here, its official guardians should, most if not all of them, live here. The thing that is needed is, that, amid all the growth and demands of the future, it should be,—what, in considerable measure at least, it has been in the past,—a College so excellent in its discipline and teaching, that the whole people shall know it as a bright light in the world. In this sense, it may be, and ought to be, a national university;—that is, a university with a national reputation, and drawing its pupils from the north and the south, the east and the west alike. And in this sense only, is it a matter of high importance that it should be national in its character. It was found-

ed in Connecticut, and for Connecticut;—it has been, for more than a hundred and fifty years, one of the brightest ornaments which Connecticut has had to glory in, and we hope the day may never come when the control of its interests shall pass into other hands. But the point which we are noticing, at present, is not so much the giving over the entire control of the College into other hands,—for the fathers, in their wisdom, provided that the clerical portion of the board should be Connecticut men, and made this a part of the permanent charter of the institution;—it is that, in order to give a national character to the College, it is in no wise necessary to change any part of the existing Board. It has had such a character, in a great measure, for many years, as is universally acknowledged, and it bids fair to have it always, if it goes onward as it has done. Its governors should be near it. They should not be swayed by the influences and sympathies of remote places, or, perchance, of other institutions, and thus be out of harmony with the historic growth of the College in the old place. We can scarcely question, that the Legislature of this State will hesitate somewhat to give up the State interest in the institution, even though, on some grounds, it may seem desirable. We are very glad that it cannot give up—and that no one else but the successors of the first ten ministers who founded the College can give up—that interest which this State must always retain in its government through the clerical body in its Corporation.

A third point, which is urged, is, that the College *belongs to the Alumni*, and that they, therefore, have the right to manage it. No more, certainly, than the parents of a family belong to the children, and ought to yield the right of government or of a share in the government of the family to the children who have left their home. The College is under obligations to its Alumni, to love them, to welcome them heartily as they return to their old home, and to care for and rejoice in their fair fame and success. It stands to them in the parental relation. It is their Alma Mater. They, on the other hand, belong, in a peculiar sense, to the College, and are under undying obligations to it. It has given them their education, and has done for them a very large part of that which prepares them for and secures for them

the various blessings and honors of after life. It has bestowed upon every one of them—largely as a charitable gift—everything which they have learned within its walls. It has opened the way, through what it has given them, to all learning. And no one of them, who knows the glory of being an educated rather than an uneducated man, can fail to feel in his inmost soul, that, in so far as it has made him an educated man, or given him the possibility of becoming one, it has bestowed upon him a priceless gift. No graduate of Yale College (or of any other that is worthy of the name) who has faithfully used the advantages it offered him, can ever repay the debt he owes to it, any more than he can repay the debt he owes his mother's love and care. He may very properly, then, be glad to do anything he can for it. He may even desire a place in its Board of Trustees, that he may be the better able to repay its kindness in good services and helpfulness. But when he claims a right to manage its affairs and direct its government, as some of those who are pressing this matter are now doing in public places, because he is an alumnus, he is claiming that the College shall yield itself to his control, not because he has conferred a benefit upon it, but because it has conferred an inestimable benefit upon him.

It should be remarked, also, that while Yale College is a public institution, it is so only in the sense that it is open to the public and was designed by its founders to do good to the world. It belongs to nobody, so far as the right of controlling it is concerned, except to those who founded it and to their successors. It is like every other College in the country, with here and there an exception, in this respect. It is a corporation designed by its originators to be, and having always been, self-perpetuating. It was founded for special purposes, and its founders, like most other wise men who have had a similar work to do, felt that it was more sure to accomplish these ends for all time, if they gave to its Trustees the power of selecting their own successors, than if they left it to the chances and dangers of the uncertain future. Their wisdom has been justified by its wonderful growth and prosperity for more than a century and a half. When it ceases to do good, let the public withdraw their approbation by withdrawing its students.

But while it keeps onward in its present course—its numbers and opportunities, and means of usefulness, and reputation, and permanent funds increasing with a steady and uninterrupted progress—we have no fears either that it will ever lose its honorable position, or that judicious and Christian men will feel that the fathers made a mistake in creating its Board of Trustees, in its essential part, a self-perpetuating board. It is a public institution, inasmuch as it is for the good of the world. It is a beneficent public institution, inasmuch as it gives the best education which the country affords to every student, who comes to it, at less than one-half of its actual cost. But in its management and government, it is not, and was never designed to be, a public institution. It is what every other institution for benevolence, or for the enlightenment of the world—which is not established by the State—invariably is,—namely, a self-perpetuating corporation. And so long as it has the great interests of religion and education to care for and watch over, it should remain what it now is. The great body of the Alumni, as we believe, agree with us in this view; and we present it thus emphatically, not because we doubt their opinions, but because there is evidently, in the minds of a few, both among the Alumni and outside of their number, an idea that the successors of the original founders of Yale College have, and that they ought to have, no more claim to control it than any other body of men. The only question in this matter—and it cannot be too often repeated or too constantly borne in mind—is not one of *rights* on the part of any one among the public or even among the Alumni, but solely one which concerns *the highest well-being of the University*. If this can best be secured by the appointment (in addition to the present clerical members, who, as we have already seen, have, from the early times, been almost without exception of the number of its graduates) of the six remaining members of its Board of Trustees from among its Alumni, then it becomes an act of wisdom on its part to appoint them;—and *this*, and *this alone*, is the question which ought now to be discussed. President Woolsey has expressed his opinion in answer to this question, and we have found it to be favorable to this new reception of graduates into the governing Board.

But, in his Article above alluded to, in which his view seems to be more fully expressed than in his remarks in New York, he has suggested one or two dangers, which have appeared to us so serious as to deserve most careful consideration before the plan in its details should be finally determined upon. He says, "Will not these graduates, *if well elected*, be a new strength to their Alma Mater?" and in speaking of the similar changes at Harvard, he says, "What is there to prevent party tickets among the graduates, with the necessary excitements before and ill-feeling after the election?" If the graduate members are not "*well elected*," they had better not be elected at all.

There have been, as far as we are aware, only two methods of choosing these members suggested publicly up to the present time, and both of them seem to us open to serious objections. One of these methods is to have the elections held at the meetings of the graduates at the time of the annual Commencement of the College. These annual meetings are necessarily hurried meetings. They are attended by not more than a sixth part of the living Alumni. They are seasons when a thousand other things are filling the minds of those present, unless, indeed, they come for this purpose only. They could, therefore, be very easily "packed"—to use the language of politics—in favor of particular candidates, or even by the candidates themselves. They would be liable to have their harmony and good feeling—so large a part of the usefulness and enjoyment of such meetings—broken up by the pressing of "party-tickets," and by the "excitements and ill-feeling," of which Dr. Woolsey speaks. Moreover, there is no opportunity at such meetings for that calmness and seriousness of consideration, which is essential in order to the selecting of suitable men for the office. It is the restless and dissatisfied men who are most active on all such occasions. Those who are content to "let well enough alone," and see no special change of management to be necessary, will either be absent or will generally be inactive. And the field is thus free for the operations of the former class. Who can doubt that they will, most likely, be successful wherever the conservative section is not roused, as it will not often be, to an earnest opposition? President Woolsey

paid no mean compliment to the State Senators, and said no light word in favor of the present system, when he said that those gentlemen "had done no harm." If the method above suggested for choosing the graduate members were to be adopted, we question very much whether, after twenty years' experience, it could be said, with equal truth, that they had "done no harm." And this, not because the graduates are not the best class of men, but because they are like all other men, and therefore the innovators and hasty reformers and more selfish among them would, under such a system of election, be very often successful in pushing their way into the management of affairs. We do not say that this would always be the fact. Perhaps it might not be oftener than in one case out of every three or four. But the election of one noisy agitator, or of a single individual who was disposed to think, in accordance with the declared views of one of the prominent Trustees of a prominent College in New York, that the reading of the *American Encyclopedia* would be as good a way of educating the mind as the usual course of College studies, might be an incalculable injury to any institution devoted to the cultivation of sound learning. We have had some opportunities for personal observation in this matter, and we have had testimony founded on long acquaintance with the government of at least one other prominent College; and we believe that the greatest of all dangers to which such institutions are exposed is from the election into their Boards of Trustees of men who will "do harm." And in the adoption of any new system of election, the wisest thought and the greatest care ought to be brought into exercise to prevent the possibility of the choice of such men.

The same objections apply, to an equal, if not even greater degree, to the other of the two plans referred to above—namely, the election of one member of the Corporation by each of the Associations of the Alumni in the various larger cities of the country. These bodies, being much smaller than the one which assembles at the College at Commencement, would be even more likely to be hurried or engineered into the adoption of ill-judged measures, or the election of unsuitable men. But there are further weighty objections against this scheme.

These bodies, located in different cities, have, of necessity, their local prejudices, and may not unfrequently have views which are determined by the sympathies of the region in which they live. Moreover they, all together, include only a section, and even a small section, of the whole Alumni. The power of election is thus thrown into the hands of a few, while those who are in the more remote and retired places are denied any voice in the matter; and these more retired men are often the ones whose judgment is of most value, and whose minds are least likely to be carried away by ill-considered views. We see no reason why Boston and Philadelphia graduates, for example, should take this matter into their own hands, while the alumnus, whose work in life calls him to live in Northern Vermont, or the interior of Georgia, is set entirely aside, simply because of his residence. It might, possibly, be desirable, at some time, that a particular graduate from Boston or from Philadelphia should be in the Corporation of the College, but, even if it should be so, he should not, for very obvious reasons, be elected by his associates only whose home is in the same city. This plan, however, so far as we are aware, has never been suggested by any one except a single speaker, in a few extemporaneous remarks at a late public dinner, and doubtless it was, in his own mind, only the thought of the moment. It is so open to objections, and so utterly impracticable, that we can hardly believe it would ever be seriously entertained.

Such a change should not be made in a day. It should be carefully considered. And the consideration and decision of it should turn—as we think all judicious persons will admit—*solely* upon what is for the *highest good of the College*. We believe that neither of the plans suggested will best conduce to this end. A much better plan, as it seems to us, would be this. Let the present Corporation, who would be able to do it with much deliberation—with entire freedom from prejudices—with a due regard to the interests of all sections—with a thorough knowledge of the needs of the College, and with the warm affection for it which has, undeniably, characterized all the permanent members in the past, select six new members from among the graduates, who shall hold their office either for life, or for such a considerable period of years as shall give them

opportunity for good service; and as these persons pass out of office, by death or otherwise, let the Board, as then existing, elect successors to fill the vacancies. By this means, the best men can be found—the men who know most about educational interests, who have most sympathy with sound learning, and whose opinions and efforts will be most beneficial to the College. The conservative and progressive elements can thus be best united, and the serious dangers of every kind can be most successfully avoided. And we see no reason why, at least in rare cases, the choice might not go beyond the circle of the Alumni, and rest upon such men as Governor Buckingham, whose education has been outside of college walls, indeed, but whose interest in the cause of learning is as honorable as their judgment is wise.

The men who elect the Trustees should, in general, be the men who are best qualified to do so. No one will question this. We believe that these men are the ones who are most familiar with the College history and its interior life. The graduates of Yale are as intelligent a body of persons, no doubt, as the country contains. They are possessed of wisdom and knowledge and high character, as much as any men. Their opinions, on many subjects, are worthy of high regard. But comparatively few of them, after leaving the College at their graduation, are able to know anything of its interior life. They are widely removed from it in space. They are busily engaged in pursuits which draw their thoughts away from it, and which give them little opportunity for reflection on the great subjects of education. At the end of five, or ten, or twenty years, therefore, they have, by the very necessities of life, lost their powers of passing an intelligent judgment on questions which arise in regard to the progress or interests of the institution with which they were once familiar as students. They have become unqualified, for the same reason, to decide intelligently who are the best persons to be chosen for the management of its affairs. And it is no disparagement to them to say that they are thus disqualified. The same is true in regard to every department of life. If I have been connected with a college for twenty years as an instructor or a trustee, if I have daily watched its growth and known everything belonging to it, if I have had a large share in raising all its fund

which have been gathered in during all that period, if I have canvassed the field, over and over again, and have become acquainted, in this way, with all the probabilities and possibilities of enlarging its means of good, if I have made its work my life's work, and have filled my mind with those things which lie within its field of study and of usefulness, I am, for this very reason, better qualified,—and vastly better qualified,—to judge what is for its good, or what person will be most useful as one of its governing Board, than my classmate who has passed those same twenty years in a New York bank or lawyer's office. And it is as reasonable to place my views on questions belonging to his line of life on an equality with his, as it is to place his, in my line of life, on an equality with mine. He may be a much abler man than I am in many respects, but he is inferior to me in this respect, because he has, of necessity, been thinking mainly of other things. No one can reflect upon this subject, with any seriousness, without admitting the truth of what we say. It would be a disgrace to either party, if it were not so. It is no depreciation, therefore, of the merits of the graduates of any one of our Colleges to say that great numbers of them have not the essential qualifications to give judgment on its management, or the necessary knowledge of the subject, in all its relations, to make them wise voters for its offices of trust. In the case of the government of the country this is not so, for every intelligent man, by the very demands of his life and highest interests, is compelled to think constantly and intelligently on political subjects, but, in the case of colleges and all private institutions for the public good, what we have said is certainly true. A very large section of those who leave our colleges never give any study, and, from the pressure of their work in life, are never able to give any serious study, to the subject of College education;—and they surely ought not to vote on the subject. If they do vote, what shall prevent their voting wrong,—or what shall prevent their voting for the wrong man, being led by his prominence and reputation to believe him to be qualified for what he has really no fitness for at all? But if the election is put into the hands of the men who thoroughly know what they are doing—that is, into the hands of the Board, which has justified its claim to wisdom

and disinterestedness by a long course of service, then all these evils will be avoided, so far as they can be with any arrangement which can be devised.

The change in the Corporation which is now under discussion has not, as is erroneously believed by many, been called for, for some years past, by any general movement of the graduates, nor, so far as any evidence has yet been given, by any large body among the graduates. A few persons, no doubt, here and there had spoken of some such thing, and wished that some change might take place in the constitution of the Board. But when the first suggestion of it was made by President Woolsey, it was a new thought to almost every one. Since its suggestion very few of the Alumni have earnestly advocated it, and we have reason to believe that numbers among them do not feel that it is very desirable. But, however this may be, one thing is clearly manifest—that there has been neither any universal, nor any general, nor any specially noticeable complaint among the Alumni as to the general management of the College by its present Board. The almost universal feeling is that which President Woolsey has so decidedly and publicly expressed—namely, that of confidence in it. A small number of graduates and of other persons—most of whom have no intimate knowledge whatever of the affairs of the College—have spoken depreciatingly of the Corporation. Complaints in regard to certain things in its action or want of action, from time to time, have been heard from different quarters, and some of them may have been just ones. But as for any general dissatisfaction with the present government, or any feeling that a change ought to be made on this account, there is not only no evidence existing of any such thing, but there is every reason to believe that it is far otherwise. The graduates of Yale College are not, and never have been, dissatisfied with its management, or without confidence in its Corporation;—and the statement that they are so is one of those loose statements which we so often hear in these days, and which rest mainly, if not wholly, on the views of the few persons who make them. No man, or body of men, is perfect. Mistakes will inevitably occur in the course of years;—and, when they occur, they will be seen, and will, sometimes at least, be spoken of.

But we do not believe any Corporation ever existed in the country against whom less complaint was made, than has been made against the Corporation of Yale College by its great body of judicious graduates.

The idea, then, which has been thrown out in some quarters, that the graduates of Yale have not contributed more largely to its funds because they were unwilling to intrust their money to the keeping of Trustees who were so unqualified to take care of it, is an idea, as we believe, *totally without foundation*. It is a very remarkable fact, if it be a fact;—for during the last few years, within which these assertions of wide spread dissatisfaction have especially been made, nearly a million of dollars has been given into the hands of this Board from men who do not throw away their money with no care as to what becomes of it,—a sum not only larger by far than had ever been given before, but larger than has been contributed, during the same period, to any other College in the country,—not excepting Harvard itself, whose vicinity to the rich men of Boston has always given it special advantages in this regard, and whose preëminence in the amount of its donations has, until this recent period, been unquestioned. The gentlemen who are troubled in view of the incapacity of the present Corporation to manage the College funds are not among the generous and wealthy men of the country. Nor do they, as we believe, include the great body of such men among the graduates, for, within this same period, more has been given by graduates to the College than ever before. A single one among them has presented to the College the sum of nearly three hundred thousand dollars. And another, who resides in New Haven, and who has had opportunities of observing the management of the institution for many years, has been a most frequent and liberal donor—so much so that, probably, no man in the country has ever proved himself to be a more wise, more constant, or more faithful friend to the cause of education in Literature or Art than has he in what he has done for Yale College. Surely, if evidence can be obtained anywhere, that the possessors of wealth have the same confidence, which Dr. Woolsey has, in this Board of Trustees, here is such evidence of a most unmistakable character—in a most abundant degree. Why, then, have not the graduates generally

made larger contributions? There are several reasons why they have not. One is, that most of them have always been men of moderate means, and, until quite recently, almost none of them have been possessors of ample fortunes. Another is, that, in this imperfect world, very few persons give *very largely* to any object entirely of their own impulse, or except as they are impelled to it by the solicitations of others; and the graduates of Yale do not, like those of Harvard, live in its immediate neighborhood, but are scattered all over the country, where they have never been reached by persons soliciting in behalf of the College. Still another reason is, that, in this day, men who have only a small sum to give—a few hundred dollars, perhaps—feel that it is lost, and that it becomes almost useless among the gifts of tens of thousands from wealthy men around them. The feeling has come to be this, that a *large* gift must be given to a great institution, or *none at all*; and men who cannot give large sums feel themselves, therefore, almost shut up to the other alternative. We have met hundreds of the graduates of Yale from every section of the country, during the past twenty years, and have conversed with them freely on the subject of the College. We have heard from them numberless expressions of warm affection and gratitude for what the College had bestowed upon them while members of it. We have found many who said they would gladly aid it by pecuniary gifts, if they could. But we have never seen a single one who expressed the slightest unwillingness to intrust anything which he had to give to its Board of Trustees. And even one of the most active and energetic advocates of the present proposed change, with whom we were personally connected for a considerable period, was not only willing to subscribe according to his ability for the assistance of the College, but to press its claims far and wide upon others. We believe that nothing is more true than that the great body of the Alumni are satisfied, in the main, with the financial management of the College, so far as they are qualified, by knowledge of the facts, to judge of the matter; and that the reason of the small number of gifts which have been received from them, is to be sought elsewhere than in any feeling of discontent. We do not doubt that the number of gifts, and of large gifts, from

the graduates, as well as from others, will increase in the future. We believe it, because the graduates, as well as other men, are growing richer constantly, because the habit of giving is extending itself and becoming more settled everywhere in the country, and because there will doubtless be more systematic arrangements hereafter to solicit such gifts. But we do not believe the proposed change in the Corporation—whatever other advantages may result from it—will remove any unwillingness, or increase materially the willingness, of the graduates to give to the College. Money for benevolent causes is gathered in only by hard work. It is very easy, in the enthusiasm of a public meeting or the good fellowship of a public dinner, to say, Undertake this or that gigantic enterprise and present the bill to the Alumni. But the man who should begin to carry out the enterprise on the ground of this encouragement, would show that he had had little experience in the matter of raising money by contributions. The gifts to Yale College, during the past ten, not to say the past forty, years, have been obtained, in very large measure, because the officers of the College have earnestly and patiently solicited them. The same thing will be true in all time to come, and it will mainly be in answer to their personal and patient solicitations that money will ever be obtained. And the mere fact, that the Alumni are represented in the Corporation by a few honorable gentlemen, will not change the great law of the world. Men will not be inspired by this fact to give largely. They will, in general, give largely, if at all, just as they have done, because the College Faculty—the men who have given themselves to the College, and who live in it every day—go out among them, with all the influence and earnestness which they possess, and tell, as no one else can tell, the story of its wants.

We have spoken, thus, at some length upon this subject, because we feel that certain erroneous, and, on the part of some persons, diligently disseminated views need to be corrected and shown to be unfounded. The reason for the proposed change is not to be found in any one of these things to which reference has been made; and as the discussion of the subject is entered upon seriously, it ought to be confined to the real

point in question. If the College will, on the whole, be benefited by the presence in its Corporation of six of its graduates, in place of the present equal number of State Senators, then, doubtless, the change may well be made, but not otherwise. This is the reason given by President Woolsey for favoring the change, and is *the only reason* which he has given or which is worthy of consideration. *The highest interests of the College as influenced by the character of the men composing its Board of Trustees—this is the whole question to be discussed.* We do not think this question ought to be decided, except after deliberate consideration. But, if it is decided, and decided favorably for the proposed change, then there is another most important point, which demands careful thought—namely, the manner in which these persons shall be chosen. We believe the plans suggested are fraught with possibilities of danger and evil, as we have already shown; and we have no doubt that the plan of election by the members of the Board itself from among the Alumni, is a plan which will be most free from all evil, and which will best secure the great ends of deliberation and wisdom in the choice, as well as the possession of a thorough knowledge of all the essential qualifications for the office on the part of those who make the choice.

II. THE REMOVAL OF THE COLLEGE.

The second prominent subject referred to at the New York meeting was also brought forward by President Woolsey. It was the subject of a removal of the College from its present site, and building anew at a distance of a mile and a quarter from the center of the city, where it now is. The President, in speaking upon this point, announced a decision which had been reached after the most serious consideration of the whole matter, and a most careful estimate of the cost of the undertaking,—namely, a decision that the College must remain where it is. As this subject, also, has been discussed in the public papers and elsewhere quite extensively of late, and as few persons, who have not patiently looked into it on all sides, appreciate it in its various bearings, it is deemed not inappropriate to say a few words in regard to it here,—presenting the

matter in what we believe to be its proper light, and showing that some of the arguments urged in favor of a removal are of little weight, while others are overbalanced by the difficulties which lie in the way of accomplishing it.

The removal of Yale College from its present site has been advocated chiefly on account of the present size and prospective growth of the city of New Haven. It has been thought by many that, if a new site could be procured on the east side of Prospect street, on the elevated land which stretches northward of the residence of Mr. Winchester, great advantages would result from the change. Any other site among those which have been named and which could be procured, would be, in our judgment, undesirable; and the question of removing to any other would not deserve to be entertained. Among the reasons advanced in favor of removal, is the consideration of health. It is thought that the new situation would be in this respect decidedly preferable to the place where the Colleges now stand. To this argument we are not inclined to attach much weight. New Haven, whatever representations have been made to the contrary, is one of the most healthful towns in the country. Its soil, though flat, is porous, and it is washed half round its borders by the tides of the sea. During the month of August, which is here the least salubrious month in the year, the students are dispersed for vacation. It is rare that anything that can be called an epidemic prevails here. A year ago there were a few cases of typhoid fever among the students, several of which proved fatal. But at that time, the aggregate amount of sickness in College, as physicians assure us, was not greater than is usually the fact at the same season of the year; and the reports of the unhealthy condition of the city, which were spread abroad in the newspapers, were largely the product of fancy. Students, as a rule, are far from being distinguished for their prudence as regards the care of their bodies; and yet the average health of the members of College is remarkable. The present site, if provisions are made for drainage—which can be made easily, at a small cost—will afford no ground for apprehension or complaint on this score. It has been urged that the moral exposures of students will constitute an increasing evil connected

with its present position. In reply, it may be said that these are not to be lessened by removing to a short distance from the city. The city will still be readily accessible. Cambridge is several miles from Boston, but the temptations offered to students there are fully as great as if the College were in the city itself. As far as manners and deportment are concerned, a city is to be preferred to a country town as a place for a university. In the latter, the restraint from the local police and from the public opinion of citizens is comparatively small. Most of the great universities—as those of Paris, Edinburgh, Berlin, Heidelberg—are in cities. Students are less disorderly and are more easily controlled in a large town than in a small one. It should also be observed that the growth of New Haven has thus far not been such as to deprive it of the character of a rural city. There is room still for indefinite expansion without crowding. It is true that the business part of the town will be compactly built and have the characteristics that belong to marts everywhere. The possibility that the College will be annoyed by the vicinity of noise and business, is the chief claim that can be urged in favor of a change of location. Were the present grounds more extensive, this objection would lose its force. At present the College is fully protected in front by the public Green, the quiet beauty of which is familiar to all who know anything of New Haven. An extension of the College limits in other directions, by judicious purchases, would go far to remove the difficulty which we have stated. The trade and manufacturing of the town have rather tended to move away from the College than towards it heretofore; and this will, also, probably be the case hereafter. Were the dormitory system given up, no embarrassment would be felt from the contracted extent of the old site. But it is wisely decided to retain this system, so far, at least, as to provide accommodations for a majority of the students on the College grounds.

We have mentioned the considerations which have an importance as bearing on the question whether a removal is expedient. It will be seen that there is no such pressing necessity of a change as has been represented. The Institution can be comfortable, can continue to thrive and prosper, on the old

spot, which is consecrated in the memories and attachments of so large a number of graduates. Few universities in existence can boast of what is, on the whole, so beautiful and commodious a position.

But, granting that a removal might be desirable, is it practicable? The first answer would generally be in the affirmative. New and costly buildings are to be erected; many of the old buildings must before long disappear, and the new Art Building, being designed, in part, for the benefit of the city, may be left where it is. The valuable land on which the Institution is now placed can be sold, and, with the proceeds, the new site can be purchased, and the new edifices erected. This would be the first impression of most persons to whom the question of the practicableness of a removal should be submitted. A more thorough inquiry, however, would change this impression. On the most careful and sober estimate it has been ascertained, that the College could not be transplanted without an expense of at least five hundred thousand dollars over and above the proceeds of the sale of the present square, with the buildings upon it, together with the land adjacent that is owned by the College. And this large outlay would only give the same amount of accommodations, in the way of public and private rooms, which the College now has in its present place, leaving all enlargements in these respects,—that is, the erection of any additional number of buildings,—to be provided for by a still farther outlay of money. To undertake the removal, without a half of a million of dollars to begin with, would be an imprudent and unwarrantable proceeding on the part of the Corporation. Can this large sum be raised for such a purpose? In considering this question, it is important to bear in mind several facts. One of these is, that there are pressing and acknowledged wants of the institution, which it is very difficult to obtain the means of supplying. The Professors are not more than half paid. Their salaries are not more than half sufficient to support a family respectably in New Haven. Then the library fund is miserably inadequate. The Professors are grievously embarrassed in prosecuting the researches that belong to their various departments of study, for want of the needed books. Then, again, for the best

efficiency of the Academical Department, its corps of instructors ought to be doubled. These are among the obvious necessities of the College, of which the graduates are aware, but which, as we have said, it is very hard to supply. Another fact is, that direct efforts to solicit contributions for the Institution by any appeal to considerable numbers of persons or the general public, even when prosecuted with energy and judgment, have never been attended with more than moderate success;—while, as to large gifts from individual persons, they have most of them come only after there had been long reflection on the part of the donor, and as the ripe fruit of a benevolent purpose slowly and deliberately formed. But the absolute necessity of erecting those new buildings, for which provision has already been made, within a comparatively brief period, will not permit the determination of the question as to locating them to be indefinitely delayed. Still another point is, that, even if a half of a million of dollars could be collected merely to change the location of the College, it might, not improbably, follow that the giving power of its friends would be so far exhausted that it would suffer for a long time to come,—suffer, we mean, in its higher, *immaterial* interests. But as to the feasibility of obtaining this large sum for the purpose named, the opinion of those who have had most experience in the financial affairs of the College, who have been most successful in obtaining gifts for it, and who are best acquainted with its graduates, must be heeded. Their opinion is that it would be utterly impracticable. It is easy to be very sanguine in regard to such a subject; but let those who are most sanguine say, first, how much they would give themselves to effect the end; and, secondly, how much they can promise on behalf of their acquaintance, with a reasonable probability that the promise would be verified. The results of consultation with friends of the College in the leading cities are most unfavorable to the hope that the requisite fund could be obtained. After dinner enthusiasm, when coined into money, as we have already said, often yields an unexpectedly small sum; and the only way for practical men, who are charged with responsibility, to determine a question of this sort is to make inquiries here and there, and to be guided by the results of such inquiries and by

the lights of experience. It being thus impracticable to change the site of the College, it behooves the institution to be content (as well it may) where it is. The friends of the College will do well to direct their attention to those wants of the institution which are more imperative and more serious than any that are likely to arise from the dimensions and situation of its grounds, and of which we now propose to speak somewhat more particularly.

III. THE WANTS OF THE COLLEGE.

We have alluded, in a former part of this Article, to the very large sum of money which has been given to the College within the past few years, and yet, in the remarks just made, we have stated that the wants of the institution are very pressing. How are these two statements to be reconciled? This is a question which has risen, doubtless, in many minds, and it can scarcely be wondered at if the general conviction of late years is that the College abounds in wealth. A pamphlet has been recently placed in the hands of many of the Alumni, entitled "*Yale College in 1868*," and prepared by the Executive Committee of the General Society of the Alumni, which contains a careful statement of the condition of the College at present. At the end of this pamphlet is given a list of all the benefactions which have been received since 1860, and which severally amount to \$5,000 or more. On looking over this list we notice, what, indeed, is mentioned at the close of it, that the General Fund of the Academical Department has only been increased to the extent of \$5,000, and, we may add, that a very large proportion of the whole amount has been given for the special purpose of erecting new buildings. These more special gifts have been, and will be, of great service to the College in the way of providing superior accommodations for its students, and of furnishing places for depositing its collections in the departments of Natural History and of the Fine Arts. But it is manifest that they do little, if anything, toward enlarging the means of instruction, or supplying what we have called the "immaterial" wants of the College. Most persons, who are not very familiar with the interior life of our

collegiate institutions, have no adequate idea of the amount of money which is needed to carry forward those institutions with the highest efficiency and success. The mere cost of suitable buildings is enormous, and a very large amount beyond what Yale has received for that purpose of late would be necessary to answer all its demands. A simple arithmetical calculation, founded upon the cost of a single appropriate building, will convince any person of the correctness of this statement. But the wants, which are independent of these outward things, are very large. The insufficient salaries of the College officers have been already incidentally alluded to on a former page. We may refer to this matter again as an example in point. The present salaries of the Professors in the Academical Department are scarcely more than half that of several of the clergymen in New Haven—those of the Professors in the other Departments are even less. The necessity laid upon these gentlemen, by reason of this fact, to do other and outside work, of course impairs their efficiency for the College, and so far hinders its highest well-being. Moreover, how are men to be called to the service of the College hereafter, when even in that most poorly paid of all the professions, the ministry, they are able to command in our cities, both larger and smaller, a more comfortable support? And, again, how is the number of Professors and teachers to be increased, as it must be in the early future, and ought to be now? The increase of endowment, which should be adequate to the raising of the salaries of the existing Professors in the several Departments of the College, so as to be equal to those of the ministers of New Haven, would be an increase of the present funds by an amount which would surprise most persons who have not thought of the subject; and yet this, again, is a simple arithmetical matter, and the conclusion forces itself irresistibly on the mind which once considers it. It is quite within bounds to say that a sum amounting to at least one-half of a million of dollars is needed for this one object alone. The increase in the number of Professorships would also require a corresponding increase in the funds of the College. And though the College may get on, as it has done, with honorable progress without these additional means; though it may be as successful as the other Colleges

which surround it, in case they are no more largely endowed; yet it is very clear that it cannot do all that it might do, and that its most devoted friends hope that it may be enabled to do in the future, unless its Professorship funds are very largely increased. The wants of the College Library have also been hinted at, on a preceding page, and are of the most pressing character. No University can accomplish its work, as it ought to be accomplished for the good of the country and the cause of education, without provision, in the way of books, for the most varied and thorough investigations in every branch of learning. The implements are wanting for the carrying forward of the work until these are supplied, and they cannot be supplied without large outlays of money. There should be an annual income of some thousands of dollars for this object, instead of the small amount which can now be devoted to it—only about fifteen hundred dollars. The Librarian, in his statement, in the pamphlet of which we have spoken, says that the scanty income at present received has been necessarily anticipated to such an extent that but few purchases, and those only of absolute necessity, can now be ventured upon. "It will be a surprise to many," he adds, "to learn that during the last twenty years, while the cost of books has nearly doubled, and the demand arising from the growth of the College, and still more from the increased activity in every department of knowledge, has multiplied fourfold, the increase of the library funds is expressed by so small a fraction as one-tenth." No rich man or body of rich men could do a greater service to learning than by adding one or two hundred thousand dollars to the scanty fund on which the Library now rests. The various departments of the College, also, have peculiar needs of their own. The School of Science, which has been aided so munificently by one of New Haven's most liberal citizens, opens still a very wide field for the offerings of those generous-minded men of wealth who are interested in the progress of scientific knowledge in the country. Its rapid growth and great success, during the past few years, give every promise for the future, if it can be sustained as it should be. And now that it affords not only a purely scientific education in the several departments of Natural Science, but also a general education

for those young men who do not desire to pursue a classical course, it appeals to all who are interested in establishing such a course of study in our Collegiate institutions. The Theological Department, which, during almost all its history, has been exceedingly limited in its funds, has for some years been slowly gaining in this respect, but it needs from one hundred and fifty to two hundred thousand dollars, in addition to what it is now in possession of, in order that it may complete its new building, and may afford that pecuniary assistance to its students which will be an absolute necessity, until the churches give their ministers such sufficient salaries as shall enable them not only to support themselves after they have entered upon their work, but to discharge the debts incurred during their education. The Law and Medical Schools are, if possible, in even more pressing need than those mentioned already. Their past efficiency cannot be increased in the future, as their officers and graduates would wish it to be, unless they are provided with those abundant resources which the times demand. We have spoken briefly, and in only a general way, of some of those things which the College still requires; and we think any one who carefully looks into the matter will feel that it is wonderful that so great results have been accomplished in the past with so limited means, and will also feel that the numerous generous gifts which have been bestowed upon the institution within the past ten years, though amounting to nearly a million of dollars, yet leave very great and urgent necessities still unsupplied. A million of dollars more given for the increase of the means of instruction, and for the "immaterial" interests of the whole University, would be no more than is needed at once. The Alumni, in the past, have had only a limited ability to help the College in this way. But they are now, many of them, men of large property, and they are rapidly increasing their means with every passing year. Shall we not all remember the debt we owe to our Alma Mater?

In the suggestions which we have offered on the foregoing topics, all of which were more or less fully introduced at the late meeting in New York, we have intended to address our-

selves more especially to the graduates of the College. We have endeavored to clear away certain mistaken views which have sometimes been pressed upon their notice, and to present the subjects referred to in the true light. We have, also, called their attention to the wants of the Institution. As members of the great company of the Alumni, we have believed that it was not unsuitable for us to speak on these important subjects, now that they have been brought forward and that discussion in regard to them has already commenced. The Alumni of Yale are her glory, even as the children of a family are the glory of their parents, and, as they are widely scattered over the land, they may do much for her prosperity if they will give to her of their substance. In the pages which follow, we desire to add a few words on one or two other subjects which are of interest to the graduates. And as the fourth point of which we speak,—being partakers with them all in the blessings of the liberal education which has been so generously bestowed upon us,—we are glad to assure them that, in the great controversies of the present time, the College takes no uncertain ground.

IV. THE RELATION OF THE COLLEGE TO EDUCATIONAL REFORM.

Yale College has kept pace with the times in introducing new branches of study into its system of education. The astonishing progress of the physical sciences, and the great work to be done in developing the material resources of this country, suggested the need of the establishment of courses of instruction, in which these studies should have the principal place. The Scientific School, founded mainly by the munificence of Mr. Joseph E. Sheffield, meets this need. The Scientific School, we may add, is one section of the more extensive Department of Philosophy and the Arts, which undertakes to provide higher instruction also in Philology, History, and Metaphysics. The small number of Bachelors of Arts who desire to pursue a post-graduate course, is the only reason that prevents this last section of the Department from assuming the prominence which has been attained by the School of Science. We do not see that Cornell University offers any superior ad-

vantages, as regards the number and variety of studies and courses of study, which are provided. Without any flourish of trumpets, Yale College has met the reasonable demands of the time, in this particular, quite as fully as any other institution. But Yale has refused to take any step which implies a diminished esteem for liberal education according to the old standard. In the College course proper, the classics still hold their place. The degrees that are proper to those who have pursued this course are not given to others. There is no disposition here, as far as we know, to yield to the clamor for the substitution of other branches for Greek and Latin, for the reason that this clamor is considered to spring from superficial and false ideas of education. The advantage of the new or special courses for a large class of young men, whose circumstances and plans of life render it inexpedient for them to receive a learned education, is freely conceded. But the peculiar and indispensable place of a classical training in a system of liberal education, depends on facts which man cannot alter. The character of the ancient nations and their relation to the history of civilization, apart from the superior disciplinary value of the study of their languages, settles this question. To all schemes for subverting or radically altering the College curriculum, or for degrading its importance, Yale is thoroughly hostile. It is doubtless true that some room may wisely be given for the selection of studies on the part of the student; but the optional system is not to be extended so far as to lessen materially the time that is given to the ancient languages. We regard the recent changes at Harvard as inexpedient and dangerous, so far as they involve a departure from this canon. Everything that tends to supplant general education by special, instead of making the former the basis and preparation of the latter, is founded in a false principle, and will be productive of mischievous consequences. In nine cases out of ten, young students who choose their studies will select such as are easiest to them, and because they are easiest; but this is a poor criterion for determining what branches it is best for them to pursue. The truth is that, generally speaking, they are incapable of determining this question for themselves. The science of education is something which they very poorly

understand. We believe that all such selections, whenever they are to be allowed, should be made under the advice and direction of the College instructors, and that, in general, a prescribed course, which has been settled upon by the judgment of the most able men, and the excellence of which has been proved by the experience of the past, should be enjoined upon the whole body of the students. The great thing which our country needs is not less but more of sound learning. Instead of throwing out the classical studies, or limiting them to the briefest possible space, our Universities ought all to do what Yale has done—namely, to offer opportunities for higher and more extended cultivation of them after the ordinary Academical course is ended.

V. CRITICISMS OF THE COLLEGE.

All our Colleges, of late years, seem to have been exposed to a large share of criticism. The advocates of almost every new theory of education and the different classes of persons, who think that in any respect, whether of government or discipline or instruction, they could manage these institutions better than they are now managed, hasten to present their views and complaints before the public. Radical reformers in this department of life, as in all others, consider the past and its wisdom of little account, and they are not content even to wait for that slow progress by which great and long-established institutions can alone be safely changed. But we are happy to believe that in regard to Yale College, to say nothing of any other, the persons who thus criticise it, and who would transform it into something essentially different from what it has been, are not its great company of graduates. They understand too well what it once did for themselves, and what it is now doing for others, to wish it to lose its old character and glory. The men who charge it with want of sympathy with progress, or public welfare, or great moral reforms, or everything that is good, are generally persons who have never seen the interior life of the College, or known the influence which has gone out from it. And while a public institution, like a private individual, cannot hope to pass through any consider-

able period of its history without being exposed to censures and complaints, it may well take satisfaction, when the persons who are most familiar with it, and have lived in it as sharers in its beneficent gifts, are those whose commendation of it is warmest and most unvarying. We believe that Yale College can take to itself this feeling of satisfaction as fully as any institution of any kind which has ever been known in our country. We doubt not, if it goes onward as it has done, that such will always be the fact.

We had proposed to close our Article with some remarks on those criticisms which come from quarters where there is less information or less love for the College. But since writing that portion of it which precedes this point, we have found in a Norwich newspaper a communication signed by Professor Gilman, and relating to certain strictures respecting the College, which had gained admittance to the newspapers of that place. Not having read those strictures, we can say nothing as to the spirit in which they are conceived, or the probable motives that instigated them. But the remarks of Professor Gilman are so valuable in themselves, as bearing upon the class of criticisms to which we have referred, and the views which they express in regard to the system of study at Yale are so coincident with our own, that we shall quote a large part of his communication. If some thoughts differ little from those which have been presented in the preceding pages, the reader will pardon the repetition.

After alluding to some things which had been said respecting the governing Board of the College, Professor Gilman proceeds as follows :—

“It is also a judicious and a progressive body. The history of Yale College is one of the wonders of the land. How a ‘few country ministers,’ robbing their scanty book shelves for material with which to found a College, have built up a national power; how a few ‘country ministers,’ with their scanty funds, have not only kept the College out of debt and out of discredit, but have made it a beacon light of truth and learning from Maine to California; how a few ‘country ministers’ have attracted to their graceless ‘barracks,’ and their ill ventilated lecture rooms, scholars from every State in the Union,

from every walk in life, from every denomination of Christians, and have fitted those scholars to shine on the bench, in the pulpit, and in the inventor's laboratory, in the editor's chair, in the Senate, in the Cabinet, and in the World of Letters,—all this I say is a wonder of wonders to those who are not mindful that the 'country ministers' of Connecticut are a wise, a self-sacrificing, a sagacious, a learned, and a public spirited body of men.

"This Corporation, while exercising, in behalf of the public, a constant supervision over the affairs of the College, have a resident body of counselors in the various faculties of the College. In all great moneyed institutions, it is necessary to success that the resident managers should be vested with a large amount of power. This is especially important in College administration, and whatever changes may be made, residents in College, giving to it all their time, are more likely to understand the College necessities than any body of non-resident trustees. Any serious change in this respect would certainly be disastrous.

"Jerky, meddling interference with Colleges is damaging to all their interests; the faculty, the students, and the public, all suffer. Learning is checked. The education of the country is impeded. An old College like Yale should go forward, always growing wiser and better; but it ought to '*go steady*,' and take no steps backward. It has too much of an investment in reputation and influence to engage in extra hazardous risks.

"A second complaint is that the College is losing ground by not keeping up with the spirit of the age. This has been so well answered in your columns that little remains to be said. More students, more funds, more professors, more buildings, more courses of study, more strictness of admission and of graduation, more recognition of science, history, political philosophy, modern languages, and other so-called 'modern studies,' are certainly signs that the College is not yet 'losing ground.' But the 'spirit of the age' in educational discussions refers, I suppose, to the recognition of modern science. Now, in this dispute, which is in progress all over the world, respecting the comparative value of 'scientific' and 'classical

education,' Yale College has taken no hesitating stand. She has solved the problem, wisely, harmoniously, permanently. She has now *two* departments, both well equipped; *first*, an academic, or classical, department, where letters, or 'the humanities,' are, as of old, the chief studies, with some recognition of natural science; and, *second*, a scientific department, where 'the realities,' or the various modern sciences, are the chief themes of instruction, languages and history holding subordinate places. So that now and henceforward, at New Haven, the student may follow, at his option, the old path or the new. Greek, Latin and mathematics may form his chief discipline; or, if he prefer, natural sciences, mathematics and the modern languages may constitute his studies. Time will decide which course is best, which course is most wanted. Both are maintained in Yale College. To me this does not seem like foolish conservatism, nor sheer 'old fogysm.' It is not jerky radicalism. It is steady, judicious progress, in harmony with the movement of the age. What institution of learning in any land has more wisely marked out its course in deference not only to 'the spirit of the age,' but to 'the spirit of the ages?'

"The third complaint is also made that the College officers are exclusive, that they do not take a frequent part in the reforms, the conventions, the moral and religious movements of the day. There is no foundation for such insinuations, as a few facts will show. If the charges were true, it might be said in extenuation that the College professors are overworked. Two of them, still in the prime of years and among the most distinguished, have broken down in health. Several whose scanty salaries are inadequate to the support of their families, are hard at work, in all their supposed hours of leisure, earning a decent living. Three or four hours a day in recitation rooms, constant calls from students, parents and teachers, the necessary study required to keep up with the progress of science, official and literary correspondence, the correction of written exercises and examination papers, attendance on faculty meetings—all this is enough official work for half-paid men. Moreover, within the College walls there are frequent literary, religious, and social meetings which call for sympathy,

addresses and attendance. I will only allude to the work which some of the Professors perform in vacant pulpits, in Mission Sunday Schools, in the Young Men's Christian Association, in the delivery of public lectures, in ministerial and ecclesiastical councils. Besides all this, most of the College officers are at work with their pens for the advancement of science and the promotion of the public good. The *New Englander*, the *Journal of Science*, the *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, and the *Theological Eclectic*, are edited by Professors in Yale College. The *North American Review*, the *Nation*, the *Hearth and Home*, the *American Naturalist*, *Hours at Home*, and other periodicals, receive frequent contributions from this same body of writers. Within a very short time past several new books have been published by officers of Yale College, and several more are known to be in the works. I state them as I recall them, leaving others to speak of their merit. President Woolsey's '*International Law*,' in a revised edition; Dana and Brush's '*Mineralogy*' (800 pp. 8vo.); Loomis's '*Meteorology*,' and '*Algebra*' (revised edition); Johnson's '*How Crops Grow*;' Porter's '*Human Intellect*;' Fisher's '*Life of Silliman*,' and '*Evidences of Christianity*;' Hoppin's '*Old England: Its Scenery, Art, and People*;' Whitney's '*Lectures on Language*;' Hadley's '*Greek Grammar*,' and Norton's '*Astronomy*,' are before the world as signs of the recent and present intellectual activity of the College.

"It is said, however, that this implies no 'personal' contact with the world. What time is left, I inquire, for such intercourse? Very little, but that little is employed. I wish the College Professors could come more into contact with the community at large. It might do both parties good, but it cannot be done until every man is provided with a clerk, or with 'a Double,' or till he is relieved of half of his present tasks and duties. Professor Thacher has identified himself with the cause of common schools; Professor Northrop is prominent in the councils of the republicans; President Woolsey is the President of the American Home Missionary Society, and an efficient member of the Committee on Versions in the American Bible Society; Dr. Bacon is a man of mark in almost every ecclesiastical conference of this region; the Scientific Professors are not want-

ing in the national and local scientific gatherings; the Agricultural Professors give life to the agricultural meetings; the philologists are to be found in the meetings of the Oriental Society and in other philological associations. Courses of lectures are annually given to the mechanics of New Haven. In short, we cannot all do everything; but the Faculty of Yale College do not shirk their share of public service. They think their first duty is to serve the College, to do all they can to advance its usefulness and influence. After that they are ready to help along all other good social institutions. As a single illustration of their interest in moral reforms, remember how early, how unitedly, and how boldly they stood in opposition to slavery, and how much obloquy some of their number endured for their efficient zeal.

“Having thus referred to the complaints which ‘the public’ have made through your columns against the College, let me say a word about THE GREAT DEFECT, yet scarcely referred to. It is THE DEFECT OF FUNDS. Yale College is woefully poor. It was never poorer than now. Large gifts have indeed been received, but most of these have been for buildings, and many of them are positive taxes upon the general treasury. Meanwhile, the corps of Professors is far from being numerous enough for the work to be performed. Yale College needs more men in its faculty; more men to teach and govern and guide its great body of students; more men to prosecute science in all its phases; more men to write books and lectures; more men to influence the public. But it cannot afford to pay decently those whom it has already enlisted. How can it get more? If the Faculty were twice as large as it now is, and if the men who compose it were free from anxiety for the *res angusta domi*, many of the defects referred to would vanish.

“It is scholars who make a College; not bricks and mortar. It is endowments which secure the time and services of scholars. Next to scholars, books are essential, but Yale College has *not a dollar* on hand to buy books with for the next two years, its scanty library income having already been expended in advance.”

ARTICLE IV.—SPAIN, AND THE LATE REVOLUTION.

THE present attitude of Spain excites great interest both in Europe and the United States. It is a matter of surprise that a nation, which for three centuries has exhibited little signs of progress, and has been regarded as among the least intelligent of the nations of Europe, should, at a time when the revolutionary spirit is generally quiet, carry forward a successful revolution.

It is not the object of the present Article to answer all the questions to which an answer might be desired, but simply to make some suggestions which may assist our readers to an intelligent understanding of the events which have recently transpired in Spain, and of those which are to follow.

The late Queen reigned for thirty-three years. She was placed upon the throne after a bloody war of parties while an infant of five years, although the elder branch of her family had a living representative. That change in the government, as well as the attempts at revolution which have two or three times taken place during her reign, seem to have proceeded rather from the ambitious designs of individual leaders, or of political parties hoping to take advantage of the supposed popular discontent and uneasiness under misgovernment, than from any settled desire on the part of the people for a change. From one point of view the late revolution presents a similar appearance. It is the ever ready answer of Topete, Serrano, and Prim, to popular demands, "The army and navy have made this revolution, the people had nothing to do with it." The fact undoubtedly is, that Isabella's government was overthrown, without any popular uprising, by the military and naval power; but it is no less true that this revolution could not have been successful without the general approval and support of the people. If the leaders aimed at personal ends, as is probable, the revolution succeeded because the people were ready for a change; otherwise this attempt would have fared as others which had preceded it. The causes which underlay

the revolution were not the prestige of prominent men nor the strength of the military or naval arm, although each of these had its importance, but they are to be sought mainly with the people themselves. The people had become disgusted with the Queen and with her government. Isabella is a bad woman; she has been amassing millions for herself, while little has been done for the kingdom. Her government, since she came to her majority, has been administered not for the good of the people, but for the benefit of herself and her favorites. Her private character has been disgraceful. That she has been habitually guilty of drinking to excess, even to intoxication, is notorious, and no one in Spain doubts that she is guilty of grosser vice. These causes have been accumulating with increased force for many years, but another weighty reason remains to be mentioned. The strength of our own government, as exhibited in the suppression of the late rebellion, and, above all, the power of citizen soldiers, springing at once into the ranks of the army and as rapidly and easily subsiding again into the peaceful condition of citizens, has given to multitudes in Spain, as well as throughout Europe, a renewed confidence in republican institutions. That the leaders in the revolution had private ends to accomplish, is probable. It is generally believed that Serrano, the President of the provisional ministry, received money from the Duke de Montpensier, the Queen's brother-in-law, to assist him to become King of Spain. Prim, the minister of war, is an ambitious, aspiring soldier, possessing some of the virtues and most of the vices of the soldier; always without money and ever lavish of that of others; having possessed himself of power, he is reluctant to let go his hold. He is believed to favor some younger monarch, over whom he may exercise authority, and be really king under the name of regent or minister. These men and their co-ministers, are a self-constituted committee, having no authority save that which they assumed as the leaders of a successful rebellion. At the commencement of the revolution, and before the provisional government was firmly established, about sixty thousand stands of arms were distributed to the people that they might be prepared to sustain by force, if necessary, the new order of things. No doubt some arms came into the

possession of unworthy persons, yet we are not aware that any bad use of the arms has been made.

Since this time the provisional government has been using its power and influence in favor of a monarchy. They have issued an order limiting the right of suffrage to persons over twenty five years of age, fearing the sympathy of the young with republican principles. They early declared their intention to call for the votes of the people on the government which should be established, but having determined to have a monarchy, whatever the will of the people might be, they dared not allow an election to take place which might result adverse to their wishes, so long as arms remained in the hands of the people. The order for an election, which, after some delay, was issued, was recalled, and this was followed by an attempt to disarm the people. To this demand to surrender their arms the people replied, Let us elect our representatives and let them establish a permanent government for Spain, and then, if this government of our own choice requires us to surrender these arms, we will obey, but we will not surrender them to you, who are seeking to establish a monarchy over us, and who will have us in your power when we are without arms to defend ourselves.

The first feeble attempt was made in the remote city of Cadiz, where every Spaniard is a republican. Don Caballero de Rodas, the military governor of that province, issued an order requiring all arms in the possession of citizens to be delivered to him within three hours, or they would be taken by force. This order was made in a peaceful city, where there was no disturbance of the public quiet, and was altogether unexpected by everybody. The spirit of the republicans was at once aroused, and they immediately proceeded to erect barricades and prepare for their defense. The fighting commenced at three o'clock on the afternoon of the 5th of December, and continued without intermission until the morning of the 6th. Cadiz is a walled city, and the soldiers were within strong fortifications extending along the walls on the north and west, thus holding the principal gates of the city. During all this time the citizens were strengthening their barricades and building new ones, and, on the morning of the 8th, were

stronger than when the fighting commenced and in better spirits. They had taken by direct assault the "sea gate," the principal entrance to the city, in the centre of the line of the soldiers' fortifications, thus interrupting their communications, when the soldiers asked for a truce. It was believed by military men that Cadiz could only be taken by bombardment, and it was only when the government sent eight vessels of war there with the threat of bombardment, that, through the intervention of the American Consul, who seemed to be the only man to whom all men of all parties looked for advice and assistance, peace was restored and the arms given up. During this contest a small party of Americans, who were accidentally in Cadiz, were everywhere greeted in the most friendly manner and treated with the utmost courtesy by the republicans, who sought in this way to show how strongly the institutions of the United States had their respect and sympathy. A similar demand for the surrender of arms at Malaga resulted in a severe contest, in which the republicans were defeated and the provisional government gained a victory; but such victories cost dear, and although possession of the arms in these cities and other places has been obtained, the feeling engendered by these contests will remain, and may result in another revolution. At Malaga, too, some American ladies, seeking to leave the city, were escorted by republicans who were fired on by the soldiers, but so regardful were they of their charge that, so long as these defenseless ones were under their protection, they did not return the fire.

The sentiments of the people are not entirely harmonious with reference to the true policy of Spain. Some of the best friends of that country, who, by long residence and favorable opportunities, may be considered good judges, have confidence that a republican form of government may be the best thing for Spain. Others, in perhaps equally good circumstances for forming an opinion, believe that a constitutional monarchy is better fitted to the present condition of the people. In Spain itself, Queen Isabella has some adherents still, but these exercise little influence on the public sentiment. The great mass of the people are either republicans or, as they call themselves, "Democratic Monarchists." The republican strength

is in the South and East of Spain, where there is the greatest amount of intelligence and activity, in Cadiz, Seville, Malaga, Cordova, Valencia, Barcelona, and Saragossa. Throughout all these provinces the republicans are vastly in the majority. No doubt many hold their faith in darkness and ignorance, but they have a real discernment of the truth. The monarchists are those who fear that Spain is not prepared for a republic by education and enlightenment; those who fear the outside pressure of European monarchies, if a republic should be established; those who regard the monarchical form of government as more stable than the republican. The strength of the monarchists is in the North. About Madrid parties are somewhat evenly balanced, with the majority on the side of the monarchists.

In the meanwhile the republican leaders are not inactive. Through their instrumentality evening schools have been established in Madrid and other large cities, for the purpose of giving instruction to the masses. Meetings are held, at which the people are taught their duties as citizens and the principles which underlie governments. Newspapers have greatly multiplied. Sixty newspapers are now published in Madrid, issuing 150,000 sheets. In these, as well as in pamphlets and broad sheets, are discussions of the questions now of greatest prominence: the relative excellence of republicanism and monarchy, the elective franchise, freedom of worship, &c. Knots of people are to be found in the squares, in the cafes, and indeed everywhere, discussing these questions.

In the midst of all this exciting discussion and this transition period of the government, the general order and quiet which have prevailed in Spain is quite remarkable. Madrid itself is guarded by a volunteer police force, and never has the public order been so well preserved. A crime, or breach of the peace, is a rare occurrence. When, on the 27th day of December last, a great republican demonstration was made in Madrid, not a soldier appeared in the streets as the guardian of the public order. The procession, numbering many thousands, and the crowds which witnessed its march, needed no police nor military to preserve order. General Milans de Bosch, the military commander of Madrid, said to a friend on the pre-

vions evening, "I shall be the only military on duty to-morrow." The General is an ardent republican, and stood with two aides in the door of the Arsenal and received the salutes of the procession as it passed. Before this procession took up its line of march through the streets of Madrid, the leading republican orator who addressed them, counseled them to preserve order, and neither by word nor act to give their enemies any ground to blame them. Well was this counsel followed. Some American travelers, who happened to be in Madrid on that occasion, hung out from their hotel window an American flag, which they had carried with them, in order to show their sympathy with republicanism. As the procession came under the Stars and Stripes, at the unexpected sight, every banner was lowered, every hat was raised, every eye glistened, every cheek was lighted with a smile. The enthusiasm which was manifested by such signs could not be entirely suppressed, but showed itself by the clapping of hands, and shouts of "*Viva la grande république*," subdued indeed, as the men in the ranks remembered the last words of their orator. but with intense feeling which must find some vent. During the fighting at Cadiz, the republicans posted placards on every corner, proclaiming death to any one found stealing. For twenty-four hours after the truce was proclaimed there the goods of a grocer, the front of whose shop had been shot away, lay exposed in the most frequented part of that city without the loss of a single article,—and this, too, although the shop was filled with articles of food, which the people most needed, and although they had no especial guard. Such regard for order as that described in Madrid, or this in Cadiz, could not have occurred in any large town in the United States. It pleases a writer in the *London Times* to charge the republicans of Spain with being communists. He gives no proof of his charge. In Cadiz, where the republicans were victors, there was no wanton destruction of property, but the most punctilious regard for the persons and property of all unarmed persons. In Malaga, where the soldiers were the victors, an utter disregard of all rights was shown. The incident already narrated, in another connection, illustrates the wantonness of the soldiers, and the self-command of the republican volunteers.

The condition and character of the people is, in many points,

such that we cannot be sanguine of the success of republicanism in Spain. For three hundred years the Spaniards have been oppressed by the Church and the State. The monarchs have amassed wealth, the Episcopal sees are among the richest in Europe, while the people are impoverished. With no incentive to labor, with no stimulus to exertion, the Spaniards are indolent. The cities and large towns are full of beggars. From the best information we can obtain, in the absence of reliable statistics, we believe that at least seventy-five per cent. of the people of Spain cannot read or write. We have ourselves seen, since the revolution, in several of the large cities, groups of men standing or sitting around some reader of the publications of the day, showing both their inability to read themselves and their interest in the questions discussed. The Spaniards are naturally quick of observation and comprehension, but the lack of ability to read in so large a proportion of the population is a serious drawback to their progress. During the last ten years lines of railway have been built from the French frontier at Bayonne to Madrid and Cordova; from Cordova, in one direction, to Cadiz and, in another, to Malaga; while another line leads from Madrid to Alicante, and thence, following the east coast, northward to Valencia and Barcelona. Another line connects Madrid directly with Barcelona. Some of these lines pay the expenses of operation and some do not. But whether they do a greater or less amount of business, the character of the country and of the people seems to have undergone little change. In the Basque provinces the same kind of forks are used, and in the same way, to turn up the soil as were in use a thousand years ago. In Valencia the ground is irrigated by means of the same kind of water-wheels as the Carthaginians used before the Christian era; while, in the centre and south of Spain, ploughs are scratching the top of the ground of the same pattern as Virgil describes in his Georgics. There are no villages by the side of the railways to indicate improved or increased business. The railway seems thus far to have failed in Spain to develop the wealth and industry of the people. One great curse of the country is that the land is divided into large estates, some of which have never seen their owners, instead of being subdivided, as they

should be, amongst small proprietors. Only a small portion of the people are owners of the soil. Hence it fails to yield its just production. The valley of the Guadalquivir, for instance, is one of the richest valleys in the world, with a moist and equable climate, and is now, as it has always been, very productive, but it is evident to the passing traveler that it is poorly cultivated. What might be done under a proper system has been partly shown by an Englishman who became, two or three years since, the owner of a farm, and who, though without previous agricultural experience, has obtained from it more than double the production it had yielded to its former owner. This example, however, has produced little effect on the Spanish proprietors, who are satisfied to do as their ancestors have done. The Spaniard is too proud to work, but he can never be truly a freeman until he learns that there is honor in labor.

The future it is not easy to forecast. While we write the election of Deputies is taking place; before this Article reaches our readers the Cortes will meet, and perhaps the decision will be made. It seems clear that the late Queen will have a few adherents, that the republicans will have a strong force of nearly, or quite, a hundred members, and that the provisional government will have a large majority; but it is not yet time to classify the "Democratic monarchists," who are counted as supporters of the present government. They embrace various shades of monarchists, and it may prove that the majority is not so large as it now appears.

We regard it as by no means certain that the vote of this election fairly represents the opinion of the people of Spain. The republican leaders have been active and zealous in all the large cities to bring out the votes of their party, but there has been a wide-spread sentiment that the result was a foregone conclusion; that the provisional government would control it by fair means or foul; and this sentiment cannot but have had an influence in keeping away many votes from the polls. The young men between twenty-one and twenty-five years of age have not been allowed to take part in the election. In the remoter districts the people have not been sufficiently educated in their rights to understand the importance of this first experiment in voting. On this Cortes, however, depends the

future government of Spain, and we think their decision must be in favor of a monarchy of some kind. The Duke of Montpensier is an aspirant to the throne, and will have a strong and influential following. Some members of the provisional government are pledged to his support. He may be the choice of the Cortes. If he should be elected King, another revolution, more bloody than the last, is in store for Spain. The pronounced republicans, and a portion of the constitutional monarchists, will not be contented with a Bourbon on the throne, and a change must sooner or later take place. Should the choice fall on the Duke of Aosta, the second son of the King of Italy, whose election is pressed, it is said, by the money and influence of Prussia, the success of his reign might be more hopeful, although he would not satisfy the republicans; but we do not consider his election probable, as in case of the death of the elder son, the Crown Prince, and the renunciation of the succession by the Duke of Aosta, the crown of Italy would be diverted from the house of Savoy. In our opinion there is one man, and but one, who can safely be called to the head of the government at the present time. That man is Espartero, Duke of Vittoria. He commands alike the confidence of republicans and moderate monarchists. He was regent during Isabella's minority, and his administration of the government, if not always wise, was honest and upright. He left office without enriching himself. He seems to be a true patriot. He is now somewhat advanced in years, and would seem to have no other ambition than to serve his country faithfully, especially as he has no children to lay claim to the throne after his death. The republicans would be glad to make him President, but we can hardly expect that they will so far surrender their principles as to vote for him as King; nor have we great hopes of a coalition in his favor between the republicans and the moderate monarchists. If such a result should occur Spain might be judiciously ruled for a few years, and perhaps brought to understand better the principles of a liberal government; so that, when Espartero should be removed, the people would be prepared to establish their institutions on sure foundations.

A few words on the present state of religion in Spain. One of the republican watchwords is "freedom of worship," and

this they have proclaimed as a cardinal principle. We have not found any falling off in the attendance on the Roman Catholic churches, and the desire of freedom of worship seems to be rather opposition to Catholicism than real faith; it is rather negative than positive; more political than religious. The Spaniards know, and many feel deeply that the church has eaten, like a cancer, on the life of the people; many have broken its yoke, and are rejoicing in their freedom, but we fear that it is freedom to disbelieve rather than freedom in believing. The petition of fifteen thousand women to the provisional government against allowing the profession of any other form of religion than the Roman Catholic, shows that the attachment of multitudes to that Church is unshaken. Indeed it cannot be supposed that the mere flight of the Queen could have changed the sentiments of the people on the subject of religion. What now appears is only the development of what already existed under concealment. Until the revolution, to profess any other than the Roman Catholic religion in Spain was a criminal offense, punishable with death. A small band of Protestants, some two thousand in all, who have heretofore worshiped and labored in secret, now work openly and zealously, but what are they among so many. The convents established since 1845 have been disbanded. This was not at all in the interest of religion, but was solely a political measure. The members of the disbanded convents, and their property, have all been transferred to the older institutions of the same sort, so that neither is the church the loser nor the nation the gainer. It is true that opportunity is now given for the introduction of the Gospel. One of the "Plymouth brethren," a self-constituted missionary, sold in two weeks, in Madrid, more than three hundred Bibles, and in other parts of Spain he has sold as many, but this is a small beginning, and we are not aware of any organized effort. The people have been too long oppressed by the Church and State to make the present religious prospects of Spain seem encouraging.

Spain is one of the richest countries of Europe in natural resources. If we leave out of account the arid plains of Castile, there is still abundance of good land in the northern part of the country for pasturage and grain, while all the region

south of Madrid, save the mountain ranges, is capable of the highest degree of production. The southern slope of the Pyrenees abounds in valuable ores, and in coal of a good quality. The Sierra Morena is rich with copper, iron, lead, and coal; the Sierra Nevada, with coal and metals. The quicksilver mines of Almaden are the richest in the world. With the exception of the latter, which have been the property of the crown, but little has been done in the working of any mines in Spain. The Spanish railways are obliged to bring coal from England, notwithstanding extensive coal fields lie within twenty-five or thirty miles of important stations. Had the Spaniards who accompanied and those who followed Columbus to the New World staid at home, and turned their attention to the development of the resources of their own country, instead of seeking for an El Dorado, where wealth could be obtained without labor, the condition of Spain would be very different from what it now is. She might have led the van of the nations. Now, after so long an interval, she awakes to find herself far in the rear. She needs the renovating and stimulating influence of a good government and a pure religion.

ARTICLE V.—THE AMERICAN COLLEGES AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.

II.

WE proceed, as it was intimated in the preceding number of the *New Englander* that we should, to consider some of the more general peculiarities of the American Colleges.

The first which we name, is that in these colleges the same course of study has been uniformly *prescribed* as a condition for the Bachelor's degree. We say "*uniformly*," for the exceptions have been so few as scarcely to deserve to be named, and any deviations, when allowed for a time, have very soon been abandoned. When we say "*has been*," we do not include the few years which have just elapsed, within which some influential colleges have abandoned, in part, a prescribed uniform curriculum, and introduced very largely, the system of elective or optional courses of study. The period in which we are now living is eminently one of reconstruction and experiment, and with its tendencies and movements the colleges seem to have largely sympathized. The college which we describe is not the college of the passing year, or of the current five years, but the college of the past thirty years, and of the present generation.

The theory of education, after which this system of study has been prescribed, has been, that certain studies (among which the classics and mathematics are prominent) are best fitted to prepare a man for the most efficient and successful discharge of public life. By "public life" we do not mean merely professional life, but life in that relatively commanding position, which a thoroughly cultured man is fitted to occupy. By a thoroughly cultured man we mean a man who has been trained to know himself in his constitution, his duties, and his powers; to know society in its history and institutions, its literature and art; and to know nature in its developments and scientific relations. The liberal education which the colleges have uniformly proposed to give is none other than what

Milton calls the "complete and generous education," that "fits a man to perform justly, skillfully, and magnanimously, all the offices, both private and public, of peace and war." It is a very serious mistake to say that, historically considered, the education for which the colleges arranged their preparatory curriculum was what is technically called a professional education, and that these studies are especially necessary for persons destined to one of the three learned professions. It is, doubtless, true that the studies of the English universities, from which the American colleges are historically derived, were originally arranged with special reference to the clerical profession, and that to this day some of the peculiarities thus induced have not been entirely outgrown. The first American colleges were also primarily founded as training schools for the clergy, but as the other professions came to require a liberal culture this special reference to the clerical profession was laid aside. It would be more exact to say that both the universities and colleges were designed to give a professional as well as a liberal education. To use the language current in the United States, they combined the function of the professional school with that now assigned to the college. But the English universities and the American colleges were also designed, from an early period, to educate gentlemen as well as scholars. But inasmuch as in the earlier, and in that respect at least the better days, every gentleman was supposed to take some position in society as a legislator or magistrate, a diplomat or soldier, the same education was deemed suitable for all who aspired to what we have called a public position. These liberal studies were not thought unsuitable even for the duties and station of a merchant, especially of one who might be a prince among his fellow merchants in generous tastes, wide information, courtly manners, and refined accomplishments. Moreover it ought never to be forgotten that the natural sciences were never formally excluded from the scheme of university studies. Even the scholastics included in their scheme of liberal knowledge the science of nature as then received, and made the knowledge of it an essential element of the liberal education of their times. The American colleges have done the same from the earliest period. They have never,

either in form or in fact, excluded these sciences. Nor is the question now mooted in any of them whether these sciences shall be excluded from the liberal share which they possess of the curriculum. It is whether these sciences shall exclude all the others, whether they shall either occupy the entire field of liberal culture or shall direct the selection of studies in their own exclusive interest, so that the classics shall give way to French and German, because these last are more essential to the student of nature, and are, as is contended, equally well adapted to general culture.

We contend that the American colleges have been in the right in requiring a prescribed course of study as the condition for a degree. In support of this opinion we shall offer no extended argument in addition to those we have already presented, but shall occupy ourselves chiefly with the arguments that are urged against it. If the considerations already urged are admitted to be pertinent and convincing, our argument is complete. If it be conceded that the studies which have been usually prescribed in the American colleges are the best fitted to impart a liberal culture, then it follows that the practice of these colleges in making them the ordinary conditions for the first degree is well grounded and ought to be adhered to. If our argument concerning the theory of the curriculum of studies is valid, then these studies ought to be prescribed. There is not a single study that is superfluous. Not one should be displaced, because not one can be spared. The theory of this curriculum has been to provide for all these studies which could properly find a place in a system of liberal culture, or should enter into the scheme of a complete and generous education. The end has not been to train men for the learned professions as such, but to train for that position in life which many others besides professional men should aim to occupy. For such a position the curriculum has been arranged, not by theorists in education, nor by the traditional adherents to a hereditary system made sacred by hallowed associations, but under the just demands of public life as tested by long experience and confirmed in the success of many generations. In this curriculum the study of the ancient languages has been prominent as training to the power of subtle analysis; the

mathematics, as strengthening to continuity and rigor of attention, to sharp and bold discrimination; physics, to give power over nature,—real power, as we wield and apply her forces, and intellectual, as we interpret her secrets, predict her phenomena, enforce her laws and recreate her universe; psychology, that we may know ourselves and so understand the instrument by which we know at all; ethics, that we may rightly direct the springs of action and subject the individual will to the consecrating law of duty; political science, that we may know the state in the grounds and limits of its authority; the science of religion, that we may justify our faith to our disciplined and instructed reason; history, that we may trace the development of man and the moral purposes of God; logic, rhetoric, and literature, that the powers thus enriched and thus trained may fitly express themselves by writing and in speech.

When we say this curriculum has been prescribed, we do not intend that the student has been forbidden to pursue other studies, nor that his time has been so entirely occupied and engrossed by the regular course as to leave no opportunity for favorite pursuits or general culture. On the contrary, the college course has usually contemplated much additional labor and study, and has encouraged such efforts and indirectly rewarded them by special prizes and honors.

Whether or not academic degrees signify little or much, whether they are of greater value or less, it is clear that they are sought for, and are likely to be in the future, and that they ought, therefore, to signify something. The something which they should signify is the having pursued with more or less fidelity and success those branches of study which are essential to liberal culture.

We do not observe that those who depreciate the meaning and worth of the degree of Bachelor of Arts are any the less anxious or determined that the courses of study which they would substitute shall entitle to this degree, nor are they less affluent in inventing a variety of subordinate and special degrees for briefer and less comprehensive courses of study. The two letters B. A. are certainly as significant as B. S., D. S., Ph. B., C. E., M. E., if they are not as valuable.

A strong pressure is just now applied to induce the colleges to abandon both the theory and the practice of insisting on a prescribed course of study. Some are very urgent that students should be freely admitted to the instructions of the college in any single branch, provided they are qualified to receive such instruction, even though they may be unable or disinclined to pursue the other studies that are required for a degree. Others insist that no course of study should be prescribed as the condition for any academic honor, but that instruction should be freely dispensed to all who are qualified to appropriate it; examinations being held as a test of progress and acquisition in the departments selected. Others contend that several parallel courses of study should be assigned, at the completion of any of which the student should receive the same or a different degree. Others propose that the course should in part be prescribed and in part be elective, so that within the limits assigned the pupil may freely select the studies which may please him best, and on passing his examinations shall receive the common degree.

It is contended by the advocates of these several propositions that in these ways we can exalt the college into a university and invest it with the dignity, the privileges, and; above all, with the freedom, which are supposed to belong to an institution with the more high sounding name. All these projects do indeed propose to attach to the college some of the features which properly belong to the university, viz. : freedom of election, the gratification of special preferences and tastes, real or supposed, and a direct preparation for the student's contemplated profession or business in life. But they all fail to provide or require the feature which gives the university its dignity or invests its name with special honor, and that is a *thorough discipline previously undergone and a liberal culture already attained*, which are indispensable before the student is fit to exercise the freedom, to use the selection or appreciate the instructions which belong to the university. A university consisting of uncultured and undisciplined youths whose conceit may be supposed to be in direct proportion to their ignorance, and whose self-confidence springs out of their lack of knowledge, is the less to be desired for the highest ends of a univer-

sity exactly in proportion to the amplitude of its endowments, the brilliancy and learning of its professors and the sanguine hopefulness of its numerous friends. Its theory is false and its fruits must be disappointing. It can only become what it calls itself when it shall have developed within itself a college or school of liberal arts which shall train fit pupils for its university classes, and when it shall have employed in its several schools the curriculum and methods which are suitable to each.

We grant that it may be desirable to establish institutions in the large cities and in the newer portions of our country, on the principle of teaching a little of everything which those students may wish to study whose elementary education is deficient and whose time of attendance on either liberal or professional studies must be short. A little knowledge and a little study to persons eager to learn may be of the greatest service. Large endowments, distinguished professors, ample museums and abundant apparatus may serve to quicken the intellects and to stimulate the zeal of the strong-minded and strong-hearted young men to whom poverty or early toil or misfortune have abridged the period of school and college culture. The colleges in the newer States, which have a small number of students in their regular course, have acted wisely and beneficently in allowing the attendance of irregular and optional pupils, so far as this did not interfere with the efficiency and prestige of the liberal curriculum. What we do not approve, is the dignifying of institutions of any kind by the name of universities, when they lack the one feature which gives to the university all its dignity and peculiar meaning, and that is the presence of a considerable body of students of liberal culture who are prepared by that culture to select some higher department of knowledge and to pursue it under the teachers of their choice, by free and independent methods of study. For example: The Michigan University has been more than once especially extolled as till recently the only real university in the United States, and no measured laudation has on this account been bestowed upon the institution and the enterprising State which endowed it. This has been done by gentlemen of eminent literary culture and of high position in older institutions. We have never been able to learn any reason for these

encomiums upon this institution, nor why it is *par éminence* a university in comparison with Harvard, except that while it furnishes a considerable number of well qualified professors in many departments of knowledge, the students are permitted to some extent to attend upon more or fewer of these courses at will, without the condition of previous training in the liberal arts, or even in the very department of knowledge upon which the professor gives instruction. But this feature, so far from elevating into a university what might have been a college, tends to degrade what might be a college into a preparatory school, and even to sink it to the level of those most superficial but most pretentious things called "business or commercial colleges," with the ineffable assurance and the contemptible performance of such peripatetic and short-lived organizations.

It ought, as it would seem, to be an axiom in education that, to successful instruction, the capacity of the school to receive, is as essential as the power of the instructor to give. Pupils capable of understanding and appropriating what is taught, are as necessary as instructors who are qualified to teach. Eminent professors may indeed astonish the beginner by the splendor of their generalizations, the boldness of their theories, the eloquence of their delivery or the perfection of their style. They may quicken and stimulate to industry and ardor. But unless their hearers or pupils are already educated to the capacity of understanding and appreciating their teachings, they must be content to be ranked with the brilliant sciolist and the splendid declaimer, even in the judgment of their scholastic audiences, and in the judgment of the public to rank as somewhat lower, or, perhaps, at best, to serve as imposing figure heads to badly trimmed and badly sailing vessels. Such men cannot but be useful indeed, for they will insensibly diffuse the spirit and impart the tone of a higher scholarship and culture to not a few of the raw and uncultured pupils who come within their reach. But the partial success of gifted and learned professors, in spite of the defective theory of the institutions with which they are connected, only serves the more strikingly to illustrate the essential defects of the system itself.

The modification of the college system which we shall next consider, is that which does not abandon a prescribed curriculum, but makes the college studies *largely elective*. This does not sacrifice the college to the university system. It rather combines the one with the other, by introducing some of the features of the university into the system of the college. It requires all the students to pursue a common course up to a certain period; at Harvard College, to the end of the Freshman year. After this a selection is allowed, till the end of the course, of any two or three of certain appointed studies, for about two-thirds of the time, the remaining third being devoted to certain studies pursued by the class in common. Prominent among the elective studies are the ancient languages and the mathematics, to the end of the course. The arguments urged in favor of this system are that while it requires all the students to master the elements of liberal knowledge, it does not require that any one study should be pursued to such an extreme as to weary those to whom it is distasteful, or to take the place of studies for which there is a marked predilection or special aptitude. It furnishes the opportunity to the student to make a selection with some reference to his future occupation or profession. It adopts the happy medium of insisting on the necessity of a common groundwork of preparation in disciplinary studies, and providing for each an election as the tastes and pursuits of the pupil may require. It satisfies the devotees of any special department of knowledge by allowing him to follow his favorite studies. It excites him by the emulation and sympathy of fellow students as eager to learn and as ready to labor as himself. It releases the instructor from the intolerable and disgusting drudgery of enforcing upon the unwilling and incompetent, tasks which they cannot or will not perform, and gratifies him with the pleasure of carrying a few enthusiastic pupils far beyond the elements of the language or science to which he himself is devoted. It tends to enthusiasm in study and is fitted to relieve the college system from the spirit of mechanical routine into which it is so apt to fall.

The objections to the scheme are many; some of them seem to us to be insuperable. They may be expressed briefly thus:

The collegiate course will be so seriously shortened and curtailed as to fail of its appropriate results ; the university course, which it is proposed to graft upon it, will be prematurely commenced, and, for that reason, cannot be really successful. College students, at the end of the Freshman year, are usually incapable of selecting between any two proposed studies or courses of study. They do not know themselves well enough to be able to decide in what they are best fitted to excel, nor even what will please them best. Their future occupation is ordinarily not so far determined as to deserve to be seriously considered. Their tastes are either unformed or capricious and prejudiced. If they are decided and strong, they often require correction. The study which is the farthest removed from that which strikes his fancy may be the study which is most needed for the student. The preferences are also likely to be fickle. The real but unanticipated difficulties which are revealed by trial will occasion discontent and vexation, or some new discovery concerning the value of a study that has been rejected, will lead to repining and discontent. So far as the studies presented for selection are disciplinary, the reasons for preferring one above another are not so decisive as to warrant any great liberty of election. So far as they are professional or practical, it is not desirable that these should be entered upon at so early period of the education. What might seem to be gained in proficiency or in time, is lost many times over in mental breadth and power by a neglect of the studies which are disciplinary and general. The student who begins the study of theology or law in his Sophomore or Junior year, or pursues a course of reading which has special relation to his future profession, in ninety out of a hundred instances becomes a greatly inferior theologian or lawyer in consequence, but does not appreciably abridge the time required for his professional preparation. By a similar rule, any very special attention to any one of the physical sciences in the way of severe scientific study or of time-consuming occupation, is almost certain to involve a loss in scientific acquisitions and eminence at the end of a very few years. The specialty or profession to which a student is to give the best energies and the exclusive devotion of his life, will occupy him soon enough at the latest

and will confine his powers as well as rule his tastes with its absorbing demands. All that he can spare from it in the way of energy, preferences and time, is, in a certain sense, so much gained to his mental breadth, and, therefore, to his final eminence. If it can be shown that there is any single course of study which is within the capacities of the majority of students who are properly prepared and who will use ordinary diligence; which includes no branch of knowledge with which any man of liberal knowledge ought not to be acquainted; and also that these branches are not prosecuted farther than is desirable for the ends of such culture; it follows that such a course of study should be prescribed in every college. This is especially true if it can also be shown that a prescribed course can be so modified as to attain many if not all the advantages which the elective course promises to achieve.

Other objections might be named, as that the introduction of elective studies tends to weaken the class feeling, which may be so efficient for intellectual incitement and culture, and to interfere with that common life which is so powerful in most of the American colleges. It must necessarily be complicated in its arrangements and operose in its working. It must also require greater energy than can be exacted of any single administrator who acts as the driving wheel of the class or the college; or greater united and conspiring activity in the heads of separate departments than can be presumed in ordinary institutions or under the conditions of our imperfect humanity. It may further be urged that the existence of a prescribed, rather than an elective curriculum in the preparatory or the professional school, was originally the result of circumstances and the product of experience. The same circumstances that compelled and the same experience which taught it at first, will, we believe, require that it be resumed as often as the attempt is made to abandon it in any institution which is designed for general culture. The inconveniences will be found to be so great and the advantages so inconsiderable—if, indeed, the disadvantages are not so manifold and overwhelming—as to compel a return to what is substantially a uniform and prescribed course. We have intimated that most of the advantages promised by the elective, may be secured by the

prescribed curriculum. It does not follow because the same branches of study are pursued that they must be prosecuted by all the students to the same extent or with the same thoroughness. A minimum of classical study may be allowed, while a maximum may be rewarded. A passable knowledge of the mathematics may be accepted, while a more thorough mastery of these branches may meet with encouragement and the more difficult problems need be assigned to but few. An arrangement or curriculum of *pass studies* prescribed for all, which shall be thorough and severe, is not incompatible with provision for *class or honor studies*, which shall be the conditions of academical prizes and distinctions. Private studies may also be provided for, to a limited extent, especially in those branches of literature, English or modern, which are the favorite and not severe occupation of many persons who are not inclined to the severer efforts required by philosophy or science. The division of classes into subordinate sections, according to attainment, provides for a varying adaptation to different tastes and capacities. Enthusiasm in study, the want of which is so much to be deplored, and the maintenance of a high intellectual tone, the presence of which is so greatly to be desired, can be obtained, we believe, as successfully under the prescribed as under the elective curriculum.

We have said that in almost every organized institution of education in the civilized world, whether liberal or professional, some curriculum of study is presented as the condition of receiving the honors of the institution, or of being admitted to public employment. The fact that several such courses are united in the same institution makes it to be a university, which is therefore properly conceived when it is styled a collection of schools of learning, in each of which certain studies are prescribed, certain terms must be kept, and certain examinations must be passed, before the pupil can receive the certificate or degree which they all contemplate. The fact that in some universities single courses of lectures may be attended by those who expect no certificate or degree, has caused the impression to prevail to some extent in this country, that these exceptions exemplify the rule of university life. Nothing can be more untrue. In the *German univer-*

sities, which constitute with many the *beau idéal* of what the American colleges ought to become, the great mass of the students attend the lectures which are necessary in order to qualify them to pass the examination which is required before they are admitted to their life career. It is true a few persons are admitted to the lectures who do not look forward to an examination, and who attend what lectures they please, but such are not members of the university, except they are from a foreign country. In the theory of university instruction and administration, there is no *option of studies*; the option is between several *instructors* in the same department of knowledge, and between a faithful and careless use of its opportunities.

Another point still more material to be considered, and one that is almost universally overlooked in this country, is, that in Germany the gymnasium is the counterpart of the American college. The proposal in America, that the colleges should become universities, is equivalent to the proposal in Germany that the gymnasia should be transformed into universities, that is, that the instruction now given in two or three advanced classes of the gymnasium should be omitted in whole or in part, in order that the student might be admitted at once to professional or scientific study. Such a proposition in Germany would be received with derision. We observe, in passing, that as the gymnasium answers to the American college, so the *Realschule* correspond to the scientific school with us, or, rather, to the scientific school as it was originally conceived in this country, for the form which these schools are now taking, e. g. the Sheffield School and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, bring them somewhat nearer to the gymnasium. But even when the curriculum of these schools shall be extended to four years, and Latin shall be insisted on as a preliminary study, they will scarcely rise higher in their programme than do the real schools of Germany. These schools, in Germany, prepare for business or practical life only. To a matriculation and full membership in the university, and to a certificate or degree founded upon an attendance on the lectures in physics, the old-fashioned classical course of the gymnasium is the indispensable prerequisite.

It is so because the university professes to teach Science and not Technology, and to scientific knowledge in the eminent sense, an antecedent preparation of liberal culture is thought to be necessary. Those among us who, like the author of the articles upon "The New Education," in "The Atlantic Monthly" for February and March of the current year, propose so to perfect the schools of Science as to combine most of the disciplinary and liberal culture of the college with a special adaptation to practical and business life, have our best wishes for success in their enterprise. They certainly will succeed in one thing, and that is, in delivering these schools from the hands of those educational charlatans, who believe in nothing but a "Practical Education." Those Americans who plead the German universities as models for our colleges, could not, however, avail themselves of a more unfortunate source whence to derive their tirades against classical study or a prescribed curriculum. They have one feature only which can be thus applied; the student is not held to so strict account as in our colleges for his attendance upon lectures or for the use of his time. The principal motives which hold him to his duty are the love of study, and the desire for reputation, which are actively stimulated by a public sentiment such as is found in no other country, and last, not least, by the ultimate connection between fidelity in study and his future subsistence, which is so sensitively felt in a country in which the avenues to a decent living are choked by crowds of struggling competitors, and are guarded by numerous artificial barriers. But notwithstanding these stimulants to labor, the success of the German university system is not so remarkable as to justify the confident inferences which are urged by its American encomiasts when they argue that the American college system can only be redeemed by modeling it after its practice. The utmost that Matthew Arnold dare assert to its advantage, is the following: "There are, of course, many idlers; the proportion of students in a German university who really work, I have heard estimated at one-third; certainly it is larger than in the English universities." (p. 229.) Mark Pattison asserts of the students at Oxford, that seventy per cent are "idle, incorrigibly idle." If these estimates are correct, we are confident

that defective as are the operation and results of the American colleges, none of them will present so scanty a proportion of earnest and successful workers as do the English and German universities, while our professional and advanced schools, which should more properly be compared with these, would make a much better showing. We speak not of actual attainments but only of the spirit of labor. How ruinous and demoralizing it would be to allow to the students of the American colleges the freedom and irresponsibility of the German university, a freedom which would not for a moment be thought of in the gymnasium, needs scarcely a moment's thought. Even if the grade of the students in the university and the college were the same, the circumstances of the two countries are so diverse as to exclude all inferences from the one to the other. The influence of a learned class is with us comparatively feeble. The pecuniary prizes offered directly to scholastic attainment are far from being tempting. The road is nearly as direct and open to the professions from the log-cabin as from the university. To political success it is quite as free and as crowded from the one starting-point as it is from the other. The colleges and schools have nothing of the value in the eye of the government in America, which the university has in the view of the government in Germany. All the patronage with respect to the more important civil offices, flows in a stream exclusively through the literary institutions, and is determined by the examinations held by the civil authorities. These, and manifold other circumstances, explain the energy and zeal with which science is pursued in the German gymnasia and the German universities. Were their system very diverse from our own, success with them would be no warrant for success with us. But inasmuch as their system is substantially the same with our own in respect to a prescribed course of study, it may confirm us in the purpose not hastily to abandon a feature which has been almost universally accepted, wherever literary institutions have been instructed by the wisdom, or have stood the test of time.

Another marked peculiarity of the American colleges is the frequent examinations of the students, or *the recitations*, as they are called. This feature is almost unknown in the

English universities.* In the German gymnasia it is rigidly maintained, modified, indeed, by the German method of giving instruction. In the German universities these frequent examinations are altogether unknown. After the student has passed through the final examination in the gymnasium, which answers to our Bachelor's degree, he is free of all intermeddling except the stern arbitrament which awaits him from the government officials who give him his passport to place and position in life, or the more trying one from the *Senatus Academicus* which shall promote him to a Doctor's hat. In the Scotch universities the examinations are more or less frequent, according to the subject matter, but the instruction is given in large measure by lectures and the final examinations are conducted by the representatives of the professions for license to practice in the guild or the church. In the Queen's Colleges and the London University there are examinations for degrees and honors, and more or less frequent examinations to ascertain the proficiency and to stimulate the activity of the student. The German gymnasium and the American college insist on these very frequent daily examinations or recitations. Instruction is not excluded from these exercises. It is imparted more or less freely according to the knowledge and skill of the instructor and the receptivity of his pupils, but the prominent feature is the examination of the student's private work for the purpose of holding him to his daily duties by a constant and even pressure of responsibility, and of noticing and measuring his attainments under the watchful eye of his tutor and the not uninterested inspection of his fellows. For the sake of making this responsibility more effective and just, the practice has been introduced into many colleges of recording the work of every recitation by a mark according to a numerical scale. These daily examinations are, in most of the colleges, supplemented by examinations at the end of every term and of every year, and in some by a final examination upon the whole of the course, for the Bachelor's degree. In some col-

* The examinations are occasional in the colleges for standing and prizes, say two or three times a year, and more rarely in the university at "the Senate House," or in "the Schools" for university degrees and the great rewards that bring fellowships and livings.

leges the examinations at the end of one or of two years, serve, so far, as the final trial for the degree.

In connection with these recitations from a text-book, lectures are given in greater or less number—i. e. oral expositions and enforcements of facts or truths—with experiments in the case of the physical sciences, and other illustrations in history, literature, and philosophy. Upon these lectures examinations are usually held. In a few of the colleges, instruction is given very largely by lectures, and great reliance is placed upon the examinations held upon the lectures heard, in comparison with recitations from text books. In others, text-books are made the chief instruments or occasions of oral instruction. The methods of conducting these recitations vary very greatly in different institutions, according to the traditions of the college, the number of the students, the knowledge and skill, the fidelity and affableness of the instructors.

It is, of course, implied, and ought here to be noticed, that attendance upon these recitations and lectures is required, and that in some colleges the custom has been introduced of also exacting that the lesson should be recited privately in every case in which an absence has been excused, certain exceptions being allowed for long illness, and other reasons. If the absence is not excused or the lesson is not recited, the student suffers in his standing.

We have named all these features together, because they are features of a common system and because each one of them has been of late much discussed. They do not necessarily go together, but they are all special applications of a common principle of college administration, viz., the principle of frequent and enforced examinations. The principle itself we are prepared to defend as essential to the successful administration of the American college, and indeed to all thorough education in such a country as ours. The special modes of applying and enforcing it are all the fruits of experience, and are not only capable of being vindicated as defensible, but may be recommended as important improvements. We will consider these features in order.

We notice, first of all, the relative advantages and disadvantages of giving instruction by *text-books and lectures*.

This point has been very earnestly discussed in this country. Not a few contend that the only method of instruction which is becoming the dignity of a scholar, is instruction by lectures. For an eminent philologist or scientist to do anything but give prelections upon his science, is represented as a profound degradation. It is held by many that the college, if it aims to be a university, should furnish instruction in no other form, and leave the students to be attracted and held to the lecture-room by the ability, reputation, or eloquence of the professor; subject only to occasional examinations upon the knowledge which they have acquired, and their fitness to enter into certain employments. These views have been propounded in this country for the past thirty years with great earnestness and zeal. Scarcely a day elapses in which some writer in a newspaper or journal does not take up and repeat the refrain. Inasmuch as lectures upon certain branches of physics seem to be required in order to exhibit experiments by apparatus, the professors of these branches and their friends are foremost in insisting that oral exposition by lecture is the only method of teaching which ought to be required by the institution or submitted to by the professor. In some institutions in this country, as formerly in the University of Virginia, it was used very generally in all departments of knowledge. This is the only method practiced in the German universities with some very limited exceptions. In the great English universities it is used but little, and meets with scanty favor. In the Scotch universities it is largely used, as it is also in the Queen's Colleges, and we believe in the branches of the London University.

Instruction by lectures is the most attractive to the teacher, especially if he consults his private ease, comfort, and reputation more than he considers his usefulness or effectiveness as a teacher, or the real interests of the institution which he serves. This is especially true if the professor is required to give one or two courses of some thirty or fifty hours a year, and if with the preparation and delivery of these lectures his responsibility begins and ends. Even when he lectures an hour every day, or even more frequently, it is an immense relief to know that he has no concern with the progress and fidelity of the

students, except to give them sound and methodical teaching. Lecturing is especially attractive when a man can be appointed to a special lectureship in one or more universities, and receive a handsome stipend for reading ten or twenty prelections upon a subject to which he is supposed to have given special attention. A Professorship limited to such duties is, moreover, a very convenient endowment for the devotee of any special department of knowledge; giving him position in connection with an influential and learned community, a limited excitement in the obligation to deliver a few lectures yearly, which may sustain his reputation and make public his discoveries, and leisure for private studies, for the enlargement of science, and the honor of the university. But however attractive this method of instruction may be, in its relations to the dignity, the ease, the irresponsibility or the pockets of the instructor, or even to the enlargement and defense of science, it is not the most profitable to the pupil unless he is far advanced in knowledge, and is animated with an ardent zeal for learning. Even then it has only a limited usefulness and should never be exclusively employed. Its advantages, when used within proper limits, are the following: The instruction is given from a living man, with the interest and excitement which personal presence and oral communication possess above the written page. The accessories of an audience composed of others intent upon the same themes, and moved by the same activities of thought and feeling, are not inconsiderable. The methodizing agency of an able thinker in recasting and representing acknowledged principles and received facts in such relations as are peculiar to himself, with especial reference to the known wants of his hearers, to current objections, to prevailing controversies, and to popular literature or passing events, whether public or private, is of the greatest importance. The Professor has been constituted, and accepted by his class as their teacher, and communications from him are received with a deference and trust which are accorded to no other person. It is often difficult, sometimes it is impossible, for him to find a manual or text-book which accords with his opinions or method. For this reason, even if he uses a text-book, he must lecture more or less in order to supply its defi-

ciencies or rearrange its method. Even when he relies chiefly upon a text-book and recitations, lectures may be required to present matter which can only be gathered from many authorities, which the student is incapable of looking up and arranging for himself, but which, when presented in connection with the author recited, invests the study of the subject with a heightened interest, and impresses its truths more firmly upon the memory. A brief course of lectures is often of the greatest importance as a means of gathering together what has been read or studied, of restating it in a compact and intelligible method, and impressing it more firmly upon the memory. Lectures, also, help to reveal the individual peculiarities of the Professor's intellect and heart more fully, and in more particulars, than his occasional comments upon the authors which are recited, because the discussions can be more complete and exhaustive. They are of especial importance in case the teacher has made important discoveries, or seized upon important truths, or invented a new method, or completed a peculiar system. The necessity and usefulness of lectures for these and other ends, will, however, vary very considerably with different studies and departments. Instruction in the Mathematics and in the Classics, with the exception of special topics of History and Antiquities, can be most advantageously given in connection with a text-book upon which the Professor comments and the pupil is examined.

The objections to an exclusive reliance upon lectures for instruction in any department of college teaching are manifold. The pupil receives by the ear and not by the eye. The eye can re-peruse what it sees and can reflect upon its import. The ear must hear it a second time, either as repeated, or as given in varied phraseology, and made obvious and palpable by copious illustrations. Hence the lecturer must necessarily be slow, tedious or diffuse, repetitious or superficial. Hence if a pupil relies upon a lecturer for all the knowledge which he acquires, his acquisitions will be scanty and imperfectly grounded, even if he employs his own thinking in revising and recasting what he has heard. A remembered lecture is vastly inferior to a thoroughly mastered book, because the book will ordinarily be more condensed and scientific than the lecture, or, if not,

more of it will be retained and placed methodically at the service of the learner. The reason why lectures are especially adapted to students who have read and mastered many books, is that the teacher in such cases may revise and recast the knowledge that they have acquired, or, it need be, supply what is wanting or confute what is erroneous, and have an audience intelligent and appreciative by reason of their previously acquired knowledge.

Not only can the pupil gain less positive knowledge and fewer thoughts than from an hour's reading, and for this reason receive from it less advantage, but he will acquire this knowledge in a manner which will less vigorously exercise and discipline his powers. The fact that the acquisition by the lecture is the most pleasant, may indicate that the attitude of the pupil is passive and receptive rather than active and recreative. The stimulus and aid furnished by the presence and voice of the teacher may be at the expense of the self-exciting and self-controlling activity of the learner. Attendance upon lectures is exhaustive of the body and the mind, and it is especially injurious to both the taste and the power for close and effective private study. If the chief reliance is placed upon lectures, five or six hours of close attention will constitute sufficient labor for the day, and the remainder of the time of the pupil must be given to studying his notes for retention or examination. The consequence will be that very little reading will be accomplished and the student will become the passive recipient of the doctrines and opinions of his teachers, and hence, even under the ablest and most various instruction, narrow in his range of knowledge and of thought, if not the passionate and bigoted adherent of a single school, with few resources and a feebler inclination to correct his defects.

For the more advanced students of a college, and even for the students of professional schools, instruction by lecturing should be sparingly applied. It should never supersede the independent reading of the student nor the task-work of individual acquisition and thought. For pupils who are less advanced it should be employed very rarely, and only for the purpose of rousing the attention, stimulating the zeal and gathering into brief and comprehensive statements the most general

views of the topic or author which is studied. The chief occupation of such students should be to commit to memory, and to master by thought, the words and principles which the text-books present for study. The use of a text-book is, however, in no sense degrading to the instructor, nor does it preclude him from giving instruction in the amplest variety and the most effective manner. The teacher is not necessarily degraded to the position of a mere examiner of his pupils' work or a hearer of recitations. On the contrary, he enjoys special advantages for the most effective teaching, viz., teaching by the Socratic method. The defects of his author in statement or in method may even be the convenient occasion and foil to set off his own better phrased definitions or his neater methods. The felicitous or defective performance of his pupil may excite the instructor to draw forth the vindication or the correction of his work by well adapted questionings. Instruction given in this way is more concrete and lively than the more general and abstract expositions of the lecture-room. To comment upon an author may task the powers and display the genius of the most gifted teacher as effectively and variously as to utter his own lucubrations. Indeed the brief foot notes of a learned commentator upon a printed text are often as valuable as the learned dissertations which he presents in an appendix. Instruction by this method has also the very great advantage of bringing the teacher into a close and individual contact with his pupil, of giving him a personal knowledge of his powers and his defects, and sometimes of awakening a humane and friendly interest in his progress. The familiar questionings of the class-room open and invite the way to familiar intercourse and acquaintance in private. They tend to bring both pupil and teacher into the relations of confidence and friendship, and thus to make real the ideal of friendly guidance on the one hand and of grateful docility on the other.

We dwell upon this point at greater length, for the reason that the opinion has extensively prevailed in this country, and is countenanced by manifold influences, that the American colleges can never rise to their proper position until they are manned by a large number of eminent professors, to each of whom shall be assigned a lecture-room for instruction, and

whose sole function shall be to read or expound the results of his individual researches. If examinations are to be enforced, it is held that even these should be conducted by assistants or tutors, but from all duties of this sort which involve a close personal knowledge of and interest in the progress of the individual pupil the professor should seek to be excused, as inconsistent with his position and interfering with his own studies. No heresy seems to us more dangerous than this. No disaster could be more serious than for college instructors or college guardians to cherish such ideals as this of what is desirable for the college or attainable by a professor. All tendencies in this direction should be discouraged as injurious to the welfare of these most important institutions by weakening their efficiency, and as inconsistent with efficient teaching and thorough acquisition.

If a man desires to be a professor in an American college he desires a good work, but he ought to have just conceptions of the nature of the work which he desires. His official business is to educate the young, i. e. it is to teach and to train. This is the work for which the college exists, and in carrying forward which all its instructors, the professor included, are appointed. It is true, that in order to teach he must himself know, and in order to make progress in knowledge, he must himself continue to study and learn. In order to continue to learn he must also have leisure and opportunities. For these reasons he should not be overworked in teaching; he should not be employed so many hours in instruction as to be unable to study with freshness and success, nor, we may add, should he be so distracted with cares by reason of insufficient pay, or so worn with other labors required by the necessity of earning his living, as to have little strength either for study or instruction. But it should never be forgotten that his post is one of duty to his pupils as an instructor. The American college is not designed primarily to promote the cause of science by endowing posts in which men of learning and science may prosecute their researches, but to secure successful instruction for our youth. In securing the last object, it incidentally promotes the first, and cannot do otherwise, but its aims should be primarily and distinctly directed to effective instruction as

the chief end of its existence. It may be desirable, under certain circumstances, to connect with a college special lecturerships to be occupied by distinguished scholars whose duties should be limited. We will not discuss this question here, but would only remark in passing that, whatever the functions of such lecturers may be, they are very subordinate and inconsiderable, compared with those of the instructors who have the charge of classes as their regular employment and devote themselves to the business of education as their principal occupation.

We return to our subject. We assert that it is not only undesirable that our colleges should very largely give instruction by lectures, but that, on the other hand, our more advanced schools of knowledge, both professional and general, would gain in thoroughness and efficiency if they combined with lecturing thorough courses of reading. Nothing is more unsatisfactory in the judgment of one who sees beneath the surface, than the superficial habits and the narrow culture which are contracted by the students of those professional schools in which the instruction is given chiefly by lectures. We observe hopeful tendencies in these schools toward reform in this very particular, notwithstanding the prevalence of the notion in our speech-making and speech-admiring country that the millennium of colleges will never come till they are advanced to universities, and that to the conception of a university the essential elements are a library, museums, a suite of lecture rooms with a professor in every chair, and classes of persons with pens and paper who pay their fees with regularity and promptness!

But here we shall be met with the familiar inquiries and objections, how is it with the German Universities? Is not their practice directly opposed to your theory? Is not the instruction in these universities given almost exclusively by lectures? Where in all the world is instruction more valuable or received by a larger number of appreciative and zealous hearers? To this we reply, the German universities, as has already been said, presuppose the gymnasia. In the education which they give, both as to matter and form, they adapt themselves to students who have been trained, in these lower institutions, to the power to understand, to assimilate and delight in, the lectures

which the university gives. Take away the gymnasia and the hearers who have been trained by their peculiar method, and the university lecturers would either become unintelligible or else unprofitable by reason of the incapacity or inadequate culture of their hearers. The hearers of the university lectures are also stimulated to attention and zeal by manifold influences which either do not exist or act but feebly in this country. Nor is it true, as is often represented, that the majority of the hearers of these lectures are either enthusiastic or eminently successful devotees of knowledge. The enthusiasm of a few, upon subjects which excite in this country the ardor of only here and there a solitary devotee, is indeed most noticeable, but this is not in the least to be ascribed to the fact that the instruction is given by lectures. This enthusiasm is more frequent and more fervent, as not a few attendants upon the universities have had occasion to notice, at those exercises in which the instruction is given more nearly after the English and American methods. A large number of the students are negligent and idle, though they have been trained by the rigid and persistent discipline of the gymnasia, and though they are stimulated to effort by the manifold excitements of German society,—a larger number than in the American colleges; notwithstanding the prevalent impression in this country to the contrary. Last of all, the judgment of many of the most intelligent professors and educators in Germany itself is in favor of modifying the lecture system by introducing instruction by recitations to a large extent. The only insuperable obstacle which these opinions encounter is the indolence and indisposition of the professors themselves, who greatly prefer a system which relieves them of the drudgery and petty details which the other method seems to involve.

The authority of the example of the great English universities is decidedly against instruction by lectures. The few lecturers who are provided are little esteemed and scantily attended on. Now and then a brilliant and able professor attracts a few scores of admiring listeners, but the educating influence of his instructions is very inconsiderable. Of late a reforming party has sprung up within and without the universities, who argue from the eminent scholarship and the scientific zeal

which prevails in the German universities, that if a system similar to theirs were introduced in England it would be followed by similar zeal and proficiency. In these judgments they overlook or underestimate the very admirable results which the English method, objectionable and deficient as it is in the particulars complained of, has effected in the manhood and power of the multitudes of its reading men. They also entirely leave out of view the difference in the structure of English and German society and in the motives which in the two countries stimulate to intellectual activity, as well as determine the directions in which this activity shall be employed.

Leaving the question between lectures and recitations, we proceed to another point; the *frequency* of the recitations and the manner in which fidelity should be enforced. Should these exercises be frequent or only occasional? Should the acquisitions and diligence of the pupil be estimated daily, or oftener; or should this be done only at what are technically called examinations, at longer or shorter intervals? We call the attention of our readers to the fact that examinations are required under almost every system and in institutions of all kinds, in the English and German universities, the American colleges, and in most professional and scientific schools. The only difference of opinion concerns the question whether these examinations shall be held rarely and for the single purpose of testing the permanent acquisitions of the student, or whether in addition to such examinations, others shall be held, and very frequently, for the joint purpose of giving instruction and of testing the student's diligence and progress. It should also be noticed that, in all institutions, marks or their equivalents are employed at what are technically called examinations, and that the only difference of opinion relates to the question whether they shall be also employed in what are technically called recitations. In the English universities the private tutor, or *coach*, hears the pupil recite his classics and his mathematics, but he does this simply to prepare him for his examination, whether this be a class or a pass examination. He hears him recite while he works with him—oftener while he works at him—for the purpose of correcting his errors, of inculcating what he needs to notice and remember, and above

all, that he may quicken and strengthen his capacity to retain and recall what he learns. In the great schools of England the practice of daily recitations is as abundantly insisted on as it is in the American schools and colleges; the manner of conducting them being determined by the kind of work which the pupil is required to furnish. In the German gymnasias the pupils perform more of their studying in the presence and by the aid of the teacher than with us. Dictations are abundant, which the pupil records as they fall from the lips of the instructor. Passages in the classics are read and commented on by the teacher; the principles and examples in mathematics are expounded and explained before the classes. The five hours of attendance are indeed more conspicuously hours of instruction and of acquisition, of joint and excited labor on the part of instructor and pupil, than they are in the English public schools and in the American colleges. But the pupil also recites, and his task ordinarily is not complete without a great deal of work out of school, the results of which he brings up for the satisfaction of the teacher. Whatever is set as a task or has been communicated in the class-room is reproduced by the scholar and may be called for at any time.

In the American colleges the practice has till recently been uniform. Very frequent recitations have been required and the performance of the student at every one of these exercises has been estimated in determining his scholarship, whether or not an entry was made by marks. Formerly the examinations were more hurried and superficial than they should have been. They were usually *viva voce*; written answers from a series of questions being comparatively unknown. Of late, marks have been introduced at the daily as well as at the occasional examinations, and the occasional examinations have been far more formal and thorough. Indeed in respect of form and thoroughness, though not in respect of quality or quantity of matter, these occasional examinations, both written and *viva voce*, in the best colleges, will compare very favorably with those of such institutions as make occasional examinations the only tests of scholarship and the only grounds for honors. Moreover, till of late the minute attention and the constant pressure applied in the regular recitations, in the form of marks or

otherwise, have been intensified in the same degree with the increased breadth and pressure employed in the occasional examinations.

Some tendencies to change have, however, of late been manifest. In one college a great excitement was recently occasioned by the application of marks to recitations evaded by unexcused absence. In connection with this the custom of using marks at all has been complained of as degrading to the manly spirit of the pupils, and this complaint has been re-echoed in not a few of the public journals. The proposal has, in some quarters, almost assumed the form of a demand that marking should be abandoned as savoring too much of the discipline which is fitted for school-boys, and as therefore unsuited to young men at college. Other objections have been urged, as that it tends to foster the spirit of servile and superficial study, and that it promotes cramming for the recitation immediately impending, as well as brings constantly before the student an immediate gain or loss, one of which he will snatch at and the other he will evade by stealthy and superficial practices, to the damage of his intellectual and personal integrity. It is objected, moreover, that the attention of the instructor is divided and distracted between the work of instruction and of adjusting the measure of the attainments of his pupils. For these and other reasons it has been proposed to abandon marking at recitations and even marking for attendance, and to hold somewhat frequent examinations, say whenever an author has been read, or any special topic in science or literature has been finished, which examinations shall be the sole ground of judging of the attainments of the pupil and his claims to honors. In favor of this arrangement it is asserted that the student will study his author and his subject more thoroughly because he will study, not in parts, but as a whole,—that, being thrown somewhat more on his own responsibility, he will study with more manly purposes and a more direct regard to his own self-improvement. It is claimed, as a chief advantage, that he will “cram” his intellectual nutriment less and digest it more perfectly.

It may be said, on the other hand, that all these advantages may be secured without abandoning the most stringent enforce-

ment of the daily recitations. Examinations may be multiplied as is proposed, and to any extent, for the purpose of giving the pupil a general view of and command over an author and a subject, and great comparative importance may be attached to such reviews and the student's performances, in the estimate of his scholarship. But the advantages of frequent reviews of this kind need not be purchased by the sacrifice of the advantages which are peculiar to the daily recitations, at which the presence of the pupil is enforced, and his performances are marked. The claim that the substitution of the one for the other as a measure of scholarship would exclude or discourage "cramming," is, in our view, not only wholly untenable, but it suggests the most serious objection against such examinations, when made the sole criterion, that they eminently foster the cramming spirit. Indeed, we hesitate not to affirm that nothing can intensify this spirit so actively as the introduction of such examinations as a *substitute* for daily enforced recitations. In any school, college, or university, let a single day of the week or the month be devoted to a review and examination upon the work of the week or the month; and let this be accepted as the chief or only test of that work, and the day or two preceding will inevitably be devoted to the most energetic cramming. The first part of the week or month will, by the less faithful and conscientious, be wasted or expended on favorite pursuits, and the work that should have been distributed evenly among the several days will be crowded into one or two. Even the more studious and ambitious will be more careless of their daily studies and of course less qualified to appreciate and assimilate the instruction which is given, and will rely upon their capacity to apply their concentrated energies upon the reviews. If it be said that the daily recitations involve a daily cram, we can only reply that a daily cram is less objectionable than a weekly or monthly cram, inasmuch as the quantity taken is smaller and the unnatural strain of the powers is less severe. Moreover the daily so-called cram renders the strain at the end of the week or month less severe. Indeed it makes the labor less a labor of cramming at all. Superficial, indolent, and unfaithful men

will abuse any system, and hence the only question worth considering is, which system grants facilities for the least abuse.

To dispense with the enforced recitation, moreover, would be to throw away one of the chief incidental advantages attained by college discipline, apart from the special culture which it imparts, and that is the training of the man to the power and habit of successfully concentrating and controlling his powers. This discipline trains a man to bring his powers to act with their utmost energy, within a given time, to meet an impending necessity. To be able to do this under the varying calls of life with effect, is one great secret of success in any occupation or pursuit. To be able to do this in the greatest diversity of circumstances and exigencies, gives a man the widest and most varied influence. R. W. Emerson says very finely in his "Conduct of Life," that of the conditions of success "the first is the stopping off decisively our miscellaneous activity, and concentrating our force on one or a few points; as the gardener, by severe pruning, forces the sap of the tree into one or two vigorous limbs, instead of suffering it to spindle into a sheaf of twigs." "The one prudence in life is concentration; the one evil is dissipation; and it makes no difference whether our dissipations are coarse or fine; property and its cares, friends, and a social habit, or politics, or music, or feasting. Everything is good which takes away one plaything and delusion more, and drives us home to add one stroke of faithful work." "Concentration is the secret of strength in politics, in war, in trade, in short, in all management of human affairs. One of the high anecdotes of the world is the reply of Newton to the inquiry, 'how he had been able to achieve his discoveries?'—'By always intending my mind.'" "A man who has that presence of mind which can bring to him on the instant all he knows, is worth for action a dozen men who know as much, but can only bring it to light slowly." The constantly enforced recitations of the college, following each other day after day, and more than once in the day, made important as the conditions of success and honor, and continued for several years, are an admirable discipline to this self-control and self mastery. They hold a man to his work by a pressure that he cannot evade. They train him to bring his

powers to act upon a task that must be achieved within the hour. They help him to despise slight indispositions, whether of body or of mind, to set aside inertia and headaches, to turn from the novel and the newspaper, the gymnasium and the rowing match, in order to meet the demands of the teacher and the class room. If this is not the way *to treat the pupil as a man*, it is the way *to make him a man*,—with a man's command over his intellect, and a man's capacity to summon and direct his energies at will, and to energize them up to the demand of every occasion. It is because of this very result that the English university system has done so much for its reading men, and made out of them the mature, self-poised, efficient men of action; and when the occasion required, men of effective speech. Notwithstanding all the evils of excessive cramming, increased as they are by the enormous pecuniary value of the prizes in prospect, notwithstanding, too, the one-sidedness of the curriculum prescribed, the training, simply as training, of these universities, has done more for England and more for the world than has ever yet been acknowledged. It has hardened the bone to a compacter grain, and toughened the muscle to a finer fibre than any other, simply because it has aroused and concentrated the energies for the accomplishment of definite tasks, and because, after the training of its champions was complete, the empire of England has furnished for them an arena in diplomacy, in commerce, in politics, and at the bar, which was fitted still further to excite and to display these most consummate powers. However justly we may criticise or complain of the universities of England for doing so little for science, or philosophy, or even for the best kind of philology, we ought never to overlook what they have done for the training of the men who have wrought the deeds, and uttered the thoughts, and inspired the sentiments that have made England so great. But while the universities have so efficiently trained their honor or class-men, it is the universal testimony, that the pass-men have been as grossly neglected. And why? Chiefly because they are not held to the responsibility of *daily work under the pressure of a constantly impending necessity*. We cannot imitate their class system in this country, because we have no such prizes as they possess by

which to enforce and stimulate labor. The university of Oxford distributes yearly in scholarships, fellowships, etc., the sum of 120,000 pounds sterling, the hope of sharing in which, excites some four or five hundred reading men. It may be safe to dispense with daily examinations when the hope of such rewards constantly inspires and impels to labor. Their failure to influence the pass-men to constant industry, and often even to the appearance or profession of such industry, should warn the American colleges against any similar relaxation in the tension of the feeble incitements which they can apply.

The German system has also prizes in the civil and professional appointments, which are determined by the result of every examination from the beginning of the gymnasial to the end of the university life, and which are most powerfully reinforced by the intense and prevailing intellectual activity of the cultivated classes. But the German system fails effectively to reach the lower two-thirds of the university men, notwithstanding all that the rigid and compulsory training of the gymnasium has previously done for them.

As to the objection or the sentiment on which it is founded, that to labor under compulsion or for marks is degrading to the manhood of the pupil; neither seem to us to require consideration or discussion. The constraint is moral, and is of precisely the same character which meets a man all his life long. It is only made more definite and efficient in the college. It neither excludes nor weakens the nobler motives of self-culture and of duty, the motives derived from the love of learning, or from a desire to be useful to man and to do honor to God. Marks for what a man is and does are everywhere noted for or against him, with more or less justice, as long as he lives, and for all his efforts, in the judgments of his fellows, and, as we are taught, even in the books of the Eternal Judge.

We object, then, most strenuously to the substitution of the occasional examination for the daily recitation, because wherever it has been used it has failed even under the most advantageous circumstances; because it can be applied in the American colleges with a comparatively feeble efficiency; and because the stimulus and training involved in constant and re-

quired intellectual application, is more needed and is less valued in this country than in any other. A few self-educated men reach the same results on similar conditions in different circumstances, as the lamented Lincoln forced himself to master Euclid's geometry, and learned in that way to master his own intellectual powers. But the great mass of our ruling minds, and among them a considerable number of college graduates, are shrewd and quick-witted, rather than reflective and self-directing—men of intense intellectual activity and exalted self-confidence, rather than patient and scrutinizing seekers after truth, and, worst of all, men of little reverence for truth and small confidence in principles.

If there is any country where the sobering and disciplining influence of a vigorous but enlightened training from books is needed, or where it is fitted to be most efficient, it is in a country like this. If there is any country where those who themselves have had experience of the benefits of college discipline, and have seen its power over their fellows, and to whom, withal, is entrusted the direction of the discipline and instruction of wealthy and influential seats of learning, should be slow in relaxing the efficiency of its forces, it is the country in which presumptuous demagogues, both lay and clerical, editorial and speech-making, cry one thing one day and another thing the next, and where quacks in education, religion, and politics of every variety and degree find a ready hearing and devoted partisans.

A continued residence at college, or *keeping one's terms*, has been esteemed important in all the American colleges. Such residence has ordinarily been required as a condition for the first degree. The practice of shortening the course by over-leaping a year or a term, or of presenting one's self for examination at any time, has not been allowed, on the general theory that no person, unless in very extraordinary circumstances, can perform the work of two years or of two terms in one, and therefore no one should be admitted to examination in advance of his standing. This practice and the theory on which it is founded, are called in question by some, and the doctrine is advanced and occasionally put in practice, that residence and class standing should both be disregarded, pro-

vided the pupil can pass the prescribed examinations. So much prominence has of late been attached to competitive examinations all the world over, that the importance of residence and continued study has been somewhat overlooked, and it would not be surprising if the practice should be recommended and introduced in some colleges of ceasing to require continued or regular residence, and of throwing open the examinations for degrees,—possibly for honors,—to all well-accredited applicants.

We do not propose to argue the subject of residence at length. It will come up again in another connection. We will content ourselves by citing the following testimony of Matthew Arnold, in respect to the German practice :

“ A public school boy, who, to evade the rule requiring two years in *prima*, leaves the gymnasium from *secunda*, goes to a private school or private tutor, and offers himself for examination within two years, needs a special permission from the minister in order to be examined. So well do the Prussian authorities know how insufficient an instrument for their object—that of promoting the national culture and filling the professions with fit men,—is the bare examination test ; so averse are they to cram ; so clearly do they perceive that what forms a youth, and what he should in all ways be induced to acquire, is the orderly development of his faculties under good and trained teaching.

“ With this view all the instructions for examination are drawn up. It is to tempt candidates to no special preparation and effort, but to such as a scholar of fair ability and proper diligence, may, at the end of his school course, come to with a quiet mind and without a painful preparatory effort tending to relaxation and torpor as soon as the effort is over. The total cultivation (*Gesamtbildung*) of the candidate is the great matter, and this is why the two years of *prima* are prescribed, ‘ that the instruction in this highest class may not degenerate into a preparation for the examination, that the pupil may have the requisite time to come steadily and without overhurrying to the fullness of the measure of his powers and his character ; that he may be securely and thoroughly formed, instead of being bewildered and oppressed by a mass

of information hastily heaped together.' All *tumultuarische Vorbereitung*, and all stimulation of vanity and emulation is to be discouraged, and the examination, like the school, is to regard *das Wesentliche und Dauernde*—the substantial and enduring. *Perverse studet qui examinibus studet*, was a favorite saying of Wolf's." (*Schools and Universities, etc.*)

We had proposed to treat distinctly of the class system which is almost universally adopted in the American colleges. It has not escaped severe criticism, and at present is likely to be exposed to still more earnest objections. It must stand or fall with the retention or abandonment of the several features which we have noticed, viz., a prescribed curriculum, an enforced and daily recitation, and a continued residence or keeping of terms. Some of its more important relations, as a means of intellectual culture and excitement, will need to be considered when we come to speak of the American college as a society having a common and organic life.

These several features of the American college system involve of necessity a constant enforcement of faithful study by the instructors, and a vigorous application of stringent discipline. A curriculum, frequent recitations and constant residence, can have no force or effect unless they are prescribed and enforced as law, and are made the conditions of enjoying the advantages and reaping the rewards which the college holds in its gift. This is so obvious as to need no elucidation. Young men who are too manly in their spirit, and too independent in their feelings to acquiesce in such a discipline, are too old in their feelings to be members of a college, however young they may be in years. A year's trial of the discipline of a banking or trading house, on shipboard, or in the army, might set them back a half-score of years in fancied age, and serve to correct somewhat their ideas of the consistency of manliness with responsibility and supervision. Their confident advisers of the press who recommend the abandonment of supervision and constraint over such high minded youths, may be properly advised in turn to try the experiment in their own printing offices and among the members of their own editorial corps.

We neither overlook nor deny the evils of the college system.

The evils which attend its operation are neither few nor slight. The spirit of routine is constantly in danger of taking possession of both instructors and pupils, inducing in the one the mechanical and perfunctory performance of duty, and, in the other, the constrained and enforced preparation of lessons. The pupil is constantly in danger of regarding the lesson as a task imposed, and of overlooking the necessity that tasks should be imposed, and the fact that every task brings the opportunity for intellectual energy and improvement. Other modes of employing and improving the mind which are more exciting, or are rewarded by the acclaim of one's society or one's set, such as rhetorical exercises and feats of reading and debate, or striking acquisitions out of the common line, whether in science, or letters, or in achievements less intellectual, are constantly preferred to the more sober and common-place duties of the college work. The resort to all sorts of expedients to meet the enforced recitation, the use of assistance to avoid dishonor or discredit, excessive cramming for those examinations which, properly used, furnish the best of opportunities for a leisurely review, and the prevalent attitude of antagonism against, instead of coöperation with, the aims of instructors, are too widely prevalent and too notorious to be denied or overlooked. The disposition to find in the unconstrained pursuit of favorite studies for the fancied future an excuse for the neglect of studies that are imposed in the present, is fearfully prevalent. Self reproach for neglect, or chagrin at disappointed expectations, or vexation at some real or fancied injustice, is made the pretext or excuse for persistent idleness and systematic neglect. The college studies are declared by consent to be a bore, even by many who derive from them no inconsiderable advantage. Even the most faithful and conscientious students are deterred from pursuing their studies in the most enlightened spirit, and from perfecting and fixing them by additional thought and research, through the influence of associations which their better judgments resist, and of a prevailing sentiment of which in their hearts they are ashamed. Studying for rank and cramming for immediate effect, both tend to dwarf the love of knowledge itself, and to induce bad intellectual habits.

The instructors, also, are in danger of being either vexed or discouraged, and so of becoming unsympathizing with and distrustful of their pupils. Their best instructions are not always listened to, or not appropriated, through the impatience or the listlessness of their constrained and wearied pupils often "cabined, cribbed, and confined," through the poverty of the college, in low and ill-ventilated class-rooms. The perpetual inculcation of elementary knowledge becomes wearisome and disgusting to the men whose sympathies with the young are not perpetually renewed. The experience of the same failures, of the same mistakes and observations is wearisome to the spirit. The antagonism and slyness of the pupils tend to evoke inhumanity and suspicion in the teacher. Hence the want of earnestness and hopefulness, of courage and patience, sometimes the want of interest in the truths imparted, and in the pupils to whom they are given, which occasionally settle down upon the mind and heart of the half-paid and unthanked college teacher, and paralyze his efforts, and eat out his life, and sometimes make him pedagogical, hard, and dry, or supercilious, distant, and "Donnish."

Not a few of these evils are incidental to any system of instruction, whether optional or enforced. The few that are occasioned by the enforced curriculum of the college, would, if it were abandoned, be exchanged for others more serious, and their name would be Legion. It is, however, a fair and important question by what expedients can they be obviated and the college system retained, as it must be or be sacrificed at the cost of evils manifold greater and more numerous?

In answer to this question, we beg leave to offer the following suggestions:

First of all, an adequate and somewhat uniform preparation of knowledge and power should be sought for in the students, and as far as possible should be required. We would allow great liberality in the trial of candidates, but if, after trial, any are found hopelessly deficient, they should be sent down either to another class or to a thorough-going coach, who will either drive them up to their duty, or discipline them to better habits of study and acquisition. The men who are best prepared and whose previous studies in any way make it easy for

them to master the college work, should, in case the class is divided into different sections, not be allowed to go into the section of lowest attainment, but should be compelled to keep up to the line which is fairly within their reach. Such men should be stimulated, if possible, by some additional work for honors or prizes, especially in extra classical reading, or in mathematical problems.

As it is notorious that not a few enter college with a fine classical preparation, and have abundant time for extra reading, they ought to be encouraged to do so by a special examination in some author not read by the class, at which honors should be given to all who acquit themselves well, and in which success should count in the estimate of the college standing. This examination should require something more than the ordinary studying which is exacted in the recitation room. By a similar method, encouragement for special studies in all departments of knowledge should be systematically allowed. In order to provide for such studies and examinations, as well as to give somewhat more freedom and variety to the curriculum, it would be necessary that the time of the students should be less cut up by too great a number of exercises. Indeed, the relief would be very great to both students and instructors if in any way this change could be effected, especially in the two higher classes, where it is more imperatively required and where it would be best appreciated.

There are many reasons, indeed, why, in the later years of college life, the recitations should not be so frequent, in order to avoid this evil of excessively dividing the time, and also that the exercises themselves might be less exclusively exercises of recitation, and admit more and might more largely the element of instruction. It would be most desirable if the instructor should seem to be a fellow-worker with his pupils as he is in the English Universities. At least, the habits of college recitations would be greatly improved if the pupils should be allowed to express their own difficulties or misgivings, or ask questions for information and guidance. To this end the apartments should be made attractive and convenient, and should be provided with every accessory in the way of apparatus and illustrations. No classical room would be any

the less agreeable if its walls were hung with attractive maps and photographs. The instruction would be none the less severe and exacting, were the students allowed to breathe a respirable atmosphere, or to sit on comfortable benches. The hopeful son of Tim. O'Flaherty is better accommodated at the age of ten in the palatial public school-houses that are voted him by our sovereigns, than is the delicate son of a millionaire in the class-rooms of colleges that have educated thousands of the intellectual princes of the land.

The instruction of the colleges should be made as intellectual and as wide-reaching as possible, in order that the drilling processes should justify themselves continually to the judgment of the most stupid and faithless. Even the driest analysis of word or sentence and the most rigid processes of the mathematics may be enlivened with some interesting illustrations and applications, provided the instructor be a man of intellectual breadth and have a desire to stimulate and enlarge the minds of his pupils. The teacher of the classics may teach much of English if he will, while he professes to instruct only in Greek. Geography, history, and æsthetical criticism can scarcely be withholden if the teacher has a well-stored and generous mind. We have already expressed the opinion that a less strictly grammatical and a more liberal character should be given to classical study in the advanced years of the course.

It would not be amiss if more frequent instruction and incitements were furnished of a general character in respect to the opportunities for improvement which attend each of the stages of college life, and occasional free and friendly communications were made respecting the hindrances and aids to self-culture and the best methods of making the most of the college curriculum. Perhaps there is no point in which students err more seriously than in respect to the use of their leisure, the selection of private or special studies, the direction of their reading and the cultivation of facility in writing and in speech. In short, while the disciplinary processes should be enforced with the utmost rigor, in order that they may be efficient, the intellect of the pupils should be treated as little as possible as a mechanical recipient and should be stimulated and enlarged as rapidly as possible to independent and rational ac-

tivity. This is possible only on the condition that the instructors are men of generous intellectual training, that they are not so overworked as to become mere intellectual drudges, and that they give the best of their energies to the work of teaching and of training. The instructors of a college should be men who are not merely at home in their own departments, but who understand and appreciate their relations to other sciences and to life. Otherwise they cannot teach in a liberal spirit and with the generous effect which is to be desired. They should not be overworked in the college by being tasked too many hours to allow them to make progress in their own departments and to retain their freshness and vigor for work in the class-room. Nor should they be overworked out of the college by extra labors to gain the living which they fairly earn and which the college ought to provide. They should also give the choicest of their energies and zeal to the service of the college as instructors. No mistake can be more serious than that a college gains very largely by adding to its corps of professors eminent personages, who have little or no active concern with the business of instruction or who come rarely in contact with the students. The continued presence of a resident professor of acknowledged eminence, or the occasional appearance of a non-resident lecturer of popular renown, neither of whom holds a constant and intimate connection with the processes of instruction and moulding that are every day forming and exciting the minds and characters of the students, is of comparatively little significance. To attach to the roll of a college a list of names of men eminent for science or learning, whose connection with its work is occasional only, may gratify the vanity of its patrons and sound largely in the ear of the American public, but it adds little of strength and may impart much of weakness to the efficiency of the corps. By the same rule, to found so-called chairs of instruction which shall serve as comfortable provisions for the real or professed devotees of special sciences, may promote the cause of science (in a questionable way), but it does not add to the energy or effect of the college or university as a place of training. Even science is furthered in a questionable way by such endowments, for the reason that the man who is called to the con-

stant service of instruction, is far more likely to make advances in his own department than the man who is installed upon an endowment in which study, and not teaching, is the chief object. The German professors lecture their one or two hours a day through the academical year, and yet they do far more for science than the Fellows at Oxford who are held to no duties of instruction at all.

The more widely cultured an instructor is, the more liberal will be the spirit and effect of his teaching, all other things being equal. Consequently to deliver the colleges from the tendencies of routine, they must be provided with men of liberal culture and varied intellectual endowments. The influence of such teachers is not, however, limited to the spirit and manner of their direct instructions. The presence of and contact with a man of such a description, who occupies the place and exercises the functions of an instructor, is itself both instruction and inspiration of the most effective character. The driest exercises become fresh when conducted by such teachers, and the most monotonous routine is varied by their admonitions and sympathy.

It is, then, of the first importance that the instructors who man our colleges should be men of high general and special culture. It is equally important that such men should not merely be attached to the college, but should become its working forces by actually coming into frequent contact with the students as efficient instructors. The proposal to attach a species of university chairs to the American colleges, to be filled by eminent *savans* or *specialists* who shall simply give a few lectures with the hope of stimulating and exciting the students, is founded on a serious misconception of the actual working of the college system.

It would be far better for the efficiency of the college system if there were attached to every large college a corps of Fellows to whom should be assigned special duties of instruction in a private and familiar way, and whose intercourse with the students should diffuse a spirit of culture and of enthusiasm for self-improvement. Such Fellows might be elected in special departments, as in Greek, Latin, English Literature, History, Mathematics, each of the Natural Sciences, Philoso-

phy. They should be elected, not advanced on examination, that college rank alone need not determine their position, but the capacity to receive and impart culture, and general desirableness for the higher considerations of character and promise. They should be elected for a term of years, that the spirit of sloth and self-indulgence should neither in fact nor in appearance be fostered by a life pension. They should be elected to an office with definite duties, as examiners, as critics of composition, as coaches to the timid or the halting, above all as private or parlor teachers to special classes who might desire improvement, and as inspiring friends to the whole community. They should be advanced to the post of private teachers in their special studies after they have themselves been admitted to the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The provision for their support should be ample enough to satisfy one who is animated with a desire for knowledge and self-improvement, or who aspires to a literary career as instructor, editor, or *littérateur*, and liberty should be given to teach privately, for pay, only to a limited extent. The presence of such a body of studying and teaching Fellows would, it is believed, be most efficient in elevating the tone of the whole academic body. Being fresh from the undergraduates, they would retain their academic sympathies and traditions. Occupying a quasi-official position, and being entrusted with certain duties, they would feel their responsibility to use their influence in the right direction. Such a corps of honorary students and teachers would do much towards elevating the college to the real efficiency and the generous spirit of the university. One hundred thousand dollars expended in the endowment at Yale or Harvard College of six or eight such fellowships, terminable in from five to eight years, would do more to furnish the country with a real university than the expenditure of a million in founding a new institution on a scale of magnificent expectations. Such a body of Fellows would at least serve as a school for the training of permanent instructors.

Much would be gained, also, in breaking up the traditional routine of college life and in waking up a generous enthusiasm for knowledge and improvement, if the heads of those departments in which are associate professors and tutors would ex-

ercise a personal supervision of the instruction that is given. The teaching which they can give personally must be confined to a single class. But if they could also have leisure and opportunity to inspect and direct the teaching of others, if they could, as a part of their duty, visit the class-rooms of their proper subordinates, they might do much to quicken the zeal of both teachers and pupils.

Many other expedients might be devised to give greater efficiency to the college system, without relaxing in the least from its thoroughness or departing from those traditions which experience has established and confirmed.

We owe some apology, perhaps, for bringing before the public these suggestions of detail in which they have little interest, and in respect to the merits of which they are scarcely competent to form an opinion. We mean no disrespect when we say that the American public, even that part of it which is made up of the graduates of colleges, are as unfitted to advise in respect to the details of the management of a college as they are to direct the details of managing a railway, a cotton mill, or a trading house. We shall therefore say no more upon the subject before us. The discussion of it thus far, in these few particulars, may serve to convince our tribunal that those most familiar with these institutions are as well acquainted with their defects and as sensitively desirous that they should be removed as are the public who criticise them so freely. A few topics of more general interest remain upon which we may again ask a hearing.

ARTICLE VI.—PRINCETON EXEGESIS. No. II.—ITS DEALINGS WITH THE TESTIMONY OF THE SCRIPTURES AGAINST THE DOCTRINE OF A LIMITED ATONEMENT.

The Atonement. By the Rev. ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER HODGE, D. D., Professor of Didactic, Historical, and Polemical Theology in the Western Theological Seminary at Allegheny, Pa. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. 1867.

The Atonement: Its Reality, Completeness, and Extent. By ROBERT S. CANDLISH, D. D., Free St. George's, Edinburgh. London: T. Nelson and Sons. 1861.

Princeton Review. *Review of Barnes on the Atonement*, July, 1859, and *Articles on the Atonement passim*.

IN the number of the *New Englander* which was issued in July, 1868, we examined the exegetical efforts of the Princeton School of theologians in regard to the doctrine of Original Sin. The leading commentator and divine of that school had recently expressed to the public his sense of the danger of holding any other view of this doctrine than the one entertained by himself, and he had, within a comparatively brief period, published a new and enlarged edition of his work on the Epistle to the Romans. In this book he had brought out what may doubtless be regarded as an authoritative exposition of the views of his party, and, we suppose we may add, the highest results of Biblical scholarship which have yet been attained among them. It seemed, therefore, a suitable occasion for a renewed consideration of the soundness of their exegesis, and for a renewed inquiry in regard to the Scriptural grounds of their claims to be the sole possessors of the strictest orthodoxy. Of our success, at that time, in establishing what we attempted to prove we leave others to determine; but as this question of the exclusive possession of true doctrine has come to have a

new interest of late, owing to the charges made by these theologians against those who differ from them and to the events which many look forward to as likely to occur in their part of the Church, we think our readers may not be unwilling to accompany us into another field, and to inquire what they do with the statements of the New Testament there. We propose, accordingly, in the present Article, to make a brief examination of some of those passages which indicate that Christ died for all men, but which the Princeton theologians regard as consistent with the doctrine of a Limited Atonement—a doctrine which must be held, or they will not receive us into their ecclesiastical houses or bid us God-speed.

We regret, in entering upon this subject, that we have not in our possession commentaries by the same distinguished author on all the books of the New Testament in which these passages are found. It would be agreeable to us to hear, in respect to every verse and phrase, the words of the acknowledged chief among the defenders of this peculiar system of theology, as we have been permitted to hear them in the discussion of the fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. As, however, only a limited portion of these books have engaged his special attention, or, at least, have found in him an expositor known to the general public, we must content ourselves to look elsewhere and seek from others what we would so gladly receive from him. But unfortunately our seeking, even when we look elsewhere, is not rewarded as fully as we could desire, in the line of minute and exact interpretation, for while these gentlemen are never slow to give us their doctrines and to assure us that those doctrines are found in the Scriptures, they have long been accustomed to surrender the department of Biblical study mainly to this one leader. Where he fails them, therefore, they are apt either to limit themselves to theological discussion or to appeal to their friends in Scotland who have labored in the exegetical field. Thus the latest work on the Atonement from the Princeton School, which has been so highly commended by those nearest the central power that we suppose it may be regarded as authoritative as to their views, only tells us, in its closing pages, how the controversy on these passages, when entered upon from the exegetical standpoint,

may be decided, while the remark is added that the author of the volume has "neither the space nor the taste" for an examination of this kind. This author, like his associates in general, apparently prefers the region of theological to that of exegetical discussion, and he confines himself almost entirely to the former, within which, after all, he thinks the determination of the whole matter may be left. He, therefore, leaves us with scarcely a hint of his own exegesis, and simply points the persistent opponent to what he is pleased to call "the triumphant proof" given by a foreign writer* that the passages in question, when rightly interpreted, do not in the least contradict the doctrine of a limited atonement. What the Princeton doctrine is, is a matter of no doubt. What the statements of the Scriptures to which we refer are, we propose to consider in the following pages. But if, in examining the Princeton exegesis, we wander as far as the guides oblige us to go, and if we hold the guides responsible, wherever their own words fail us, for what they commend as satisfactory and even "triumphant," we hope we may be justified by our readers. "The taste and the space" for Biblical interpretation are, perhaps, greater in some other regions of the world than in the one which these writers chance to occupy. But if so, we may surely be permitted to go for their explanations where they themselves go for them—whether it be to their own oracles or, when these are silent, to those which speak more frequently but yet with an accepting teaching.

The recent writer to whom we have just referred† opens his remarks on the particular subject which we have in hand by saying that the words "all," "world," etc., do not necessarily refer to all mankind. We are happy to find that the Princeton school are ready to admit this, if, indeed, their admission goes beyond the limits of those passages which, when interpreted in the universal sense, establish the views of those who oppose their doctrines. This is not always the case with their admissions, as we have had occasion to see in our former Article, for even Dr. C. Hodge himself says, in his commentary on First Corinthians, that "the analogies of Scripture are not

* Dr. R. S. Candlish.

† Dr. A. A. Hodge.

to be pressed beyond the point which they are intended to illustrate;"—a statement which, if applied in the fifth chapter of Romans, takes away one of the supports of his doctrine there on which he and his followers rest with the most self-satisfying confidence. But, in the present case, we accept the admission very willingly and are glad to make it a starting-point for our discussion of all such subjects. "These phrases do not," as this author very properly remarks, "of themselves"—that is, outside of and regardless of the connection in which they stand and the design for which they are manifestly used—"necessarily settle the question," or—as he expresses the same idea in another work—"these terms are unquestionably used in various degrees of latitude in the Scriptures." But, while this is true, it is equally unquestionable that the words of which we speak *may* be used in such a way and such a connection as to show that they are to be understood *in their universal sense*, and, wherever this is the case, they do necessarily determine every dispute which turns upon the matter of universality or limitation. And, therefore, it is a point of much importance, in the consideration of the subject now in hand, to ascertain by exegetical inquiry what is the use of the words in the passages to which we are referred. The theologian is obliged to come back to the field of the Biblical interpreter if he would ascertain the true doctrine. This is a thing which most Protestants have learned by this time; and while the meaning and use of words, and consequently the declarations of the Scriptures, "cannot sometimes indeed be decided by an appeal to grammars or lexicons," as this writer very correctly maintains, they can be settled within the proper region of the commentator's labors, notwithstanding he seems to maintain the contrary. It should also be noticed that the remark which he makes—that "particular expressions limit general ones rather than the reverse"—is one which cannot be everywhere applied. An author cannot, surely, on the foundation of this principle, excuse himself from all necessity of investigating the general expressions. Above all things he cannot attempt to establish, on theological grounds simply, a particular doctrine as found in certain passages of the Bible, and when he has done this to his own satisfaction, undertake

to tell us that, though we have other and clear statements which contradict his doctrine, we must accept his view, because, forsooth, he has got hold of a particular statement and we only of general ones. Our general statements, whose meaning is ascertained according to the legitimate rules of Biblical interpretation, may, as we have already intimated, determine what is the true declaration of God's Word, and they cannot be neglected or passed over as of little consequence. There are, in a word, places and connections in which the word "all" must mean *all men*, and whenever it does mean *all men* it does not mean *anything else* or *anything less*. Once settle this meaning, and the "general" passage gets, in one sense, a very "particular" character. It decides everything. It turns the principle above alluded to quite round the other way and shows the theology which ignores or denies it to be on a false foundation. Moreover, it will be borne in mind that the presumption wherever the word "all" and "world" are found is in favor of their universal sense, and it is incumbent upon those who reject that sense in any individual case to give satisfactory reasons why they thus reject it. The burden of proof manifestly rests upon them. They must prove the limitation which they insist upon, or their view cannot be accepted. It has no foundation on which to stand. The Princeton writers themselves admit this, as they show by the painful efforts which they make to explain away the simple meaning of these universal expressions. How successful their efforts are, the following pages will show.

The passages in the New Testament which we propose to examine, and which are contradictory of the doctrine of a Limited Atonement, may be divided, for convenience, into four classes; namely, those which declare that Christ died for all men or for the whole world; those which distinguish between the limited number of the elect and those who are outside of that number, and declare that he died not only for the former but for all; those which declare that he died for some who may hereafter prove to be not among the elect; and, finally, those which represent that the only reason why sinners will be condemned at the judgment is, that, though the Atonement

was made for them, they would not accept it for themselves. The reader's attention is invited to an examination of the passages in this order.

I.

In the first place, there are repeated statements in the New Testament that Christ died *for all men*, or *for the whole world*. Such statements are found, for example, in 1 Tim. ii. 5, 6, Titus ii. 11, Heb. ii. 9, with reference to all men, and 1 John iv. 14, John i. 29, and John iii. 16, 17, with reference to the world. In 1 Tim. ii. 5, 6, Paul uses the following language: "There is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself a ransom for all," and in Titus ii. 11, he speaks, according to the true construction of the verse, of "the grace of God as bringing salvation to all men." That the literal signification of these verses, considered in themselves and independently of the surrounding context, is favorable to the doctrine of a universal atonement can hardly be doubted. Christ gave himself a ransom for all, ἀντίλυτρον ἐπὲρ πάντων—God's grace brings salvation to all, σωτήριος πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις. Nothing, surely, can be more completely without limitation than these words. The Princeton gentlemen do not deny that we have the widest extension in the phrases used. But they fall back upon their general proposition, "that the word 'all' is used with various degrees of latitude in the Scriptures," and assure us that the context, or the manifest purpose for which the sacred author employs the word, must often determine the sense in which it is to be understood in a particular passage. With this principle established—and, as we have already intimated, we make no objection to it—they maintain that in these verses, though the word all is used, it means not *all men*, but something else—namely, *men of every class*. Let us look, then, at the context in each case. In the passage in the first Epistle to Timothy, the Apostle commences by saying, "I exhort, therefore, that first of all supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks be made for all men; for kings and for all that are in authority, that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty. For this is good and acceptable in the

sight of God our Saviour, who will have all men to be saved ;"—and then he adds the two verses quoted above, "For there is one God, and one mediator, &c., who gave himself a ransom for all." These verses, thus, are introduced as giving a reason for the exhortation in regard to prayer, and what they contain must be at least as wide-extended in its signification as the exhortation is. For whom, then, did the Apostle desire that prayers and supplications should be made? For *all classes of men*, say the Princeton theologians. We ask for the evidence that this is the meaning, and we get only one reply,—indeed, no other evidence can be given. The second verse, it is said, specifies a particular class of persons, namely, kings and those having civil authority; therefore the author must have in mind *a succession of different classes* in the *whole passage taken together*. But if this is so, it is certainly somewhat singular that he does not indicate the fact by *mentioning* any other class. Paul is not a writer who ordinarily hesitates to make his intention plain in such cases, or who breaks off in alluding to a succession of classes after he has spoken of the first one, and then, *though no reason presents itself for doing so*, passes all the others by unnoticed. He does, indeed, sometimes abruptly turn aside from the direct progress of his discourse without returning to it. But it is not his habit to do so in such cases as the one before us; and for a very good reason for he might, by so doing, entirely mislead his readers as to ~~the~~ meaning. If a Christian teacher, in writing to his pupils or his church, says, I desire that prayers be offered for the civil magistrates and for all men—and this is the utmost that the Apostle says in the way of dividing the objects of prayer into classes—every one will understand him to mean, I desire that prayers be offered for civil magistrates and all other men. This is the natural and inevitable understanding of his words, and therefore it is the meaning of his words,*—a meaning

* We intend, of course, to say that this is the natural and inevitable meaning in case the writer, in the expression "civil rulers and all men," is to be regarded as dividing into classes at all. Under these circumstances, he cannot be understood to mean anything but "civil rulers and *all other men*." We do not, as we show on a subsequent page, intend to say that the meaning might not be "civil rulers and *all men*"—the latter phrase including the civil rulers as well as *all other men*.

which must be adopted unless he explains himself as meaning something else. A person commenting upon or endeavoring to interpret his words has no right, therefore, when the author himself says nothing which justifies such a course, to throw into the phrase any idea or explanation of his own. The language is before him, and it is to be interpreted according to ordinary and known rules. The farthest extent, then, to which the Apostle goes toward this view of the Princeton scholars is the making a division of mankind into *two classes*—one of them the comparatively small class of rulers and the other including all the rest of mankind. And when, in this immediate connection, he presents as a reason why the prayers should be made, the fact that Christ gave himself a ransom for all, he must mean either that the “all” which he here uses should be coextensive with the “all” which he used before, or that it should cover not only them but the other class which he had individualized and separated from the “all.” If there is a division into classes at all, therefore, in the verses, the declaration at the end must be *either* that Christ gave himself as a ransom for all other men except civil magistrates, *or* that he gave himself for all men universally, including not only all other men, but civil magistrates also. The advocates of the doctrine of a limited atonement will scarcely be willing to limit it to those who are not holders of civil office, and to make this the teaching of the Scriptures. But if they do not take this course, they must, so far as this passage is concerned, adopt the other alternative—and, with the other alternative, Paul declares that the Atonement is without limitations,—*designed for all the race.*

We have said above that the utmost limits to which the Apostle can be supposed to go in these verses, in the way of division into classes, only allow the possibility of supposing him to express the desire that prayer be made for rulers and for all (*i. e.*, all other) men. But this is farther in this line than the fairest interpretation carries his language. The thing which he actually says is this—I exhort that prayers be made for all men; for kings and rulers;—and what, in all probability, he means is, I desire that prayers be made for all men, and for one class among them which I will specify more particu-

larly, namely, rulers. There was a peculiar reason for mentioning this class of persons at that time, for we have evidence elsewhere in the New Testament that the converts to Christianity were in danger of holding the existing civil governments in too light esteem; and surely, when such an Emperor as Nero was on the throne, and was beginning his course of persecution, the friends and followers of Paul might easily forget or neglect to pray for magistrates as they ought. The leading modern commentators, both of England and Germany, generally take this view of the proper interpretation of the passage, and make the second verse, which has reference to kings, &c., parenthetical in its character. But with this explanation of the verses, there is, properly speaking, no division into classes at all. There is nothing in the main thought but the exhortation to *prayer for all men*, and the reason is given, *because Christ is a ransom for all*. The atonement, then, is as universal as the prayers are to be, and the prayers are to be for all mankind. On the true interpretation, therefore, the alternative in regard to the reference of the word "all," to which we alluded, is not allowed, and the phrase in question cannot mean anything except what the words in themselves plainly mean. Paul declares that Christ Jesus gave himself a ransom for all men. This truth he states, in the words that immediately follow this declaration, to be the great subject of Christian preaching—"a thing to be testified in due time; whereunto I am ordained a preacher and an apostle, (I speak the truth in Christ, and lie not), a teacher of the Gentiles in faith and verity."

The passage in the Epistle to Titus is introduced by an exhortation "to speak the things which become sound doctrine," and then these things are presented more definitely, as they bear on the proper character and conduct of several classes in the Church; namely, aged men, aged women, young men, slaves, &c. Following the several exhortations we find the ground on which they are given presented in these words:—"For the grace of God that bringeth salvation to all men hath appeared, teaching us that denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world, looking for that blessed hope, and the glo-

rious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ." The grace of God is described in this passage as *ἡ σωτήριος πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις*, and the bearing of this passage on the question before us depends upon the meaning of "all men" in this phrase. It will be noticed that in these verses the Apostle is speaking, as is evidently not the case in the verses quoted from the first Epistle to Timothy, of a series of different classes among mankind. Here, then, is a case where it would be possible for *all men* to mean simply *men of all classes*, and the decision whether such is actually the meaning must be made in view of other passages. Does the Apostle, in any other place, employ an expression precisely or substantially equivalent to this? If he does, is it clear, in that place, in what sense he uses it? These are the questions which we must ask, and the answer is at hand. In 1 Tim. iv. 10, which is the only similar passage, God is called *σωτὴρ πάντων ἀνθρώπων*, and no reference to various classes is found in any part of the context. It is wholly gratuitous and unsuitable, therefore,—a violation of all exegetical principles,—to say that, in that verse, Paul intended to speak of God as the Saviour of *all classes of men*. He must have meant of *all men*; and inasmuch as this passage is cited from one of the Epistles belonging to the same period of the Apostle's life and writings as the one under examination, no unprejudiced mind can fail to feel that the strongest probability is derived from it as to the meaning here. We believe this argument alone will prove convincing to most persons, that the reference in Titus, as in first Timothy, is, without any limitations or exceptions, to *all men*. This passage in the Epistle to Timothy is one of much importance, and we shall have occasion to refer to it again, at which time we may show, even more clearly, that it cannot be limited in any way. But enough has been said already for our present purpose.

We must, however, notice another suggestion which is made by way of escaping the force of this universal word "all," in Titus ii. 11,—namely, that it refers only to *all believers*. "The grace of God that bringeth salvation to all men hath appeared, teaching us that we should live soberly, &c., looking for the glorious appearing;"—in this language, it is said, since the

gracious and the glorious appearings are set over against each other, the universality of the former must be measured by that of the latter, as to which there can be no question that it is limited to all believers. In respect to this suggestion we have two remarks to offer. *The first* is, that, even admitting what is claimed—that the universality of the gracious appearing must be measured by that of the glorious appearing,—we are not obliged to measure the limits of *πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις* in the same way. The statement of the Apostle is, that the grace of God, which is saving for all men, hath appeared, teaching us, &c. In the language of this statement we have two points brought out; one of which is the main thought of the declaration—namely, that the grace of God has appeared,—and the other is a subordinate thought, and is introduced as a descriptive epithet characterizing the grace,—namely, the grace which is saving for all men. *Ἡ χάρις ἡ σωτήριος πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις* is the Greek expression, and the exact construction of *ἡ σωτήριος* will be understood by all who understand the Greek language. Now, if we are obliged by reason of anything in the context to limit the *main* statement that the grace of God has appeared, so as to understand the Apostle to mean, *in this particular place*, that it has appeared *to believers*, we are surely not compelled for this reason to limit *the mere subordinate, general, descriptive epithet* in the same way. Supposing the government of our country were to provide and offer a universal pardon to all engaged in the late rebellion, would it not be a perfectly legitimate use of language for any portion of them to say, “The mercy of the government, that brings pardon to all rebels, has appeared to us, teaching us to live as loyal subjects hereafter?” Or, if such language were used, and we were asked to interpret it, should we be obliged to say that the pardon was limited in its extent to those only who used the language,—that the “all” meant them alone? Surely not. And it is no more necessary to interpret the Apostle’s language in a similar manner. But this will be even more clearly manifest, if possible, when we remark, *in the second place*, that there is no necessity of admitting that the universality of the gracious is to be measured, in this passage, by that of glorious appearing. What was the gracious appearing? Evidently it

was the appearance of Jesus Christ as the bearer of the grace of God ; at least, this must be the meaning, if there is any correspondence at all with the glorious appearance, as these writers maintain that there is, for that appearance is declared to be the appearance of Jesus. But the appearance of Jesus as the bearer of the grace of God was not limited to those who were his followers. He proclaimed salvation, and offered it to all men—he made a sacrifice which was sufficient for all men—his gift of himself was, to use the language even of writers of the Princeton class, “a display of good will towards men—towards the human race,” and his “gospel has a gracious aspect towards mankind as such.” But, if this is so, the appearance of the only-begotten Son, whom God gave for all, was *an appearance to all*. when he came in the gracious way, whatever it may be, hereafter, when he shall come in the glorious way. The Apostle, then, in the passage before us, *may* evidently be speaking of the two things as differing from each other in this point of universality, and the proof must be presented that he *does not* thus speak in case our belief that he does not is demanded. But where is this proof to be found ? Certainly not in the mere juxtaposition of the words relating to the two things within the limits of the same paragraph. It must be found, if found at all, in the other words of the passage, which are connected with these two and lie between them ;—and here, indeed, these writers seem to discover it. It is the fact, that believers occupy the intermediate place in these verses between the two appearings, that shows the two appearings to be commensurate as to extent. So Dr. Candlish informs us. But what does Paul say ? He does not say that the gracious appearing was made to those only who believed, and who would finally rejoice in the glorious appearing. He does not, in this way, put believers in the intermediate place between the two appearings. But what he does say is this ; The grace of God, that grace which has salvation for all men, has appeared—not has appeared to believers, but has appeared—teaching us who believe to live a godly life. The intermediate place—if so it is to be called—which believers hold is not between the gracious appearance and the glorious appearance, but between the *teaching* of the gracious appearance and the

attainment, if we may so speak, of the glorious one. In other words, the Apostle says, that the grace of God, which has provided a salvation for all men, has appeared, and that its influence, so far as we Christians are concerned, is in the way of teaching us to lead a godly life. The statement, so far as relates to the point now in hand, is clearly presented in the English version, (though the construction of the sentence, as there given, is incorrect),—"The grace of God, that bringeth salvation, hath appeared to all men, teaching us that we should live soberly, righteously, and godly." The very language, which is employed, seems to show that Paul not only had the distinction of which we speak in mind, but that he wished to make it perfectly clear to his readers, so that they could not mistake his meaning;—for, while, on the one hand, he avoids saying *hath appeared to believers*, he is careful, on the other hand, to use two distinct phrases in the different parts of the passage, namely, "*us*," where he refers to those who are looking for the *glorious* appearing, but "*all men*" when he speaks of the *gracious* one. The proof, then, which is said to be discovered in the intermediate words between the allusions to the two appearings, is not there at all, and the argument of the Princeton writers falls to the ground.

We have shown, in regard to this passage in the Epistle to Titus, that it does not *declare* the two appearings to be equally limited in the matter of their universality, and does not necessarily *view* them, *even for the moment, and with relation to the exhortations to believers* which the Apostle had in mind, as thus equally limited, but rather the opposite. We have, also, shown that, even if the Apostle does view them in this way, for any purpose and for the moment, it does not at all follow that he limits the phrase *ἡ χάρις ἡ σωτήριος πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις* in the same way. The phrase "all men" in this passage, therefore, does not refer to "all believers;"—and if, as was previously shown from the usage of Paul elsewhere, it does not refer to *all classes of men*, the argument is complete. The phrase refers to *all mankind*, and takes its place beside the passage in the first Epistle to Timothy, which has been already examined, as showing that the atonement was not limited but universal.

The passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews, to which reference was made, is in the second chapter and ninth verse. In this verse Christ is spoken of as "tasting death for every man," or, as the Greek has it, *ὕπὲρ παντός*. The Princeton theologians suggest two methods of escaping the force of the universal expression here. They point us, in the first place, to the fact that the word for *man* is not found in the original text, and then say that the absolutely universal phrase *for every one* must be regarded by all persons as necessarily limited to *some degree*. It does not mean, for example, every sensitive creature, nor every rational creature, nor every fallen rational creature. We are obliged to ask, therefore, what it does mean, and we are obliged, they say, to answer, It means that Christ tasted death *for every one of the objects of redemption*. But who are the objects of redemption? This verse does not tell us, they say, and we are compelled to determine this point by examining the Scriptures elsewhere. This verse, therefore, decides nothing in itself. But when we have discovered, in other passages, that the objects of redemption are the elect alone, the expression here used naturally and readily limits itself to them, and the meaning ascertained in this way is, that Christ *tasted death for every one of the elect*. Now the force of this argument depends on this point—whether *ὕπὲρ παντός* means "for every one of the objects of redemption," *without deciding who the objects of redemption are?* A writer in the *Princeton Review* says there can be no dispute on this point, but to our minds this is the very point which is in dispute. We deny that this is the meaning of the verse. It might, possibly, be allowable to translate the phrase by the words "for every one of the objects of redemption," though such a translation would not be a natural or felicitous one. But even if it were translated thus, it would be a thing wholly unwarranted to say that it does not determine who the objects of redemption are. There are numberless instances in the New Testament where the word *all* occurs in the Greek without any substantive. But are we obliged in every such case to go on a search through all the Gospels and Epistles to ascertain what the adjective "all" belongs to? Biblical interpretation would be a tedious matter, if this were essential. The method is a

much simpler one than this in most cases. It is to examine the context or the demands of the sentence itself, and see if the author does not indicate clearly the word to be supplied. Where he does so, nobody, who is unprejudiced, doubts what his meaning is any more than if the word had been expressed. The same method is to be adopted here. The context which precedes and introduces this verse has nothing to say except of angels and men. The following context refers prominently to the same. In regard to angels, it is stated, *in express terms*, that Christ did not undertake anything in the way of salvation for them, and it is for this simple and plain reason that we exclude them from the "all." The other class, then, are the class to which the author refers—namely, *all MEN*. It was into human nature that Christ entered. It was the seed of Abraham whom he took it upon himself to help. It was for the sins of the people, that he made reconciliation. It was for those who all their lifetime were subject to bondage, that he became partaker of flesh and blood, in order that he might deliver them from the fear of death. These universal expressions, in the different parts of this chapter, in regard to mankind, or to the Jewish race, as distinguished from angels, show what the writer's thought was. And the great idea of the whole passage is, that the world to come—the Messianic age—is put in subjection to man, or to one who has man's nature, and not to angels. If the author of the Epistle does not clearly set forth what his meaning is, when, in the midst of all this discourse about *man*, he speaks of tasting death *for every one*, we do not see how he could clearly set it forth. And to come forward and tell us that all that we know about this passage is, that the phrase "every one" *must* be limited so as to exclude some sensitive creatures, some rational creatures, and some fallen rational creatures—brutes, angels, and devils—and, therefore, it *may* be limited to *any extent*, but *how far* can only be determined by searching from the beginning to the end of the New Testament, is to contradict the simple rules on which we proceed in all interpretation. The writer to the Hebrews doubtless knew what he meant; and he expected his readers to know what he meant, without reading any other book but his own, or any other passage but this.

His readers were not speculative theologians but plain men who understood language in its natural sense.

The Scotch author, to whom we have already referred, appears to have some perception of the relation to *mankind* in this whole passage. He is not able to shut his eyes altogether to this fact, as his Princeton brethren seem to do. But he says it is mankind *in their nature* that the sacred writer is speaking of, and not the *number* of them—whether a part or the whole. In this particular verse, however,—we answer,—he is using a word which has to do with the *number* only, and not the *nature*. He says *all*, and if, as this writer admits, it is mankind of whom he is discoursing, then it is *all mankind* that he means. With those who see the light even as clearly as Dr. Candlish does, there ought to be no need of farther discussion. He has substantially admitted the vital point.

The other method of escaping the universality of this verse is this. It is said that the train of reasoning in the passage in which it is found has no reference to the question of the *extent of Christ's work*, but to another matter altogether—namely, *his humiliation and exaltation*. We do not propose to enter into a discussion of the precise object which the author has in view in this chapter, or the precise course of thought which he follows out. Such an examination would carry us beyond the limits of our present space. But, admitting what is claimed, we are not obliged to conclude that *the phrase in question* has no reference to the *extent* of Christ's work. As we have just seen, there is here a distinct allusion to *number*, and it must be explained. How are we to explain it? Dr. Candlish gives the reasoning as follows. Christ is crowned with glory and honor on account of the suffering of death. In order to this suffering of death he must “be made” in a low estate. In point of fact he “is made a little lower than the angels.” But why lower than the angels? Because, for the carrying out of the purposes of the grace of God, he is “to taste death for every man.” This is well enough, so far as it goes—at least, we will not here raise any objection to it. But the difficulty is not removed by this statement. The reason why he was made lower than the angels may be because he was to taste death for beings who have a nature lower than

the angelic; and if the author had said this, any limitation of Christ's work might have been consistent with his language. He adds, however, beyond this, a very significant and important word, "every one." What is the force of this word? Does it not present a significant and important *additional idea*—namely, that he was to die not for *a portion merely*, but *for the whole* of that race of beings next lower than the angels whose nature he assumed? Trace out the general course of the reasoning as we will, there is that little word which claims to be heard. If the reasoning goes one side of it, it is still there, and speaks with the same clear voice.

But Dr. Candlish thinks he can make even this word, if necessary, speak in his favor, and can make it follow in the line of the reasoning as he gives it. He calls our attention to the fact that it is in the singular number. It thus means not *all*, but *every one*. Now if the work of Christ, he says, had been merely a method of vindicating the divine justice and opening a door of pardon to all,—having reference, thus, merely to mankind collectively and in the mass,—it does not appear how it might not have been accomplished by him without his becoming lower than the angels. But if the work was to be one of substitution and identification, in which he was to take the place of each, and meet all the obligations and liabilities of each, the necessity of his manhood appears. He must take upon himself the very nature of the individuals whom, one by one, or each one of whom, he is personally to represent. But, we reply, the declaration of the sacred writer, after all this attempt, remains. It is that Christ entered into the nature of mankind that he might die for *every one*. This numeral, in the singular number, *may refer to individuals*, but it refers not to *some* individuals, but to *every* individual—not to *every* individual of a particular and limited number, but to *every* individual having the nature which he assumed—not to individuals one by one simply, but to individuals *every one*. If this, however, is the meaning—and it is surely all that can be made out of the the singular *πᾶν*, for *πᾶν* does not, of itself, mean, simply, individuals one by one—then this word accords neither with the idea of limitation nor with that of substitution which the Princeton writers hold. But it can only be explained consist-

ently with the opposite view, which regards Christ as dying for the vindication of the divine justice, and in order to open a door of pardon to *every individual of the race*. And this is just what the author, who is writing to the Hebrews, says, and, if he is a different person from the Apostle who wrote to Titus and Timothy, he is another witness uniting himself with that Apostle in the declaration of this great doctrine.

We now turn to those passages which declare that Christ died *for the whole world*. The first to which we direct our attention is in the first Epistle of John—the fourteenth verse of the fourth chapter. It reads as follows: “And we have seen and do testify, that the Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world.” The words with which this verse commences are manifestly connected with the similar solemn announcement at the beginning of the Epistle, where the Apostle sets forth his design in writing it—namely, to proclaim the truth of Christ which he had been taught by the Divine Master himself. The verse, therefore, contains a declaration of the great fact of the gospel, and is of the highest importance as showing what the disciple, who entered into the most intimate communion and fellowship with Jesus thought in respect to this subject. What do the Princeton writers say of it? They tell us, in the first place, that, as the word *world*, like the word *all*, has different uses in the Scriptures, it has a peculiar and limited meaning in this passage. It is said that Jesus came to be the Saviour of the world, not in the sense that he was to die for all men in the world, but for a certain number of persons scattered among all nations and generations throughout the world. These persons are undistinguishable by any one but God from the mass of fallen humanity, and, therefore, they are called by the name which is elsewhere applied to the whole mass of fallen humanity. This seems to be the view of the author of the latest work on the Atonement which has been published by that school. “The world” means not *all men*, but *some men in all places and in all times*. “We have seen and do testify,” the Apostle says, according to this explanation, “that the Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of some men in all places.”

In regard to this explanation of the verse, two or three thoughts suggest themselves. One of them is that, if such was the idea in the Apostle's mind, it is remarkable that he used a word which was so likely to deceive his readers. This is a word, too, which he employs several times in substantially similar phrases, and the danger of being misunderstood was increased, of course, by every new case in which it was introduced. It is, also, a word, the misunderstanding of which might lead to a very fundamental misunderstanding of the gospel plan. It might, therefore, be a matter of serious moment to great numbers of those to whom his book should present itself. How could he have failed to feel the importance of the utmost clearness in such a solemn declaration? How could he have failed to use some expression which would set forth the true idea, instead of adopting a word which, *on its face*, undoubtedly meant the opposite? When, in this same epistle, the author says that the whole world lieth in wickedness, who can suppose that he means simply that "some men in all places and in all generations" are in this condition? How, then, can we, with any more propriety, maintain that, in such statements as those of the verse now under consideration, or that of the second chapter of the epistle, where it is said that Jesus is the propitiation for the sins of the whole world, there is no more extended idea than that of some men scattered widely throughout the world? And if an ordinary reader would not feel justified in interpreting the word *world* in either case in this limited way, it is,—as we think every candid mind which has no special theological doctrine to contend for will admit,—altogether improbable that the author would have used the word in such a sense. Our next remark is, that there is no evidence that he could with propriety have so used it, even if he had desired to do so. The usage of the word is against it. The word "world" is employed by the New Testament writers "with different degrees of latitude," no doubt, but only with a certain number of different degrees. It does not mean anything whatsoever, which any interpreter chooses to put into it. It has definite significations and applications, like any and every other word. It sometimes means mankind, and sometimes the unconverted world, and some-

times the physical world, and sometimes, perhaps, something else. But nowhere, in any passage of any of the writings either of the Evangelists or the Apostles, does it have the meaning here suggested. It does not mean "some men in all places and times." We can determine nothing in such cases except by following the legitimate significations and established usage of the word; and, if a writer deviates from these without explaining his peculiar way of using it, he does what he has no right to do and conveys to his readers a false idea. The interpreter, therefore, violates the rules imposed upon him when he throws such an unknown meaning into an author's words, and makes him say precisely the opposite of what, according to universal usage, his language means. When the Princeton writers show us that the Greek word *κόσμος* means "some men in all places," in those passages in the New Testament which are outside of the present controversy, they may have some ground to argue for this meaning here. But until this is made evident, we believe that everybody outside of their own company will regard this as, at the best, but one of the curiosities of interpretation. It is, in fact, something worse than this; for, if this is not the meaning of the word, the interpretation which is forced into it is a contradiction of the Apostolic statement of this great truth.

The Princeton writers tell us, in the second place, that the word "world" here may be taken as meaning not *all men*, but *Gentiles as well as Jews*. The declaration of the Apostle, that the Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world, is a declaration opposed to the idea that he came as the Saviour of the Jews only—but not opposed to the idea that he came as the Saviour of a portion only of the race. It is, indeed, unquestionably the fact that Paul proclaimed in many places salvation for Gentiles as well as Jews, and that he opposed the views of the Judaizing party in these matters. And the other apostles may, at times, have done the same thing. But, even in Paul's writings, the word *κόσμος* is not used in this sense. He does not contend against the exclusiveness of his adversaries by speaking of Christ as the Saviour of "the world," but by showing that the Gentile nations, as well as themselves, are included in God's plan and in God's invitation. If, however,

this great advocate of the Gentiles does not use the word in this way, it is altogether probable that others, who were not so much engrossed with the subject, did not so use it. The word *κόσμος* does not in itself mean the world as distinguished from the mere Jewish portion of it, but the world as distinguished from *any portion* of it. If, then, it is demanded that we interpret it in the former sense, in any passage,—and especially in any passage in the writings of authors who are not preëminently writing against Judaizers or on the subject of the salvation of the Gentiles,—the evidence must be given which forces us to this interpretation. Unless such evidence can be presented, the view cannot be held. The presumption is against it. The burden of proof rests upon those who are its advocates. But there is no evidence that the first Epistle of John was written in opposition to the Judaistic party. On the other hand it was, according to the opinion of most scholars, composed in Asia Minor, some time after Paul's death, and was designed for churches made up, in the main, of Gentile converts. It is as different from the Pauline Epistles in this respect, as it is in its style or in any other particular. We should not know, from the reading of this Epistle, that any such controversy as that which displays itself so clearly in the Epistle to the Galatians had ever existed. The Apostle John wrote for mankind, if any writer in the New Testament did so. His Epistle knows no parties nor divisions. And when he uses the word *world*, he means, if any writer ever did, *mankind*—the *whole world* as opposed to *any part* of it—*all men everywhere*. But, again, as there is no evidence of any such peculiar use of the word *κόσμος* in the Epistle in general, so there is none in this passage, but, on the other hand, quite the opposite. The Apostle is speaking in the whole of this fourth chapter, of a subject as far removed from anything connected with Jewish exclusiveness as could be imagined. Moreover, in the verse following the one under discussion,—and on the foundation of this statement that Christ came to be the Saviour of the world,—he declares that “whosoever” shall confess that Jesus is the Son of God has the divine life in his soul. Now “whosoever” is as universal a word as there is in any language, and when it follows the word “world,” it

strengthens the evidence that that word is to be taken in its most unlimited sense. And, once more, the word *κόσμος* is used some seven times in this chapter, and in no one of these instances does it have any such signification as is claimed for it in this verse. It means the world as the abode of man or the world of mankind, in some of the passages, and the unconverted world in others, but nothing else. These, also, are the usual meanings of the word elsewhere. If now the author, in this fourteenth verse, introduces this word after using it several times in the immediate context, and with no indication of any peculiar meaning, it would seem that he must use it in a sense allied to some one of the senses in which it has already been employed. But if we accept this view, we must understand him here as meaning that the Son was sent as the Saviour either of *the world of mankind* or of *the unconverted world*;—and, in either case, the Princeton doctrine of limited atonement is contradicted in this passage. The Apostle John takes his place by the side of Paul and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews in opposing all those who would proclaim or defend any such doctrine.

The same remarks are, in great measure, applicable to the passage in the first chapter of the Gospel of John at the twenty-ninth verse. John the Baptist is there spoken of as pointing those who were with him to Jesus as he drew near, and saying, "Behold the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sin of the world." The representation of the author is, apparently, this:—that, as the Baptist was discoursing with his disciples and others, or was engaged in the work of baptizing, Jesus was seen to be approaching. The Baptist immediately turned from what he was doing and, pointing the bystanders to Jesus, said, There is the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world. He added nothing farther on this subject of his relation to sin, but merely stated the evidence on which he recognized him as the one who was to baptize with the Holy Ghost. There was no discussion as to the salvation of the Gentiles or as to the exclusiveness of the Jews. There was only this one statement, directing their attention to the person who had just come within their field of vision, and describing his work as a work for the world. What indication is there

that the thought of the Baptist was of a salvation for Gentiles as well as Jews, and this only? Is not the evidence, rather, that he did not mean this? Here is a single, abrupt remark, arresting the progress of what had been said or done just before and calling attention to a person who now first appears on the scene. See, says the speaker, here is the one who takes away the sin of the world. Is not the natural inference from the language this—namely, that the word “world” is employed in its ordinary, universal sense, including all mankind, and not in the sense of Gentiles and Jews indiscriminately? And is not this inference strengthened by the peculiar character of the remark in respect to its abruptness and its isolation?

But supposing we admit that, in this verse, the word “world” is to be taken as meaning “Gentiles and Jews together” as opposed to Jews alone, what evidence is there either that the speaker meant, or that the hearers understood him to mean, anything less than *all* Gentiles and *all* Jews together. If a man—who had been accustomed to believe that the only way to be saved was to become a member of his own nation, and that if any one became so he would be saved because all his nation were surely to attain this blessing—were suddenly to be told that salvation was provided not for his nation only but for the world, would he believe that the new system was *for a part* of the world or for *the whole world*? Would he not, inevitably, say, I have been mistaken in my exclusiveness heretofore, and now I know that there are no limitations whatever, but *all mankind* are included in this glorious plan? Is it to be supposed for a moment that he would immediately establish new barriers, and say, My old notions have, indeed, been overthrown, and the provision is not limited to my own nation, but yet the word which I have heard is “susceptible of various significations,” and “the world” means, therefore, only a certain elect circle. I was not so far mistaken after all. The ones for whom the plan of salvation was designed are still the class to which I belong and this class only—not, indeed, *Jews alone*, but yet *only some* Jews and *some* Gentiles. Such a man might be slow to abandon his old national exclusiveness, and years might pass before he had

done so altogether. But the almost necessary impulse of his nature, as soon as he had become completely free from it, would be to take the doctrine in its widest sense. There is not, then, a shadow of proof or of probability to be derived from the story of this scene in itself, to show that John the Baptist or his hearers thought of anything else in this word *κόσμος* than *all the two portions of the world together*,—that is, *all Jews and Gentiles*—if, indeed, they had this idea of Jews and Gentiles before their minds at all.

But, again, how are we to determine with certainty what the understanding of these words is? Evidently, by following down the history and ascertaining what the hearers, who were at that time listening to John the Baptist, learned afterward to be the truth in regard to this matter. John the Baptist either knew what the divine design was, or he did not. If he did not, his statements are of no moment. But if he did—and it is on this admission that we proceed in a discussion with the gentlemen at Princeton—he understood it to be what John the Apostle understood it to be. We have, however, already found John the Apostle proclaiming the truth in nearly the same language as we find in this declaration of the Baptist, and, when he speaks of *the world*, we have seen that he refers to *all mankind*. John the Baptist, therefore, spoke with the same universality and referred to the same “world.”

We have shown, then, in regard to this passage, that there is no evidence of any reference in it to Jews and Gentiles as opposed to Jews only, and that, if such a reference be admitted, there is every reason to believe that the meaning is *all Gentiles and all Jews*, and not *a limited number* of each body. We have, also, set forth the simplest and clearest way of deciding the question as to the use of *κόσμος* in this verse, in case any such question is raised—namely, by ascertaining what the disciples, who were at that time pointed to Jesus, learned afterward from Jesus himself;—and this is told us in the formal and solemn declaration of the great truth of the gospel, which is found in the first Epistle of John. To the company of witnesses for the doctrine of a universal atonement, therefore, John the Baptist is now added, and he unites his voice with Paul’s, and John’s, and with that of the writer to the Hebrews. John the

Baptist understood these great truths better than the Princeton school of theologians do in this nineteenth century.

A few words only will be necessary, after all that has now been said, with reference to the well-known passage, in the third chapter of the Gospel of John at the sixteenth and seventeenth verses. "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life. For God sent not his Son into the world, to condemn the world; but that the world through him might be saved." These are the gracious words of the Lord himself in regard to his own mission, and of the fullness of his grace we have all received. The writer in the *Princeton Review* to whom we have already made allusion says, that the word "world" in these verses simply designates *the class of persons* whom Christ came to save. This class of persons, he adds, is men—men as distinguished from angels, and men in general as distinguished from Jews. His view, thus, is the same with that which we have discussed in connection with the verse previously considered, except that here the idea of *men as distinguished from angels* is said to be in the mind of the speaker. But why men as distinguished from angels? Does the verse allude to angels? Does the context either before or after this verse say anything about angels? Is there any reason to suppose that Nicodemus was troubled in mind on the question whether the Messiah was going to help angels to the exclusion of men? Certainly not. But this is not all. The Lord states in these verses what he did *not* come for, as well as what he did; and nothing, on either side, is said with reference to angels. No reader would ever have any reason to suppose, from the perusal of this conversation between the Saviour and this Jewish doctor, that either of them had ever thought or known anything about angels. It is the suggestion, simply and wholly, of the defenders of a certain doctrine in theology which finds itself opposed by the plain language of these verses—a suggestion which serves no better purpose than to draw away the mind for a moment from the point which is discussed. Christ did, indeed, give himself for mankind as distinguished from angels, and so also he gave himself for mankind as distinguished from animals. But

who that approached the Scriptures with unbiased mind would ever suppose that, in the declaration made to Nicodemus, the word *κόσμος* was used in order to guard him against imagining that Christ died to save the irrational creatures? Nicodemus came to him for no such purpose as to inquire about the salvation of angels. He came to him as a teacher sent from God, and desired to ask him concerning the truth of God *in its relations to man*. Jesus answered him by showing him the way of salvation, and by assuring him that he himself had come in order that *the world might be saved*. He did not tell him that the world *would* be saved, but that he came in order that it *might* be saved, and that *everybody* in the world who chose to accept the offer of salvation might have eternal life. This was his announcement, and it was in the most universal language; *κόσμος* the world—*πᾶς* every one. It cannot be that he meant by such expressions, in such a conversation, men simply as distinguished from angels, or, indeed, anything but the whole of mankind. As to the other part of the explanation, which finds *men in general* referred to here, in distinction from Jews, but still limits the reference to a *portion* of mankind, enough has been said already in connection with John i. 29, and we pass over this point without further remark.

We are happy, in relation to both these passages in the Gospel of John, to find ourselves sustained, in a measure, in what we say in opposition to this Princeton writer, by that distinguished Scotch divine who is appealed to as "triumphant" in his exegesis. He says, "I confess I am but little inclined to *qualify* or *explain away* the term 'world,' as here employed." "I rather rejoice in it," he adds, "as asserting that the gospel has a gracious aspect toward mankind as such, without reference to the elect or non-elect." The Princeton gentlemen can hardly complain of us if we do not regard very highly their attempts to "explain away" or "qualify" this universal word, when we have from such exalted authority a view so much in harmony with our own on this point. Let it not be supposed, however, that the Scotch writer agrees with us altogether in our opinions respecting these verses. Far from it. He finds in this statement of Christ the very doctrine he main-

tains. Instead of the blessed universality of God's gift, in which multitudes of Christians have comforted their souls, this author finds only a limitation of it. "Nothing is said," he assures us, "about God *giving* his Son *for all*," but the design of the gift is, "in express terms and very pointedly, restricted to those that believe."* We hardly feel inclined to argue the question with one who can find nothing but limitation of design in this verse. But if he does not find anything beyond this in the *sixteenth* verse, what will he say to the *seventeenth*? He has just admitted, as we have seen, that the term *world* includes all, both elect and non-elect. But, in the *seventeenth* verse, Christ says he was sent into the world by God in order that *the world* through him might be saved. The expression "in order that" denotes design, as this writer admits. It is the common way of setting forth design in the New Testament. This, then, is *the design* with which God sent his Son into the world—namely, in order that both elect and non-elect might be saved. Whether the design is thus set forth in the *sixteenth* verse or not, it *is set forth in the seventeenth*—and it is set forth, according to this author's own explanation of the word "world," as *universal—for all men*.† And if it is thus declared in the latter verse beyond all doubt, it can hardly be questioned that the emphasis in the former verse is on the words which are *unlimited* in their character, and that the

* According to this view of the verse,—since it is only said that God *loved* the whole world, but is not said that God *gave his Son* for the whole world, but only for an elect part of the world,—we have the following remarkable statement from the Apostle:—God so loved *the whole world* that he gave his only begotten Son *for only a part of the world*. A single inquiry suggests itself in connection with this explanation of John's language—namely, whether the thought would not have been expressed more clearly and with a more exact setting forth of the "gracious aspect toward the non-elect," if the verse had read, "God so loved the non-elect part of the world that he gave his only begotten Son that the elect part alone might be saved."

† The distinguished Scotch exegete, who is reported by his American admirers to be such a "triumphant" leader in defense of this doctrine of a Limited Atonement, seems to have been off his guard for a moment at this point. These bold and mail-clad warriors, while in the very midst of the conflict, should steel their hearts against the tenderer feelings of humanity. When they begin to think of "gracious aspects" and "displays of good will," they are in great danger of giving the enemy an advantage.

gift of God is there also declared to be for the *whole world*, non-elect as well as elect, whom he loved, and *for every one* who was willing to receive it. The fact is, that the Princeton writers must "explain away" the words *κόσμος* and *πᾶς* as meaning something less than they do mean in and of themselves, or there is no hope for them in these verses. But even their foreign brother sees that their attempt to explain them thus away destroys the joy and fullness of the gospel declarations. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that their doctrine is not accepted more widely than it is.

And now the Lord himself places himself at the head of that company which has already been found to include such prominent ones among his disciples and among those who pointed to him and believed in him; and he adds his own witness to theirs in favor of the truth. We do not wonder that they all declare it so harmoniously, for we know now where they learned it, from the same common Master, the source and revealer of all truth.

II.

The *second class* of passages, to which reference was made at the commencement of our discussion, is the class which distinguish between the limited number of the elect and those who are outside of that number, and declare that Christ died *not only for the former, but for all men*. Under this class we propose to consider briefly 1 Tim. iv. 10, and 1 John ii. 2. The former of these verses reads as follows:—"For therefore we both labor and suffer reproach, because we trust in the living God who is the Saviour of all men, especially of those that believe." The Princeton writers do not seem to give very careful attention to this statement, which Paul makes to his younger associate, and which, in the following verse, he bids him to teach as the truth. But two or three things will be noticed by the candid reader in connection with it. *In the first place*, it evidently includes not only those who believe, but all other men as well, and it declares that God is the Saviour of the latter as well as of the former. Here is a passage, where the words "all men" cannot mean some men in all places, or Gentiles and Jews indiscriminately, and thus refer to the elect

alone, for the persons designated by the words include manifestly more than these, or others than these. To say that the two expressions, "all men" and "those that believe," are co-extensive, would be to make Paul declare that God is the Saviour of those who believe, especially of those who believe. But the gentlemen who have taken Dr. Charles Hodge as their leader, and who remember his strong condemnation of that view of Romans v. 14, which in his judgment leads to a similar tautology, will be the last to admit the possibility of any such explanation of the present verse. God is, then, the Saviour of all men—not merely of the elect. This is the statement which is made, in unequivocal language, in these words; and the force of this statement cannot be evaded by any limitation of the universal phrase. Whatever success such attempts at evasion may be regarded as having in the case of other passages already examined, they are not, and cannot hope to be successful here.

In the second place, it will be noticed that there is an *actual* bearing of this salvation upon others than the elect. The relation of the genitive πάντων ἀνθρώπων, to the word σωτήρ is precisely the same as that of the genitive πιστῶν, and the word σωτήρ cannot be taken in a different signification in the one case from that which it has in the other. A confirmation of the correctness of what we say is found in the passages which have a similar construction to that of the verse before us. We may refer, for example, to Gal. vi. 10, and 2 Peter ii. 9, 10. In the former of these passages Paul says, "Let us do good unto all men, especially to those who are of the household of faith." In the latter Peter declares that the Lord knoweth how to reserve the unjust unto the day of judgment to be punished, especially those that walk after the flesh, in the lust of uncleanness, and despise government. In each of these cases it is perfectly plain that the thing which is spoken of has an *actual* bearing on the different classes, and that its relation to both is precisely the same, except so far as is indicated by the word *especially*. No one can doubt that the Galatian Christians were exhorted to do good to all men as well as to their fellow-believers, or that the Lord, to the view of the Apostle Peter, knew how to punish all other sinners, as well as the particular class among them who were under the dominion of unclean lusts. The

same is true with regard to every one of the passages in the Pauline Epistles, or elsewhere in the New Testament, which have this peculiar construction, as any person may see, by examining them. By repeated instances, then, in which the Apostle Paul uses the phraseology which he adopts in this verse, he shows what his meaning here is. He means, as we have said, that there is an *actual* relation which God bears *as a Saviour* to all men, and not only to the elect. But if Christ did not die for any one outside of this limited number of the elect, if his atonement was not designed for those beyond their circle, then he did not come into the world to save all men, and, properly speaking, he had no actual relation as a Saviour to all men. It is nothing better than a mockery to call him by this title, and the truth, instead of being what the Apostle has here stated, is a thing altogether different—namely, that God is a Saviour of those that believe, but of no one else in the world. The meaning of this verse must, therefore, be that the atonement, which Christ made, was a universal atonement; that God is a Saviour for all men, in that he sent his Son into the world to die for all, but that he is *especially* a Saviour of those who believe, in that through their acceptance of his offers of reconciliation he is enabled to bring them to the blessed experience of his own kingdom.

In the third place, it will be noticed, that the connection, in which the verse before us stands, affords additional evidence in regard to its meaning. The Apostle had just made the statement concerning godliness, that it has the promise not only of the life that now is but also of that which is to come. He had likewise declared that this statement is worthy of all acceptation. He now says that, with reference to the realization of the promise in their own case, (for so the words translated “therefore,” in the English version, are to be understood according to the best commentators), he himself and other Apostles and teachers or, perhaps, other Christians, both labor and suffer reproach, because they trust in the living God who is the Saviour of all men, especially of those that believe. And, finally, he enjoins upon his fellow-laborer in the Gospel the duty of teaching all this. Now what was the thing which he was to teach? It was that godliness has the promise of the

future life. How extensively was he to teach this? Evidently, wherever he preached, and to whomsoever he addressed himself, for the Apostle says that it is a truth "worthy of *all* acceptance" What encouragement was he to give to those to whom he taught it, that they might earnestly seek this blessing, even through all toils and persecutions if need were? The same encouragement which had sustained his own heart, and that of Paul in their efforts—namely, that which was derived from a hope founded upon God as the Saviour of all men, and especially of all that believed in him. But this encouragement would have no foundation for many of his hearers, if any limitation is to be placed upon the phrase "the Saviour of all men." We cannot seek after godliness, at the first, unless we have the assurance that God is our Saviour, and we cannot have that assurance unless he is the Saviour of all men, for we have no revelation, any of us, that we belong to the limited number of the elect. If, then, the saying which the Apostle had uttered was worthy of all acceptance, and if Timothy was to proclaim it everywhere and to all hearers, as no one can doubt that he was,—for this is one view of the gospel, and he was a preacher of the gospel,—we may conclude, with even more confidence than before, if possible, that this verse declares the design of the atonement to be universal—not for the elect only, but all mankind.

The passage in the first Epistle of John, second chapter, first and second verses, is in the following words:—"My little children, these things I write unto you that ye sin not; and if any man sin we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous. And he is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world." The sacred writer here uses the strongest and plainest terms. Christ is declared to be the propitiation—to have made an atonement—not only for "us," but for the "world," not simply for the world, but for the *whole world*. No greater universality could be expressed than is expressed by this language. If the words are to be left in their ordinary and natural signification, the whole question is settled by this one verse alone. It is the announcement of the truth for all mankind, in all ages, by the last survivor of the Apostolic company. The advocates of the

doctrine of a limited atonement have always understood the difficulty which this passage presents in the way of holding their theory, and they have made the best efforts they could to escape its force. It is manifest that no other possible way of escape offers itself except that of explaining away the meaning of the universal expression. Accordingly, they apply themselves to this task with all energy. The great source of all authority for the Princeton school, in the seventeenth century, announces that no man can take comfort from a grace that is common both to the elect and non-elect, and unless he knows that Christ's death has provided something more for him than it has for unbelievers; and, on the ground of this statement, he says that the phrase must be taken as referring to the elect scattered throughout the world. The verse was written, according to his view, to prevent any one of the Christian readers in the church or churches, to which the Epistle was originally written, from supposing that the propitiation made by Christ was designed either for the Apostles alone, or for Jews alone, or for themselves alone. But how was it possible for Christians of the date of this Epistle, and Christians, too, who, probably, lived in Asia Minor, and were of Gentile origin, to suppose that the atonement was designed for either of these classes only. The gospel had now been preached, far and wide, for forty years or more. It had been proclaimed in its fullness and the universality of its offers, as extending to Gentiles as well as Jews, by the Apostle Paul and his fellow-laborers throughout all the region of which Ephesus, where John lived, was the centre. The very proclamation of it by the Apostles, showed every convert, in a way that he could not by any means mistake, that the propitiatory sacrifice was not for the Apostles only. The wayfaring man, though a fool, must have known this. Again, Gentile churches, or churches which knew anything of the history of the gospel since the death of Christ, must have learned, before this time, that Christ did not die for the Jews alone. Moreover, all the arguments which have been brought forward, as proving that *χόσμος* in other passages does not refer to Gentiles and Jews simply, apply with equal force here. This cannot, therefore, be the Apostle's meaning in this verse. And, finally,—as for

the third supposition,—a church, or a circle of churches, (such as that to which this Epistle was addressed), could not have existed which believed that Christ died for no one else but themselves. Such a belief was contrary to the very fundamental and rudimentary teachings of their religion, and contrary to the very demands and necessities of their life, for how could they maintain themselves as a Christian church, or obey their Lord's command, except by preaching the gospel to those around them. Or if such a church was a *possibility* in those times, the Christians to whom John wrote could not have had this character, for, if they had been thus unchristian or exclusive, the Apostle could not have failed to make it manifest in his letter by a sharp rebuke, or by correcting their erroneous views with clearness and at length. But there is no hint of any such thing in the Epistle from its beginning to its end. It is impossible, therefore, that John wrote these words for the purpose of preventing mistake in regard to any one of these points, and "the whole world," as he uses the phrase here, must have some other reference than any one of these three.

But we are told by the modern advocates of this doctrine, that the words used in this verse ought to be limited by the surrounding context. From the commencement of the Epistle down to this point, it is said, the author has been addressing himself to Christians,—sometimes directing his exhortations to them by using the second person, and sometimes uniting himself with them in the use of the first person. The same way of speaking is found, also, in the verses which follow the one now under consideration. Moreover, this verse is introduced in immediate connection with one which tells the Christian believers, to whom he is writing, where they may find help, in case they fall into sin. They have an advocate in the person of Jesus. But if the author is referring to Christian believers in all the preceding and succeeding verses, he must be referring to them here also. When he says, therefore, in this connection, that Christ is "the propitiation not for our sins only, but for the sins of the whole world," the meaning must be taken to be this—that he is the propitiation not only for the sins of those Christians to whom the Apostle is now writing, but also for those of all Christians who may find themselves in

a like condition, (i. e. who may have fallen into sin,) wherever they may live in the world, and in whatever period of the world's history. The whole passage, it is said, is designed for the comfort and help of Christians, and hence there can be no reference to any one else in any part of it. Indeed, the force of the passage for the Christian heart is lost, if it is not limited to the aid and delivering grace which Christ gives to his own followers alone. But in considering the meaning of the verse, we must remember, in the first place, that the word here employed is one which, as we have already seen, is never used in the New Testament to denote *some men* or a class of men scattered throughout the world. We must, also, in the second place, remember that the expression here used is one which it is more difficult thus to limit than is the simple word "world." The author says "not of us only, but of *the whole world*." Moreover, in the third place, it should be noticed that this strong expression is used in but one other instance by this Apostle in any of his writings, and that, in that instance, it is unquestionably employed in an unlimited signification, and with a distinction from the "us" of whom the verse before us speaks. The instance to which we refer is in 1 John v. 19 :—"And we know that we are of God, and the whole world lieth in wickedness." The very infrequency and emphasis of the expression, when taken in connection with its unmistakable meaning where it does occur, give additional evidence of the Apostle's intention in using it. And, finally, the careful reader will not fail to observe that this statement in respect to the propitiation for sin is not a mere subordinate part of the preceding sentence,—which speaks of the aid which Jesus as an Advocate gives to his believing followers,—but it is an *additional* statement, "*And he is the propitiation,*" &c. Even if we admit, then, the truth of what is said,—that the comforting force to the believer of the assurance that he may turn to the great Advocate is lost, unless there is some special efficacy in Christ's intercession for him, which is not known in the case of the unbeliever,—the conclusion which is drawn does not hold with regard to this added verse. We are to interpret in such a sentence according to the usage of the words employed, and are to change the uniform usage for an utterly

unknown one, only in case we are absolutely compelled to do so. The words employed here, as we have seen, are never found with the meaning which has to be assigned to them by those who assert the doctrine of a limited atonement. But, on the other hand, even if we take the preceding verse as having reference to a work of Christ exclusively for believers, the words of this verse can be satisfactorily explained as giving an additional thought, and as setting forth the work of Christ in relation not only to believers, but to the whole world. Under circumstances like these, we believe no competent scholar, whose judgment was not biased by preconceived theological views, would hesitate for one moment which course to adopt, or would fail to say emphatically that *the usage of the language must determine the meaning here*. As Neander remarks, "There is presupposed in this perpetual advocacy of Christ—as appears from the immediately following connection—that which He has, once for all, wrought out for the human race. When John speaks of the reconciliation for *our* sins, he feels constrained to guard against every limitation of the universal reference to the work of redemption. His vision widens to embrace all humanity; to behold in Christ not alone the reconciliation for those who already believe, but for those who as yet belong to the world. The reconciliation of Christ has for its object all humanity in its estrangement from God; all which belongs to the world as it stands opposed to the kingdom of God." This passage, must, then, be regarded as showing that Christ died for the non-elect as well as the elect. The apostle John unites with Paul in *this form* of presenting the truth of a universal atonement, as we have already found him in harmony with the same great teacher of the Gentiles in *another form* of stating the same truth. God is the Saviour of all men, especially of those that believe. Jesus Christ is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world. The design of the sacrifice upon the cross, then, was not for those who should believe alone, but for the whole unconverted world—for the whole world of mankind.

III.

The *third class* of passages, to which reference was made at the beginning of our discussion, is the class which declare that Christ died *for some who may hereafter prove not to be among the elect*. Among this class may be mentioned Romans xiv. 15, and 1 Cor. viii. 11; two passages which are substantially similar to each other. We shall refer to them, however, only in a single word. In connection with the latter of the two, which reads, "And through thy knowledge shall the weak brother perish, for whom Christ died," Dr. Charles Hodge offers two suggestions. One is, that this is a mere supposed case which never will happen, and therefore it has no bearing on the point in question. The justness of this conclusion might be a matter of dispute, but we pass it over at the present time. The other suggestion is, that, even if we do not adopt the view just mentioned, the force of the verse can be set aside by saying, that "to die for a person" is to die *for his benefit in any way*, and so the weak brother here referred to may be simply one for whose benefit (in the way of prolonging his probation, &c.) Christ died. But wherein lies the special force of that reason which Paul here presses upon the stronger and more enlightened Christian not to lead his weaker brother into sin? Does it not lie in the danger that the weak brother, if he follows this example, will lose *the particular thing* which Christ died to secure for him? It would seem impossible to doubt this. There is, comparatively speaking, no emphasis in the words at all on any other view of them. They might as well have read, And through thy knowledge the weak brother shall perish to whom Christ gave good health or any other temporal blessing, or even,—a reading which on this explanation of the passage (which assumes that the case alluded to is not a mere supposed case never actually to occur) would seem more exactly in accordance with the Princeton doctrine—and through thy knowledge the weak brother shall perish for whose salvation Christ did not die. Is it conceivable that Paul meant to convey such an idea as this, when he urged the stronger brother in the church to be

tender and considerate toward the weaker? Is it conceivable that he meant to say no more than that the weak brother had had his probation lengthened out for a while by reason of Christ's death? No, he evidently spoke of him as a weaker brother, indeed, but as one for whom the atoning sacrifice was made as truly as it was for the stronger and more enlightened. He meant to say, and he did say, that the weak brother was liable to *lose salvation*, though Christ died that he might *gain salvation*. We may as well abandon all attempts to interpret the Scriptures, if we cannot determine this to be his meaning. When theologians can do no better with his words than explain them thus, they may be sure that their doctrines will not stand the test of time.

The passage in the second Epistle of Peter, second chapter, first verse, is one of those which belong to the class now before us, and the only one which the limits of our Article will allow us to examine more minutely. The writer of this Epistle here teaches that in the midst of those to whom he sends his letter, there will arise "false teachers who privily will bring in damnable heresies, even denying the Lord that bought them, and will bring upon themselves swift destruction." In subsequent verses it is declared, that their "judgment now of a long time lingereth not, and their damnation slumbereth not;" that they "shall utterly perish in their own corruption," and that for them "the mist of darkness is reserved forever." The plainness and distinctness of this language are equalled only by its awful import. Such teachers, says the Apostle, shall arise, shall introduce these damnable heresies, and shall bring upon themselves this destruction. Persons whose actions and fate are described in such terms as these, can scarcely be regarded as certainly of the elect; and yet it is said of these persons, that the Lord bought them. He bought, therefore, those who, to say the least, may prove to be outside of the limited number of the elect. In this verse Dr. Candlish does not undertake to explain away the meaning of the individual words, but he attempts to set it aside by the following remarks: "This passage," he says, "turns on the interest which God has in the parties referred to, rather than on the interest which they have in him. It asserts God's pre-

rogative, rather than their privilege. It proceeds on the consideration, not of any claim which they have upon God, but of the claim which God has upon them. In this view, what gives this text, rightly apprehended, its peculiar point, emphasis, and solemnity, is not the assertion, as a matter of fact (*de facto*), on the part of the persons referred to of the tie, or the relationship, or the obligation indicated by the expressions used; but rather the assumption of it, as a matter of right (*de jure*), on the part of God." But if these remarks leave the expression "denying the Lord that bought them" in its legitimate and natural meaning, they amount to nothing, so far as the question in hand is concerned. Whether set forth emphatically or not—whether the main point which the writer had in mind or not—whether the matter is viewed from the side of God or that of man,—these words declare that the persons referred to "deny the Lord that bought them." Suppose this statement is the most subordinate of all parenthetical clauses, and that it has no bearing whatever upon the solemn warning which is given to the Christian brotherhood—still, this little insignificant phrase describes these false teachers in language that is not to be mistaken. If the remarks which we have quoted, therefore, have any force at all, it must be through a denial of the natural and literal meaning of the phrase, "the Lord that bought them." But can these words be properly interpreted in any other than the literal way? As for the word *ἀγορεύειν*, which is here translated *bought*, it has but two uses in the New Testament. It either means to buy merchandise, land, &c., or is applied to those whom Christ purchased or redeemed by his blood. Even if it were to be taken here in the former sense, it would still be true that they were bought at the price of his sacrifice. But, wherever the verb is used with any reference to Christ, it has the latter of the two meanings, and, therefore, it unquestionably has the same meaning here. There can be no doubt, also, that the person spoken of as redeeming them in Christ, for, though the word "Master" is used in the original text, the meaning is settled by the strikingly parallel passage in the fourth verse of the Epistle of Jude, where these teachers are represented, according to the true text, as denying the only Master and

Lord, Jesus Christ." The effort made by Turretin, long ago, to escape the legitimate force of these words,—while it clearly showed the essential necessity of doing so in case the doctrine of a limited atonement is to be held at all,—made equally manifest the futility of every such attempt. The redemption here spoken of is not, as he thought, a mere freeing of the persons in question from idolatry that they might be outwardly connected with the church, nor was it a mere admission of these persons into the office of teachers, which admission, by a sort of figure, is called a purchasing of them as slaves on the part of Christ as a master. Everything in all the usage of the New Testament writers proves the falsity of any such view. It is and can be nothing else than what is, in every other place, indicated by the same verb—the redemption through the sacrifice of Christ upon the cross. Whatever may be true of some theologians, all scholars who have entered the field of New Testament Greek, and have learned the usages and rules of the language, have got beyond Turretin in these days. *And there is scarcely a respectable commentator of the present day who admits, either here or in any other verse which we have examined, A SINGLE POINT OR EXPLANATION which is made by the Princeton writers.* With this remark we are willing to leave the discussion of this passage. But until its force is destroyed, as it has never yet been destroyed, we have in it an additional testimony to the doctrine of a universal atonement. And Peter enters the company with John the Baptist, and John the Apostle, and the writer to the Hebrews, and the great preacher to the Gentiles, and places himself under the guidance of Jesus, the Divine Master, as a witness to that truth which is a message of great joy from God to all mankind.

IV.

The *fourth* class of passages, to which reference was made at the beginning of our discussion, is the class which represent that the sinner's failure to obtain the blessings offered in Christ is owing not to any limited design in the extent of the atonement, but *to his rejection of the atonement which has been made for him.* We refer here to such verses as John v. 40, "Ye will not come to me that ye might have life;"—Heb.

ii. 3, "How shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation?"—Matt. xxiii. 37, "How often would I have gathered thy children * * * but ye would not." In the first of these passages, Christ himself is speaking; and the reason why the Jews before him did not gain the true life of the soul is declared to be simply this—that they *would not come to him* to receive it. But if the atonement was not designed for them, there was an additional and terrible reason why they did not attain to the blessing, and one which lay back of every other. It was such a reason, too, and one which bore such relations to their condition, that the failure to mention it in his discourses with the Jews would have been, in reality, a misrepresentation of the facts of the case. It could not, therefore, fail to have been alluded to, if it had existed. And as it was not alluded to, it did not exist.

The same remark will apply, in a measure at least, to the passage from the Epistle to the Hebrews. The writer of that Epistle addresses his readers as if every provision had been made for them, as if they had all been included in that "great salvation" which rested upon the atonement of Christ, and then he says, if they pass it by with neglect there will be no escape from the avenging justice of God. If the great salvation had not been provided for those who passed it by in neglect, by the extending of the atonement to their case, what a lowering would there be of the emphasis of this solemn question—nay, even, may we not say, what a misleading of the readers as to the truth would there be in the representation which the question seems to give! But, even beyond either of these passages, we have in the verse quoted from Matthew's Gospel a clear declaration of the truth. "How often would I—but ye would not." Is it possible, we may ask, that, at this time,—as Christ was weeping over the inhabitants of the devoted city and was uttering, in his sorrow for them, these words, "Ye would not,"—he knew that they were not merely rejecting him through love of their sins, but that they were not included at all in the design of his atoning work? But this is not all that meets us in this lamentation over Jerusalem. His words, as he appeals to his own readiness to receive these rejecters of his claims, are, "How often would I." Here is the

expression of his own heart. It is the declaration, with the utmost emphasis, of his will that these persons should come to him and be saved. How often, he says, during these years of my ministry—how often *would* I have gathered them all to myself and given them the blessing of eternal life! What language ever uttered was clearer or stronger? But, according to the theory of the writers whose doctrine we are now discussing, he had come into the world at first with a design, and had gone forward through his whole ministry carrying out a design, which absolutely and entirely excluded them all. This design was limited to the salvation of the elect alone. If this theory be the truth, his will was not to gather them to himself. It was not what the words used declare it to be, but directly the opposite. Either the theory of these writers, therefore, or the declaration of Christ must be rejected. They are flatly contradictory of each other. If, then, every other passage which we have examined were to be passed over, here in this single verse the Princeton doctrine is overthrown. This verse rings with the sound, Not *willing* that any should perish—Not **WILLING** that **ANY** should perish. It resounds above all the controversy of warring theologians with the announcement from the only begotten Son of the Father, that he died for all men.

But if he announces here this truth, with emphasis, and in language that cannot be mistaken, what, we may ask, is gained by any sophistical attempts to “explain away” the universality of other expressions of the same truth—such as, God *so loved the world* that he gave his Son that the world might be saved? In the light of these words, in the recording of which the Evangelists Matthew and Luke unite themselves to that company of witnesses, whose names have been already brought before us and on the foundation of whose testimony the faith of the Church must ever rest,—in the light of these words all such attempts are shown to be utterly fruitless.

The argument for the doctrine of a universal atonement, derived from many of the passages under this fourth class, is of a similar nature with that in the multitudinous and wide extended invitations of the Gospel. The Princeton writers, and

all in fellowship with them, have devoted themselves with much energy to prove that, though the atonement was made for the elect only, it is entirely sincere in God to offer salvation to all men. But they will never persuade any one outside of their own circle to accept their view. One of them asks, with an apparent feeling of triumph, "If God, in giving his Son for the redemption of his own people [and them only—for this is the doctrine] has paid a ransom sufficient for the deliverance of all men—does the purpose for which that ransom was paid [the design to pay it for the elect only—for this is the doctrine] present any barrier to the general offer of salvation?" In common with all whose minds have not been trained under the influences of Princeton theology, we answer, It *does* present such a barrier in the way of a sincere and general offer of salvation. The world of mankind, as they read the merciful invitation, "Come unto me all ye that labor and are heavy laden and I will give you rest," and as they learn the nature and loving kindness of the one who gives it everywhere, will never be persuaded that the sacrifice which he made of himself was not made for all to whom the invitation shall ever come. When they hear the gracious words addressed to the whole human race, "All things are now ready," they will not believe that except for a limited number, selected by mere will from among the race, "all things are *not ready*." And though the advocates of the doctrine which confines the atonement to the elect may tell us that "it is a weary business to have to answer the same objections day after day, and year after year," they will be obliged to meet these objections as long as they attempt to defend their views. The weariness and labor, which are so unsatisfying, can be best avoided by laying aside the doctrine. This is the way which is indicated in the New Testament, and it is the only sure and wise way. The Apostles and Evangelists did not go out upon their mission as preachers of the gospel with a mere provision in their hands for somebody—they did not know whom. They did not feel that the universality of the offers which they were bidden to make was a universality *in appearance only*, or that the great sacrifice which their Saviour had offered upon the Cross was designed

for a *chosen number alone* who were scattered throughout the world. The enthusiasm of a Paul and the world-embracing love of a John were enkindled by no such doctrine as this. They told the same truth everywhere; "God is the Saviour of all men, especially of those that believe:" "Jesus is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world:" This is a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptance. "Their commission did not run in these words, Come, because for aught we know, some of you may be elected to the feast, and therefore we invite you all. No. It was a more sure word, a more distinct testimony—Come, for all things are ready, and yet there is room." This was the fullness of the blessing of the gospel invitation which was entrusted to them for every soul. This was the offer which they carried to every soul whithersoever they went, and which they knew was an offer of Divine sincerity, for it was founded upon the great fact of a Universal Atonement.

The limits of our Article have not allowed us to examine more than a portion of the passages which prove the atonement to be for all mankind. But those to which we have referred are sufficient, and they establish the doctrine in a variety of ways. They tell us that the grace of God bringeth salvation to all men; that God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son to save every one who would believe; that Christ came in order that the world might be saved, and to be the Saviour of the world; that he is the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sin of the world; that he tasted death for every man; that he gave himself a ransom for all; that he is the Saviour of all men, especially of those that believe; that he is the propitiation, not only for the sins of his own followers, but also for the sins of the whole world; that he would have saved his rebellious enemies, except that they would not come to him for salvation; that he proclaims everywhere to all mankind, "Come, for all things are ready." This is the language in which the New Testament writers, one after another, declare the design of Christ's atoning sacrifice. Is it limited or universal? If it is denied to be universal, though presented in such universal forms of statement, we ask those who deny it

to tell us how the Apostles and the Lord could have expressed their thought, in case they had desired to proclaim an unlimited design. What could they have said that they have-not said? Where is language to be found more clear, more full, more varied in its forms of presenting the same truth, more carefully guarded, by constant repetition, from being misapprehended by any except those who will not see?

The unsoundness and baselessness of the Princeton exegesis of these passages is equaled only by what we have already seen in the fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. The doctrine which they hold in both cases is one which is founded in theological speculation, and not in the Scriptures, as fairly interpreted. And no anathemas or fulminations against their opponents will ever change the great facts. The Princeton writers deal in anathemas largely, and even those who have "no space or taste" for exegetical inquiry have no want of either for the introduction of these. Thus the latest writer of their school on the Atonement, Dr. A. A. Hodge, whose work is highly approved by those of the inmost circle surrounding the fountain of Princeton orthodoxy, indulges himself in no measured way. He speaks of those who defend the governmental theory of the atonement against his own theory as "blaspheming," and intimates that "no exhibition of human depravity that has ever disgraced the earth is more amazing" than is one of their charges. And in keeping with the remarks of this latest author, we find in the *Princeton Review* the comment upon the work of one of their most prominent opponents,—namely, the treatise on the Atonement by the Rev. Albert Barnes,—that it is "rationalistic"—which is a word of more terrible import to the minds of these gentlemen than Dr. Johnson's "phenomenon" was to the fishwoman, and only surpassed by one other in the language,—namely, the word "Arminian." It is also added, in a milder strain;—"We can hardly believe that it [Mr. Barnes's book] contains truth enough to save the soul. A man might as well attempt to live on the husk of a cocoa-nut." Remarks of this kind are not very much to our taste. They do not add greatly to the refinements and elegances of style, nor do they seem to us to carry with them much weight of argument. But as the Prince-

ton theologians take so much satisfaction in these things, and as they do not hurt anybody else, we are not disposed to complain. We can endure anything with equanimity from their leaders, so long as they do not assure us that all Biblical scholars adopt their exegesis; and, even when they emphatically assert this, the disturbance of our equanimity is in another line than that of indignation.

ARTICLE VII.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

THE PRINCETON REVIEW FOR JANUARY.—We are happy to agree with the "Princeton Review" whenever we can; and we certainly do concur with that Journal in its professed willingness to submit the questions at issue between it and the "New Englander," to the judgment of candid men. That the "Princeton Review" has been guilty of a perverse and injurious representation of Dr. Taylor's theology, has been made out, we believe, to the satisfaction of fair-minded judges. That Review manifests displeasure at the following passage from our Rejoinder in the October Number of the "New Englander:"

"It is true that Dr. Taylor was a life-long opponent of the Princeton theology. Gratuitous condemnation for Adam's sin; congenital sin inflicted upon the sinless by a judicial decree prior to their existence; sin meriting damnation, before the least consciousness of a rule of right; absolute natural impotency of the soul to throw off the bondage to evil thus engendered in it; literal endurance of the legal penalty by Christ, but only for a part of mankind, selected by mere will, without reference to results in the general good; right of this fraction to claim salvation as a matter of strict justice, their punishment having been endured; conversion of this fraction by dint of creative omnipotence acting irresistibly within their souls; perdition of all the rest, judicially inflicted for a sin done before they were created, for propagated sin which they could not prevent, and for not believing in an atonement never provided for them, and when all power of thus believing had been extirpated from their souls, through the necessary effect of an ancestor's transgression;—this system, Dr Taylor thought, in its logical implications, blots out human probation and with it the moral government of God."

The Conductors of the "Princeton Review" speak of this as a "distorted" description of their system. A charge so vague is incapable of being refuted. Had they ventured to specify the particulars in which they consider it inexact, it would have been easy to establish, clause by clause, its perfect correctness, by abundant and irresistible proofs drawn from their own published writings. These theologians are constantly asserting that condemnation for Adam's sin finds its exact counterpart in the gratuitous element of justification; that is, they affirm a "gratuitous condemnation."

Why should they quarrel with a phrase which brings out the precise characteristic of their theory? So every other part of the paragraph cited above, is an accurate equivalent of their familiar statements. There is no reason why they should wince at this naked exhibition of their system, unless they are accustomed to mask its obnoxious features even from themselves. We have not accused them of holding the logical implications of their dogmas, because we do not wish to copy their example in dealing with opponents.

After calling our paragraph a "distorted" portraiture of their system, they proceed to admit the substantial faithfulness of it, and declare it to be; also, a description of the system taught in the Westminster Creeds. This last we deny. The Princeton doctrine of immediate imputation—the corner-stone of the Princeton scheme of theology—has been a hundred times proved *not* to be a doctrine of the Westminster Assembly. We have proved it ourselves. If they do not heed our arguments, let them attend to those of Breckenridge, Shedd, Landis, and other writers of high standing in their own Church, who have demonstrated the same thing. The "Princeton Review" cannot alter history, or make white black, or black white, by obstinately asserting them to be so. And how idle it is to pretend that the Congregational Council at Boston sanctioned the Princeton theology! The Conductors of the "Princeton Review" know perfectly well that no vote of approval of their theological system could have received the support of more than an insignificant fraction of that assembly; that the Council was largely composed of new-school, as well as old-school men, and that all—Taylorites included—voted for the Declaration of Faith; nay, that Dr. Taylor himself professed his approval of the Westminster Confession with the same qualification. Failing thus to get support for their insinuations of heterodoxy—the old substitute for argument—from the Evangelical creeds, the Editors of the "Princeton Review" must rest satisfied with the remaining authority to which they appeal, the *North Western Christian Advocate*!

The "animus" of the "Princeton Review" in this discussion is plain. Its Conductors have been anxious to prevent the reunion of the two branches of the Presbyterian Church, unless they could put in the contract a condemnation of new-school theology. Hence they have raised the cry of "Taylorism," painted this type of theology in the blackest colors, and striven thus to rally a

party of proscription and intolerance. They speak of New England. The attempt to proscribe men for sympathizing with Dr. Taylor's theology is almost as obsolete in New England as the custom of hanging witches. Among Presbyterians in the Northern States, there are numerous ministers who hold the new-school theology, and not a few who differ little from Dr. Taylor. The "Princeton Review" must reconcile itself to this stubborn fact. Could a declaration, adverse to the new-school theology, be extorted from an Assembly of the New School Church—which we believe to be impossible—this fact would not be changed. The Conductors of that Review mistake the temper of Christian men of the present day; they mistake, we believe, the temper of the major part of their own denomination, who will not be chained to their intolerant policy. A few, perhaps, are left who accord with Dr. Baird in pronouncing heterodox Baxter, Howe, and Edwards. More adhere still to the somewhat less extravagant illiberality of Princeton. But this narrow, sectarian spirit, which starts with the assumption that the Church is a theological society, is melting away. The stars in their courses fight against it. The sympathies of the body of Christian men of all denominations are more just, charitable, catholic. These pharisaical fulminations against the New England theologians are heard almost everywhere with unconcern or disgust. The seventeenth century and its centrifugal, divisive spirit is gone; the nineteenth century, with its longing for union upon the one Foundation which Councils and Schools have not laid, is here. Is it not high time for Rip Van Winkle to awake?

THE WRITINGS OF PRESIDENT McCOSH.*—The writings of Dr. McCosh have been well known and highly valued in this country; and the appearance of them in a handsome, uniform edition appropriately attends his accession to the presidency of Princeton College. They are characterized by a manly vigor and earnestness, sound common-sense, and by that degree of philosophical merit which entitles them to the attention and respect of thinking men. In his successive publications, Dr. McCosh has evinced a growing power. The "Intuitions of the Mind," which we consider his ablest production, is much superior to the work on the "Divine Government," in respect to clearness and maturity of views and

* *The Writings of James McCosh, D. D., LL.D.*, President of the College of New Jersey, Princeton. 4 vols. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1869.

condensation of statement. In the treatise on "Intuitions," he writes more distinctly in the character of a philosopher, and less from the stand-point of theology. The Schoolmen, after Anselm, regarded philosophy as the *ancilla*—the handmaid—of theology. The business of the philosopher was to vindicate the accepted creed, and in thus serving Faith he discharged his highest office. Theology differs from philosophy in taking its start from a basis of historical facts, the facts of Gospel history, and from a Revelation possessing an authoritative character. Philosophy has no such data, furnished from without, with which to begin; but must proceed on the facts furnished by consciousness,—taking nothing for granted which is destitute of this inward verification. Every intelligent Christian, to be sure, holds that his faith is consistent and harmonious with reason and philosophy; but when he takes the chair of the philosopher, he must guard against assuming in this department the beliefs which he brings from another quarter. In other words, in philosophical investigation, he must follow the philosophical path with rigor and fairness, let it lead him whithersoever it will. He must be faithful to the methods and laws of rational inquiry, and not appear to be laboring to support a preconceived system of belief, however justified, on its own grounds, that system may be. Dr. McCosh is always an open, candid reasoner; and yet, if we mistake not, his later productions are marked by a higher measure of philosophical freedom, and less of the theologian's consciousness of a responsibility for making good the principles of the Christian system. This is due, indeed, partly, but not wholly, to the somewhat different nature of his themes.

The "Intuitions of the Mind," and its companion, the "Defense of Fundamental Truth," his controversial work against Mill, present a full view of Dr. McCosh's philosophical opinions. He is a sturdy opponent of Sensationalism, as it appears in Comte, Mill, Spencer, and other modern representatives of this school, and an earnest advocate of the spiritual philosophy which affirms that the mind is endowed with a stock of intuitive or *a priori* principles not imported into it from the world without. At the same time, he is an equally determined opponent of the Kantian doctrine in all its modifications, which gives to these principles only a subjective validity. Thus he sets himself in opposition to Hamilton's theory of nescience and of the relativity of knowledge, holds that the antinomies are resolvable, and that we have a real, though it

be an inadequate, knowledge of the Infinite and Absolute. The account which Dr. McCosh gives of the nature and origin of the intuitive convictions of the mind is clear and satisfactory. He shows that they are not innate images, or innate abstract notions; that they are not immediately before consciousness as laws or principles; but that they rise on the contemplation of objects, are primarily directed to individual things, and acquire their form, as general principles or axioms, by the operation of the faculty of abstraction and generalization. This is the true view of the subject. We are surprised that Dr. McCosh, in his notice of Professor Porter's recent work (*Independent*, Jan. 14), should attribute to the latter an opposite opinion,—the opinion, namely, that intuition is “a separate faculty, like the presentative, the representative, and the comparative powers.” Dr. McCosh has been misled by inadvertently inferring from the division of Professor Porter's treatise into four parts, the first three of which relate to as many faculties, that he holds to a distinct faculty of intuition. But this view Professor Porter discards. He makes (p. 77) the leading faculties of the intellect to be three, the presentative, the representative, and the generalizing faculty. He says (p. 97) that the intuitions must be “generalized from all our intellectual activities,” being involved in them. “We proceed,” he says, (p. 498), “to examine the power of knowledge, not for the purpose of ascertaining what it can perform or produce, but what its processes involve and assume.” And, on the next page, he speaks of the reference of these intuitions to a separate faculty, or faculties, by certain authors, whom, however, he does not, in this particular, follow. Dr. McCosh makes the first criterion of intrinsic truth to be self-evidence, and necessity to be a “secondary mark” of the same species of truth. He says: “I am not inclined to fix on this [necessity] as the original or essential characteristic. I shrink from maintaining that a proposition is true because we must believe it.” “I would not ground the evidence on the necessity of belief, but I would ascribe the irresistible nature of the conviction to the self-evidence.” The question which the Author is considering is, How are we to distinguish an intuitive or primitive conviction from other propositions? It appears to us that “self-evidence” and “necessity of believing” are here indistinguishable. In one sense, a proposition is not true, “because we must believe it:” it is not *made* true by our belief, but is true independently of that, or of our existence even. In another sense, however, a proposi-

tion is true—that is, is known to be true—because we must believe it. There is no ulterior, no higher, evidence than this necessity of belief. The whole fabric of our knowledge is founded on it. There is no need, therefore, of looking for any test of an intuitive conviction beyond this necessity, together with the universality which is inseparable from it.

We have looked through Dr. McCosh's volumes with much interest, in order to ascertain his views respecting the Will and Sin. He draws a marked distinction between will and sensibility. Will and emotions are not to be confounded. In insisting on this distinction, Dr. McCosh shows his wisdom and independence. It would be well if theologians generally would recognize the necessity of this discrimination. Dr. McCosh is also correct in refusing to limit the action of the will and the sphere of responsibility to executive volitions. This is a superficial notion, which no respectable thinkers of the present day would sanction. The will is active and the man is responsible, he affirms, for preferences which are not carried out in overt action. We do not think him, however, equally happy or entirely consistent in his use of terms on this branch of the subject. He frequently says that wish and desire belong to the optative faculty, and for them we are responsible. That we are often responsible for states of mind which are popularly termed wish and desire, is very true; but do all wishes and desires come under this category? Must there not be a distinction between such as are voluntary, and such as are involuntary? This, we think, is undeniable. Accordingly, we are not surprised to find Dr. McCosh making this distinction. Thus he remarks, (*Divine Government*, p. 310), "to prefer pleasure to pain, honor to disgrace, society to solitude; in such acts as these, whether they exist in the shape of wish, desire, or volition, there is nothing morally approvable, or the opposite. The morality in the will begins at the place at which conscience interposes." That is, the inward preference continued against the prohibition of conscience, becomes sinful. He allows (p. 270) that there may be a "collision of desires." He expressly allows (p. 311) that wish and desire are not sinful, when we are restrained from actually seeking an object by hatred of sin, and that "the concupiscence of evil is sinful whenever the will has given its consent to its rise or continuance" (p. 312, note). This precise statement is one with which we fully accord. It occurs in a note, in which Dr. McCosh dissents from the opinion of Chalmers, who confounds sensibility

with will. "Concupiscence of evil" is desire; and if, in order for it to be sinful, there must be superadded a consent of the will, then desire and will must be distinguished. We are not objecting to the doctrine of the Author on this topic; we merely think that his terminology is capable of being improved. Dr. McCosh rejects Edwards's definition of freedom, as the power to do as we please. He holds to an anterior liberty in choosing, such as is not included in this and similar definitions. (*Divine Government*, p. 271). Dr. McCosh explicitly affirms the power of contrary choice, as an essential characteristic of freedom. "The will is free. In saying so, I mean to assert not merely that it is free to act as it pleases. . . . I claim for it an anterior and higher power, a power in the mind to choose, *and when it chooses, a consciousness that it might choose otherwise.* This truth is revealed to us by immediate consciousness, and is not to be set aside by any other truth whatever. It is a first truth, equal to the highest, to no one of which it will ever yield." (*Intuitions, &c.*, p. 266. The italics are ours.) How is the will determined? Dr. McCosh holds that "antecedent circumstances do act causally on the will;" but that here "cause operates in a very different way upon the will from that in which it acts in other departments of nature." *How* cause thus operates, without infringing in the least on the freedom of choice, is pronounced an insoluble mystery. (*Ibid.*, pp. 269, 270.) These statements present the Author's view in its ripest form. We should observe that all the statements on this subject in the work from which these citations are drawn are more carefully and succinctly made than in "The Divine Government." As might be expected, Dr. McCosh holds that all sin, and all holiness, are voluntary. They involve choice. "Moral Good is a quality of certain actions proceeding from Free Will." (*Intuitions, &c.*, p. 256.) Sin "is not a separate entity, like a plant or an animal, but it is a quality of certain voluntary acts. It always resides in some mental affection or act in which there is the exercise of free will. The guilt of sin thus always lies with him who commits it." (*Ibid.*, pp. 260, 261.) Numerous passages, equally definite, of the same purport, might be extracted if we had room for them. It is merely the necessary corollary of his conception of the Will, and of the sources and conditions of responsibility. After reading these and the like propositions, the reader will be curious to learn what Dr. McCosh has to say on the subject of Original Sin. It is the theme of an elaborate note on page 377

of "The Divine Government." The Author refers with deserved praise to Müller's treatise, and shows the influence of it in his own remarks and reasonings. He does not profess to offer any theory to explain the origin or divine permission of moral evil. "As to original sin," he adds, "it should ever be treated as a fact established, but shrouded in mystery. Its existence can be argued very immediately from moral experience. All inquiries into actual sin conduct us to an original sin. The circumstance that all persons sin as soon as they begin to act for themselves is a clear proof of the existence of a sinful nature. Man's state of nature is much the same as that of one who had produced a sinful state of will by previous sinful acts. This prepares us to believe, on the authority of the Word of God, in a relation of our sinful nature to the common father of the race—which farther fact, however, is not fitted to remove the mystery. All inquiries conduct us, too, to a slavery of the will—a fact which cannot be inconsistent with its essential freedom." The moderation and sagacious caution of the Author are strikingly exhibited in these lines, and throughout the extended note from which they are taken. He holds to a bondage of the will to evil from the commencement of our personal life; but he declines to commit himself to any specific theory as to the way in which it originates. Were all theologians of "the Old Light School" as circumspect and judicious and reserved in their deliverances on this difficult subject, there would be far less controversy, and the preaching of the Gospel would encounter fewer hindrances in the way of its success.

Dr. McCosh adopts a governmental theory of the Atonement. He considers it a "provision for vindicating the Divine government, dishonored by the rebellion of the creature, and this in accordance with the character of God." (*Divine Government*, p. 474.) "We must believe that God hates sin, and that as upholder of the law and Governor of the world, he ought to punish transgression." Sin is intrinsically evil and ill-deserving; but Christ has so glorified God on earth, in the presence of angels and men, that sin may be justly and safely forgiven. There are various forms of the governmental theory. The one adopted by Dr. McCosh differs from the Grotian hypothesis, in that the latter looks merely to the public safety, with reference to the prevention of future transgression; while the former takes in the divine character, as requiring satisfaction or a public testimonial of honor,

through the obedience and suffering of the incarnate substitute for sinners.

In addition to the four volumes, which comprise the principal works of Dr. McCosh, the Messrs. Carter have published, in a pamphlet, three of his "Philosophical Papers,"—an "Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Logic," a "Reply to Mill's Third Edition," and an Article on the "Present State of Moral Philosophy in Great Britain." His timely and vigorous little work on the "Natural and Supernatural," which appeared a few years ago, is not included in the present edition of his writings. The productions of Dr. McCosh, in particular the "Divine Government" and the "Intuitions of the Mind," have been widely read in New England, and have been highly appreciated. His philosophical doctrines, as well as his recently expressed sentiments upon university education, are consonant with the best thought of New England. We trust that these able works—works pervaded throughout with an elevated Christian feeling—may have a still wider circulation in the form in which they have just been issued. The themes to which they relate are of the highest importance, and the character of the discussions is worthy of the themes.

THE AMERICAN EDITION OF SMITH'S "DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE:" PROFESSOR HADLEY'S ARTICLE ON THE LANGUAGE OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.*—Among the original articles contributed to the new edition of the Bible Dictionary is one (in Part XV.) by Professor Hadley, of Yale College, on the language of the New Testament. The well known learning and ability of the Author, as well as the interest that belongs to the theme, will render the following summary of the contents of Professor Hadley's discussion acceptable to our readers:

The subject of this Article is the much debated question, "What language was current in Palestine during the first century, and was used in the discourses and conversations reported in the New Testament?" It is certain that the ancient Hebrew of Moses, David, and Isaiah had ceased to exist as a popular language. The Hebrew mentioned in several New Testament passages as a spoken idiom, is shown by the specimens there given of

* *American Edition of Dr. William Smith's Dictionary of the Bible.* Revised and Edited by Professor H. B. HACKETT, D. D., with the coöperation of EZRA ABBOT, A. M., A. A. S., Assistant Librarian of Harvard University. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1868.

it to have been the Jewish-Aramaic or Chaldee. It was mainly in consequence of the Babylonian Captivity, but by a gradual process extending over several generations, that this dialect supplanted the old Hebrew. That it was in constant and familiar use among the Palestine Jews of the first century, is proved by a variety of evidence:—by the statements of the historian Josephus;—by the early existence in that country of a Hebrew (Aramaic) gospel of Matthew;—perhaps by the earliest Targums, or Chaldee translations of the Old Testament Scriptures, though these may have been designed rather for the Jews of Upper Asia;—but, most unequivocally, by testimonies found in the New Testament itself. Thus, the Apostle Paul used it in addressing the multitude at Jerusalem, who had evidently expected to hear him in Greek, and were gratified by his preference of their native idiom. Our Lord is expressly stated to have used it in a number of instances. Why these alone should be specified, when (as is probable) he used it habitually, is a question which admits only of conjectural answers. In one instance (“maiden, arise”), where Mark represents him as speaking Aramaic, Luke merely gives the Greek sense of his words, showing that in other cases we cannot safely hold him to have spoken Greek because he is not said to have spoken Aramaic.

The Greek was introduced into Palestine, as well as other countries about the eastern Mediterranean, by the conquests of Alexander. For a long time the land was subject to the Macedonian princes of Egypt and Spain, with whom Greek was the language of court and government, used in public documents, in laws and proclamations, and in the administration of justice, at least in the higher tribunals. It was the language of numerous colonial cities planted in all countries under Macedonian sway. It soon became the common language of commercial intercourse between these countries. In Palestine there were Hellenizing influences of a special character. The Seleucid rulers of Syria made strenuous efforts to force Greek culture and religion on the subject Jews. The national reaction under the Maccabees, brought about by these efforts, was of no long duration. The Romans, when they became masters of the country, were themselves already Hellenized to a great extent: there is little doubt that the Roman administration of state and justice in Palestine was conducted in Greek, not Latin. Of Caesarea, the second city in the land, and of many other cities, particularly in the north and northeast, we know that they were wholly or partly occupied by Greeks. The Jews who

migrated in large numbers into other lands, acquired the Greek, while they generally forgot their native idiom. Hence the first Bible-version—that of the LXX., made for the Jews in Egypt—was made in Greek, not Aramaic. These Jews, returning to Palestine at the national festivals, and on other occasions, would do much to extend the use of Greek in their own land. The Hellenists, twice mentioned in the Acts, were probably such returned Jews, who were distinguished not as speaking Greek (for most others could do so), but as speaking *only* Greek, having lost the knowledge of Aramaic. There is reason to believe that the Septuagint version was extensively used in Palestine. It is a significant fact that the quotations from the Old Testament made in the New are generally given in the language of the Septuagint. It is probable that this version was commonly read in the worship of the synagogue, with such renderings or explanations as might be required in Aramaic, and was thus made familiar to the ear and mind of the people. Even Josephus, though a man of learning, makes more use of the Septuagint in his works than of the original Hebrew.

The extent to which Greek had become current in Palestine, is apparent from the fact that the multitude in Jerusalem, whom Paul addressed in Aramaic, had hushed themselves to hear him address them in Greek. It is apparent, no less, from the style of the New Testament writers, most of them men of little learning, who yet use the Greek with a facility, power, and copiousness of expression, as if accustomed to use it from early years. Their Greek had, indeed, come down to them from persons who learned it in mature life, and therefore with a coloring of Aramaic, which the continued use of the Septuagint, with its Hebraizing idiom, had a tendency to perpetuate.

The conclusion is that the Palestine Jews of the New Testament period were to a great extent Bilingual, having the Aramaic for their popular idiom, but familiar also from childhood with the Greek. Among other cases of this kind, a striking one is presented by the modern Nestorians, who have for their vernacular tongue a dialect of the Syriac, but are all able to speak fluently the languages of the Turks or Koords among whom they live.

Which language, Greek or Aramaic, the speakers of the New Testament used in particular instances, is not generally stated. It may often be conjectured with more or less probability. We cannot safely assume, with a recent writer, that in every discourse

which contains an Old Testament passage cited in the words of the Septuagint, Greek must have been the original language. But we may presume that addresses made to Roman magistrates or other non-Jewish auditors, or to Jewish audiences outside of Palestine, were made in Greek. And, on the other hand, we may reasonably suppose that the familiar utterances of our Lord to his disciples and friends were spoken in Aramaic. It does not appear from the New Testament history that either our Lord or his apostles, in their public teachings, made use of any other languages than these.

These are the leading points of the Article, which concludes with a brief account of the literature of the subject.

THE ANTE-NICENE FATHERS: THE WRITINGS OF ORIGEN.*—The publishers of the new translations of the patristic literature of the first three centuries include in their late issues Irenaeus, Hippolytus, the first volume of Cyprian, and one volume of Origen. The prospectus did not promise a complete translation of Origen's writing, but we trust that the patronage extended to the series will be sufficient to induce the publishers to make it comprise everything prior to the Council of Nicæa. The present volume of Origen includes the treatise "*De Principiis*," and Book I. of the work against Celsus. The former, the first system of divinity which was produced in the Church, exists only in the Latin version of Rufinus, and the value of it to us is very much lessened by the liberties which that translator took with the original. The title signifies the beginnings or foundation—not of doctrine—but of *things*. The Trinity is a leading topic, since the aim is to unfold the metaphysics which Christianity reveals. The work against Celsus is the ablest of all the apologetic treatises which have come down to us. It exhibits the mature views of its author, for it was written in the latter part of his life. It offers an instructive picture of the controversy that was going on between the assailants of Christianity and its friends, with a fair view of the arguments on both sides. The references to Celsus are so numerous that we can form a good idea of the character and contents of his work. It is to be hoped that the Commentaries of Origen—at least those on Matthew and John—may be added to the treatises, of which

* *The Ante-Nicene Christian Library*: Translations of the Writings of the Fathers, down to A. D. 325. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1869. New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 654 Broadway.

we have here the first installment. These exist in the Greek, and hence we are not left in doubt as to whether we have the thoughts of Origen, or the thoughts deemed advisable to substitute for them.

THAYER'S REVISED TRANSLATION OF WINER'S NEW TESTAMENT GRAMMAR.*—This admirably printed volume is the fulfillment of a promise which was given to the public three years ago. It was then announced that Professor Thayer, who had recently entered upon his duties in the Theological Seminary at Andover, was about to prepare a revised translation of Winer's Grammar. So much time had elapsed without the appearance of the work, that those who were interested in the matter, and yet were unacquainted with the facts of the case, were beginning, at length, to fear that the undertaking had been abandoned. But, early in the present year, these apprehensions were set aside by the publication of the book, and an explanation of the long delay was given, which will prove very satisfactory to all who have desired its appearance. The translator's preface informs us that after a very considerable portion of the work had been finished, and three hundred pages or more had been stereotyped, the plans which had been formed were largely modified by the publication of the seventh edition of the Grammar in Germany. With a determination to make the work as valuable as possible, the translator resolved to revise the whole in connection with this latest edition. He accordingly retraced his steps to a considerable degree, and prepared his translation in conformity with his modified plan. The result is, that we have before us, in our own language, "a reproduction of the original work," in its most perfect form, and with its author's latest additions and improvements. The wisdom, as well as the appreciation of the interests of students of the New Testament, which Professor Thayer has displayed in adopting this course at the cost of long delay and largely increased labor, entitle him to the favorable regard of the public.

The present work, as the translator informs his readers, is

* *A Grammar of the Idiom of the New Testament*; Prepared as a Solid Basis for the Interpretation of the New Testament. By Dr. GEORGE BENEDICT WINER. Seventh Edition, Enlarged and Improved. By Dr. GOTTLIEB LUENEMANN, Professor of Theology at the University of Göttingen. Revised Translation. By Prof. J. HENRY THAYER, of Andover Theological Seminary. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1869. 8vo. pp. 718.

founded upon and is substantially a revision of the translation by Professor Edward Masson, which appeared about ten years ago. This translation was made from the sixth edition of the original. It was more valuable, on this account, than the translations of previous editions at an earlier date, but, as is well known, it was so marred by mistakes as to make it an unsatisfactory work. A thorough and careful comparison of it with the German work and the preparation of a new American translation were much to be desired. The labor necessary to this end, together with the examination of the more recent German edition which was published some seven years after Professor Masson's volume appeared, is what Professor Thayer has taken upon himself. It is just to him to say, that his work has been well performed. So far as we have been able to examine the two volumes, we find that he has avoided or corrected the errors of Masson's translation. We do not doubt that the old volume will be entirely superseded by the new one.

The New Testament Grammar of Winer is too well known and too highly esteemed to require any statement respecting it at this time. It has been, to say the least, one of the great works which, within the past fifty years, have done so much to advance the progress of the study of the New Testament language. The change which has so largely done away with the old and unreasonable ideas in regard to that language, and which has introduced a more scholarly method of study and a more sound and sensible style of interpretation, is, in no inconsiderable degree, due to the labors of this celebrated man. He and his fellow-laborers in the same or kindred departments have put an end to the custom of reading into the Sacred Text what is derived from mere preconceived theological notions, or from erroneous views which are made the basis of all interpretation. At least, they have accomplished this result, except in the case of those who are altogether unscholarly, or those who have such doctrines to defend as, with a fair interpretation, are not to be found in the Scriptures. And the progress of a few more years will see even these persons diminishing in numbers and gradually passing away. We are glad to have the works of these scholars made accessible to American students and ministers. We hope that, under their influence, our ministers will become more and more learned men, in the best sense of the word, and that they will enter more and more fully into a true and thorough Biblical scholarship

Professor Thayer's translation, in addition to its greater accuracy and more faithful presentation of the original work, is made very useful by its more perfect index of the passages in the New Testament which are referred to in the volume. In this respect, the former translation, of which we have spoken, is incomparably inferior. The designation of the pages of the sixth and seventh German editions, in the margins of the pages of this volume, will prove quite valuable to those who have occasion to use German commentaries, but have not the Grammar in German. A considerable amount of labor will, frequently, be saved for the student by this happy expedient of the translator. There are, comparatively speaking, few opportunities for a person to make himself prominent, who simply tries to present in his own native language the thoughts and ideas of a foreign author. Professor Thayer has been careful to avoid even these opportunities, and to hide himself as much as possible behind the work which he has done. But we believe that he may take the full satisfaction of having rendered a good service to those engaged in the studies belonging to his own department, and we feel sure that his efforts will be appreciated by many as they deserve to be.

EWER'S SERMONS ON THE FAILURE OF PROTESTANTISM.*—The Sermons contained in this volume are a series of discourses which the author preached, a few months since, before the congregation worshiping in his own church. They have attracted a larger share of the public attention than they deserve, if they are to be judged either by their merits as sermons or by the importance of the things which they say. As literary performances they compare favorably with many of the discourses of the author's compeers in the Anglican Catholic Church, as he is pleased to call it. But they are, certainly, not very remarkable specimens of pulpit eloquence. As for the statements which they make, and the picture of the present and the future which they give, we do not suppose that they are particularly alarming to anybody among 'the sects.' But they assert that Protestantism has proved a failure; and, for this reason, a considerable number of persons of more or less prominence have felt called upon to reply to them. This is a thing naturally to be expected. A person who should

* *Sermons on the Failure of Protestantism, and on Catholicity.* By the Rev. FERDINAND C. EWER, S. T. D., Rector of Christ Church, New York. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 168.

take an opportunity afforded him to deliver a course of lectures on American liberty, and should use it for the purpose of showing that the Declaration of Independence has proved itself to be a complete failure, would, doubtless, suddenly find his name in the public papers, and would call forth lectures and argumentations on the other side. But the great mass of thinking men would not be very much disturbed by his assertions, or frightened by his solemn warnings. And as for the great Declaration, we have confidence that it would survive his lectures without any perceptible diminution of its vigor and life. In the controversy between Protestantism and Dr. Ewer, it would not be surprising if the result should prove to be somewhat similar, and if the failure were to be with the Reverend gentleman rather than with what he considers a great heresy.

The author makes two points against Protestantism, as showing that it has evidently and disastrously failed. The first is, that it has failed to reach the masses; the second, that it has failed to preserve Christianity on earth, or has tended toward infidelity. The first evil—that in respect to reaching the masses—is exhibited in the pew-system and the absence of “sisterhoods,” as matters connected with the practical arrangements of the church, and in the want of attractiveness for several classes of men, as, for example, those who desire a positive faith, and the want of provision for the squalid and meaner portions of the population. The second is seen in the dreadful condition of those countries, such as Germany and New England, where Protestantism has had its largest influence. On this latter evil he is, if possible, more decisive than on the former. The descending scale, along which the adherents of “the sects” pass, with fearful rapidity, is presented with a kind of prophetic fervor. The worthy grandfather of a family in New England, or any other Protestant region, lived his simple life as a Calvinistic Presbyterian (so Dr. Ewer represents the matter), but, unfortunately, with his Presbyterianism he had a tendency toward private judgment and discussion. The terrible result of such a tendency in the good and godly man did not wait long before its evil influence began to work. The father of the family—alas! that the degeneracy is so great in a single generation—becomes a Congregationalist. And he discusses and “privately judges” more than his father did. No wonder that the evil develops more rapidly as it passes on to his son, who becomes a Unitarian, and to his grandson, who ends the history in Parkerism and infidelity.

All this is as natural as it is appalling. It is seen everywhere where Protestantism has found a home, and it is seen because Protestantism has no real ground to stand upon, and, therefore, must gradually disappear. The proof of this downward tendency is given in the presentation of the horrible condition of infidelity in New England, where the author seems to think that vital godliness is rapidly passing away. In those districts where revivals have been most frequent, he thinks the evil is worse than in other places. Such districts are spiritually burned over, as it were, and are "nigh unto cursing." Even Yale College—in regard to which he remarks, that he believes it to have been founded on account of the Unitarianism of Harvard—displays in its history the working of the same great law of decay. President Clap "publicly acknowledged not only the Westminster Catechism and Confession of Faith and the Saybrook Platform, but also the Apostles', Nicene, and Athanasian Creeds as agreeing with the word of God." President Stiles would not assent to anything but the Saybrook Platform. This last mentioned test of faith "was abrogated in 1822," and thus the Church of Christ in the College "which began with full, definite, established formulas of Faith has ended, in this respect, in nothing." These are but illustrations, of course, drawn from the immediate neighborhood of the author's residence, but they are illustrations of a universal fact. New England seems to be a favorite place for all persons to refer to, who wish to depict the evils resulting from free thought. And we are not surprised that it is so, for we have had freedom of thought in its largest extent here, and, of course, have had its accompanying dangerous tendencies. But when a worthy Episcopal minister of the more sacerdotal order, in the city of New York, begins to deplore in public the want of piety and religious life in New England, we feel somewhat as we did, in former days, when Southern statesmen discoursed upon the wild, excessive liberty of New England, or as we do occasionally, even now, when theologians of the Princeton stripe bewail the rationalism of new-school theology. It is a mysterious ordering of Providence that there are always some men in the world who want to go back to the dark ages, and who are filled with alarm when ordinary human beings begin to think. But it is no strange thing, when such men exist, that they regard everything that moves in the line of thought as a failure. We do not know that Dr. Ewer is a man of this order, but his recent utterances, and those of his friend, Dr. Morgan Dix—who thinks

that Martin Luther, by advocating private judgment in respect to the Bible, laid the foundation of all the errors and infidelity and rationalism of the present day, and therefore that private judgment should not be tolerated—are utterances which belong to men of this order. They are utterances which will be reëchoed, no doubt, in another generation by men of the same class who may follow them, but they will, probably, have little influence on the progress of the world. The Protestant element, which has, after so many struggles and trials, found a firm place among mankind, is a thing which the race will not be likely to give up. Revolutions do not go backward, however much lamentation there is over their going forward. We are not aware that piety is much diminished now beyond what it was before Martin Luther began his work.

Dr. Ewer has a very admirable way of conducting his argument, so far as the interests of his own side are concerned. If any one attempts to answer what he says, by showing that the Catholic branches of the Church have failed as badly, or even worse than Protestantism, Dr. Ewer replies by saying that this is not the question. The question is in regard to Protestantism only. But, if this "great heresy" has succeeded as well, or even better than Catholicism, (whether Anglican, Roman, or Greek), in reforming, elevating, and Christianizing the world, it seems to us that Dr. Ewer's conclusions prove to be somewhat unfounded. The Lord, surely, has not left the world altogether without the light of truth. If, however, he has not thus left it, the light of truth must be in that system which is doing the most for the spiritual welfare of mankind. Supposing, now, we can show that—with all its failures to accomplish everything that could be desired—Protestantism is more successful, and has always been more successful than the Catholic system, the charges and solemn declarations which these sermons contain lose much, if not the whole, of their force. It is perfectly proper, therefore, to bring this comparison of the two systems into the discussion. But Dr. Ewer has hit upon another happy method of escaping the force of what his adversaries say. In case they prove a failure in any one of the three branches of the great Catholic Church, he immediately replies that this amounts to nothing, for these failures are owing to the additional elements—outside of simple Catholicism—which these branches have adopted, and which make them Anglican, Roman, or Greek. Of course, under such circumstances, the controversy is wholly in his own hands. As

there is no Catholicism pure and simple, the advocate of Protestantism cannot say that it fails to reach the masses, or tends towards infidelity. He can only say this of one after another of the three branches of the Church, all of which have their Catholicism mixed with foreign elements. But, if all the Catholicism which we have had any experience of is that in the mixed and adulterated forms, our only possibility of judging is to confine ourselves to these forms. We can show that the Anglican Catholic Church, for example, does not reach the masses any more successfully—or even as much so—as the “sects” do. Everybody knows this, and Dr. Ewer does not seem to deny it altogether. We can, also, show that, while the Roman and Greek branches of the Catholic Church succeed in *influencing* the masses, they signally fail in *Christianizing* them. But we cannot show that the unadulterated Catholicism, of which Dr. Ewer speaks, has failed, and he cannot show that it has not failed, for there is no such thing in the world. The question, in this light, becomes simply a question as to which of the two systems, which he describes as the Catholic and the Protestant, is most in accordance with the ideas and principles which the Lord gave to his disciples. Is that system “which founds everything on the Bible,” or that system “which rests everything upon the Church” the true system? Which of the two is in accordance with the mind of Christ? This is the question on which the whole controversy turns. But if so, Dr. Ewer’s sermons might better have dwelt upon that question. Instead of this, he charges Protestantism with being a failure, and laboriously attempts to prove the charge. We reply that it has, beyond question, failed in a measure—nothing in this world is perfect or perfectly successful—but it has succeeded better than any branch of the Catholic Church. This has no bearing upon the matter, he answers, for these branches are not the Catholic Church pure and simple. There is no Catholic Church pure and simple, we reply; and if the distinguished Doctor hides himself, in case of every assault, behind the Anglicanism, the Romanism, and the Greek element, we can carry the argument no farther on this line. We can only say that the Catholic system is, historically, *in these forms*, and that, if we are to compare it with Protestantism at all during the past three hundred years, we must compare it as manifested in one of these three forms. Whether the Catholic system in any other form, or in an unadulterated form, would have succeeded any better, is a thing on which Dr. Ewer may hold one

opinion and his neighbor may hold another; and the one opinion is as good as the other, until it is decided on independent evidence which is Christ's own system. We think, however, that if Dr. Ewer makes the distinctive peculiarity of pure Catholicism to be "the resting of everything upon the Church," the world will not agree with him in feeling that this idea or principle has been very favorable to the highest growth of piety and the widest extension of pure Christianity in the ages past.

Dr. Ewer regards Protestantism as the second of the three great heresies of the world's history. The first was Arianism, and the third is, and is to be, modern "Criticism" as represented by Strauss, Rénan, and Colenso. He seems to think that the third is the last one which is to be anticipated. There have been, indeed, and may be many other minor heresies, which "strike at the superstructure and pinnacles of Christianity," but these are "the monstrous forms of the brood which strike at her very foundations." Arianism assailed the Church, as the mystical body of Christ, by attempting to destroy the God-man within her. Protestantism set the Church and the Bible in antagonism with each other. Criticism directly attacks the Bible. It is a somewhat striking fact, that the third great heresy, which now begins to manifest itself, has among its three leaders one from the Roman branch of the Catholic Church, and one from the Anglican; but the author, apparently, does not notice this. It leads us, however, to ask where, in Protestant countries, the tendency towards infidelity is greater or more universal than in Catholic France for example, and to inquire, in regard to the Anglican Catholic body in England, how it happens that so large a portion of the men within its limits whose minds are waked up to thought or scholarship are falling into "modern criticism" in a greater or less degree. Either the Catholic cannot be so much better than the Protestant system after all, or the Anglican and Roman elements must have so overwhelmed and buried the Catholic element that the latter has lost its influence, and is scarcely discoverable any longer. The fact is, that all this lamentation over Protestant thinking is a relic of the ignorant and superstitious ages of the world. God made men with minds, and he meant to have them think for themselves. If he had not meant this, he would not have made them as he did. They may think wrongly because they have the power to think at all, and so they may act wrongly because they have freedom of moral action. Every power involves the possibility of its abuse, but this does

not prove that it is better or more religious to be without the power. We grow into all that is good and into fitness for the kingdom of heaven *as intelligent and thinking beings*, and a man who is afraid of or bewails thinking, is afraid of or bewails the human constitution which came from God himself.

We have exceeded the limits of our space already in our notice of this volume, and we will only add, in closing, that the chief thing, in our judgment, which is to be apprehended in regard to the book, is, that the notoriety which it has gained, and the cause of which we have explained already, may be mistaken by its author for a public conviction of the truth or importance of what it says.

PRESIDENT DODGE'S EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY* is a compactly stated and vigorously written argument, somewhat rhetorically expressed, but on the whole very effectively managed. The author has treated of a great variety of well-chosen topics, and has not at all overlooked the most recent philosophical and critical objections to the Christian system, and the writings in which its history and doctrines are to be found. We have no doubt that when the lectures were delivered they must have been very powerful in their impression upon their hearers, and believe that, as a text-book for colleges and higher seminaries, it is well worth a trial.

THE AMERICAN CHURCH REGISTER.†—We may safely venture the prediction that few of the works which we have had occasion to commend in the *New Englander*, will have a longer vitality, or receive more ample annotations, or be more permanently useful than *The American Church Register*, prepared by the Rev. Daniel P. Noyes, Secretary of Home Evangelization in Massachusetts.

That the value of full and accurate church rolls was recognized by our ancestors, is attested by the archives of many parishes in which manuscripts, upwards of two centuries old, with lists of baptized persons and of church members, are still preserved.

* *The Evidences of Christianity*, with an Introduction on the Existence of God and the Immortality of the Soul. By EBENEZER DODGE, D. D., President of Madison University. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1869.

† *The American Church Register*: Adapted to Churches of Various Denominations. Nichols & Noyes, Publishers, 117 Washington street, Boston.

Miscellaneous and unmethodical as some of these records are, they are fruitful in suggestions and helpful in the researches of all who like to enquire concerning the old paths. Nor is this merely a matter of curious lore, for the successful tracing of genealogical lines, the attestation of marriages, the procuring of pensions, and the maintenance of one's right to an inheritance depend not infrequently upon the fidelity with which parochial records have been made, and the care taken in their preservation.

The pastor of a church is, by training and by office, the proper person to record the various changes and results which come under his observation. No individual needs more than he to know the condition of every family and the standing of every person under his pastoral oversight. His own memoranda, scattered through numerous diaries and private record books, are helpful to him beyond measure, and show, as the years roll on, what progress has been made in the great work for which churches are established and maintained. But, alas! for the new man who, coming to a large church, finds no full list of his parishioners, no well posted rolls of church members and their baptized children, no guide but the uncertain memories of the oldest inhabitant, by which to identify names and persons, and to get trace of wanderers and absentees.

Mr. Noyes's Register is admirably prepared. It provides a place for everything pertaining to the church history, and thus invites the registrar to make his entries full and accurate. At one opening, the names of all the pastors are presented to the eye, with details concerning their nativity, education, continuance in office, &c. At another opening, the names of the succession of deacons appear. Places are provided, also, with appropriate printed headings for names of various committees, Sabbath School Superintendents, and other persons having charge of distinct departments of Christian activity, whether they hold office by church appointment or not. The roll of communicants gives ample space for recording the date and manner of admission, and the date and mode of removal, together with those changes of name by marriage which are sometimes so embarrassing in determining the identity of persons. Every name being numbered, also, it is very easy by cross-references to mark relationships, filial, fraternal, &c.

The roll of persons baptized suggests that the children of the covenant ought to be under the eye of the church, and invites the

recorder to trace out the history of those to whom a special promise is addressed.

Full provision is also made for the record of marriages and deaths, for noting the attendance on public worship, and for preserving the account of benevolent contributions from year to year.

Appended to the Church Register, though not always bound up with it, is another no less valuable *Register of Families and Individuals*, in which is to be entered the name of every person who properly comes under the care of the church and pastor; the ruling being adapted to households large and small, and showing at a glance the number of persons in each family, their ages, and their relation to the church of Christ. However formidable the task of filling the blank pages of this part of the work may appear, we are sure that it will repay the care spent upon it; and when the enrollment is once completed, it will be comparatively easy to make the corrections and additions which every month requires. The writer of this notice has exclaimed over and over again, "O that my *predecessors* had written a book!" and we do not know how any pastor can better help those who are to come after him and build on his foundation, than by leaving such a description of the work in its progress as to show his successor of whom and what the parish consists.

This Register is prepared in different styles to suit churches of different sizes, its various departments being proportioned to the number of communicants. We have not been in haste to bestow our praise upon this work, but after putting it to actual service and copying into it nearly a thousand names and dates, in one department and another, we are glad to say that our first impressions of its convenience and usefulness are fully met; and we speak in the interest of the churches when we advise every one having charge of this matter of church statistics, to procure, examine, and adopt a work which we so highly approve. We do not know of anything of the kind so well adapted to the churches of the Congregational order.

We think Mr. Noyes would do well to supplement this work by a private register for ministers, duplicating some pages of this volume, but giving room for lists of sermons, and details of labor and results, which are personal rather than parochial, and of which every minister needs to preserve some record.

THE OFFICE AND WORK OF THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY.—We are informed that Messrs. Sheldon & Co. have in press a book on "The Office and Work of the Christian Ministry," by Professor Hoppin, of the Theological Department of Yale College. It will be a thorough and comprehensive treatment of this theme. It is designed to serve as a text-book in Homiletics and Pastoral Theology, and is intended also for the use of pastors, and of intelligent laymen, who desire instruction on the methods of Christian labor. It is the ripe fruit of the best study of the author for many years, and from its full and systematic character, as well as from the value of its discussions and suggestions, it will merit the respectful attention of the Christian public.

PHILOSOPHICAL.

HOPKINS'S "LAW OF LOVE AND LOVE AS LAW" is intimately related to his "Lectures on Moral Science," which was published five years ago. To a certain extent it is a repetition of the same with a different method and new illustrations. Many points which were implied or assumed in the first treatise are more fully discussed in the present work; and the results and illustrations of the former volume are in turn assumed for the uses of this, so that the second series of Lowell Lectures may not improperly be called a continuation of and a supplement to the first. The present volume is specially arranged for the uses of a text-book, and is divided and subdivided very minutely for the convenience of instructors and pupils. It is written with the freshness and individuality which always characterize the style of the author. In its tone and spirit it is elevating and Christian, without losing freshness or point in any degree, or falling into a mannerism or cant. Many of the practical suggestions are forcibly and wisely stated, and the work is interesting to the general reader as well as to the student of the elements of ethical science.

The principles taught in this volumes are in substance the same as those which have usually been accepted by the great New England Theologians, Edwards, Dwight, Taylor, and others. The author distinctly and critically rejects the principle that right and wrong are ultimate conceptions, but holds that they are founded on the relation of generic choices to supreme ends. This funda-

* *The Law of Love and Love as Law*; or Moral Science, Theoretical and Practical. By MARK HOPKINS, D. D., LL.D., President of Williams College. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1869.

mental conception he formally defends at some length in his Introduction by critically examining some of the more prominent theories which have been held in respect to this subject. We say some, for he has omitted to notice those of Hutcheson, Adam Smith, and Kant; as well as unwittingly spoken of the theory of Hobbes as having almost or entirely died out, which would scarcely be accepted as correct by the devotees of Herbert Spencer or Alexander Bain. The criticisms offered are pointed and effective. There is, occasionally, wanting a sufficiently full statement of the theory criticised to satisfy the general reader, or even the student, that he has a sufficiently clear and full comprehension of the doctrine discussed to appreciate the force of the criticism. After this Introduction the author proceeds to the development of his subject under the two Divisions indicated by the two parts of the complex title of his work; *The Law of Love*, or Theoretical Morals, and *Love as Love*, or Practical Morals. The first part suggests three topics—*Law*, i. e. the nature of obligation, and *Love*, in its varieties, and *Love operating as law*. Of these three topics, the first is that to which the author devotes the most careful attention, being well aware that the relation of obligation is commonly charged as the weak side of the theory which he advocates. The several conditions of obligation are stated as follows, viz., Freedom, involving spontaneity, an End, a Good, and Personality, which implies Moral Reason and Free Will. These conditions being each explained, we look forward with eager expectation to his explanation of what the relation or idea of obligation is which these conditions evolve or produce. We are somewhat disappointed when the author asserts that it is an idea of the Moral Reason which is affirmed when these conditions are present. He then adds, "The affirmation of obligation thus made involves both an idea and a feeling; and these are so in a state of fusion that we say indifferently, the idea, or the feeling of obligation. The Moral Reason being conditioned, as we have seen, upon a sensibility, this is true of all its products." This statement of the author seems to us unsatisfactory, not because, as a popular statement, it is not true, nor because, rhetorically considered, it is not felicitous, but because it does not answer, in philosophical form, the very question which, just at this stage of the analysis, we are prompted to ask. A similar indistinctness, which is hidden by similar phraseology, is found in his explanation of the Moral Reason. President Hopkins says very correctly that the Moral Reason

son, as the source of certain fundamental ideas, which are presupposed in all moral action, may be regarded as analogous to the Reason as the originator of those ideas which are fundamental to all intellectual activity. He asserts also, and proves by several arguments that the moral ideas which are developed by, and for the Moral Reason, are conditioned on the sensibility, and involve the ultimate idea of good. But he does not at all explain how the Moral Reason is related to the Intellectual Reason, nor whether or not obligation is a peculiar and original idea, which is psychologically conditioned upon, but not logically resolvable into that discerned relation of an action to its end, and to the sensibilities connected therewith, which he says is fundamental to all moral activity. The relation of the conscience to the intellect also, is not entirely cleared up. We are left in the dark as to whether it has any function which is properly intellectual, or, if it has, what relation such a function has to those of the so-called intellect proper. We have no doubt as to the views which the author must adopt if he pushes his fundamental principles to their logical conclusions, but we should prefer that he would state them clearly for himself, and thus bring them into manifest harmony with these axioms.

But we have been led further in a critical direction than we had intended to go. We have only space to add that the work will add to the very high reputation which the author enjoys for independent thought and for Christian simplicity of aim. We wish for it a wide circulation as an elevating and instructive guide upon subjects which vitally interest every thoughtful person.

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

CONGREGATIONAL HISTORY.—1200–1567.*—The massive volume of *Congregational History* by Dr. Waddington of London (whose visit to this country ten years ago many of our readers will remember) is a work of higher value than the author's best friends could have anticipated. In its plan and scope, and in the field which it explores, as well as in its distinctive merits, it is quite unlike what our acquaintance with his former publications and with the particular direction of his antiquarian inquiries had led us to expect. As the dates on the title-page (1200–1567) intimate, it ends just where the story of modern Congregationalism, in the

* *Congregational History*.—1200–1567. By JOHN WADDINGTON, D. D. London: John Snow & Co., 2 Ivy Lane. Paternoster Row. 1868. 8vo. pp. 748.

ordinary meaning of the name, begins. The history contained in this volume, according to the author's representation of his design, "is not so much that of a religious denomination as of the development of the principles denominated Congregational." At first the reader finds himself in "the darkest period of ecclesiastical history," and proceeding from that point, he sees "the gradual restoration of the Church as a divine institution to its primitive purity and simplicity." While he sees how long a preparation there was for the religious and doctrinal reformation in the sixteenth century, and what protests against superstition and hierarchical oppression were uttered by successive witnesses, age after age, he sees, "in all the vicissitudes of the momentous conflict, an under-current of opinion," tending toward the primitive simplicity of Christian organization. He finds, from time to time, the phenomenon of "Christian people drawn together by the force of kindred affection," and guided by primitive example or by the instinct of the primitive spirit, "meeting together for mutual instruction and united worship, apart from the parochial congregations of the national Church."

Beginning at "the zenith of the Papacy," when the notion that the priest could "make the body of Christ," and "act in the person of Christ," instead of being a vulgar superstition only, was asserted and maintained by learned theologians; when the scholastic theory of transubstantiation—that stupendous metaphysical perversion of language perfectly intelligible to Christian affection and to common sense—was formally sanctioned by an assembly pretending to represent the universal Church of Christ; and when for the simply spiritual ministry of pastors and teachers holding forth the word of life, there had been substituted everywhere a priesthood armed with supernatural powers, banded together in subordination to a supreme pontiff, and separated by an enforced celibacy from natural relations to human society; our author describes the struggles not of Congregationalism existing in organized churches, but of Congregational principles distinctly asserted or unconsciously implied and maintained by successive witnesses through a period of almost five hundred years. He says in the announcement of his purpose:

"We propose, by the light of indubitable evidence, to trace the course of this revival of first principles in relation to church polity. The dawn of the Reformation, like that which breaks upon the tops of the mountains after a long and cheerless night, cannot be determined with unfailing exactness as to time. We

cannot fix a precise date either to the discovery of a principle or to the first renewed application of a long forgotten truth. It is often the result of the inquiries of many minds, continued through successive generations, and simultaneously directed to different points.

"In the investigation on which we are entering, we frame for ourselves, therefore, no particular theory of ecclesiastical development, nor do we look for the appearance of witnesses in any regular order of succession. The divine plan can never be anticipated by human sagacity. Reverently following the direction of truth, we shall advance with even step, though the path may be intricate, as in a gloomy forest or an entangled wilderness, with the cheering persuasion that we shall find an outlet, and obtain in the end a prospect, fair and commanding, that shall more than compensate our toil." p. 5.

In the ages before that great conflict and separation which we commonly call the Reformation, and which is often represented, inconsiderately, as the beginning of Protestantism, there were two forces essentially adverse to each other, working throughout western Christendom. On the one hand, there was the force of hierarchical organization, armed by superstition with supernatural functions, and mediating between God and human souls. On the other hand, there was the force, intellectual, moral, and spiritual, of the Christian religion—in the Scriptures; in the living tradition of the facts and principles which constitute the gospel; and in Christian experience and character, or what we learn to recognize as the presence and working of the Holy Spirit. These two forces were everywhere interfused and mingled, and were not unfrequently subservient in some sort to each other. Good men, "full of faith and of the Holy Ghost," were often included in the priesthood, and often their gifts and their sanctity of personal character contributed to its aggrandizement. The antichristian hierarchy grew at the expense of spiritual Christianity, steadily overgrowing and concealing it, yet sharing in its life; like a parasitic plant drawing its sustenance from the tree which it encircles with its fatal garniture, and which, struggling to develop its own life according to its own nature, still puts forth something of its own foliage, and here and there, perhaps, something of its own fruit, among the festoons hung over it by its insidious enemy. Men were found, in those ages, among the clergy—in monasteries perhaps as often as anywhere—sometimes wearing the titles and badges of university doctors—sometimes invested with episcopal dignity—who testified for the sufficiency and supremacy of the Scriptures; who denied the efficacy of priestly sacraments; who denounced the Roman power as mystical Babylon; who main-

tained that what was then called the Church was not Christ's institution, and who looked for a day when it should be seen and acknowledged that the true Church is the communion of souls that have been born of the Spirit. Consciously or unconsciously, and with various degrees of intelligence and explicitness, those men asserted Congregational principles. The history of such witnesses and of their testimony, as well as of communities separated from the Roman unity and professing to obey Christ rather than Christ's pretended vicar—communities like the Waldenses, the English Lollards, and the followers of Huss—is Congregational history.

In addition to the two conflicting forces which we have just described, there was the force of civil government, distinct from both the others, generally in some sort of alliance with the hierarchy, but sometimes in conflict with it. The first aim in the policy of the first Christian emperor, was to adjust the relations between Christianity and the imperial government. Already had the Christian ministry, instituted by the Apostles in local churches mutually independent, become, by the growth of superstition, a powerful priesthood; and, although the organization of that priesthood had not been completed, the sagacious eye of Constantine saw, in the bishops and the inferior clergy, the possibility of a Christian hierarchy that should be coördinate everywhere with the civil magistracy, but subordinate to the supreme power in his person. The alliance between Christianity and the state contributed largely to the growth of the Church as an organization governed by the clergy, then to the progressive separation of the clergy into a distinct class or caste governed by the prelacy, and ultimately to the exaltation of the Pope as the center of unity and the spiritual sovereign of Christendom. During the period from Constantine to Luther, the relations between the hierarchical and secular powers were such that notwithstanding the constantly recurring conflict about the rights of the church and of its head, the Supreme Pontiff, every attempt at ecclesiastical reformation on the voluntary principle was regarded as a crime against the state. Every such attempt was, in fact, an assertion of individual liberty, and was, therefore, contrary to the genius of the feudal system. No toleration was granted to the idea that Christian men, under a monarch bearing the Christian name, might claim the same liberties and rights which Christians, guided by the Apostles, dared to exercise under Pagan emperors. At last the ever-increas-

ing weight of the Papal domination, and the abuses inseparable from the attempt to administer Christianity under the form of a ruling and centralized hierarchy, produced that revolt of princes and nationalities which overthrew the Papacy in half of Europe, and which is known in history as the Reformation. Then it was that national churches, independent of Rome and of each other, came into existence with their various methods of church government. Certain secular governments, breaking from their connection with the organized and corrupted catholicity, and making a new alliance with religious reformers, attempted—each government acting for itself within its own territory—to reorganize Christianity in such methods as seemed most practicable and most hopeful; and the religious reformers, more careful for the substance of Christianity than for the mode of its administration, were fain to accept the best method of church government they could, without asking too curiously whether it was absolutely the best.

Such were the three principal factors in the ecclesiastical history of those ages,—spiritual Christianity, hierarchical Christianity, and the secular power. In the action and reaction of these forces, there were discussions and controversies, aspirations and endeavors, struggles and martyrdoms, which belong legitimately to Congregational history. Here and there may be seen the cropping out of Congregational principles—the assertion, explicit or by implication, of the rudiments of that primitive church-order which we trace in the Scriptures of the New Testament. Our author has told the story well; and all the churches—especially those of the “Congregational Way”—owe him a debt of gratitude.

[This book can be obtained from Messrs. C. Scribner & Co., of New York].

HISTORY OF STAMFORD.*—Stamford is one of the oldest towns in Connecticut, its settlement dating from 1641, three years after New Haven, and eighteen years before Norwich. A well-known disagreement in the Church at Wethersfield led a company of the original settlers there to break away and establish themselves in a new tract of land which was offered to them by the New Haven colony west of the town of Norwalk. Toquams appears to have

* *History of Stamford, Connecticut.* By Rev. E. B. HUNTINGTON. Stamford: The Author. 1868. 8vo. 492 pp.

been the original name of the site, as it was known to the people in New Haven, though Rippowam was another designation employed by the settlers themselves. Both these Indian names soon gave way, according to the fashion of the day, to the English appellation "Stamford," the fitness of which (if there ever was any) has long been forgotten.

The relations of the new plantation to the central jurisdiction of New Haven were not always harmonious, and there is an amusing account of a "rebellion," in the name of local law, based on English antecedent, versus "the New Haven tyranny." The Quakers also early disturbed the peace of the new settlement. A portion of a manuscript journal kept by two Friends, named Gill and Story, on their journey between Carolina and Rhode Island in 1698, made for propagating their tenets, affords a curious illustration of the ecclesiastical and religious controversies of the time.

Mr. Huntington has looked into the history of the families which were early found in Stamford, has traced the history of the churches and their ministers, the origin of the public schools, the services of the town in the revolutionary war, the war of 1812, and the recent war for the Union, and has added much that pertains to the recent rapid growth of Stamford as a sort of suburb of New York. His volume is illustrated with portraits and views, and has an index of surnames. It is interesting, as a local history ought to be, from the numerous minute facts which it includes, rather than from any elaborate efforts at literary style, and it affords a useful illustration of the growth of New England institutions and ideas. The author, a graduate of Yale College, had previously published a genealogy of the Huntington family, and is otherwise well known for his zeal in antiquarian pursuits.

CHINA AND THE CHINESE.*—Bibliography, with reference to China, divides itself into three periods—the mediæval, the modern, and the recent. To the first belongs Marco Polo, Sir John Mandeville, and a few others; to the second, the rich accumulations of the Roman Catholic missionaries; and to the last, the less voluminous but more exact descriptions that have been given to the world since the opening of China by the recent treaties.

Those of this last period may again be subdivided into two classes, one of which, represented by the works of Davis and Wil-

* *China and the Chinese.* By Rev. JOHN L. NEVINS. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1869. New Haven: Judd & White.

liams, sprang from the treaties of 1842-1844, while the other has grown out of the fuller opening of the whole empire by the negotiations of 1858-1860.

The numerous works published soon after the latter date were largely occupied with details of diplomacy and military movements, and with the single exception of Mr. Doolittle's, added little if anything to our previous information. That of Mr. Nevius appears after so long an interval as to admit of a large accession in the way of experience under the new system of free intercourse, and it lays open the interior of China with a fullness sufficient to satisfy the curious, and a freshness which renders it the reverse of wearisome to the general reader.

Six hundred years ago, when Marco Polo gave the world his experiences in Cathay, China came before the mind of Europe with all the vividness of a new discovery. Astounded by his statements as to the wealth, extent, and population of that far off land, the people of his day refused to believe him and gave him the *soubriquet* of "Millione," because he dealt in large numbers. His book had sufficient credit, nevertheless, to stimulate the efforts of Portuguese navigators to double the Cape of Good Hope, and impel Columbus to attempt to reach the Indies by crossing the Western Ocean. Nearer to our own time it kindled the fancy of Coleridge and inspired that wonderful fragment entitled "Kubla Khan," the most melodious dream ever warbled from the lips of a sleeping poet.

The old Venetian was neither dreaming nor romancing when he dealt in millions as he dilated on the wonders of Cathay. Like all great objects, China has lost nothing of its real grandeur or solid interest by being better known. Its great rivers and canals, not surpassed or even equaled by those of our own country; its thousands of cities enclosed by massive walls of brick or stone; and above all, the Great Wall of the North, at once a boundary of the empire and a feature on the face of the globe; its boundless coal fields, and its inexhaustible mines of the precious and useful metals;—all these, and a thousand other things, fill us with astonishment to-day, as they did the Arabian and Venetian travelers of an earlier age.

How can we fail to admire the opulence of that vast region which yields such rich commodities for the supply of our growing commerce? How can we cease to wonder at the numbers of its teeming population, and to inquire by what system of political

economy they are enabled to live together and to prosper? And when we cast our eyes back to their early antiquity, the marvel increases. Taking its rise at a period anterior to the pyramids, China stands there to this day a human pyramid, apparently indestructible by the ravages of time. Now by what political or moral elixirs have the Chinese been able to preserve their national life, while Egyptians, Chaldeans, and Assyrians have been buried in the dust of ages?

Mr. Nevius's book will assist us to understand these problems. It furnishes such information as our legislators stand in need of when, in discussing the question of suffrage, they are disposed to class the Chinese with the savages of our Western Territories; such information as our merchants need when they desire to study the institutions and resources of a country in which they are now so largely interested; and such information as the religious public are in need of when they consider the prospects of Christian missions in the far East.

The grandest achievements of American enterprise have a reference to China. That magnificent line of steamers which bridges the Pacific and brings her people to our shores, owes its existence mainly, if not altogether, to the trade and travel of China; while our trans-continental railway, built in part by Chinese hands, derives increased importance from the fact that it brings the Chinese empire a fortnight nearer to our Eastern coast. To obtain a readier access to the wealth of China is no inconsiderable item among the advantages expected from the inter-oceanic canal. Already the Chinese are supplying the labor requisite to develop the resources of our Pacific slope; and when the railway is completed, they will offer themselves to perform the same service for our Middle and Eastern States. The newspapers are not wrong in calling the Chinaman "the coming man." All classes of our people are accordingly interested in obtaining reliable information in regard to a country with which we are brought into such close relations.

In order to furnish this kind of information, it is indispensable that the author should spend a large part of his life there, become acquainted with the spoken dialects and the language of the ancient books, and travel or reside in the interior, as well as visit the cities of the sea-coast. All this, and more, Mr. Nevius has done during a residence of ten years, dividing his time between the South and the North, the interior and the sea-coast, and in addition to this, seeing enough of the Japanese to name him

draw a just parallel between those interesting islanders and their neighbors of the continent.

In style plain, but not dull, the work of Mr. Nevius is too full of facts to require the embellishments of fancy; but we confess we should have liked to find in it a little more of that glow and animation which the subject is fitted to inspire. The author errs, in our opinion, in overestimating the population of the great cities of China. He falls, moreover, into a rather serious mistake in regard to the age of the *Leke*, or Book of Rites, which was not, as he assumes, compiled before the time of Confucius, but some four hundred years later. That certain treatises were once contained in this collection is not, therefore, to be taken as any proof that they are not from the pen of Confucius.

On the whole, this work supplies a want, and supplies it well, by giving us an entertaining and instructive account of the present state of the Chinese empire. No one can read it without thinking better of the Chinese people. He will be surprised to learn that they anticipated us in many of the useful arts and in some superstitions. Printing, gunpowder, and the magnetic needle played an important part in their world before they dawned on Europe. The philosopher's stone was sought for by the Chinese before the people of the West began to dream of it, and among them planchette and spiritualism were "played out" ages ago, though they are just now beginning to excite the attention of us slow-brained Occidentals.

In their domestic life, they are able to teach us lessons of filial piety and fraternal love, while that system of competitive examinations by which the ablest men are raised to office can boast some decided advantages as compared with the hap-hazard method in vogue among us. Essentially a democratic institution, it acts in China as a counterpoise to the arbitrary powers of the crown, and if grafted on our own constitution, it might serve as a useful check for the growing abuses of executive patronage.

We have not space for extracts, but refer our readers to the book. Its clear type and numerous engravings are among the least of its merits.

LIFE OF THE REV. WILLIAM MARSH.*—This is a neat reprint

* *The Life of the Rev. William Marsh, D. D.* By his Daughter, Author of "Memorials of Captain Hedley Vicars." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1868. New Haven: Judd & White. 16mo. pp. 349.

by the Carters of Miss Marsh's life of her father—a devoted clergyman of the English Established Church, and one of the best examples of the Low Church, or Evangelical School, of this and the last century. He belonged to a family of high standing among the gentry of England, but his heart seemed to be ever with Christ's "poor" and "little ones." He was early converted, taking at the first, and holding to the last, the stamp of a simple Biblical faith, contained in the great truth that "God hath given to us eternal life, and this life is in his Son." He seems to have been troubled by no doubts in questions of faith or theology, and to have led a singularly happy and blameless career of ministerial usefulness. His natural temperament was cheerful, and in his whole life he cultivated the sentiment that Christianity is for the present happiness of believers, as well as for their future glory. He represented no intellectual or spiritual movement, and was not a man of great or original mind; but his distinction seemed to be simply in his piety, that burned brightly in a very low spiritual condition of the English Church. His pure and simple character shone out in his beautiful and benignant countenance; and we see, in reading the book, whence his daughter derived that simplicity of faith, and that earnest practical type of piety, that has made the author of "English Hearts and Hands" a blessing to many thousands of poor English soldiers and sailors, as well as to those who have read her excellent books.

PHILOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC.

MANUAL OF LATIN GRAMMAR.*—We have been strongly drawn to this book by its most attractive exterior, and by the promise of its Preface. It is certainly the daintiest volume, for a Latin Grammar, we have ever looked upon. The fine, smooth, tinted paper, the fresh, clear, and handsome type, with the generous margin, and the beautiful binding, make the volume a hard one to match in the entire literature of school books. The Preface is full of just such promise as is desired, in these days, by both learner and teacher, such indeed as every one interested in classical education longs to have not only made, but faithfully fulfilled. To fur-

* *Manual of Latin Grammar.* Prepared by WILLIAM F. ALLEN, A. M., Professor of Ancient Languages and History in the University of Wisconsin; and JOSEPH H. ALLEN, Cambridge, Mass. Boston: Published by Edwin Ginn, Woolworth, Ainsworth & Co. 1868. 12mo. pp. 127.

nish, in one hundred and twenty pages, a sufficient text-book for the learner of Latin, which shall be brief without being obscure, compact and condensed, and yet full and accurate—such is the large promise, which is given by the authors of this Grammar. It were hardly reasonable to hold these authors to a strict fulfillment of these large expectations; and the task which they have undertaken, is so worthy a one, and so desirable a consummation, that one is disposed to pardon much that may be imperfect in its execution. But we must confess to the most serious fears about the fitness of this book for the place which the authors designed it to fill; we cannot see in it the requisite capacity to do the good service it proposes in classical education. As to the question of the size and compass of the book, that seems to us quite a subordinate one; the main question is, whether it is a good book. We have, it is true, no doubt that in the amount of matter it contains, it is insufficient for practical uses in our schools and academies. If it were worth while, it were easy to establish this view by an examination of different parts of the book. For instance, so meagre is the treatment of the Third Declension of Nouns, that we do not see how it is possible for the pupil, even with the best teaching, to get a satisfactory knowledge of the subject. The authors class the nouns of this declension, according to their stems, ranging them under the three heads of Vowel Stems, Liquid Stems, and Mute Stems; and this they do without any previous information on the subject of stems. Now, suppose the learner to try to understand this subject from the nouns given under the first class, namely, *Vowel Stems*. The first word declined is *navis*. The pupil may guess that the stem is *navi*, as that would make a vowel stem; but then the genitive is given as *nav-is*, and the dative *nav-i*, and so on, as if purposely to show him that *nav* is the stem, and that it is *not* a vowel stem; and if his teacher should chance to turn his attention to page 108, he would find this very word *nav-is* used to show that *is*, as a case ending, is added to *nav* as the stem. Precisely the same process is gone through in the other model nouns, *nubes* and *mare*.

Now, how is the pupil to understand this first class of Third Declension Nouns; and is the teacher expected to unfold the doctrine of *Vowel Stems*? Then, too, with the exception of a few remarks under the First Class, there is absolutely no information given on the peculiarities of inflection in this declension; and of course the model nouns furnish no sufficient guidance. Just as

insufficient is the treatment of the gender of nouns of this declension; this covers just three lines, which furnish merely the General Rules. We might go on and illustrate this same insufficiency in the treatment of the adjective and of the verb, and, indeed, in every part of the book. But we are not disposed to press this point. As we have already said, the main question is, whether this is a good book; whether it has intrinsic value in the knowledge which it furnishes, and in the form in which the knowledge is conveyed. We ask the authors' attention to some suggestions bearing upon this question; for we are convinced that they ought to make most important changes in their work, if they will render it "a practical guide to the learner" of Latin. For ourselves, we have been perplexed beyond measure by the singular want of clearness of statement in many parts of the book. Some statements we have read over several times without having any clear idea of the writer's meaning; and the conclusion we finally reached was not what was said, but what was intended to be said. We must be allowed to give one or two illustrations. On page 58 we have the following Rule. "Adjectives (especially those formed from proper names), as well as the possessive pronouns, are often used instead of a genitive." Very well; but then follow these words: "This is always the case with the personal pronouns; as *domus mea* (not *mei*) my house." Now to say nothing of the vagueness of the word "This," does not the meaning seem to be, that the personal pronouns are *always* used "instead of the genitive?" But perhaps we can reason back from the example "*domus mea* (not *mei*)" to the meaning of the remark; and it may be intended to be said, that the possessive pronouns are always used instead of the genitive of the personal pronouns. But, if this is what is meant, then we have to say, after all this sore puzzling, that the remark is incorrect, for the possessive pronouns are certainly *not* "always" used instead of the genitive of the personal pronouns. Hardly less obscure is a remark, on page 27, touching the Gerundive. The pupil has just been taught that "The Gerund is inflected as a Neuter Noun of the Second Declension. Its use is as follows:" Then, after examples have been given, it is said: "But with a direct object the Gerundive is usually employed: as *scribenda est mihi epistola*, *I have to write a letter*." Now the example is, of course, good Latin; but what does it illustrate? Certainly the Gerundive is *never* "employed with a direct object." Are we to apply the remark to the translation of the example, where to be sure we find the word "letter" as "a direct object

of the verb "to write?" Now we are willing to allow that a Latin scholar may discover what the author intended here to say: but can the learner understand the words? Can he understand the use of the Latin Gerundive? We observe another statement which is perhaps still more obscure. On page 60, it is thus written: "A phrase or clause with *esse*, *to be*, is often limited by the genitive; this occurs most frequently with adjectives and abstract nouns: as *neque sui iudicii (esse) decernere*, *it was not for his judgment to decide*." Now to pass over the very vague expression "this occurs," what is the learner to understand by the "phrase or clause with *esse*," and if he finds such a phrase in the example, how is it "limited by the genitive?" In short, what does the remark mean? Can any one suppose, that the words are intended to give the rule for the Predicate genitive? We have marked other passages which are in like manner sadly obscure; but we have not space for their discussion. But we hasten to speak of another and yet graver fault,—incorrectness of statement. Perhaps this incorrectness is the result, in some places, of oversight; as, for instance, where we are told, on page 24, that Latin verbs have "*Six persons*, three in the singular, and three in the plural." What shall be said to the remark on page 26, that the Gerundive "is used to govern the noun it agrees with," the example being *Karthaginis delendae causā*. How can it be said with any correctness that *delendae* governs *Karthaginis*, and that it governs it at the same time that it agrees with it? On page 54, it is stated that "the genitive is used in apposition with possessive pronouns," and then the example is given *in nostro omnium fletu*; that is, *nostro* is in apposition with *omnium*; and this, too, under the Rule defining Apposition thus: "A Noun used to describe another *agrees with it in case*." In general, we have observed that this Grammar makes no distinction between the rule for apposition and that for a limiting genitive. Compare, for instance, 50. I. with 46, and do we find any distinction laid down? Some of the strangest mistakes we find in the Rules of Quantity. Nothing could be more unfortunate than the whole treatment of *Final Syllables* on page 106. We call attention, however, only to one or two points. Under exceptions to No. 3, we find "the characteristic ending of the fourth conjugation: as *audis*." What is meant by "characteristic ending?" The truth is, the exception ought to have read: *is* is long in the Singular Present Indic. Active of the Fourth Conjugation. As another exception in *is*,

we have the remark, "and sometimes in *ëris*." What could be more unsatisfactory than such a remark? Why not have specified the forms where *ëris* is sometimes long, the Singular of the Perfect Subjunctive and of the Future Perfect? But the strangest possible mistake occurs on page 107, under remark 6, where it is stated that "Final *e* is short, except in verbs of the *second conjugation*." Now where is final *e* long in the second conjugation, except in one single place, viz., the Singular Imperative Active? In all other places, and the learner might count up ten or a dozen of them, the final *e* is short. We beg the authors to revise their whole treatment of the Subject of Quantity; such a revision is absolutely necessary to the usefulness of their book. We had marked other places, which seemed to us to contain incorrect statements; but we have already far exceeded our limits, and must bring our remarks to an abrupt close. We think that all our readers, and especially all classical teachers, will agree with us, that it is hardly worth while to discuss the question of the amount of matter contained in this Grammar, if the matter, whether much or little, is of such questionable quality.

MARCEL'S STUDY OF LANGUAGES.*—Mr. C. Marcel's Study of Languages is a summary of the doctrines taught in a large work which has been for several years known to the public. It is a very rational book on the important subject of which it treats. Its discussion of the importance of learning a language by the ear, and of the best method by which every person may make great progress in this particular, even without visiting the country or residing in a family in which the language is spoken, is very valuable, and somewhat peculiar.

COX'S MYTHOLOGY.†—This book proposes "to give the results of the researches of the Comparative Mythologists during the present century in a form suitable for the young." This is certainly a praiseworthy design, and the interests of education demand that

* *The Study of Languages brought back to its true Principles; or the Art of Thinking in a Foreign Language.* By C. MARCEL, Knt. Leg. Hon. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1869.

† *A Manual of Mythology in the form of Question and Answer.* By the Rev. GEORGE W. COX, M. A., late scholar of Trinity College, Oxford. First American, from the second London edition. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1868. 16mo, pp. 300. New Haven: Judd & White.

it should be well carried out. But the book, in our opinion, fails in doing this and is unfit for use as a "Manual of Mythology." Since it has been highly praised in several reviews and thought worthy of republication by a respectable house in this country, it is proper that we should give our reasons for this unfavorable judgment.

We object, in the first place, to the form which this manual adopts. It consists of eight hundred and thirty-three questions, arranged under different headings, with the answer to each following it. This alternation of question and answer is suitable only for a catechism. It spoils a book for those who wish to read it, and to the learner it makes the work of studying it more mechanical and less profitable than it ought to be. It deprives him of the mental discipline which he may gain by being required to pick out and reconstruct from the text an answer in his own words. For very young children such a presentation of question and answer together may be a needed help, but this book surely cannot be meant for children under twelve years of age. It is not easy to decide, we remark in passing, for what age it is meant. The preface is elaborately "written down" for children of eight or ten years, but the body of the book demands a knowledge of the Greek and Latin languages and a power of abstraction and generalization such as few students acquire until they are twice that age.

Furthermore, this book is not well constructed even on this unfortunate plan. Many of the questions seem unnecessary, and the answers are often long and wordy, introducing matter beyond the scope of the question and burdening needlessly the mind of the learner. There is a great deal of repetition and of confusing reference to parallels in the mythologies of other nations. We may mention one or two examples, leaving the reader to judge whether they add to the value of the book: "56. What is the meaning of the name Poseidon? It is not known with certainty." "151. Does the character of Ares stand high in Greek tradition? No. He is frequently overcome, and when he is wounded, his roar is as loud as that of nine or ten thousand warriors. He is also noted chiefly by (*sic*) his huge size and bodily strength; and when prostrate on the battle-field, his body was said to cover many roods of ground." "508. Is the germ of the story of Ixion found in these old poems (no 'old poems' having been mentioned for many pages)? It is said that Dyaus (the sky) struggled hard to snatch

the wheel of the sun from the grasp of Night. From such phrases sprung the notion of the dark Gorgons chasing Perseus as he hastens to the Hyperborean gardens." We may mention also, without taking the space to quote them, 313, 425, 540, 621, 637, as illustrating the faults we have specified.

The prominent idea of Mr. Cox's book is to show that the myths of various nations are really disguised forms of one story—the story of what occurs every day in the sky, dawn, sunrise, the progress of the sun across the heavens, clouds, the conflict of light and darkness, and finally sunset. Now it is undoubtedly true that the admirable generalization which brought into being the science of Comparative Mythology, with which Professor Max Müller has connected his name more closely than any other English writer, furnishes the right key to the understanding of a large part, the most beautiful and probably the earliest part, of the Greek mythology. The "myths of the dawn," and of the phenomena of the sky generally, run through the mythologies of all the Indo-European nations, and bear always the same leading features under a great variety of names and incidents. But a book founded on this one idea ought not to be called a "Manual of Mythology." There is a large body of myths which have no reference to the phenomena of the sky, but embody totally distinct ideas. This book seems to recognize no other explanation of myths, and hence treats inadequately or incorrectly those which do not admit this one. Examples of this error may be found under the names Briareos, Ares, Prometheus, Dionysus, Artemis, Arethusa, Deucalion, and Tyro. In fact, besides these, nearly all the persons mentioned under the title "Inhabitants of the Greek mythical world," qu. 645–681, a sort of Botany Bay for all who have no claim to appear elsewhere, are dismissed with very unsatisfactory treatment.

Another defect in the matter of this book is that it leaves out of view, in grouping and criticising the stories told, the elements of time and place. The stories which are found in Homer in a very simple form are mixed up indiscriminately with those of later mythologies and told with the additional features which they acquire only in later authors; and there is no distinction made between the universal and purely local myths. This is a serious defect in a book which claims to be founded on the results of modern scholarship. Such a book ought to trace the gradual development of myths, and to avail itself of all that can be learnt

from geographical names, nationalities of authors, connections of tribes, etc., in the criticism of the different forms of stories. Even in the notes to German school editions of the classics frequent use is made of such sources of knowledge.

The incompleteness of this book as a manual of Comparative Mythology may be seen from the relative space it devotes to different parts of the subject. To the Greek mythology two hundred pages are given, to the Latin twenty, and to those of all other nations, the Egyptian, Assyrian, Indian (Vedic), Persian, and Norse, less than thirty. The accounts of the Egyptian and Assyrian mythologies (which, by the way, ought not to appear in the book at all, on the author's own theory), are especially meager and really give no adequate or intelligible conception of the systems. It seems a pity that so much interesting and valuable matter as is contained (unavoidably) in the discussion of the Greek myths should be presented in so bad a shape and combined with so much that is erroneous or useless. If we seem to have written in a faultfinding spirit, let it be accounted for by the natural reaction of mind from such undue praise as this book has received.

DANA'S MINERALOGY.*—Professor Dana is eminent among men of science, both for the variety of his investigations and acquisitions, and for the extraordinary ability he has shown in them all. As a mineralogist, geologist, and zoologist, he has been successively distinguished, having published in three distinct departments of natural science, works which are as remarkable for minuteness and accuracy of detail as they are for the comprehensiveness, the logical arrangement, and the powers of generalization which they severally display. Since the preparation of his voluminous treatises on the Geology, Zoophytes, and Crustacea of the United States Exploring Expedition, under Captain Wilkes, he has found time (in addition to the editorial care of the *American Journal of Science*, and the discharge of his college duties) to prepare an elaborate text-book in Geology for the use of colleges, with an abridgment of the same; and more recently, with the co-

* *A System of Mineralogy. Descriptive Mineralogy, comprising the most Recent Discoveries.* By JAMES DANA, Silliman Professor of Geology and Mineralogy in Yale College. Aided by GEORGE JARVIS BRUSH, Professor of Mineralogy and Metallurgy in the Sheffield Scientific School of Yale College. Fifth Edition. New York: John Wiley & Son. 1868. 8vo. pp. 827.

operation of his colleague in the department of Mineralogy, to revise the treatise on Mineralogy which he began to prepare in his youth, and which has long been regarded at home and abroad as a standard authority on the subjects of which it treats.

The edition now offered to the public is the fifth. The first appeared in 1837, four years after the author's graduation in Yale College; the second in 1844, soon after his return from the voyage to the Pacific; the third in 1850, when he boldly abandoned the "Natural History System," on which the previous editions were based, and the fourth in 1854. A smaller hand book, or "Manual," as it was distinctively termed, was published in 1848. These successive issues are not nominal or slight revisions of the original work. Each of them has been entirely recast, in the light of accumulating knowledge and advancing science, and the utmost effort has been made to discover, to weigh, to discuss, and to embody the results of investigations in every part of the globe. But this is not the only nor the most characteristic feature of these successive editions. The amount of original research involved in the preparation of them all, and especially in the last, is very great, and constitutes one of the most important recommendations. If it is borne in mind that all this work has been accomplished in a state of health which is far from robust, and which has sometimes involved absolute cessation of intellectual labor, the industry, the vigor, and the genius of the author will receive still heartier admiration.

In reference to the present edition, Professor Dana remarks, that not a page and scarcely a paragraph of the previous edition remains unaltered, and full five-sixths of the volume has been printed from manuscript copy; and, he adds, that this manuscript (the paragraphs on the pyrognostic characters excepted) was almost solely in his own hand-writing, or in that of a copyist from it, "neither the consultation of original authorities, the drawing of conclusions, nor the putting of results on paper, having been delegated to another."

The name of Professor Brush, which is associated with that of Professor Dana, on the title-page of the fifth edition, is already well known from his supplements to the edition of 1854, and his frequent papers in the *Journal of Science*, not to speak of his admirable private cabinet of minerals; while his efficiency in building up the scientific department of Yale College has still further added to his distinction. It has been aptly said of him,

that he has in this country no superior in his favorite study except his distinguished teacher. The blow-pipe department of the work was under his sole charge, and the pyrognostic characters were entirely rewritten by him. His skill in analytical chemistry, and his thorough knowledge of mineralogy, enabled him to furnish other important coöperation during the progress of the work, and while it was in press the proofs received the benefit of his revision.

The distinctive features of this edition consist in the introduction of systematic and detailed description of varieties of species; a historical synonymy in place of a mere list of names; chemical formulas on the new system of chemistry as well as on the old; fuller and completely revised blow-pipe characters; and the insertion of two hundred and fifty new wood cuts. The classification of species is in system the same as in the last previous edition, though many changes have been made in detail.

The volume now issued is devoted wholly to Descriptive Mineralogy, and to such accessory and introductory statements and tables as will render it independently of service. A second volume (constituting Part I.), to be chiefly devoted to Crystallography, is promised for early publication. The Descriptive Mineralogy, now printed, covers eight hundred and twenty-five large and crowded pages, and as chemical formulæ and other parts are presented with the greatest possible brevity, it has been estimated that the covers contain material enough to make four or five ordinary octavo volumes.

Leaving to other journals a more particular examination of the scientific merits of this work, we propose to notice some general points of interest which its pages have suggested to us.

This mineralogy is a model of honest, protracted research. Every page evinces a love of accuracy, a patience of investigation, a searching after the truth of nature, which must command the genuine respect of all who look at the volume, whether they know anything of mineralogy or not. Such intelligent combinations of early and recent investigations, such critical selection of the true, such fearless elimination of the false, such sustained powers of analysis and description, evince the skill of a master.

The fidelity with which reference is made to every authority which has been consulted in the preparation of this treatise, is another noteworthy point. In this respect the authors, to a degree as commendable as it is rare, are punctilious. Every one who has contributed to the progress of the science, however slight the

grain he has laid upon the mole, is recognized, and credit is given to the full amount of his contribution. An immense amount of labor has been expended in hunting up old and new citations; private and public collections of scientific books and journals have been diligently explored; antiquarian bookstores have yielded many quaint and almost forgotten treatises; an extensive correspondence with men of science throughout the world has been kept up; and the material thus collected, which would confuse the unpractised author and would overwhelm any but the strongest, has been sifted, arranged, and conducted with so much care that the history of every important fact may be readily traced to its rightful discoverer.

Such a volume could never have been prepared if the collections of specimens and books at the command of the authors had not been of a very ample extent. Perhaps it is not going too far to say that the celebrated cabinet of minerals bought of Col. Gibbs in 1825 and presented to Yale College by citizens of New Haven and other liberal persons, has borne its chief fruit in the opportunities it has afforded to the two mineralogists whose names are associated in this volume. They have their own collections, it is true, one of them of remarkable completeness and costliness, but we think both will attribute to the collections which were grouped around the well known "candle box" of Professor Silliman, a portion, at least, of their incitement to mineralogical studies. We wish that as much could be said of the influence of the college library; but we fear that neither of the writers referred to would acknowledge much benefit from the meagre shelves of scientific books to which the meagre funds of the library have restricted them. Private resources have furnished most of the volumes contributed. This should not be so; for, if it is any advantage to the college, to the community, to the country, or to the world that great books like these should be written, books which will influence the progress of science in all time to come, books which will contribute in untold ways to the welfare of mankind, then the materials for thought and investigation must be liberally supplied to scholars, and cabinets and libraries must be generously maintained.

In the old world it is not infrequent to bestow upon men of science and letters, who have rendered long and honorable services to their fellow-men, tokens of substantial honor; that the lives which have been spent in intellectual toil may not close without

some recompense. Would that the custom might be established in this country!

MISCELLANEOUS.

SAINTE-BEUVE'S PORTRAITS OF CELEBRATED WOMEN.*—M. Sainte-Beuve is the prince of portrait-painters, but the most interesting portrait which he has ever drawn is his own. It is not a well-filled canvas, like those on which he has fixed the features of so many eminent men, and so many fair and fascinating women, where no line is wanting and none is exaggerated, where the light is so skillfully made to fall on each most characteristic trait, where the expression which he has caught with his cunning pencil is that one which best reveals the soul, where the very attitude is eloquent and the costume full of meaning. It is only an outline, made up of large and sometimes careless strokes, added at long intervals; or rather, it is a series of studies for such a picture, struck off in hours of reverie, and scattered through the many volumes which he has given to the world. If we were to try to collect them, and to add to his famous gallery the portrait of the master painted by himself, we should find them here in a preface, and there in a note, in a poem or an essay which had sprung out of his heart, and chiefly in those detached "*Thoughts*" which are framed among the poems of Joseph Delorme, and which are appended to several of his "*Portraits*" and "*Causeries*." Without setting before ourselves any such task, since this little volume of Miss Preston's translations has brought the great name under our pen, we seize the opportunity not to speak of M. Sainte-Beuve, but to let M. Sainte-Beuve speak of himself.

France has undergone, during the present century, almost as many and as violent revolutions in the world of ideas as in that of politics, and M. Sainte-Beuve, whose life began at the very beginning of the century, has passed through them all. "I am," he says in one of those "*Pensées*" to which we have alluded, "I am thoroughly broken in to metamorphoses. I began frankly and bluntly with the most extreme form of the eighteenth century, with Tracy, Daunou, Lamarck, and physiology: that is my real foundation. Thence I passed through the doctrinary and psychological school of the *Globe*, but making my reservations and without giving it my adherence. Thence I passed to romanticism in poetry,

* *Portraits of Celebrated Women.* By C. A. SAINTE-BEUVE. Translated from the French by H. W. PRESTON. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1869.

and through the party of Victor Hugo, with which I seemed to identify myself. Then I traversed, or rather skirted, Saint-Simonianism, and almost immediately afterward the party of La Mennais, before his rupture with the pope. In 1837, at Lausanne, I skirted Calvinism and Methodism, and was led to make an effort to win their good-will. In all these changes I have never estranged my will or my judgment (unless it were for a moment in the party of Hugo, and under the influence of a charm), I have never pledged my belief, but I comprehended men and things so well that I gave *the greatest hopes* to sincere minds, who wished to convert me, and who thought me already their own. My curiosity, my desire to see everything, to examine everything closely, my extreme pleasure in finding the relative truth of everything and of every organization, led me to this series of experiments, which have been for me only a long course of moral physiology." So many changes could not fail to make him enemies, and his enemies have not failed to taunt him with his inconsistencies. M. Cuvillier-Fleury, for example, in an article whose very title has a sting in it, on "Experimental criticism in the works of M. Sainte-Beuve," has charged him with a great tact for sailing, without accident and without resistance, among the great currents of ideas; with preferring even in letters "the causes which are victorious, and the banners which float even for a day to the popular breeze;" and he expresses his commiseration for the different schools "which have thus been taken on trial by M. Sainte-Beuve, and which have played in his education the part of those unfortunate persons, who supply the material for the experiments of the clinique and the medical lecture-room." The point of the criticism is, that all these transformations are not so much real as apparent, that they do not mark successive stages in the development of his mind, that they are simply costumes which he has worn at different periods, and which he has put on and off at his pleasure; that when he speaks of "passing through the school of the *Globe*, making his reservations and withholding his adherence," of "*seeming* to join" the party of Victor Hugo, of "skirting Saint-Simonianism and Calvinism," "without estranging his judgment or pledging his belief," he has simply been acting the part of a spy in the different camps, in order to catch a glimpse of the leaders in fatigue dress, and to be better able to describe the war. Doubtless this eclecticism is a prominent trait in the character of M. Sainte-Beuve, but he seems to us to have himself slightly exag-

gerated it in the *Pensée*, which we have quoted. He *did* join the party of Victor Hugo, and he was one of the most ardent and extreme advocates, both in theory and in practice, of the principles of the Romantic school. He did more than "skirt" (*côtoyer*) the party of La Mennais, for his only novel, "*Volupté*," is deeply tinged with the influence of that energetic mind. But his own words confirm the judgment of his critic, and paint, in that vivid way of which he is the acknowledged master, this interesting feature of his mind. "I have only one pleasure," he says, "I naturalize, I herborize, I am a naturalist of minds. What I should like is to compose a literary natural history." "I have arrived in life at complete indifference. What matters it to me, provided I do *something* in the morning and am *somewhere* in the evening?" "I ask of men now only one thing; it is to leave me plenty of time to myself, plenty of solitude, and yet to present themselves still, now and then, to my observation."

It appears, then, that we must give up the physiologist, the *doctrinaire*, the romanticist, the Saint-Simonian; what remains from this laborious "series of experiments?" The critic, the undisputed prince of critics, the founder of a school, the creator of an era in criticism. In the hands of others criticism is a job, a trade, a profession; in his hands it is a fine art. And it is this experimental training in which he has passed from one to another of the centers of the best life of his time, in which he has caused so many of the freshest and purest streams of thought to flow through his own mind, that he has acquired the many-sidedness for which he is eminent. There are critics enough who dogmatize, who have points of view, local, sectarian, scholastic, traditional, or merely personal; to how many could we apply the words in which another of the most eminent French critics has paid his tribute to Sainte-Beuve? "He takes possession of every character of whom he writes"—whether it be Theocritus or Franklin, Marshal Saint-Arnaud or Marguerite of Navarre—"by a double claim; he judges it, and he paints it. To take up the same character afterwards, is to run the risk of pronouncing a judgment less accurate, and of not painting it at all."

Having obtained from him this outline of his training, let us ask him for his idea of criticism. Mr. Matthew Arnold, who has something of his spirit and a little of his talent, has defined criticism as "a disinterested endeavor to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world." M. Sainte-Beuve, in-

stead of a definition, gives us two *Thoughts*, "which," he says, "seem contradictory, but which are not really so. 1. The critic is only a man who himself knows, and who teaches others, how to read. 2. Criticism, as I understand it, and as I try to practice it, is always an invention, a creation." And another thought explains the last: "What I have sought in criticism has been to introduce into it a sort of charm, and, at the same time, more reality than it had before; in a word, at once poetry and a little physiology." These two words give us the key to his method; he is a poet with a mixture of the physiologist. It is curious that the man of letters, so much of whose life has been passed in lecture-rooms and libraries, should have begun as a student of medicine, but the fact will not appear so strange if we remember his own words, that his varied studies and experiments have been only a long course of moral physiology. But he is not an anatomist merely, or mainly; his criticism is rather synthetic than analytic, not destructive but constructive; for he was at the beginning and has always been a poet. Not a great poet, doubtless; his place in that new *Pleiad*, which shone so clearly and caused so much consternation forty years ago, of which the brightest lights have now gone out or are burning dimly, was not won by his verses. And yet these verses, stigmatized by the enemies of the new school as "consumptive poetry," pronounced, unjustly perhaps, even by one of the leaders of that school, M. de Lamartine, "imperfect fruits of a tree over-forced," are something more than an embodiment of certain novel theories of versification. They are not merely curious as illustrating the influence first of *Obermann* and *Werther*, then of Coleridge and Wordsworth on the author's facile and receptive mind. They have an interest even apart from that which belongs to them, as "a style of poetry," as Béranger called them, "absolutely unknown in France, the high poetry of the common things of life." For they came from the heart of the poet, they were inspired by the deep friendships of his early years, they show us the perilous paths over which his soul has passed, and they afford us glimpses of an "experimental" training of the sensibilities, which, at least, whatever we may say of the intellectual discipline, was not voluntary, and so is indispensable in our study of the man. It is only by going back to the period from 1829 to 1837, the period in which M. Sainte-Beuve, in 1862, reviewing his literary life, found the greatest satisfaction, and by learning to know the poet, that we can understand the

critic, that we can comprehend what he means by the "inventive," the "creative" in criticism. We shall find there the secret of that rare talent for painting, to which M. Nisard refers in the words we have quoted from him. We shall learn there the explanation of the penetration and accuracy of his judgment of poetry and fiction, and of his sympathetic appreciation and comprehension, so rare and so remarkable, of woman. It is to the poet, too, and not to the physiologist, or the lecturer, or the senator, that we owe his style, that ample and luminous style which is equaled, in our judgment, by no living French prose writer, with the single exception of George Sand, and of which no better description, and perhaps no better example, can be given than is found in the words in which he has himself characterized the critical spirit: "It is a large and limpid river, which bends and winds around the works and monuments of poetry as around rocks and fortresses, hills carpeted with vineyards and verdurous valleys bordering its banks. While each of these objects in the landscape remains fixed in its place, and troubles itself little about the others, while the feudal tower disdains the valley, and the valley ignores the hill, the river goes from one to the other, bathes them without doing them harm, embraces them with its fresh, flowing water, *comprehends* them, reflects them; and when the traveler is curious to visit and become acquainted with these varied sites, it takes him in a boat, bears him on without a shock, and develops to his view, in succession, the changing panorama of its course."

We are ready to welcome almost anything which can serve to make the American public acquainted with so rare a man, and Miss Preston has chosen to translate some of his best essays, and has rendered them in vigorous English. The charm of the French style is lost, of course; the translator has wisely refrained from the attempt to reproduce it. It would be well if she had not, also, in too many cases, strangely missed his thought. She has rendered some difficult passages well, but what shall we say of such slips as these: on page 41, "*peu de mois*," a few months, is translated "one short month;" on page 55, "*du spirituel jésuite*," of the brilliant Jesuit, is rendered "of Jesuitical spiritualism;" on page 160, by an unaccountable confusion of genders, she has translated "*le long séjour qu' il fit à Paris, jeune et non marié encore*," "her long residence in Paris before her marriage;" for *her* read *his*; on page 162 we find a similar blunder; it was not to the "old Marshal Mouchy" that Mlle. Necker put the question, "what he

thought of love," but to his wife, "*la vieille Maréchale*;" on page 166, "*il suppléerait seul tous les moyens*" etc. means, not "it would atone for all the deficiencies in the means," but it would supply their place, if they were wanting; and, on the following page, "*tout à l'heure*" is just before, not "subsequently;" on page 197, Boileau's remark in regard to the style of Bayle, "*on entend tout ce qu' il dit*," we understand everything that he says, is translated by Miss Preston, "we hear," etc., as if we were deaf; on page 200, "*quand ces langues sont montées à leur perfection*," when these languages have attained their perfection, is rendered "because languages mount upward to their perfection," which is no reason why it should be difficult to introduce into them a new style, but just the opposite; on page 202, "*le célèbre article qui fit supprimer le Mercure*," the famous article which caused the suppression of the *Mercure*, is translated "the famous article suppressed by the *Mercure*;" on page 313, the innocent words, "*ces pyramides de sapins tout peuplées d' écureuils qui se miraient dans les ondes*," those pyramidal firs, peopled with squirrels, which were reflected in the water, are made to yield this astonishing nonsense, "the pyramidal firs, peopled with squirrels that admired their own reflection in the mirrored water;"—a new habit, surely, of either squirrels or fir-trees, though one to which they might be led by seeing the water "mirrored"—in what?

It is needless to say that this is not translating Sainte-Beuve well, and these are but a few of the errors we have noted in a careful reading of two or three of the essays. They prove that Miss Preston did her work too rapidly, but they will not prevent her book being read, and deserving to be read, with pleasure.

THE CONSCRIPT.*—In a country like France, where every morning and evening newspaper, from the *Débats* to the *Petit Journal*, has its *feuilleton*, and where the grave *Revue des deux Mondes* secures in advance all the novels which a dozen of the most famous writers may see fit to publish, a story which is pushed into the light by some unknown author does not often run through twenty editions in three or four years simply on its own merits. It may owe its success to a certain daring in the discussion of some delicate social question, or it may have the good fortune to incur

The Conscript: A story of the French War of 1813; by MM. Erckmann-Chatrian. Translated from the twentieth Paris edition. With eight full-page illustrations. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1868.

the interdict of the censors, and so obtain a sudden notoriety and a large sale, or it may skillfully graze some political issue, of which men's thoughts are full, and everybody will read it, as a few years ago we were all reading "Uncle Tom's Cabin." The novels of MM. Erckmann and Chatrian owe their popularity very largely to the last of these causes. They are not thrilling stories, but they are pictures of war, and they appeared at a time when every arsenal in France was busy, transforming old muskets into needle-guns, when the government was trying to contrive a way to double its army without causing the nation to feel it, and when all the newspapers, official and liberal, were filled with a great clamor for the restoration to France of her "natural boundaries." The authors of the "Conscript of 1813" undertook to calm the popular frenzy by showing the *bourgeois* of Paris, who had forgotten all about the Revolution except its watchwords, and who did not go to Sebastopol or Solferino, what war is. They attempted by a minute and graphic description of the details of each of the great campaigns of the Republic and the Empire, "to show youth the vanity of military glory, and to prove that no man can gain happiness save by peace, liberty, and labor." If their works had less literary merit than they have, every friend of the real interests of France would rejoice in their remarkable popularity. We, in this country, are unhappily too familiar with all these details of forced marches, crowded hospitals, home-sickness, wounds, tears, death in all its dreadful forms,—not the fiction, but the fact of war; but if any one wishes to revive his recollection of those terrible days, he will find few battle-fields more vivid or suggestive than the description in this volume of the great struggle at Leipsic. There is less heroic blaze in it than in Victor Hugo's famous episode on the battle of Waterloo; and so the story of a veteran, who sat smoking his pipe and nursing his wooden leg on the sunny esplanade of the Hôtel des Invalides would be less artistic, probably, than Mr. Kinglake's version of the battle of the Alma. But it might be as truthful, even if it were not quite as fine.

CONSTANCE AYLMER.*—The winning side of Puritan life, the worthier side of Quaker life, and the picturesque side of Dutch life, in the first century of American history, have long been wait-

* *Constance Aylmer*: a Story of the Seventeenth Century. By H. F. P. New York. Charles Scribner & Co. 1869.

ing to be exactly and genially reproduced. It is done in this beautifully wrought story. There is something better in it than the hard realism of photographic picture; it shows the reverent and gracious, as well as graceful, sketching of an affectionate hand. If the publisher is at all correct in his advertisements in ascribing this limning of primitive America to a "new" writer, it must be only in the sense of new in this particular species of work, not new in literary tasks altogether. If this were the fact it would disclose itself in certain obvious defects that are altogether lacking, and in a want of the harmonized and quiet treatment of incidents. With plenty of material for the sensational in it, the book makes no impression of that sort, but, throughout, one of finish and sweetness instead. The scenery, the social usages, the dress and manners, the homes, the public gatherings, the unique relations and every day history of "Old New York"—oldest New York—are reproduced with exquisite minuteness and fidelity. The characterization is distinct and felicitous. Lady Moody, Sir Henry, Dame Swaller, the "Lord Director," Barbara Elsie, and Lisbet, Lady Alice, and Lord and Lady Grey, are thorough portraits, to say nothing of Friend Baxter, Beltazzar, the lovers of the story—Mordaunt, Percy, Lord Huntington, and others,—and the Indian actors, Omance, and Tyano. The heroine, Constance, the youthful and lovely Runtan maiden, has a fresh and sweet nature made beautiful by pure and healthy piety, a creation that could only come from a mind knowing what is best and most delightful in womanliness from within. The story throughout is one of the freshest and most wholesome to be met with in these days of morbid fiction, and deserves especially to be read and admired by all whose associations with the early Dutch element in our history are intimate, and by all who know the Christian nobleness and beauty there was in Puritanism.

We take a picture or two almost without selection: Here is Gravesend, near "New Amsterdam," in its fourteenth year:

"A small village surrounded by high palisades. Its streets radiated from a common centre, where stood the Town House, the pump, and whipping-post. The best of the houses were double, with long, sloping, thatched roofs, and huge chimney stacks which admitted as much light as the very small windows.

"A little beyond the village, and also enclosed by high palisades, stood a large, irregular stone house, called Moody Hall, both on account of the superiority of the building, and on account of its occupants. Its possessor, Lady Moody, was one of the patentees of the town. She had come here to enjoy more freedom of opinion than was granted her at Lynn among the Puritans. Ten

years later she would have been persecuted there as a Quaker. The people of Gravesend, like herself, were English, with few exceptions, and of the same religious belief. They regarded this lady-mother with awe as well as affection, and submitted to her judgment all difficulties which could not be otherwise settled.

"The house, which the villagers pointed out with pride, was spacious on the ground-floor, and lighted with deep, narrow windows of diamond-shaped panes. The roof was red-tiled, and curved out in a steep slope beyond the front wall, where it was supported by roughly-hewn columns, and formed a long piazza. Some of these rude columns, and part of the roof, were covered with a luxuriant creeping vine. It was a mass of rich green in summer. Now, early in November, it gleamed scarlet. The floor of the piazza and the entrance-path were paved with round, smooth pebbles. A settle-bench stood against the wall beneath the windows, and was a cool resting place in summer. The ponderous double door, with "bull's eyes" in its upper panels, opened into a wide hall. Above the doors, leading to side rooms, deers' antlers were fixed, in proof of Sir Henry's skill as a huntsman; and Indian trophies hung upon the walls. The large room on the left had the luxury of silk hangings and richly carved furniture, which had seen their best days in England. If this room had an air of the world, it was no fault of Lady Moody's now; for then vanities were the relics of her gayer days. It was used only on rare occasions—such as the coming of the Right Honorable Lord and Director-General, Petrus Stuyvesant, whom nobody in Gravesend dared to entertain, or knew so well how to manage as the good mother."

Here is a Puritan-and-Royalist party in London :

"A select dinner party met at Lord Grey's on one of the pleasant autumn days to celebrate the betrothal of Lady Alice. Mother and daughter were resolute to have a ceremonial use of the ring. For once Lord Grey was equally resolute. He would have no papistical forms or symbols with which to insult his Puritan guests. Lord D'Arcy's family were there, stiff royalists, yielding outwardly to the inevitable course of events, crouching only till this *régime* should pass away. Flowing curls, lace ties and ruffles, and diamonds distinguished these. Staunch Puritans were there also, in plain velvet hose, broad collars, and russet leather boots.

"After the simple ceremony of plighting, Lord Grey led the way to the sumptuous dinner with the mother of Lord D'Arcy, and, following this compliment to the royalists, Lady Grey, with delicate homage to learning, selected the Puritan, John Milton. Constance was consigned to Lord Huntingdon.

"When the noisy discussion of the palatable viands sufficiently shielded her, she asked,

"Who is the gentleman of so solemn demeanor and so fine features, whom Lady Grey honored?"

"John Milton, the learned Secretary for foreign tongues. England owes much to him for the eloquence and dignity he gives to the political despatches. He is blind, and proceeds slowly, but the Lord Protector values him too highly to permit his retirement."

"I wonder that you say he is blind. His eyes are clear and serene."

"Yet moving among men he lives in the solitude of blindness. But solitude ripens a great man's soul. He comforts himself with music and poetry. I have often, in passing through Petty France, where he lives, heard him accompany his organ with his own psalms, which Henry Laws, who belonged to King Charles's chapel, has set to flowing music."

"He is a poet, then!" said Constance. "He carries an austere air for a poet."

"But he writes with delicacy as well as strength. One never finds him coarse. He gives his ideal women a dignity and high purity beyond any writer I know. Witness even his drama, 'Comus.'"

REALMAH,* by Arthur Helps, Esq., will be welcomed by the admirers of the other writings of the author, and will, we think, be pronounced to be not inferior to the best of them. It consists of a tale, of which *Realmah* is the hero, which is told in a series of installments by one of a party of friends, who are spending a holiday season in the country; and of their considerations together upon the incidents and personages of the story, and a variety of topics which casually present themselves in the progress of their everyday intercourse. The tale is well enough, though somewhat stiff and pedantic; its scene being laid among the lake-dwellers in the age of stone. It furnishes, however, not a few opportunities for refined and good-natured satire and irony upon modern life, especially upon public life in England; with an occasional glance at that which is private and domestic. The chief interest of the book lies in the conversations, which are freely interspersed, and which fall upon a great variety of topics as they are elicited in the progress of their easy flow and apparently natural development. The characters are distinctly, though not violently individual. The themes are not too grandiose and stately for casual discourse; many of them, indeed, would, at first thought, seem to be too trivial for such grave personages and official characters, but on a second view are recognized as concerning very seriously human happiness and welfare. The sentiments are all kindly and charitable; and, what is not least important, while there is very little fine writing in the book, there is a great deal of pure and unpretending English. We would gladly induce many of our readers to share with us in the quiet satisfaction which we have received from these unambitious and, at first, slightly unattractive pages.

* *Realmah*. By the Author of *Friends in Council*. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1869.

A HALF CENTURY WITH JUVENILE DELINQUENTS.*—The prevention of crime by the reformation of juvenile delinquents, and by the transfer to good homes of the children of the street, is one of the wisest and most encouraging movements of modern Christian benevolence. The rapid increase of large towns in this country, and the ease with which railroads and newspapers familiarize the smaller villages with the iniquities of great cities, make it important that throughout the land there should be an acquaintance with the means of reformation and prevention which are shown by the experience of philanthropists to be efficacious and salutary. Even errors or mistakes, if fairly described, may be useful in showing the benevolent what to avoid as well as what to copy.

The House of Refuge in New York is one of the oldest and largest institutions for the reformation of the young in existence. In a certain sense it is a prison, not a home; but it is a prison governed and directed by most excellent managers, who mean that the restraints of the law shall be made efficacious by the softer influences of Christian charity. The tendency now is to organize reformatories and asylums more and more like families, and less like prisons, but "the congregate system," as it is called, has the advantage of economy, and, as many think, of discipline also, so that it is not likely to be at once superseded by the family system. Whichever plan may be the best, the experience of such an institution as the House of Refuge in New York is very important, especially when given in connection with that of other kindred institutions in other parts of the country.

Dr. Pierce, in the volume before us, has given a careful review of the Refuge in New York (of which he is Chaplain), from its origin, in 1817, until the present time, and he has interwoven with the narrative a great deal of interesting matter pertaining to other efforts for the reformation of the young, especially in the vicinity of New York. His volume is interesting as well as useful, and deserves a place in the history of Christian charity by the side Liefde's popular narratives of kindred institutions in Europe. It is illustrated by portraits and by views of the buildings referred to.

* *A Half Century with Juvenile Delinquents; or, the New York House of Refuge and its Times.* By B. K. PIERCE, D. D. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1869. pp. 384.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

Noontide at Sychar; or, The Story of Jacob's Well. A New Testament Chapter in Providence and Grace. By J. R. Macduff, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1869. 16mo. pp. 268.

Light and Truth; or, Bible Thoughts and Themes. The Gospels. By Horatius Bonar, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1869. 16mo. pp. 422.

Hades and Heaven; or, What does Scripture reveal of the estate and employments of the blessed dead and of the risen saints. By the Rev. E. H. Bickerseth, M. A., author of "Yesterday, To-day, and Forever." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1869. 24 mo. pp. 128.

Notes of the Christian Life. A Selection of Sermons preached by Henry Robert Reynolds, B. A., President of Cheshunt College, and Fellow of University College, London. With a Preface by Rev. Elbert S. Porter, D. D. New York: P. S. Wynkoop & Son. 1868. 12mo. pp. 411.

Particular Providence, in distinction from General, necessary to the fulfillment of the Purposes and Promises of God: illustrated by a course of lectures on the History of Joseph. By William R. Gordon, S. T. D. New York: P. S. Wynkoop & Son. 1868. 12mo. pp. 492.

The Judgment Seat. A Discourse delivered in the Scotch Presbyterian Church, New York, Dec. 27, 1868, on the occasion of his forty-fifth anniversary as Pastor of the Church. By Joseph McElroy, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1869. 24mo. pp. 52.

Curlew Chimes; or, Thoughts for Life's Eventide. By J. R. Macduff, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 24mo. pp. 71.

MISCELLANEOUS.

The Gain of a Loss. A Novel. By the author of "The Last of the Cavaliers." New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1869. 12mo. pp. 439.

How a Bride was Won; or, a Chase Across the Pampas. By Frederick Gerstäcker. New York: D. Appleton & Co. One vol., 8vo.

Letters of a Sentimental Idler, from Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Nubia, and the Holy Land. By Harry Harewood Leech. With a portrait of the author, engravings of Oriental life, etc. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 12mo. pp. 473.

The Fisher-Maiden. A Norwegian Tale. By Björnstjerne Björnson. From the author's German edition. By M. E. Niles. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1869. 16mo. pp. 217.

Tales from Alsace; or, Scenes and Portraits from Life in the days of the Reformation, as drawn from old chronicles. Translated from the German. With an introduction appended to the French edition by the French translator, E. Rouasseau Saint-Hilaire. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1869. 12mo. pp. 454.

The Life of John Carter. By Frederick James Mills. With illustrations. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1868. 12mo. pp. 122.

Search After Truth. Addressed to Young Men. By George W. Egleston. New York: G. P. Putnam & Son. 1869. 16mo. pp. 267.

THE
NEW ENGLANDER.

No. CVIII.

JULY, 1869.

ARTICLE I —THE RELIGION OF THE FUTURE.

It is the doctrine of the New Testament that the dispensation which was introduced by Christ is to continue until the end of the world. The whole strain of the New Testament shows this; and such passages, especially, as "of His kingdom there shall be no end," "He must reign until He hath put all His enemies under His feet," "this gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in all the world for a witness unto all nations, and then shall the end come," are proofs, with many others like them, that the Founder of Christianity and His disciples regarded it as the final act of God's moral system for the human race. The very nature of Christ's religion would be enough of itself to demonstrate, that it must be, if true, not a stage in a progress, but the ultimate form of religious truth and thought, the last of God's economies, the fruit which, when fully ripe, is followed by the plant's death and the end of the year. As the completion of whatever was imperfect in

Judaism, as intended for all mankind and claiming for itself to satisfy the religious wants of all, it cannot be superseded by any new form of truth, or supplemented by a later and improved revelation. All the progress of mankind until the end of time and all the hopes of mankind are treasured up in it, if its claims are just. When it shall have done its work, the present condition of man on earth shall come to an end, and a state of things wholly new, a state of retribution, shall succeed.

There are many persons in the present age who refuse to admit these pretensions of Christianity. It is not to be the universal, nor the ultimate religion of the world. In some respects it may have been a very great improvement on whatever of religious doctrine preceded it, and it has carried the nations of Christendom to a higher state of culture than was ever before reached; but it is like all other religions in having no historical basis and no divine authority. The progress of the world hereafter will consist in setting aside the exclusive claims of Christ, in retaining all that in his moral precepts which will endure the storms of time, and in giving the guidance of the future to science and human insight. The religion of the future will be a religion with all that is peculiar to Christianity cast away, while something of its spirit will be retained, and with the help of this spirit, without a revelation, the coming ages will reach the point of perfection that is attainable by man.

The enemies of Christianity are divided among themselves. As Atheists, Pantheists, and Theists—the latter of various classes—they even oppose and sometimes denounce one another. Of this irreconcilable difference of opinion, however, we intend to make no use. We will suppose that the Theists are at length to triumph;—that they who receive the doctrines of an infinite God, and a divine plan in governing the world, and who hold to a system of morals something like that of Christ, are to gain the day over all other thinkers;—that the destinies of the world are to be put into their hands;—that the religion of the future is to be as they shall shape it. Their way of thinking, we will suppose, has had its perfect work. The reign of Christianity is over. That religion which soothed sorrows

and inspired hope, which took up man amid the despair, of decaying antiquity, was his only protector through the middle ages, and led on modern civilization; which has encouraged philosophy to reproduce the thoughts of God; which has given security to states by its lofty morals, and exalts the poorest of men by awakening the feeling of human brotherhood and the sense of human rights; which has controlled and modified art and letters,—that religion, we say, is fallen, its stronghold of facts is demolished, its miracles, whether to be explained historically or not, are discarded as inconsistent with the laws of the Universe, its Christ is only a man, its God has retired behind the curtain, never to reveal himself in human affairs. He spoke not to the fathers by the prophets. He speaks not to us by His Son. He will never speak to mankind. Men must do the best they can without Christ and without a Gospel.

Let us make the most favorable supposition the case admits of,—that these foes of Christ's religion are sincere, earnest, philanthropic men, haters of all injustice and of all falsehood, that they begin their work of destruction with the purpose of introducing something better, and really believe that the progress of man can only be reached through their systems of thinking. Let us suppose too that unbelief creeps over the Christian world, not all at once like a stroke of paralysis, but by a slow undermining of the foundations, by an abandonment of one point after another. The Christian faith ceases not at once to be respected or admired, but becomes by degrees conscious of its weakness, loses hope, retreats from the more educated to the less, lingers longest with the poor, the widow, the afflicted who have no weight in the world, and at length dies out and is forgotten, to be counted among the many religions, which she herself drove away from among mankind.

Now we ask what the world will do without a positive, historical, revealed religion. Let the religion of the future, as we will call the rival of Christianity, start on its career with all veneration for the spirit of the Gospel; can that veneration last? What doctrines will be left to rear their heads above the deluge of unbelief? What motives in favor of religion will survive the decay, the extinction of Christianity.

We propose to attempt to answer some of these questions in a spirit of candor, to look at some of the disadvantages, which will of necessity attend on such a religion, and to consider what prospects it can have of spreading over and of bettering mankind.

And here let it be permitted to us to say once for all, that we compare the resources and powers of the Gospel with systems of Theism, but that, if what we are about to urge has any weight, it will be still more weighty in the comparison between Christianity and Pantheistic religions. The point again towards which we turn our remarks is not directly the truth of the religions placed side by side, nor directly their services to mankind, but rather to find out whether any religion, which lays no claim to be a revelation, even although holding fast to a personal God, can fulfill the offices of a religion for the world, and whether, if it cannot, progress or civilization can take its place.

I. Our first position is that the absence from a religion of historical facts is a very great weakness, or in other words that the supposed religion of the future, being unable, as it must be, to take the form of facts and of history must be without a very great source of power.

Christianity is historical in its very nature and cannot, as we maintain, be torn apart from history, without both ruining the religion and belittling the whole story of the world, for the system of redemption through Christ is a progressive work going on in the world of men, and culminating in the manifestation here below of the Son of God. The religion being a story, and a story concerning God, its evidences, it is quite natural to suppose, must not merely make an appeal to the moral judgments and sentiments, but, like all other story, must depend on the veracity of witnesses, on the truth of facts in the outer world. Moreover as religion is a practical thing, as its highest aim ever must be to be taken up into the lives of men and hence to interweave itself with all action and all history, it must exhibit life, or truth, conviction and principle in action, before our eyes,—that is, it must be historical.

All this the great founder of Christianity and his first followers were aware of, more so perhaps than any of their suc-

cessors in the following ages until the present time. He sent them forth as witnesses, they took this attitude before the world and felt that this was their leading vocation. Their view of the strength of the Gospel was justified by their success. It spread, by the simple telling of a story, even among the most prejudiced, among the Jews to whom a suffering Christ was a stumbling block, and among the Greeks to whom a new religion, bursting in upon the events of the present world, was a thing not so much as dreamed of. It is true that it contained a system of doctrines, a philosophy suited to man's wants, to his convictions, to his deepest nature, but it is equally true that the philosophy could not have existed separate from the facts and that by the facts it was recommended, impressed, and established.

To this force of the historical element in religion the systems of heathenism bear testimony.

On whatever principle we account for the religions of nature, it is evident that their mythologies and their worship indicate a desire to bring the Deity out of the region of abstract thought, to represent him to the human senses and in contiguity with man, to call him within the limits of space and time. The great interest, the great charm of heathenism consists in its mythology, as India, Greece, Scandinavia, and even the new world bear witness: if its views of the Divine Being had not taken the form of a narrative, if the Gods had not been represented as living and moving and acting among men, it would have lacked the power to fascinate and in a measure to satisfy the human soul. The Romans, who had at first a sober religion without image worship and with a scanty mythology, to a good degree deserted their earlier and vaguer system for the more beautiful, more copious, more imaginative fables of the Greeks. Upon mythology worship in a considerable degree depends; the sacredness of particular spots, the reasons for particular rites, the character of the rites themselves, are all to be referred to ancient and venerated traditions. Poetry too and art are shaped by mythology, they draw their materials from its fables, they act originally as its handmaids. And, when heathenism decays, as decay it must, the overthrow grows out of philosophical views and historical criticism rejecting the

narratives handed down from ancient times. All these and many like considerations show that religion would appear dead and barren to mankind if it assumed an abstract philosophical form, that it would not come home to the soul or have a sway over the life.

Even the decay of heathenism in the Roman empire, that strange time when the old religion tried to brace itself up against the spread of doubt and of Christianity, indicates a longing for the appearance again of the Deity amid human events; the magic rites, the mysteries, the theurgic processes by which men sought to come into communication with the spiritual world, were, as it seems to us, so many testimonies of human nature that the Gospel by means of its narrative form, that the economy of our religion from the first by its history, is most wisely accommodated to human nature and human wants, so that they who expect much from a religion of mere abstractions must be most signally disappointed.

And this experience of mankind under heathenism and Christianity makes it probable that the nature of man itself, rather than anything so variable as the style of culture and of knowledge, pronounces a historical form to be necessary for the sway of religious ideas among mankind. This is made more than probable by several considerations. Our nature, except when under strict philosophical training, of which few are capable and from which many turn away in disgust, revolts from abstractions and delights in concrete realities. We are made to take pleasure in personal existences and in their actions. Our sentiments need some object on which they can fasten. *Reverence* is not content with existing as a vague feeling, but seeks for some reality which may be the object of worship. *The feeling of dependence* needs to have that on which we are dimly conscious of depending body itself forth in some apprehensible form. *Thankfulness* implies the purpose of a known personal object to confer a benefit, and so all our feelings go forth only towards distinctly apprehended personalities. But personalities evidence and manifest themselves through actions which have to do with life and the world. So also the imagination is distressed—so to speak—if it cannot give form to the invisible and the ideal. The Christian religion could

not hold its ground in the world but through a personal attachment to Christ. How then can a religion, with no attraction derived from history and personal power, expect to be met by human sympathy and to spread through mankind.

But again a religion which has no history must be destitute of the power of life and example.

Life, considered in relation to religion, is the embodiment and test of doctrine or principle. Example is an illustration or acting out of principle in a particular case, and implies an influence on the imitative nature of man. Nothing gives so much power or weakness to a man as his life. Nothing tests a religion so much as the way in which it moulds the life of men. The life of Christ is the central power in Christianity. The treasury of the Church is the good lives of all faithful Christians, not because they can do more than they ought, as the Romanists supposed, but because they act just as they should. The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church, not so much because they dared to die for what they prized, as because there lay behind the martyr's faith a life that rose above the ordinary level. If Christianity had not put on a living form, if it could not have passed at once from high and loving precepts into the shape of pure men and women, we should not be defending it now. Forgiveness might have sounded sweet in precept, but if Christ and his dying disciple, Stephen, had not forgiven, where would the humanity of the world have been at this time.

It seems certain then that the strength of Christianity, as of Judaism before it, lay in its history, in the lives which it formed, and especially in that one life which it set up as a perfect model. But for facts in the life of Jesus, the cloud of witnesses would not have surrounded us, the host of shining ones would not have arisen in our sky. Mere precept, although invested with celestial authority, can effect little; an abstract standard of character, not realized in the life, will be almost destitute of power for the great mass of mankind.

But the man whose religion, as he thinks, is to control the future, may ask whether it cannot become the "heir of all the ages;" whether all that has been good and pure in the lives of men, under the Gospel and under heathenism, cannot be col-

lected and used for the good of mankind. Why may not Christ, with his saints, stand on the calendar of that religion, even as the heathen emperor, Alexander Severus, built a temple to Christ, and counted Him among his Gods. Meanwhile, he will say, the religion itself will be forming its own examples of a higher than Christian virtue, and setting them up for the veneration of all future time.

What success this proposed religion may have in the way of making godly and finished lives we do not propose now to consider. But this is certain, that a great part of the glory of Christian lives must then be effaced and lost. For Christ will have become a self-deceiver, and the view of his own character under which he acted was false. You cannot separate his consciousness of a peculiar relation to God from his life itself, and you cannot separate the life of his followers from a faith in him as divine, and from the power of those truths which he taught, and which, on the supposition, have turned out to be false or to be without divine authority. Either, then, veneration and respect for the character of Christ and of the best Christians will in a good degree cease, or it will be accounted a thing of small importance, whether that be true or false which controls the life, since falsehood has attended the development of the noblest characters known to the world.

II. The supposed new religion of the future must be a religion without authority, a religion constructed by human reason alone. The Christian religion claims a two-fold divine authority; it is from God and by God,—it is a revelation contained in inspired writings. Even if you gave up the latter source of authority, you would not cut all its connection with heaven, unless the claim to inspiration be part and parcel of the revelation itself. Nor is the Christian religion solitary in advancing such claims, but all over the world, wherever religions have sprung up, they have declared themselves to be disclosures of the Divine will. Nor is it important to our argument to decide whether these religions have been the product of imposture, or of the myth-making power, or of a self-deluding enthusiasm. If impostures, they confess a need of some authority beyond their inventors. If the offspring of a myth-making age, they clothe themselves in the garb of revelation

from an instinctive sense that religion ought to wear such a dress. If they grow up in an individual mind of large imaginative power, the same craving for a connection with God and for an inspiration from Him is manifest.

It is further evident that the reception of religion in the world, has much depended upon faith in its divine origin. That Christ was a teacher come from God was an essential element of his power, without which many would have refused to listen to His words, and few, if any, would have followed Him. The churches founded by the apostles were founded on faith in a divine interruption of the natural order of things. And so the written word is indebted for no small part of its power, for the attention originally given to it in spite of its defects of composition, for the hold it has had on the best minds of the world to a belief that it is in some way authorized to give the news of a plan of God, which man's own faculties could not discover, that it contains facts and truths above nature and above the reach of reason. And hence, if at any time the evidences of the Christian religion lose their hold on the faith of any age, the religion itself is abandoned. We are now thrown back upon reason; we must decide between different schools of philosophy, or follow our inward light, or be tossed on the uncertain waters of scepticism. And the need of divine authority for the guidance of our faith and conduct is felt by many of the strongest minds to be so great, that it is only with extreme reluctance, and by a kind of necessity which is harrowing to the soul, that they blow out the light that was their guide and commit themselves to the direction of reason. They feel when they reject the Gospel that some authorized guide, some standard of truth, some charter, speaking pardon, spiritual help and hope, would be divinely precious.

The contrast between Christianity, as authorized to make God known to men—not indeed shedding full light on every side, but satisfying and stimulating without suppressing reason,—and a religion of man's devising, is one that reaches to the very foundations of the soul's life. Religion in the soul would shrink into pitifully small dimensions without the guidance and authority of a supernatural revelation. What is to become of faith in spiritual realities, in what God thinks of conduct,

in what He is and how He will treat men, if the Scriptures are of "private interpretation," if Christ spoke without authority, if no one hath come down from heaven to tell the world of heavenly things? What will trust find to lean upon, if the "great and precious promises" are of human origin? Where will repentance go for refuge if there is no assurance of pardon? How will the soul be made strong enough to resist sin, if there is no certainty of divine assistance? How can such a hope of heaven as reason can establish, fortify the erring against earthly trials and help them to die in peace? In short, since every religious feeling, every virtue, all morality, all practical benevolence are now maintained, as Christian experience demonstrates, by the voice of God in His word, will there not be an end of all these things, and must not religion become so uncertain, so weak, when Christ shall be given up, as to have next to no power over human life and society? Without divine authority, evidence and motive power are taken away from religion, and without these what can it do for the good of man? Nay, without assurance concerning those great questions that perplex unaided reason, will not the main energy of human thought be turned towards the problems of philosophy and away from practical virtue? Can a religion drawn up out of man's own soul satisfy his reason? Will there not be eternal questionings, as there were among the old philosophers? Will not the main strength of the greatest minds be spent in finding out truth, instead of reducing it to practice and using it for human improvement? At present to a very great extent Christianity satisfies the cravings of the soul by its truth and by its evidence. What can any other religion which claims no such authorities bring into the world save doubt, restlessness, self-dissatisfaction and wandering, unsuccessful efforts after rest?

To make the immense importance of divine authority more apparent, let us briefly sketch the progress of subjective religion, as we find it arising and increasing under the Gospel. In the first instance there is a recognition, founded on positive precepts, of a divine law reaching to the thoughts and intents of the heart. This the moral sense approves and adopts as its rule, but what would become of the standard of action, if the

outward authority were to be disregarded and denied? Is it not certain that the divine requirement, as things are, originates and sustains all the convictions of the necessity of a religious life, and awakens a sense of want and a sense of sin by which the soul is led to God? Then again in the pathway of our return to God we are met by positive assurances of danger on the one hand, and positive offers of forgiveness on the other, without which it is certain that religion on the Christian plan could not begin to exist. And the terms of forgiveness, contained in these revelations which the Gospel makes, are the outward resting place on which the peace of the soul through a long life reposes. What assurance can it find within itself or in the plan of the world large enough to fill the place of this authority? Then the whole of internal religion is obviously maintained by declarations of scripture, some of which, singly, have afforded more comfort than all the reasonings and self-encouragements of unaided minds since the world began. A life of inward morality and of holiness is built on the Scriptural exhibition of God and His holiness. A life of benevolence is a following of the precepts, and of the lives which are precepts, that the Scriptures afford us. A life of hope needs distinct statements, and these must embrace both worlds. A life of unworldliness and self-renunciation needs promises to support it in its weakness, lest it should have given up everything to gain nothing. And so whatever aspect religion presents to us in the soul, whether it consists in escaping from sin, or in reconciliation of heart to God, or in acts of morality or of philanthropy or of piety, or in the development of certain feelings, or in the formation of a certain character, it needs throughout and actually uses the support of the Scriptures, as the guide of faith, the directory of life, the support of every feeling of the heart. What must happen then, when this revealed word shall have been abandoned, when its former influence shall have ceased, when its light shall have faded away from the world's atmosphere, but that religion must lose its hold on the world, must dwindle down into a feeble, sickly, timorous thing, looking every way for help to itself, if it do not quite expire?

But it will be said by a portion of those who hope to see a new universal religion rise up on the ruins of Christianity, that *their* faith is in a certain sense from God and is attended with authority from Him. Every good man, every man who walks according to the inward light is in a sense an inspired man. Christ had with Him more truth than any other human being, because He was better than any. Thus there is a kind of natural inspiration of the human race, which is slowly perfecting truth, eliminating errors, bringing man from the outward and historical, from the claims to divine authority—proved now to be unreliable and yet for a long time serving as stepping stones in human progress—to the pure ultimately recognized inner light of the soul.

There is much of beauty and attractiveness in such a theory as this, but it cannot stand the test of truth and sound philosophy. It takes no account of the weakness of human reason, as demonstrated by the history of opinions,—of the vain efforts, for instance, made by the Greek philosophers to attain to theological truth, and of their hopeless diversity of views ending in scepticism. It takes no account of the subsequent history of philosophical thought, which has failed down to the present time, notwithstanding all the efforts of highly gifted minds in the idealistic and pantheistic schools, to reach any assurance in regard to any doctrine of religion. It takes no account of the diversities of opinion, into which men of insight have been or may be led, either from confounding their insight and the conclusions of their understandings, or because insight itself, at least in the present condition of human nature, is an unsafe guide. It demands that a man should be good in order to have a true insight, but how is he to be good except by truth which insight discovers, and how is he to be followed by those who have no such clear insight as his? Would Christ have been a lawgiver and an example for mankind, if he had spoken out his own private feelings without any claim to divine authority. The theory then will at length discover that it is decking itself in the robes of Christianity, that its illumination and insight are really borrowed from the Gospel, that whenever it shall succeed so far as to destroy faith in a historic revelation, at once darkness and distrust will begin to creep

again over the minds of men whom Christianity had somewhat enlightened.

This theory moreover discloses its own inconsistency and falsehood by the position which it takes in regard to Christ. The wisest, best, humblest, most unselfish of men, as is conceded, he made the most stupendous mistake in regard to himself, and brought it about that this mistake became engrafted on his religion, nay—that it gave to his religion its distinctive character and its power in the world. So much light with so much darkness, such lofty purity united to such false claims of exaltation above the measure of a human being—this was the wisdom and excellence, this the insight of Jesus Christ. If he had insight and nothing more, is not his insight wholly unreliable, since he failed to see into himself?

III. The supposed religion of the future will of necessity have a very limited range of doctrines.

Religious doctrine is the measure and sum total of the motives which a religion can bring to bear upon character. If the doctrines are false or immoral, they will form perverted or defective characters; if scanty, they will have little effect on character; if merely metaphysical and not ethical, they will have no effect on character whatever. It has been claimed by the friends of Christianity that it is intensely practical, that its grand truths or doctrines, especially those which are connected with its grand facts or history, have a direct and most healthy bearing on human life, that it contains enough of truth to finish human character on all its sides, and that, when believed, it actually forms characters of the highest excellence. The question then is how much loss of power over human nature will arise from a rejection of the most important and distinctive doctrines of Christianity; by the side of which question stand others already answered, how much power will be lost by losing the vital force of a historical religion, and how much will be lost by losing the authority of revelation and throwing men back upon the results of human speculation.

It is impossible at this time to predict what shape the doctrines of the new religion of the future will ultimately take. But thus much we can say, that if it should start with a certain apparatus of doctrines, part of them will at length be

broken or not used at all, and that owing to the influence of Christian education, which its advocates cannot now escape, its motive power and seeming excellence will be greatest at first, and will be growing less and less afterward.

But let us try to form a candid estimate, as far as probabilities will allow, of the amount of truth and motive that will be within the reach of this religion of the future, and that can be used in endeavoring to give finish to moral and religious character.

First, whatever is especially Christian, as distinguished from natural religion and from the conclusions of human reason, must be given up. The doctrine that the word became flesh,—that God sent His Son to redeem men from sin—will be looked upon as a fable, as an unaccountable claim on the part of Jesus or an unauthorized addition to His teachings. Thus, His relations to God and to man being put on a wholly different basis, He ceases to be a great personage governing the world's history, and sinks into a teacher who mistook His own nature most fearfully, and from whose most authentic doctrines very much must be lopped off. That this alone would make a revolution in the world, greater than any since the birth of Christ himself, cannot be questioned. Oh! what other throne, what dynasty of high born kings reaching through ages and famed through the world, could fall, which man might not forget in a century! But this kingdom over hearts, this invisible sway of Christ beginning in the self-consecration of the soul and ending in the entire renovation of society and of government, when can it cease to be regretted? Oh! what lapse of time, what changes in outer things will prevent the world from bleeding at every pore through a feeling that it has lost its guide and the pledge of its stability!

Secondly, the doctrine concerning God and His providence must be reduced to its lowest dimensions. Whether the reigning form of this new religion will cling firmly to the personality of God, as a cardinal point, and drive Pantheists as a heretical sect beyond its pale, cannot be distinctly anticipated. But suppose its standard doctrine to be that human nature within itself, apart from proof, contains a recognition of a deity, when we come to the doctrine of providence and of spiritual

influence, the ground is more uncertain. To a providence, in any such sense that any interruptions of the common course of physical law can be admitted, it cannot subscribe, for it rejects all the miracles of the past. And thus it can scarcely teach, with any show of consistency, that prayer can in any way affect the order of things, or be an argument with God for bestowing blessings on the worshipers.

Moreover, without a positive revelation, that speaks of a God near at hand and around His creatures, it is increasingly hard to put faith in that high doctrine, for every advance of science thrusts Him to a remoter distance. He has left the reins on the neck of time, and inhabits His eternity as a vital energy, without concern or pity for man. What check can the religion of the future apply to this tendency to shut God out of the visible and actual present? Must it not succumb to the relentless blows of science, and lose its faith in a hand guiding the world, since positive and natural religion together find it so hard to furnish strong enough antidotes against scepticism?

The doctrine of spiritual influence, for ought that we can see, it may with consistency admit. But who can tell whether such influences can be hoped for, since they proceed from the free will of a sovereign, who has made no promises either in an external revelation or to the soul? May they be prayed for? What encouragement is there even to begin to pray, much more to persevere in it, when everything is so uncertain? May it not be the appointed lot of man to struggle alone against internal evils, as he must by the law of his nature against outward? In this state of uncertainty there will not be much prayer, and without Divine help the hope of improving the character will decline. Does not this single consideration show that a great part of practical religion will be cut up by the roots?

Thirdly, the doctrine concerning man which Christianity has taught us will need great modification. If the Gospel's view of sin could be retained without its remedial provisions, if a sense of guilt with no assurance of forgiveness could settle upon souls under the new religion, as now, mankind would cry out against it in desperation, they would flee away from leaden clouds of death which let no rays of hope through, or would

wander, if not desperate, into all kinds of heathenish ways of propitiating God. Will it be said that the glimpses which we catch without revelation of the Divine clemency and forbearance would be enough of an assurance for sinning men? We answer, that they might satisfy a weak sense of sin but could not comfort a deep one. The sense of sin then, as of a malady at the root of our nature for which each one of us is responsible, would very much fade away. God never having by any revelation from heaven disclosed his wrath against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, what sufficient evidence would there be that sin is a very great evil, how would it be seen to alienate the soul from Him, what reason would there be to dread His frown? Nor is it unlikely that sin would be regarded as a transitional state in the necessary progress of human nature. And it seems likely that the efforts against it would be confined principally to the rectification of society, to the removal of ignorance, to the relief of the lower classes, on the ground that human nature is not bad, that evil emanates from society and can be effectually obstructed and dried up by outward reformatations. However this may be, it is certain that by some anæsthetic process what we call a sense of sin would be benumbed. But is it not evident that the cost of this would be immense? Must there not ensue a weakening of the very foundations of morality? Could the family, could society endure this? Will the religion of the future be able to endure it? Will not faith in God, and faith in unalterable morality, in holiness and justice, stand or fall together with faith in sin? Must there not then be a further plunge of a demoralized world into Atheism?

Fourthly, the doctrine concerning the last things will very probably be an open, unsettled question. Only a glance at the history of opinion down to the most recent times is enough to show that man has in vain sought to solve the problem of the immortality and future destiny of the soul. But let the religion of the future pronounce a decisive word on these high doctrines; how little will it gain since it has no new proofs to bring forward, and has nothing but human insight to rest upon. And then, a future state being admitted, are there to be rewards and punishments? May sin, here, affect our state in

that future life? If it may, we need some help from God, which the religion does not make sure. If it may not, of what value is the future life in relation to conduct? What is the future life in that case but a barren fact standing a great way off? Thus, whether we consider the uncertainty in which the religion must remain concerning a future life, or the slender use it makes of this doctrine in the way of a motive and of elevating man above worldly things, it will be found quite indifferent whether the doctrine be retained or discarded; at the best, it will be an appendage of no importance.

The whole of what we have said thus far, and especially the consideration of the slender stock of truth at the disposal of the religion of the future, makes it clear that the motive power of such a religion, its influence on life and character, must be exceedingly small. Some room will be left for reverence, and for the sense of dependence; thankfulness also may be awakened to a degree, although crippled by doubts concerning Providence. But how narrow will be the reach of trust, how feeble the vigor of hope, having no promises to feed upon; how poor a part will be played by faith in things unseen! And if the doctrine of immortal life gives an immense amplitude to human action, enlarges our sense of our own importance in the universe, and adds untold force to the reasons for improving our character, how lame will all efforts at moral excellence be, how small the motive, how trifling the issues of conduct, when this great truth shall be feebly held or quite discarded!

But in lieu of all other considerations touching this point we urge that the new religion will have no fuel for love towards God, that the harmony of the human and divine soul will be nearly impossible. The justice of this remark will stand in a clear light if we consider what excites the emotion of love,—of love, we mean, as involving complacency, confidence, and general harmony of spirit,—and how it differs from some other feelings that play a part in religion. The feeling of reverence will be aroused according to the laws of our nature, although we may have a very dim perception of the power that we revere. So the sense of dependence implies indeed an object on which we depend, but gives no light in regard to the qualities of that object. But love needs for its ex-

istence some sort of disclosure or revelation of the feelings and character of the object towards which it goes forth. Between man and man love cannot arise, unless one party has a manifestation of the character and feelings of the other. We cannot love an unknown person, nor love on conjecture, nor love an intellect. It is the same in the case of the Divine Being. There must go before all love to him some conviction of his moral excellence, and as love is reciprocal, some assurance that he can love in return. And hence, again, there must be some persuasion that he can regard sinners with favor in spite of their sins. The history of heathenism, the convictions of our own sinful natures, will show us that a sense of guilt without an assurance of pardon must drive men from the face of God; they will show us the justice of those words, "We love Him because he first loved us."

Now then if the Gospel which pretends to be a revelation of God's character and of his mercy is to be abandoned as untrue, what room is left for man's love to him? He has become an unknown God; how can we love him of whose character we know little, and of his feelings towards us, next to nothing? Will it be said that something within us leads us irresistibly to conceive of him as absolute moral perfection? Were we to grant this, which the diversities of human religions do not justify, yet love requires more, it demands some knowledge of the relations between him and ourselves, and how do we gain any information on this point from our insights and instinctive judgments? If our nature assures us that he loves the good, must it not equally reveal to us his alienation from the morally evil? How then with our conscience of sin can we love him whom we have offended, love him of whose pardon we have no assurance, love him in whose sight our nature is unholy? Love, then, in its highest and noblest forms must be a stranger to the religion of the future. If love to God is the crown of our character, if to call such a sentiment into life constitutes one of the chief glories of Christ's religion, as well as one of the great sources of its strength, must not a religion that knows little of God, and nothing of forgiveness, be incapable of forming beautiful lives? Must it not perish and become despised from its very weakness?

In short, the religion will be of this earth, getting next to no influence from the unseen life beyond this world, or from the unseen life above this world. It lacks, therefore, the power of faith and the possibility of a life of faith. Can the age when it shall be established fail of being intensely worldly, and epicurean? Think of the art and literature of such an age: think of the spirit they must breathe; think of the loss of motives for morality and a religious life at which we hinted just now. Can such a prospect fail to excite deep alarm?

IV. We remark very briefly that the new religion of which we speak will be without the strength derived from a church and its institutions.

The Christian Church of the present, with all its faults and weaknesses, is the salt and the light of the world. As holding, preserving, and spreading the faith of Christ, as built on the feeling of brotherhood, and on trust in a common Saviour, as bound together by social worship, sacraments, a ministry and a discipline, and as containing in itself a self-reforming power, it is one of the bonds which bind mankind together, and on it the hopes of mankind in a great measure rest. Its influence extends far beyond its own pale, and beyond the religious interests of man; it originates or aids every effort to make him wiser, happier, and more manly.

What now can take the place of the church, or compensate man for its fall, as fall it must, if the old historical religion is abandoned? What common hopes, what common object of reverence or love will the new religion have to offer to its professors, nay, what common faith can it supply them with, except a few meagre shreds not large enough to cover the nakedness of reason? It must have worship, but what kind of worship? That in which sentimentality and taste take the lead, with the fewest, the weakest appeals to religious feeling. Will it introduce prayer into its public services, when the question of an answer to prayer is unsettled, or denied; or thanksgiving, when a Providence is doubted, and blind law accounts for all things? Can it have institutions? Institutions of a historical origin are out of the question, because the religion has no history from which to draw them. Institutions made for the sake of having them it can invent, but how weak the

hold on the mind of man of such institutions, how small their venerableness! What can it have or find to replace the sacred supper? Compare the fellowship pertaining to such a dead skeleton of a religion with membership in Christ. Compare its preaching on a narrow round of dogmas with the inexhaustible themes of the Christian pulpit. Must not, in fact, morality take the place of religion in the pulpit, and religious doctrine be no more looked to as suggesting the great motives of action! Compare the probable zeal for its propagation with that resulting from the nature of the Gospel, and from the command of Christ, "Go ye into all the world." Can there be much zeal for its diffusion, especially as long as its friends maintain that the systems of heathenism involve all the essential truths of religion? Wherever we turn, then, we discover its weaknesses, we cannot find one element of power. It will make no place for itself in the affections of human souls.

V. If these things are so, human progress must cease, and civilization, whenever the world shall throw away its faith in revealed religion, must decline.

We seem to ourselves to have shown, that, whether the form, the evidence, the substance, the motive power, or the social influences of the new rival of Christianity be taken into view, it is wholly weak and unreliable. Can the destinies of mankind be safely entrusted to a religion without facts, without authority, with a minimum of doctrines, and with no institutions at all? Must not the advancement of society in all that is good, cease, if Christianity is to lose its hold over the faith and love of men. If a large factor be thrown out of the account, must not the product be greatly lessened?

There is but one answer to this question: such a decline must take place, unless in the future, other influences are to make up for the diminished power of religion. Just this, we suppose, is what many thinkers anticipate, who have rejected the claims of Christianity. We apprehend, that, as a class, those who have looked upon bare Theism as the heir and successor of the Gospel, do not put very much of dependence upon this predicted religion of the future; we conceive that it is expected to take its place as a handmaid and not as a mistress, while civilization, or progress, is looked upon as the coming

Queen of the world. The bitter taunt of the Greek poet is to be fulfilled, who makes his sophist say, that vortex or whirl has expelled Jupiter from his throne; God is to cease to reign and Progress will take his place.* This doctrine of progress may adopt the form of a fatal development, or that of a free advance in accordance with a divine plan. The first form, or that which it must assume in a pantheistic theory of the world, does not now concern us. The other form, or that which a Theist, who rejects the scriptures, can embrace, will be something like this: that, in the course of time there will be such an accumulation of knowledge, such a lifting up of man above nature, such improvements in government and legislation, such refinement diffused through society, that even in the lowest classes, the propension will be towards sobriety, honesty, chastity, and kindness. And so a very little influence from religion, very little knowledge of God, or concern about him will give all needed aid to the advancement of mankind.

A theory of human progress like this deserves, on account of its importance, an extended examination; we must content ourselves, however, with two or three remarks that bear on our subject more immediately: we observe, then,

1. First, that facts do not justify the hope of such a progress; we mean, that the improvements which have been made in society must be ascribed chiefly to Christianity; that advances in physical science have no great weight in bringing about moral ones; and that ameliorations of governments and of society can scarcely begin, cannot be permanent, without the aid of religion.

It is apparent that a benevolent feeling aroused by the Gospel has, in fact, had very much to do with modern reforms; with reforms, for example, in prison discipline, in the houses, habits, and privileges of the poor, in promoting temperance, in putting an end to the slave trade and to slavery, in sending light to the ignorant, in endeavoring to spread the spirit of peace. Christ's religion has in fact taken the lead in schemes for the benefit of society, and it will be scarcely maintained that, while thus at the head of this blessed movement, it has

* Aristoph. *Nubes* 381, Δῖνος reigns *vice* Δεός.

crippled or suppressed other benevolent forces, which can take its place when it shall become extinct. For where are they? Were they in action when the Gospel overcame heathenism, and were they put in the background by it as by some jealous monarch? On the other hand, without the Gospel the field, and the energy of benevolence will be vastly lessened. The field will be earthly relations almost exclusively. The energy will be paralyzed, when the conception of God's kingdom on earth, when faith in Divine influences shall be discarded, when the doctrine of a future life shall be disbelieved, or just clung to, amid the waves of uncertainty.

Again, the advance of science does not, in fact, secure the advance of society, notwithstanding all the efforts of Christians and other benevolent persons. As far as the past can teach us, science may add indefinitely to its stores, while society continues corrupt or degenerates. There are armies of thieves and of reprobates, worse than heathens, within sound of the voice of the great lecturers of Paris. Officers of preventive and of correctional police have plenty of work to do in all large cities, both in Europe and this free land. In some respects the dangerous classes in large towns are worse than they were. They know more, and are more excitable. Their knowledge, having nothing to do with rules of conduct and the meaning of life, being in fact such as a class of men without religion would gather, makes them craftier, more able to combine, more able to evade justice.

Nor is there any necessary connexion between the advance of science and the improvement of political institutions. Even the theory of politics may be conformed to true science in a nation, while yet the body politic may have no power to govern itself or to shake off abuses. The moral energy, the spirit of self-sacrifice, the courage to attempt reform in the right way, the hope of success, the healthful tone of opinion in society concerning justice,—all these and other sources of national health are far less dependent on the state of science than on religious and moral influences. Nations, in order to grow great, or become free, or remain free, must, like single men, have strength of character, and this is mainly from moral and

religious culture, or from a certain simplicity of life which is lost in high cultivation.

2. But in the second place theories of human progress like that at which we are looking, misconceive of and underrate the power appropriate to religion in the civilization of the world, and also give an exceedingly earthly view of life.

They misconceive of the civilizing power of the Gospel. At least they seem to conceive of Christians as thinking that religion of itself, without the aid of any other agencies, is the sole source of human improvement and civilization. But the true and received statement is that religion controls the forces which mould and refine the soul and society. It is the main-spring or the governing wheel which gives motion, and it also regulates and harmonizes all movement. It is in harmony with all truth and in sympathy with all improvement, but it acts not only through its own direct invisible power, but through the laws of nature, of the soul, and of society. It looks on the science of nature with favor, because this is an exposition of the thoughts of God, and thus science has a strong, healthy growth under its fostering influence. It sends the individual's thoughts within, and thus aids the science of the soul. It makes him aware of his rights and his duties, and thus helps to build up a true philosophy of man in the State, as well as a just society. It elevates his feelings and purifies his taste, and thus gives wing to true art. It is the foe of vice, and thus of all ignorance and of all oppression. But its glory lies in making "all things new," not *without* other agencies, but *through* its control over them, and *through* its sway over the individual soul.

Again, in such theories of civilization the power of the Christian religion seems to be greatly underrated. In the first place, a due value is not set upon that which is distinctively Christian, as compared with that which belongs to Judaism and to natural religion. The history of Christian art, the examination of religious experience, if we look to no other sources of proof, will show us that the great sway over life and society proceeds from that which is new in Christianity, from Christ in His person, life, and work, from forgiveness of sins and redemption, from the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, from the judg-

ment and the future state. Take all this away, and you take away, if we are not deceived, nearly all that constitutes the superiority and the glory of Christian civilization.

But again, such theories contemplate the civilizing forces of Christianity as standing side by side with those of literature, art, science, law, and government. Tariffs, roads, and printing presses are held to be as original and as efficient benefactors of society, as bibles and sermons. But this seems to be a very serious mistake, which grows out of another, still more fundamental, concerning the nature of man,—an assumption that he is unfallen, that he has all power within himself without the aid of new truth from heaven to elevate his condition. Is it not evident that the system of practical forces which make up the Gospel, must, if believed and loved, govern the will, heart, and life of the individual, and that through the amelioration of the individual all civilizing influences will be either perfected or originated? What the Gospel has done or can do in the way of benefiting society, the institutions it founds, the science it warms into life ought not surely to be alleged as reasons why we can get along at some future day without the Gospel. The Gospel is not the schoolmaster who leaves the grown up pupil to be guided by his own reason; it is the leaven hid in the meal *until the whole mass is leavened*.

The conservation of society can be entrusted only to moral and religious forces. If religion has no moving, preserving, checking, or balancing power, or if, as is true of heathenism, it is itself immoral, then art, literature, whatever promotes the advance of society, is paralyzed or corrupted; and there comes on a decline of society, as in Greece after Alexander and in Rome under the emperors, without hope of recovery from any internal power. On the other hand, if, as is true in the case of Christianity, the religion is ethical in the highest sense, in the sense not only of teaching morals but of enlarging the conception of what is right and supplying the highest motives for the ennoblement of character, then there is a foundation laid on which society, with all its interests, can rest, and there is opportunity for all that progress which is possible in consistency with the condition of man.

We are now prepared to say, that if the influences from the Gospel should be withdrawn, a most earthly civilization, one having its own doom written on its forehead, would take the place of that which Christianity has been the leading agent in forming. Suppose, for instance, that all thinkers should lose faith in the immortality of the soul. Is it not evident that with the abandonment of this one truth the concerns of the present world would begin to assume a new relative importance, that all motives drawn from a life to come would be feeble, that self-gratification must rise in value, and self-denial fall, that all the aspirations of man must droop and wither? Is it not evident that something of that mingled frivolity and despair which Atheism engenders, and of which heathen society, especially in its decay when its faith is lost, gives us examples, would brood over the world? For how could civilization fail to decline, when frivolity blighted the taste and depraved the moral judgments, and when despair, the sense of the emptiness of life, took away the stimulus from all noble endeavor?

3. Finally, in one very important respect the very progress of society demands the assurances and supports of positive Christian truth. As knowledge and refinement increase, the standard of character tends to rise, and along with it will deepen the feeling of responsibility and the pain of falling below the standard. A sense of imperfection—of sinfulness if we may call it so, as keen as any other sense and more indestructible, will then be in vigorous exercise. How is this sense to be satisfied without a Gospel? Heathenism has had its method of satisfying the consciousness of sin, its reconciliation of man and God, in which lay no small part of its strength. Christianity has its method, and herein lies much of the service which it has rendered to mankind. But naked Deism, the religion of human insight and natural reason, says nothing of pardon and redemption, nothing of a helping, life-giving spirit. In this respect it occupies a much weaker position than that which is taken by the systems of necessary development. They legitimately deny the reality of moral evil. It has for them no existence, because the will is not free, or because sin, being a necessary stage for finite minds, is not objectively evil. But a system, in which a personal God is a central principle, can-

not extinguish the sense of sin or deny its reality. Nay, the further the true refinement of society is carried, the higher the standard of character is raised, and the vaster the creation is shown to be by science; so much the more grandeur and glory are spread around the throne of God. Sin, then, tends to enlarge in its dimensions before the eye of a refined age which has not thrown aside its faith in the moral attributes of God. But Deism has nothing to satisfy this sense of sin but baseless hopes and analogies drawn from the unexplained dealings of God. If God ought to forgive because the best conceptions of human virtue include forgiveness, He ought to have indignation against sin because that too enters as an element into our ideal of perfect character. And how terrible that indignation! What distance so vast as that between the Infinite One, inhabiting His dwelling place of holiness, and a soul conscious of selfishness and of impurity! The course of things, if Deism should be the ultimate form of religion, would be something like this. As long as the recollections and influences of Christianity survived its fall, earnest souls would hope on, they would stay their soul-hunger on the milk drawn from the breasts of their dead mother. But a new age would toss about in uncertainty, if not in despair; or else, throwing aside their Deism which brings before their wearied minds the unsolved problem of the relations of sinning man to a holy God, they would hunt after peace in the fields of Atheistic or Pantheistic philosophy. Civilization with God but without Christ leads to a terrible dilemma. If the sense of sin remain, the life of all noble souls will be an anxious, gloomy tragedy. Or if that burden so crushing is thrown off as in a life struggle, then the standard of character will fall and the sense of sin grow faint to such a degree that the pardon from God craved in heathenism will not be needed, and the utmost frivolity will be reached of life and manners. In either case the progress of civilization will be stopped; the world of the future will be doomed; and the "religion of the future" will turn out to be a miserable raft, unfit, after the shipwreck of Christianity, to carry the hopes and the welfare of mankind down the ages.

ARTICLE II.—THE AMERICAN COLLEGES AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.

III.

IN the two preceding papers with this title we have treated of the *studies* and the *methods of instruction* which are best adapted to the American colleges, in their present condition, and in their present relations to the sentiments and the culture of the country. A few topics of a somewhat general and miscellaneous character remain to be considered. These are no less important and are perhaps more interesting than those which have hitherto occupied our attention.

The most of these topics relate to *the college as a community*. Sufficient prominence is not always given to the social and common life which characterizes most of the American colleges. There are a few of these institutions, it is true, in which these influences are not especially noticeable. Those colleges in our large cities in which nearly all the students reside at home, and none live in common lodgings, have a much less marked and energetic public life. The students in these institutions are not shut up to the society of one another. They are not separated from the life of the family; but this continues to exert its accustomed, though a somewhat divided influence. The excitements of society out of the family are as much within the reach of the student as before he entered college, and are likely with the progress of his student-life to be more and more attractive and engrossing. The intellectual influences of the students upon one another are mainly restricted to the class-room and the occasional debate. They do not proceed from a social life which is created by residing in common lodgings, eating at common tables, and participating in common conversations, sports, and festivities. Those colleges in which the number of students is very small, furnish a public opinion which, it may be, is less active for evil; possibly one that is less efficient and controlling for good. It may not be

easy to analyze this subtle but most potent agency into its various elements and to assign to each constituent its relative force. Indeed the product itself is far from being a constant quantity. It is not the same in any two institutions; each individual college having a *genius loci* of its own, which is in part dependent on traditionary influences and in part affected by the force of living men and of current events. This spirit varies in the same college, and it may be with each college generation. There are, however, a few salient features that are common to all these colleges and that are active at all times, which it is not difficult to enumerate.

These influences are not always adequately estimated even by those who have enjoyed the exhilaration and have been stimulated by the force of this highly oxygenated atmosphere. Those who have not experienced them find it difficult to estimate them at their real value, and often listen with incredulous questionings to the representations of their great importance, or look with silent wonder upon the excitement which they occasion in the young collegian as he begins to feel the stimulus of this peculiar life, and in the gray-headed student whenever he greets an old classmate with an unmistakable heartiness or reverts to the scenes of his college life with a special enthusiasm. It is important that they should not be overlooked in any attempt to vindicate the college system against the prejudices or misconceptions which are entertained by its censors and judges of the American public. Possibly the discussion may result in a higher appreciation of the indispensable value of such an agency in a state of society like our own and of the duty resting upon the philanthropist and the patriot to make it more efficient and abundant in its influences for good.

The college community is emphatically an *isolated* community; more completely separated and farther removed than almost any other from the ordinary and almost universally pervading influences of family and social life. When the student leaves his home to enter college, it is true that in a most important sense he leaves it forever. He literally leaves father and mother, not in his affections or his respect; for both of these feelings may remain with him and grow

stronger and tenderer with absence and the progress of years ; but he does leave them in respect to the controlling power which they are to exert over his opinions, sentiments, and aims. He may do this unconsciously and most unwillingly, but he does it none the less truly and emphatically. When the father has carefully provided for the comfort of his son in the apartments which are henceforward to be his new home, he little thinks of the import of what he has done. When the mother takes her affectionate and most anxious leave of the boy who goes forth into his new life, she little dreams how true it is that she loses him as a boy forever. The public opinion of the little community which has hitherto formed his aspirations and his hopes, his principles and his prejudices, is henceforth to cease to be controlling ; in the future it will either entirely give way to another, or will share with it a doubtful and divided influence. The public opinion of the larger community of mankind which had begun to be felt through the openings which the family life had allowed, is swept away by the new atmosphere that rushes around him, and gradually but quickly becomes all-absorbing and controlling. Removed from the restraints of home, not yet subjected to the restraints and responsibilities of society and its public opinion, the college student is abruptly introduced into an isolated and peculiar community, which is eminently self-contained and self-sufficing, most energetic in its action and all-pervading in its presence. This common opinion is sensitive and changeable ; often it is capricious and unreasonable ; it exerts over all the members of the commonwealth a subtle and resistless fascination. Something of this influence is exerted in a large public school—but the influences of the college community are immensely more energetic and enduring. This is owing to many reasons. The college student is older and though for that reason he should be less pliable and more self-relying and independent, yet the first form in which the developing man asserts his being is ordinarily to attach himself to a society of those who like himself are ready to withstand the control of his “natural enemies.” It is no paradox to say that the first essay of the student’s independence is often an act of prostrate subserviency to the opinion of the college community. This

opinion he at first has little share in forming: he does little else than yield himself to the opinion which he finds already formed. This community has its traditions, which are represented to be sacred by age and uniform observance; its customs, which are so ancient that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, i.e. for one college generation; its self-constituted and venerable lawgivers in the guise of certain loud mouthed personages who are often little better than disguised sons of Belial; its natural aristocracy of eminent scholars, distinguished writers, prize and honor men, boating men, and gymnasts. To these should be added its ladies' men, its fancy men, its fast men, its witty men, and its stupid and silly men, through all the varieties of the *Dii majorum et minorum gentium* who make up the college mythology. It is eminently a law unto itself, making laws and enforcing them which no other community would recognize or understand; laws which are often strangely incongruous with the usually received commandments of God and of man. It has standards of character which are peculiar to itself, unlike those which the great world recognizes, but which are well understood and most efficient within its own limited circle. It has an intellectual atmosphere of its own, stimulating to extraordinary and long continued labor, and to austere self-denial, sometimes unwise in the aims and methods of activity which it enforces. Its social customs, laws, and criteria, are the products of its isolated and peculiar life, and are an unsolved enigma to all other societies. Its ethical and religious life is marked by singular excellencies and as striking inconsistencies and defects; sometimes sinking far below the rules and attainments of men in other communities and sometimes soaring loftily above them. No community is swayed more completely by the force of public opinion. In none does public opinion solidify itself into so compact and homogeneous a force. Before its power the settled judgments of individual conviction are often abandoned or overborne, the sacred associations of childhood are relaxed, the plainest dictates of truth and honor are misinterpreted or defied. Notwithstanding the unnatural virulence of the morbid epidemics with which this community is occasionally visited, and the steady operation of certain endemic tendencies to evil, justice

requires us to assert that the prevailing influences are not only healthful but are eminently vitalizing. In no community of persons of immature age is the intellect more likely to be efficiently awakened, and on the whole to be more wisely directed, than in this commonwealth. In none is real merit more likely to be discerned, or when discerned is it more generously acknowledged. In no community are the fictitious distinctions of life, as of wealth, birth, and manners, of so little account in comparison with intellect, generosity and open-heartedness. In none do the rich and poor meet together on terms more honorable to the rich and more acceptable to the poor, than on the arena dignified by the presence of earnest intellectual labor, and cheered by the sunshine of youthful sympathy. In none are shallowness, pretension, and shams more quickly discovered or treated with a more unanimous derision. In no community in which young men live together are that conceit and assumption which are as natural to many youth as teething is to infancy, more effectually rebuked and more quietly abandoned. Even the resident traditionary follies and sins of the place, its antagonisms against the faculty and the law, the occasional frightful evasions and untruth in the acts and words of otherwise honorable and honest students in their dealings with the government, and the jealousies and feuds between classes and factions, are many of them exaggerated and perverted virtues, so that the very "failings" of college students, however inexcusable and injurious they are, may be truly said to "lean to virtue's side."

In respect to the moral dangers which attend a residence in this peculiar community, very superficial and very unjust impressions prevail. Our opinion is, and we believe it will be confirmed by the most extended observation and the most accurate statistics, that there is no community in which this preëminently critical period of life can be spent with greater safety than it can in the college. If needful pains were taken to describe the dangers and enumerate the failures which befall an equal number of young men selected from families of similar conditions in life, whether at home or among strangers, whether passing their youth as farmers or mechanics, as clerks or students, it would be found that the moral results

alone would be in favor of the life at a well-regulated college. Many of the dangers and evils of the college are eminently short-lived, being quickly ended by their own excess and extravagance ; many are abandoned, outgrown or repressed by means of the very intensity and publicity which they assume. Many of them are the results of artificial crises, somewhat like those which are superinduced by a physician, for the expulsion of morbid matter. Many of them are laughed at and are frowned down by the better sense and the mature experience of the older students and the more advanced classes. It is noticed in some of our colleges—and we believe it is true of many—that some of the lower vices and the more degrading indulgences which are incident to earlier youth, are less prevalent among the older than among the younger classes, as the natural result of the public and private influences exerted by the college community, apart from any special moral or religious improvement.

The consideration of the common life of the college is essential to a just estimate of its importance. Without it the college can neither be understood nor appreciated. It is a true and pregnant saying, "You send your child to the school-master, but 'tis the schoolboys who educate him." The studies, the systems and methods of teaching, the knowledge and skill of the instructors, do not constitute the whole of the educating influences of the college. Often they do not furnish half of those influences which are most effectual, which are longest remembered or which are most highly valued. It is true that without the first the second could not be exerted, for they could not exist. The more obvious and essential elements of the college also exert upon its common life a positive and formative influence. They do not merely serve as the necessary nucleus around which the crystalline material is gathered in bright and beauteous order, but they act as living germs which shoot vitalizing influences through an organized body. But they are not themselves the whole of the body, nor do they include all the forces which it has at command. Very many even of those college graduates who have turned to the best account all the resources which their *alma mater* could furnish feel themselves quite as much

indebted to the educating influences of its community for the awakening and direction of their energies, as to their studies or their instructors. The examples of successful effort which are constantly present, the inspiration that is derived from the striking achievements witnessed by themselves, the kind words of a classmate or a college-mate, the encouragement spoken at a critical moment, the prevailing estimate of literary and artistic tastes above the vulgar aspirations after wealth and power which is inwrought into the very fibres of the soul of every genuine college alumnus, his pronounced aversion to all sorts of Philistinism—the inbreathing for years of a stimulating atmosphere that is fragrant with “sweetness” and pervaded by “light;” these,—together with the warmth of college friendships, the earnestness of college rivalries, the revelations of character, the manifestations of growth, the issues of villainy and passion in retribution and shame, the reward of perseverance and fidelity in triumph and honor—all make the college world to the student to be full of excitement in its progress and to abound in the warmest recollections in the retrospect. The men whom the student knew so thoroughly in college become ever afterwards the representatives and types of all other men; the incidents which there occurred are examples of all other events; its loves and its hatreds, its triumphs and defeats are those by which he ever afterwards reads and interprets society and literature, politics and history.

The intellectual stimulus and education which are furnished by the college community are of a kind which neither circumstances nor instructors can impart. They are eminently a self-education. Most of the efforts at self-improvement which are prompted by the independent movements of one's fellows are zealously prosecuted because they are self-enforced. They fall in with the voluntary activities of awakening manhood and of dawning responsibility. They train to the dignity and duty of self-culture. The studies which they directly foster and inspire are preëminently literary and rhetorical studies, because these studies are more dependent on individual tastes and individual culture, and from their very nature cannot be successfully prescribed nor enforced in the regular curriculum.

Studies and ambitions of this sort are indeed not unfrequently irregular, desultory, and unwise. They often interfere very seriously with the thorough mastery of the curriculum of the college. Excessive attention to them sometimes weakens the intellectual energies, induces bad intellectual habits, depraves the taste, and perverts the judgment. But with all these abatements, the intellectual excitement and guidance which are indirectly furnished from the community of fellow students are to many a man: the influences of all others which leave the strongest impression because, it is with these that he connects the first consciousness of awakening power, the earliest sense of independent activity and the beginnings of a steady course of self-culture. Some book recommended by a fellow student, some incident casually occurring in the varied course of college experience, some conversation of a wise and faithful adviser, some achievement of a classmate or friend, is remembered as a starting or turning point in the intellectual life.

Nor are the social influences less important in the formation of the character and the furnishing of the man with the beginnings of all kinds of practical knowledge. It may be said that the college world is a narrow and peculiar world, is artificial and factitious in many of its workings, is greatly unlike the larger and freer world of mankind, and is therefore incapable of serving as a preparation for the actual life for which it must so soon be exchanged. Whatever may be its disadvantages in these respects, the advantages which it brings are manifold. The intimacies are most unreserved, the opportunities for the study and interpretation of character are various and long continued. It is at this period of life that the man is, if ever, proverbially frank and transparent, open and fearless. During its progress the character rapidly undergoes many transformations, which are open to the inspection of one's fellows and often are forced upon their attention. The leisure and curiosity of this morning of life, together with the zest with which its novel experiences of research and discovery are enjoyed, all contribute to give energy and interest to this study of character.

This study of character must involve the constant exercise of ethical judgments and the training of the moral

powers. That there are peculiar exposures and dangers of a practical sort from this excited and one-sided life in an isolated and self-sufficing community, cannot be denied. That not a few are misled by its special temptations, not merely nor chiefly to vices and prodigalities of a grosser sort, but to a refined and subtle insensibility to good that is more insidious and not less really evil, will be confessed by many. That the moral powers often become paralyzed in some of their functions and incapable either of right judgments or active feelings on certain classes of ethical questions, is one of those ever recurring enigmas and scandals that puzzle and offend the looker-on. To the guardian and instructor of one or many victims of these abnormal ethical paroxysms, the question will often present itself whether he ought to be more vexed or amused at these instances of suspended animation in the conscience. And yet with all these biasing and perverting influences, it is found to be true that the observations and experiences of college life are often eminently effective in educating and quickening the conscience and in awakening and directing the moral faculty. The failures and derelictions of college life, and even the occasional paralysis of the conscience of which we have spoken, may serve most important uses as warnings from similar repetitions. The moral lessons of college life are indeed sometimes learned at a painful and bitter cost. But similar experiences are not uncommon with youth in every situation of life. Perhaps under no circumstances can they be made with a more wholesome and permanent ethical effect.

The religious influences of this common life should not be omitted. We suppose that the college is a truly Christian institution, so far as the instructions and the faith of its teachers are concerned. There are not a few reasons why the public life of such an institution should be favorable to earnest religious thought and a positive religious faith. The life of the student is necessarily intellectual and reflective; whatever subjects are studied, the study of them involves intellectual effort and studious attention. During the period of college life the earnest mind often encounters those questionings which require a decided answer, and it awakes to thoughts which cannot be repressed. It is haunted by the presence of mysterious

realities which cannot be dispelled. The prospect of coming manhood with the responsibilities of individual character and of independent life, at once sobers and elevates. It often happens that many nearly allied as friends and classmates, are moved to similar earnest emotions and to like searching inquiries. The common sympathies of a familiar circle thus occupied quicken the better emotions and favor the happiest results. The temptations in college to sensualism and to unbelief are manifold; but so are the influences which favor an earnest and zealous Christian life. The number of those is not small who look back to the common life of the college as the beginning or the helper of the higher life of the Christian. Were the religious influences that proceed from the colleges of this country to be withdrawn or sensibly diminished, it would seem that the Gospel itself might almost cease to be acknowledged,—so manifold are the relations of each generation of college students to the faith and life of the whole Christian Church.

The effects of these varied intellectual, social, ethical, and religious influences are so powerful and salutary that it may well be questioned whether the education which they impart does not of itself more than repay the time and money which it costs, even to those idlers at college who derive from their residence little or nothing more than these accidental or incidental advantages. The constant companionship with the members of a community professedly devoted to intellectual pursuits and elevated by literary tastes, the constantly renewed interest in those incidents which will ever break forth from its exuberant and irrepressible life, the pressure of its necessary restraints, the countless lessons of good which cannot be unheeded even by the most thoughtless and perverse, elevate the life of the merest laggard and drone at college immeasurably above the life of the luxurious do-nothing who haunts the saloons, promenades the streets, and lounges at the concerts and theatres of a large city, or who drones away the animal, most likely the sensual life, of a rich man's son in the country.

Such idlers sometimes awake to manliness and to duty when they leave college. However heavy may be the burden which they carry through life as the result of folly and waste, they

rarely fail to have stored up an abundant stock of rich experiences as well as of pleasant recollections which makes their college life to have been anything rather than a want and a loss. Even if they sink downward with no recovery, their descent is retarded by the associations of dignity and self-respect with which their previous access to culture has enriched them.

We have dwelt somewhat at length upon the features of the college as preliminary to the question, Whether it is on the whole desirable that these influences should be cherished and fostered, and how far would any proposed changes in the college system be likely seriously to impair their beneficent influence?

Is it desirable that this peculiar life of the college should be retained and fostered or should it be curtailed and crippled? We reply with an indignant defiance of all sorts of low and high-lived Philistines, let it be retained! Let it not only be retained but let it be intensified and turned to far more effective results. We are sure that in these answers we have with us not only the warm hearts, but the sober convictions of all classes of collegians. The experiences of the college life are too valuable and its manifold recollections are too precious to be sacrificed, to satisfy the vulgar prejudices of envious illiterates, and the prosaic theories of Quixotic reformers. Whatever else is taken from the college, its associations, its friendships, and its inspiring influences must all remain. The low-lived utilitarianism of this money-loving age may grudge the waste of a year or two to the youth who is wanted at the counting house or in the field. The self-seeking rivalships of hard faced greed may scorn its generous impulses. The sharp-faced and venal politician may see but little *money* in *its* elections and offices. The cold blooded realist may laugh at its romantic dreams. The man of wide experience may sneer at the inordinate conceit and the extravagant expectations of the great men of the college year or of the college society as "carpet-knights," but it still remains true that there is in college life, with all its ignorance and its romance, its follies and its conceit, a well-spring of living waters, of which these Gentiles of the outer court may never taste, and a sanctuary into which these inhabitants of Philistia are not worthy to be admitted. Of

these living fountains and this hallowed sanctuary let all the initiated say, they shall ever be guarded by our loyal arms as they are hallowed in our best and most generous recollections. Though the ignorant may despise them we know their worth, though the vulgar and prosaic may scorn and dishonor them, we who have drunk of these refreshing waters and wandered in the sacred shades, can never forget, because we can never lose their life-giving and ennobling influences. To all the prosaic arguments of educational reformers and the passionate appeals of envious Philistines, we lift up the triumphant song of reply, "*Gaudeamus igitur * * * * Pereant osiores, quivis anti burschius atque irrisores.*"

We will not, however, appeal solely to the feelings of those who are already convinced, nor to the unreflecting preferences of those who judge from their own direct experience. We think it is susceptible of satisfactory proof that in such a country as ours, the peculiar influences of the common life of the college are of the greatest consequence, to deliver it from that gross vulgarity of taste and superficial conceit of knowledge to which we are especially exposed. Among the conservative and elevating influences which are most efficient in the promotion of general culture there are few so important as the refining influences of the college life. It takes into its organization a band of young men, at the period of life which is most susceptible of permanent influences—at the period when they are not too old to be easily moulded, and not too young to lose the forms into which they are shaped. It isolates them from the world. It surrounds and permeates their very being with the intense and quickening atmosphere of a community of youths slightly older than themselves, who are already at home in the place, and therefore masters of the situation, and with a public opinion as overpowering as heat and as searching as light. These strangers are by natural attractions and repulsions drawn closely together as allies and friends, and before they are aware they begin to understand the sacred import of the words "class" and "classmate." Within the class, like soon finds its like, and friendships are speedily formed on the basis of mutual sympathy which are so closely cemented under the varied experiences of the college as to

continue unbroken for life. The pursuits of this community are professedly intellectual. The thoughts and opinions of each of its members are occupied more or less predominantly with intellectual themes. The labors and anxieties, the strifes and victories, the discussions of persons and things, the loves and the hostilities, turn chiefly upon subjects of an elevated character. For four consecutive years, beginning as boys and ending as men, the members of this community make a common experience, with interruptions frequent and long enough to give greater zest to their peculiar excitements. This life has conventionalities and factitious distinctions of its own, but they are grounded on no such false and superficial reasons as are those of the great world without, but are far more just, more honest, more sagacious, and more generous than are the distinctions of that coarser world. True manhood in intellect and character is in no community so sagaciously discerned and so honestly honored as in this community. Pretensions and shams are in none more speedily and cordially detected and exposed. Whether displayed in manners or in intellectual efforts, conceit is rebuked and effectually repressed. Modest merit and refined tastes are appreciated, first by the select few and then by the less discerning many. Each individual spectator of the goings on of this active life is learning intellectual and moral lessons which he cannot forget if he would, and which he would not if he could, and he comes away with a rich freight of the most salutary experiences, of culture in his tastes, his estimates of character, his judgments of life, as well as in the positive achievements of literary taste and power.

Let any reflecting man think for a moment of the kind of education which society furnishes to a great extent in this country, apart from these higher influences. Let him reflect on the trickery of business, the jobbery of politicians, the slang of newspapers, the vulgarity of fashion, the sensationalism of popular books, the shallowness and cant that dishonor the pulpit and defile worship, and he may reasonably rejoice that there is one community which for a considerable period takes into its keeping many of the most susceptible and the most promising of our youth, to give them better tastes,

higher aims, and, above all, to teach them to despise all sorts of intellectual and moral shams. Whatever overweening importance the college student may attach to his own artificial life, with its factitious distinctions and its one-sided tastes, it is at least satisfactory to know that what he values and rejoices in is not in the direction of the ignoble, the selfish, the pretentious, and the trickish; that he has been taught to honor what is true, solid, and permanent, and perhaps brings away from the scene of his discipline refined tastes for the beautiful in literature and art, which shall adorn his own life and brighten that of others. Were we to tear out of our American life the civilizing and culturing influences which proceed from college residence and college associations, we should do much to vulgarize and degrade it. If we vulgarize and degrade the life that is so depressed by materialistic tendencies, and beset by grosser temptations, we shall certainly demoralize it. We cannot safely dispense with a single agency which tends to elevate and refine this life, least of all with an agency which has been so conspicuous in its history, and been so closely interwoven with all the subtle forces of its better manifestations. It is enough for us to be able to assert that thousands of the noblest men who stand foremost in the ranks of social and professional life, would be forward to acknowledge that they are indebted to the cultivating influences of college friendships and college associations, for the germs of their best principles, their noblest aspirations and their most refined tastes.

With the views which we have expressed there are many who do not sympathize. Not a few regard the peculiar influences of college life as anything but refining, as tending rather to barbarism than to civilization, to grossness and conceit rather than to refinement and modest self-estimation. To such we have no further arguments to offer. Whether they are honestly or dishonestly ignorant and unjust, they are hopelessly irreclaimable. With those who do nothing but rail, it is useless to try to reason. There are others who propose changes which would materially modify the whole operation of the common life of the college. They would remove or introduce features which would weaken or set aside the influences which we have enumerated. They would do so with the

express design of avoiding some of its alleged social evils, or with the desire indirectly to accomplish other important ends.

The first of these changes which we notice is the abandonment of the *dormitory system*. This has been seriously urged by not a few of the friends of higher education as a most desirable improvement in the college economy. The reasons adduced in its favor are that if the students lived in lodgings they would be brought within the amenities and restraints of the family, and would be prevented from contracting the exclusive and perverse *esprit de corps*, which is thought to be the curse of colleges; in short, they would live, and feel, and think, and act more as other human beings do, and less like that particular variety of the human species which is cloistered within the walls of a college and secluded from the ordinary influences of human society. The expensiveness to the college of providing and keeping in repair a large number of dormitory buildings is also insisted on, as well as the duty and desirableness of appropriating the money required for these purposes to objects that are more properly educational. It is often asked, "why invest so much money in brick and mortar, in houses for students to dwell in, when so much is needed for salaries, for endowments, for prizes, for books, and apparatus? It is time that the system of cloisters and quadrangles, inherited from other times, should be abandoned with the changes required by modern life. More than half of the barbarism and absurdity of college life would cease if the students were distributed generally throughout the community and in a certain sense were members of its families, subject to their restraints and elevated by their refining influence."

To these questions and arguments the following considerations are pertinent. First of all, the advantages which it is thought would follow from the distribution of students in families cannot be realized. It is not easy to find, even in a very large community, a sufficient number of families which would at once be competent and willing to exert a wholesome influence over the students even of a small college. Families which are independent in respect to income are not willing to receive lodgers, least of all students, unless they can assert some claim of acquaintance or friendship. If the families are

dependent upon the students for a part or the whole of their living, the students will control so many, either by a direct or indirect influence, that they cannot be relied upon for restraint, except against the grossest excesses, and not always against them. The experiment has been tried sufficiently often to be hardened into an intractable fact, that students who reside in the most faithful and conscientious families often succeed in making them their allies rather than their guardians and guides, and that when a crisis or conflict arises between the students and the faculty, the families in which any considerable portion of them reside, even the best and most reasonable families, more usually side with the students than with the faculty. If the offense or custom of the students is not very serious in its immediate consequences, the interference of the faculty is complained of as officious and unreasonable. Even if it is plainly mischievous to the community and dangerous to life and limb, if it has been often forbidden and punished and is yet pertinaciously persisted in, the necessary discipline of the college is often greatly weakened by an antagonistic or at least an unsympathizing feeling in the families in which many students reside. It has almost passed into a proverb, that when a college is situated in a village even of considerable size, the college controls the public sentiment of the community, and the faculty are compelled to contend against the public opinion both of village and college united. It is often the case in a much larger community that the families in which a few students reside, or with whom they visit, are strongly moved by their representations and their prejudices to a not inconsiderable excitement in a direction which is anything but favorable to the order of the college or the welfare of the students themselves. The restraints and refinements of family life should not be expected, for they cannot be realized for a large community of students, except by those collegians who reside at their own homes in a large city. It may be questioned in respect to these students, and in respect to all who can reside at their own homes when the college is situated in their own city or village, whether they do not lose more by the absence of the salutary excitements and educating restraints of the common life of the college, than they gain by the restraints and refine-

ments of their own families. This leads us to observe that the residence in dormitories by a very considerable part of the students is absolutely essential to any vigorous and definite common life. This is foremost among the advantages of the dormitory system. If the maintenance of such a common life is desirable, then dormitories are essential. The students, in order to enter into a common fellowship, must have ready access to each other's society on an equal footing. They must occupy the same premises by day and night, so that they can see one another under every variety of circumstances. They must chat and talk with one another as they walk and as they lounge. They must be able to discuss the topics of graver and of lighter interest, the politics of the country and the politics of the college, the characters of the leading statesmen of the time, and the character of the leading men of their class and college, the literature of ancient and modern times and the prominent writers of their own circle; the last lesson, the last lecture, the last boat race, and the last party; they must be able to report and circulate the latest joke, the latest news, and the latest *canard*. If college students are distributed in lodgings throughout the village or city they will form sets and associate in cliques, which, the more intimate and exclusive they are, are likely to become more narrowing, but they cannot partake of a general public life with its manifold cross and counter currents, its checks and counter checks, the influence of which upon the plastic minds of active minded and sagacious youth is liberalizing in an eminent degree.

The dormitory system gratifies the student's desire of independence. It fosters that feeling of self-reliance which is suitable for his time of life, which cannot and ought not to be repressed. At the same time it tempers and tones it down by the manifold restraints of the community in which he dwells. At the age when a boy enters college it is usually time for him to be released from the petty and minute oversight of the domestic household and to be thrown somewhat upon himself. "The wise instructor," says Emerson, "will press this point of securing to the young soul, in the disposition of time and the arrangements of living, periods and habits of solitude. The high advantage of university life is often the mere

mechanical one, we may call it, of a separate chamber and fire, which parents will allow the boy, without hesitation, at Cambridge, but do not think needful at home."

At this period of life he must in some form or other make the experiment which is inevitable for all of passing from the restraints of the family into those of the great community of men. He makes it under peculiar advantages, to which are incident special but not undesirable perils. He cannot be effectually nor can he be advantageously subjected to the restraints of another family than his own. It is not desirable that he should be restricted to the uncertain chances and the narrowing influences of a private and exclusive clique. It is far better, and far more safe that he should be cast upon the common life of a college that is properly restrained by skillful discipline, that is guarded by wise supervision and invigorated by a healthful ethical and religious life.

Residence in dormitories is also *morally safer* than the distribution of students in lodgings. Should it be conceded that it is attended by certain peculiar temptations, it is also attended with certain more than counterbalancing advantages, so far as it subjects the student to a more direct and ready supervision and brings him within the reach of healthful public sentiment. Residence in lodgings withdraws the student from supervision and opens abundant opportunities for secret mischief and gross vice. In those colleges in which the students are largely distributed in lodgings it is notorious that the grossest outrages against decency are plotted and executed in apartments which are remote from the inspection and interference of the college officers, and that the most deplorable examples of abandoned sensualism and sin are more frequent among that class who hide themselves in remote and obscure habitations that they may indulge themselves in secret and undetected vice. Whatever may be said and said with truth of the energy of temptation and the facilities to sin which inevitably arise in a congregated mass of excitable and passionate youth is offset by what may be said with equal truth of the restraining and elevating influences which such a community develops within itself when its sentiment is properly directed and reinforced. Residence in a dormitory is less expensive

than residence in lodgings, and is therefore, in a large institution, absolutely necessary, unless such an institution is content to be a college for the rich, which would involve a great calamity for both rich and poor. It is said that the college is not obliged to furnish lodgings at a rate below that which the ordinary and natural demand would justify. We reply by two considerations. First, the college can furnish apartments in public dormitories at a cheaper rate than private parties will do it, even without loss to itself; and second, the college may as properly furnish room rent as tuition to its pupils at less than remunerative rates to itself. But it is notorious that the instruction is furnished at less than half its cost, to both the rich and the poor. The American colleges in their theory and administration are all beneficiary institutions. As long as they remain such, it follows that public lodgings should be furnished either at comparatively high rates, because the college can do it more advantageously to the students or at rates which are lower because they are beneficiary.

Public dormitories may and should be made more convenient and comfortable than private apartments. They may and should be provided with all the appliances of modern civilization, with water, gas, and heat, and everything else which conduces to health and morality, to neatness and self-respect. We have nothing to offer in excuse or defense for those dormitories which are not so constructed and provided, except the excuse or defense of poverty, and for this the guardians and officers are not responsible as long as they themselves suffer in common with the students. But we have delayed too long perhaps upon this topic. We were led to speak of the dormitory in connection with the common life of the college. To the general topic we again return and observe that the *class system* is essential to an efficient and energetic common college life. The class is the organic centre, or rather one of the organic centres, the combination of which constitutes the college into an organic whole. Indeed, we do not see how an American college without fixed classes can have an efficient common life. The English universities find in the separate colleges the proper central forces, which work together into what there is of university feeling and university life. The

separate colleges are distinct communities in separate buildings. The number of undergraduates in each is so small, and they are brought so frequently and so closely together, that though they may differ in age and in acquisitions, they make up a separate family, with family interests, family traditions, and family pride. Closeness and frequency of intercourse, and a sense of family honor, with their common relation to the elder fellows who eat at the same table and lodge under the same roof, unite them all by many ties and connect together men of different years and attainments by warm and intimate friendships. In the American college, the class is the charmed circle within which the individual student contracts the most of his friendships, and finds his fondest and most cherished associations. The sentiment of his class is that which influences him most efficiently, and is to him often the only atmosphere of his social life. He enters the college community as a timid and often an uncultivated novice, he meets with a company of strangers to one another and strangers to the place, its customs, and its inhabitants. These are all supposed to have reached the same grade of intellectual culture and are destined to be associates and competitors for four years in the same studies and the same amusements—in the same relations and the same rivalships. The members of this community are at once united by a sense of their common strangeness to the place and by the mutual sympathy which it engenders. This union is usually cemented by the antagonism in which this newly formed society finds itself with respect to the superior classes, and is more firmly fixed by the necessity of protection and defense. Its members soon become interested students of each other's powers and observers of each other's progress. They meet in the same class-room, or hear from one another of the achievements and characteristics of a few prominent individuals. Not a few of those who at first stand in the foreground become less conspicuous and others take their place, till under the searching tests of the class-room the capacity of each man is satisfactorily ascertained, and under the still more sagacious and nearer scrutiny of youthful companions, the character and temper as well as the practical sense and judgment of each are thoroughly tested. Like is

attached to its like and the foundations of friendships begin to be laid, some of which do not survive the fortunes of the college generation, while others endure through all the changes of the earthly life. Each term has experiences and a history which is limited to the class, but in which every member of the class takes a lively interest. Each college year carries this community through its appointed cycle. As the youthful excitements of the beginning are gradually sobered into the more thoughtful anticipations that gather around the close, the fervor of its friendships increase rather than abate, till at the hour of parting the class feeling becomes more intense and the ties of its union are welded into links of iron.

But while the class is the most important society to the college student, the class itself shares largely in the sentiment of the college community, being largely formed by it and reacting upon it. The new class lives upon the common life of the whole body, while it in turn ministers to and modifies that life. It is, however, as essential to an efficient common life, as an energetic and efficient local community, whether it be township, county, or state, is essential to an energetic national life. Should the class be destroyed or set aside by the substitution of the *régime* of the university for the *régime* of the college, the energy and interest of the common life that at present characterizes the American college, must inevitably go with it. Such intimacies can only be developed by the common studies and common interests, the common enjoyments and common antagonisms of a succession of years, during the most plastic age. If we substitute for them the classes that are held together for a few weeks or months by common attendance in the same lecture room, and these classes are then broken up and re-formed of new materials in new combinations, we shall lose much of the charm and more of the educating power of the college life. Whatever this common life is worth in its manifold training of the intellect to practical judgments and of the heart to its finer affections, must be sacrificed if the class system is greatly weakened or practically abandoned. The value of these influences is in our view another weighty argument in favor of retaining fixed classes, in addition to those which have already been urged.

We ought not in this connection to omit entirely another prominent feature of the college as a community, viz., the arrangements for culture and enjoyment furnished by the so-called *college societies*, secret and open, larger and smaller. These societies are common to all the universities and colleges of Europe and America. Their existence in some form is a necessary outgrowth of human nature. In similar circumstances ardent and ambitious young men will devise some expedient for self-improvement, particularly in rhetorical and literary exercises. The university cannot furnish all the culture of this sort which is required, nor if it could would it be either as acceptable or as efficient as that which is originated and managed by young men themselves. It is not surprising that in the American colleges, animated as they must be with the practical and independent spirit of the country and sympathizing most warmly with every public movement, whether political or literary, these associations should have assumed great prominence and should have exercised a powerful educating influence. The social tendencies of young men would naturally lead to associations for other than exclusively literary purposes. The clannish tendencies which result from their warm likings and their violent antagonisms, as well as their newly developed feelings of independence would tend to make these societies exclusive and secret. We do not propose to discuss the general question of the desirableness or the undesirableness of some associations of this sort. It is scarcely open for discussion. They are so natural to young men, indeed to men of all ages, as not to need defense or justification. Whether it is desirable that they should be secret or guarded by a mysterious reserve, and so involved with a factitious importance, admits of more question. The love of secrecy and reserve is too strong in human nature, and especially in boyish nature, to be easily thwarted. We doubt the expediency because we disbelieve in the possibility of destroying or preventing secret societies. That such societies may be, and sometimes are, attended with very great evils, is confessed by the great majority of college graduates. Prominent among these evils is the fostering of an intriguing and political spirit, which is incongruous with the general tendencies

of college life toward justice and generosity, and the division of the community and the classes into hostile factions. Whatever excesses attend them, of late hours, late suppers, noisy demonstrations, and convivial indulgences, should be repressed by the good sense and manlier spirit of the college community. Could the continuity of these societies, from one college year to another, be broken up, the college life would be greatly ennobled.

The consideration of this subject suggests another which is nearly akin, and that is whether the arrangements for social life in the college are sufficiently numerous and complete. Is it practicable and desirable that such arrangements should be more attractive? Some colleges have provided bowling alleys for exercise and relaxation. Ought billiard rooms and club rooms to be added? Is it desirable that public parlors should be furnished, or places convenient for rendezvous and conversation? Questions of this sort are more easily asked than answered. It is safe to say that whatever withdraws the students from resorts for eating and drinking or gaming, which may furnish facilities for other excesses, is so much gain to academic manners and morals. An accessible and cheerful reading room, furnished amply with the best newspapers and journals, should be esteemed a necessity, and if it were made attractive and tasteful in its appointments and furnished with retiring rooms for conversation, and could be rigidly controlled by the rules of gentlemanly etiquette, would be a most desirable and useful agency in the college community. The tendencies to barbarism and roughness are manifold in the college. Jeremy Taylor enumerates as among the miseries of our human life, that the boy at a certain age yields himself in subjection to "a caitiff spirit." That a *caitiff spirit* prowls around the buildings of every college and sometimes takes possession of scores and hundreds of its inhabitants is too notorious to need any evidence. Whatever may impede its influence or repress its manifestations is obviously most salutary. That this spirit has sometimes been exasperated and rendered more brutal and barbarous by barbarous methods of punishment may be safely admitted, without abating at all from the authority of any existing government

or without conceding in the least to the fine delusion that a college community can be managed without rigid authority; and even in entire consistency with the doctrine that the government must be absolute in its commands and summary in its administration. Whatever removes the occasion for the exercise of mere authority or even for the semblance of its assertion is usually acknowledged to be a real blessing with men and brutes, and a college student may surely take rank somewhere between the extremes of the series.

That a college community requires rules and that rules must be enforced by discipline will not be disputed. That a certain measure of inspection and supervision should also be exercised over this community, to preserve decorum in the apartments and grounds, would scarcely be denied. It is not, however, easy to answer the question how minute the supervision of the college authorities should be. Upon this subject opinions differ very widely, and these opinions differ in the case of the same persons with their varying circumstances. One class of critics contend for the constant and minute supervision of a Jesuit seminary, every rule and provision of which is founded on suspicion and distrust. Another class would abandon all special rules and inspection and leave the students entirely to their own sense of honor and decorum. One class of advisers would proceed on the principle that all students are liars and scoundrels, another that they are all gentlemen and men of truth; neither of which opinions happens to be just. The complaint is often heard and urged with special earnestness for or against this or that college, that in one college the instructors are on intimate and familiar terms with their pupils and exert over them a paternal supervision, while in the other they are distant and leave the pupils to themselves. Some insist that if students reside together they should be inspected in their apartment by day and carefully locked in at an early hour by night. Others would leave them alone by day and night, without even the presence of an officer in the building in which they congregate, and to and from which they have ready access and egress at all hours. Many insist that all special laws and penalties provoke disorder and mischief, while others insist that college laws should be many and be strictly enforced. We cannot dis-

cuss these questions in detail, nor need we in order to vindicate the system of college residence and general supervision. The English system of locking in at an early hour is manifestly unsuited to the general freedom of our institutions, and it is chiefly valuable as a security against a single vice. It is better adapted to their system of small colleges in each of which the inmates live in some sort a family life. It is the supplement or counterpoise to the greater freedom of their students in many other respects, as in daily attendance at lectures and in daily examinations of the work performed. It is in fact the single controlling influence which the college can constantly enforce, in place of which the American college has manifold more efficient substitutes. Frequent visitation of the students by day and evening has been recommended by many as essential to the faithful supervision and the parental care which the college is bound to exercise. This was practised in many of our colleges in other times and has not been entirely disused. In some instances the lodgings of students have been attached to and been alternate with the residences of professors for the purpose of making this inspection more constant and complete. It has been generally found that such minute and constant supervision is exceedingly ungrateful and annoying, because it presents the aspect of meddling; and it provokes in return an antagonistic attitude in manifold petty annoyances. The aggression of constant interference provokes the resistance of boyish mischief and arouses the wrath of the manhood that is half developed and is therefore intensely jealous for its invaded rights. The proper medium between the too little and the too much, is for the government to maintain and occasionally to assert its right of visitation, to provide for the presence in every dormitory by day and night of officers clothed with complete authority, but to exercise its supervision chiefly by methods that are indirect. The judgment of what students are doing and the control of their movements can be most efficiently exercised by their presence at all the required exercises, by constant responsibility for the work of every day, and by the manly and scholarly sentiment of the college community. The monitor's returns and the instructors' record book, when closely watched and efficiently used, if conjoined with

occasional personal interviews with students who are any way derelict are, we are persuaded, the most efficient as well as the least oppressive instruments of official supervision. That the sentiment of the college community is far more important and far more efficient than is commonly supposed we have already sought to establish. It is a most interesting and important enquiry whether any system of measures can be devised by which this public sentiment can be elevated to a higher tone and can be maintained in greater efficiency. Can any formal arrangement be made by officers, discipline, or studies which shall introduce into the community better and more efficient influences. It is manifest that these influences must to a great extent be personal and individual. The selection of officers of high personal character and of ardent and self-sacrificing devotion to the interests of the students is the first condition of success in this respect. The maintenance of a certain degree of free and familiar intercourse between them and their pupils is equally essential. The traditions of some of the colleges in this country are unfavorable to a too familiar intimacy, and the feelings of the students themselves demand a measure of reserve and isolation on both sides. Too much advice, especially if it is obtrusively administered, is if possible more offensive than too much supervision. The students themselves naturally withdraw from the society of those who are older than themselves and who hold official relations which involve some constraint on both sides. The opinions and sympathies of their fellows are of far grater concern to them than the judgments and feelings of their instructors. While all this is true there is room even under the present arrangements, for the exertion of a very efficient influence over the college community, by those who are disposed to use it. The English universities have one advantage however which we should seek to engraft upon our system. The intercourse of the tutor with his pupil is constant and intimate. It is often generous and confiding. The tutor works with his pupil and teaches him how to work. He sympathizes with his difficulties as well as corrects his mistakes. He inspires his ambitions and elevates his aims, he liberalizes his drudgeries and imparts to the flagging somewhat of his own

enthusiasm. He lays the foundation for life-long friendships, and in this way perpetuates his own influence, and the spirit of his own attainments and culture. Can we do anything of the sort? We could if we had the means. We could avail ourselves of all the advantages of the system of "fellows" and "private tutors" without many of its incidental evils. The advantages to our system of instruction of *terminable fellowships* or scholars of the house has already been insisted on. The services which they might render as connecting links between officers and students are if possible still more important. The presence in a college community of a sufficient number of recent graduates, of eminent attainments and of attractive characters, who should share in the sympathies and have access to the opinions of the undergraduates, whose associations should be constant with the better men of all the classes, while their services as tutors and guides to the weaker should open to them abundant opportunities for befriending them intellectually and morally, could not fail to be most efficient in elevating the tone of college opinion and of college scholarship, manners, and morals. Such a provision would go farther than any other towards redeeming these communities from much of the reproach which rests upon them, however undeserved and exaggerated it often may be.

Dr. Arnold remarks more than once in his letters to this effect, if the sixth form is with me I can defy and control all other evil influences. This thought occurs to us in connection with the enquiry whether the higher classes, and especially the highest of all, should not have the place of a somewhat more decided manhood than is allowed it, in respect to its methods of study, its relations to the instructors, and its responsibility for the controlling sentiment of the institution. Under the operation of natural laws a somewhat different position has been accorded to it in all these respects than has been conceded to the other classes. The studies pursued are at once more directly liberal as well as more practical. They are at least more practical in the sense of having a more vital relation to the principles which underlie individual faith and character, to the historical and political questions which agitate the world of living men as well as to the literature in which men of

culture find at once their refreshment and inspiration. The methods of instruction may be less constrained, and the intercourse with instructors more free and confiding. Some have advised that the freedom of the university should be introduced in the closing year, and that for the selection of their studies as well as for irresponsibility in pursuing them the Seniors should be more largely left to themselves. We have already given the reasons why elective studies cannot to a very great extent be allowed and why *private studies* are to be preferred. It is however altogether essential to the perfection and the full development of the college system, that the last year of college life should be turned to its best account in self-culture. With its beginning there begins to be developed even to the frivolous and the idle the sense of individual responsibility for the future. Many of the studies invite to manly and moral reflection. Many of them exercise the inventive and aesthetic powers to an unwonted degree. All of them introduce the students to the thoughts and opinions of cultivated men on subjects of comprehensive and general interest. During this year the student begins, perhaps for the first time in his life, to read, and is tasked to learn how to read. All these influences tend to awaken whatever of manhood may hitherto have lain dormant, and to quicken into life some sense of his responsibility for his influence over the community in which he lives. Whatever can be done to turn these advantages to the most efficient use will elevate the tone of feeling in the whole college. We do not advise the release of the Senior from any of the obligations of an enforced system of study. He needs them as much as ever and can profit by them more than ever. But he can certainly be made to understand the value of a manly sympathy with the decorum and order of the college and the importance of his own influence in this regard. It is not desirable that he should be instructed without constant responsibility for his work. But he may certainly be treated as a man who has ceased to be a school boy, and has begun to feel his responsibility for his influence. The Senior year ought to be the busiest year of all, but it ought not to be overburdened with manifold and novel studies. The habits of thorough

work and the satisfaction of successful achievement, which come from a very few things well and carefully done, is worth quite as much to the character as it is to the intellect. Whatever gives tone to either in the management of the Senior class in any American college will give elevation and tone to the sentiment of the whole community. It is not too much to labor and hope for, that in the future development of the college system the Senior class may feel its responsibility and exercise its influence for good with greater efficiency, and as a consequence the American colleges may attain a nobler and more healthful common life.

Our discussion of this common life requires us to consider the moral and religious influences which may properly be employed in invigorating and controlling it. This subject opens a somewhat wide and perplexing field of discussion and must be reserved for another paper.

ARTICLE III.—ROMANISM.*

It may be fairly presumed that when the respected founder of this course of lectures made his will,† he had no personal apprehension that Romanism would ever become a formidable power in this continent. As a member of the Church of England, he had been taught to regard the Roman Catholic Church as the sworn foe of a reasonable religion, and as the mother of all superstitious devotion. He inherited the traditions of his race and of his church; and we can understand that he felt in duty bound to do what he could to give emphasis to the protestantism of the English Church by providing that one lecture at least should be directed against error and superstition as taught by and witnessed in the Church of Rome.

In fact Romanism was in a bad way, one hundred years ago. It was writhing under the assaults of French infidelity. The blows of Voltaire and of his comrades were falling thick and fast. There was a sting in the sharpness of their wit. Their arguments became the staple of ordinary conversation. The educated classes, the men of science, the people of fashion, working and ill-informed people besides, turned their backs upon the church, and laughed contemptuously at its absurdities and superstitions.

In England, Roman Catholics were still suffering under political disabilities, and all they expected was the right to worship God in their own way, and according to the rules of their own church. They scarcely looked for anything more. They knew that the mind and conscience of England were against them, and that even their safety lay in the modesty of their bearing, and in the unobtrusiveness of their beliefs.

* *The Fifth Price Lecture*, delivered in Trinity Church, Boston, Wednesday, March 10, 1869.

† Mr. WILLIAM PRICE, by his will, dated A. D. 1770, made provision for a course of eight lectures upon Christian doctrine and practice, to be delivered annually, during Lent, in Boston. To this purpose he devoted the proceeds of the rent of a house, which then brought sixteen pounds a year.

In all European protestant lands and in this country, the prevailing feeling was that so far as they were concerned, Romanism was at an end, that the battle with it had been fought, and that whether it might or might not last long in Romish countries, it could have only a precarious existence elsewhere. Rome had no great champions who could uphold her waning glories by the force of their talents. Her Bossuets, Bourdaloues, Fenelons, and the like were gone. Her de Maistres, Chateaubriands, La Cordaires, Möhlens, and the like had not yet come.

To-day Romanism is immensely stronger than it was an hundred years ago. It has numerous advocates well equipped for their work. Its area is much broader, its spirit is more active and buoyant, and it asserts its claims to universal sovereignty without either abatement or disguise. In England and in America especially, it is pushing itself forward in every possible way, in the establishment of churches and schools, and in the erection of new dioceses, in the introduction of monastic orders, and in the increased pomp of its ritual. The secular newspapers report its religious services, and the sermons of its preachers; and every man who is interested in the general doings and fortunes of the Christian religion, is forced to feel that Romanism is once more a living, tangible power which is confronting us without fear and with decided audacity.

It has, however, undoubtedly lost much that it prized hitherto, especially in its conflicts with Protestantism. It can no longer depend upon the arm of secular authority, nor induce sovereigns like Philip of Spain, or Charles of France, to draw the sword and to light fires for the suppression of heresy. Its relations with the State in Roman Catholic countries are disturbed, and its prestige is diminished. It has nevertheless accepted promptly, though under protest, the new situation in which it has been placed by the advance of constitutional liberty throughout the civilized world.

You will not expect me, at this time, to enter upon any inquiry into the causes which have contributed to the revival of the influence of Romish ways of thinking, and to the new growth of the Roman Church. I seek to impress upon your minds the fact that in treating of Romanism we are dealing

with an actual *thing*, and we must be prepared to meet it according to the exigency of time and place..

It has been too much our habit to spend our strength upon certain peculiarities of Romanism, which do not touch its heart. We find fault with its measures. We impeach it because it is in league with absolutism in the State, or because it is at war with republican institutions, or because it is unwilling to give the Sacred Scriptures freely to the people, or because the confessional is sometimes dangerous to the peace of families, or because it keeps alive gross superstitions in various parts of the world, or because it is not friendly to popular education, or, lastly, because it insists upon the principle of authority, and suppresses freedom of thinking.

We impeach it again because it does not inculcate the love and practice of truth, and because its casuistry is often dangerous to the purity of the personal conscience.

These and kindred charges are well founded indeed in general, yet Rome is flexible and subtle in her ways, and she has an answer more or less explicit, which she is always ready to make whenever we confine ourselves to a criticism upon her measures.* In America she has her Sunday schools, and her people are allowed the use of their Bibles under certain restrictions. In France her foremost prelates and priests are endeavoring to convince the people that the church is the great guardian of society, and that in all that appertains to purity of manners, to the preservation of marriage, to the nurture of childhood in virtue, she is doing her duty to the utmost.

Since the revolutionary outbreak of 1848, the authorities of the church in some countries have been seeking her estab-

* I cite the following, from the *Histoire... de la Compagnie de Jesus... par J. Cr  tineau-Joly*. "Les D  voys  s n'ont pas cess   de dire que l'Eglise Catholique, and les J  suites en particulier, d  robaient aux fid  les la connaissance des Saintes Ecritures; cependant en dehors de Bellarmin, de Tolet, de S  , et de Cornelius    Lapid  , voil   la r  ponse que tant d'ex  g  tes adressaient    des pareilles imputations. On les accusait de tenir la Bible sous le boisseau; ils en recommandent la lecture, ils la traduisent, ils l'expliquent dans toutes les chaires et dans toutes les langues. Ils semblent s'arracher les difficult  s pour y donner des solutions, et ces solutions aux yeux m  me de la science, doivent avoir plus d'autorit   que celles dont les Protestants sont si souvent glorifi  s."—Tom. IV. p. 234-235.

lishment upon a basis of simple and complete independence of the State, and in the United States they are professedly satisfied with the laws by which we are all governed. The posture of the Roman hierarchy here, in this particular, has made sufficient impression in France to elicit notice and admiration in the *Revue des deux Mondes*. If then in a matter so weighty as the relation of the State to the Church, they can vary their policy without any embarrassment or annoyance to themselves, we ought surely to understand that it is a mere waste of strength, in a day of earnest strife, to strike the Romish system hard blows anywhere but in its doctrine. For in this respect Rome is to all intents and purposes, inflexible. She may from time to time vary or disguise the spirit of her policy, she may veil her dogma under pressure, but she will not deny nor modify it.

What is it then that separates us from the Church of Rome? What is it that renders intercommunion, at least for the present, impossible? When we remember that our own Church and the Church of Rome are professedly Christian—that we have and hold in common the doctrine of the Trinity, of the Incarnation, of the Atonement, of original sin and the like—that we both recognize the Nicene Creed and the sacred Scriptures (Rome having added, however, the Apocryphal books to the Canon), the answer to the question must be found, of course, in the things which are deemed essential by the Roman Church, and which are repudiated by us. After due analysis we find these to be the papacy and the mass with their corollaries and logical deductions which Rome has transmuted into acts. The one is the crowning error and the other the crowning superstition of the Church of Rome. The one concerns the constitution and government of the Christian Church, the other colors the whole conception of Christian life and worship. If we accept the papacy, our action forthwith is affected, for we place ourselves in visible communion with the Pope. If we accept the mass our action is equally affected, for we adore what we believe to be our present Lord, and, in either or in both cases, we should become what Romanists would call good Catholics. And we should, in their judgment, cease to be good Catholics if we

rejected either. In these then we find the *differentia* of Romanism. They constitute it, so that wheresoever these are held, acknowledged, or seen, we see the specific thing which we name Romanism. Let us now ascertain what we understand by these two terms.

I. The papacy is the office which, in the judgment and according to the belief of the Roman Catholic Church, is filled by the Bishop of Rome. He is regarded as the *pontifex maximus* of the whole Church of Christ. Pontifex maximus! The very word brings up memories of the imperial city before it became Christian. Julius Cæsar was pontifex maximus—the office was held by all the Cæsars—it was held while the disciples of Jesus Christ, worshiping their Lord in the catacombs, or dying in the amphitheatre “to make a Roman holiday,” associated the office with all cruelty and impiety. It is claimed that the Pope is the head, the ruler, and the teacher of the Church—the successor of St. Peter the prince of the Apostles, and the inheritor of all the rights and privileges and powers conferred upon that apostle by our blessed Lord. He who repeats the creed of Pope Pius IV promises and swears (*ac spondeo ac juro*) true obedience to the Roman pontiff, the successor of the blessed Peter, the prince of the Apostles, and the Vicar of Jesus Christ. He is the Vicar of Jesus Christ in respect not of his humanity simply, but also of His divinity. And when a new pope is crowned, he is thus addressed:—“Receive the tiara adorned with three crowns, and know that thou art the father of princes and kings, the ruler of the world, the Vicar of Jesus Christ.”

Nor are these simply empty titles such as sovereigns sometimes wear. They are the genuine and legitimate expression both of a theory of the papacy and of actual powers wielded by the pope. Every one knows the theory. It is in brief that to St. Peter the oversight and government of the whole church were committed by our Lord—that he founded churches, and was really Bishop of Rome in the exercise of his vicariate, and that he transmitted his apostolate to his successors in office for ever. Being then St. Peter’s successor, to whom the whole flock of Christ had been committed, according to the Romish theory, the Pope inherits all his rights,

privileges and powers, in respect both of government and of teaching. The direct oversight of the whole church is vested in him. Every bishop is bound either to visit Rome, or to transmit an account of the state of his diocese once a year. Particular prescripts issued from Rome are obeyed wheresoever mass is said, or a priest can officiate. The government is complete, for the authority is exercised by the Pope, and universally acknowledged by bishops, priests, and peoples.

In the matter of teaching—for he is a pastor—the authority of the *Pontifex maximus* is still more magnificent. He is the duly appointed representative of the Catholic Church, which, in matters of faith, cannot err. As such when he speaks of *faith* he also cannot err. He may err in matters of fact when ill-informed, but when he rises to the height of his great office, as the Vicar of Jesus Christ, the light of the world, he cannot then go astray. What he utters is of God, and is true, and is binding upon the conscience of every Catholic. Nor is this prerogative claimed and acknowledged as a sort of pious fiction pleasing to the vanity of an aged Italian priest. It is a sober fact. The Pope is infallible, in the belief of many men in every continent and under every sky. On the eighth of December, 1854, Pius IX pronounced a decree.* He added to the number of articles of the Roman Catholic faith—he made, what had previously been a so-called pious belief, a matter of faith. What he did then was distasteful to many who give him their obedience, but in this instance they, as usual, submitted. Whatsoever they may have thought, they obeyed. The word of the most holy father could not extract the thought they may have had within their brain, but it could silence the expression of it. I do not know what you may think, but I call this *power*.

I know that the infallibility of the Pope has not been defined; but as a thing must exist before it can be defined, so there is no doubt in the Roman Catholic mind of the fact. From the Council of Florence [1439], on subsequent, to our own time, this belief has been seeking and now seeks a more and more determinate expression, and the day will doubtless come when

* The Immaculate Conception.

it will be *defined*. It is perhaps under advisement to-day whether the matter shall be presented for consideration at the coming Œcumenical Synod. But no definition can increase the actual authority of the Pope.

In the judgment of Roman Catholics he is Peter—the rock upon which the Church of Christ is built.* It is one and the same everywhere, whether put in a mild and softened light as Newman puts it, or in the hard, sharp, crisp statements of an Italian like Perrone, who does not care how his statements may strike Protestant ears. The belief is so astounding—the claim for the papacy is so audacious that the very audacity is sufficient to convince us that it could not have been sprung upon the world at once. It bears every mark of slow and gradual growth. If the Pope be that rock, we can find by the light of history, the strata and the law of its structure. We observe it acquire shape and size—and there is a hammer which can break it in pieces.

We can go back to the past, and follow the course of history, and observe how, step by step, the idea that the church must be under one government, and subject to one visible head, gained ground. We can observe how, step by step, the convulsions of society, and the civilization which followed the overthrow of the old empire, lifted up the papacy higher and higher, until at last the Pope sat upon his throne—a sovereign ruling in that realm of spiritual reality which knows no geographical, no territorial limits. It was and ever remains a wonderful empire. The old idea of the *Ecclesia militans* disappeared before that of the *Ecclesia triumphans*;† and the princes of the church are wearing the purple, and the kings of the earth have bowed themselves before the Pope as the representative of that God in whose sight they are but as the small dust of the balance.

II. It is time, however, to devote our attention now to the mass. As the papacy, so also the mass is essential to the Romish system. Without it the confessional, penance, purgatory, as these are believed in and practised by Roman Catholics, fall to pieces. It is the keystone in the arch of the church's life,

* Denzinger Enchirid, pref. p. viii.

† Cf *Roths anfangs*.

contemplated as a spiritual agent and power in the world. What then is the Mass?

We Protestants are very apt to overlook the distinction made by the Roman Catholics themselves, between the holy communion or the sacrament of the Eucharist, and the sacrifice of the altar. It is true the two go together, and must go together, since what is sacrificed—the host—is also the substance or thing used in the reception of the holy communion. But though the two go together of necessity, the distinction between them is very palpable. How palpable may be inferred from the fact that the decree of the Eucharist was promulgated by the council at Trent at its thirteenth session, held in October, 1551, and that of the sacrifice of the mass was promulgated at its twenty-second session, held on the 17th September, 1562.

Protestants, moreover, are apt to resist most strenuously and to combat most resolutely the dogma of transubstantiation, but in fact the greater wrong done to the Church and to our Lord, the larger superstition, the more baleful error are in the dogma of the mass. What now is the difference between the sacrament of the Eucharist and the Mass?

The difference is very marked, and requires only to be stated in order to be understood. According to the fathers of Trent the sacrament of the Eucharist was designated by our blessed Saviour to be the spiritual food of souls, by which the living might be nourished and comforted by the life of Him who said, "he who eateth me, even he shall live on account of me," (*propter me*):* and it is as it were, an antidote by which we are delivered from daily infirmities and are preserved from mortal sins. And it is the most august of all sacraments, because, after consecration, the bread and wine are converted into the substance of the body and blood of Christ, "which conversion is conveniently and properly, by the Holy Catholic Church, called transubstantiation," (*convenienter et proprie a sancta Catholica Ecclesia transubstantiatio est appellata*).† And because the body and blood of Christ are in the Eucharist, the council of Trent declares that the *Author of holiness* is him-

* Sess. XIII. Decretum de sanctissimo Eucharistiæ Sacramento.—Cap. 2.

† Ibid., cap. 4.

self in the Eucharist prior to the reception of it, *ante usum*. This phrase was aimed at Protestants. All therefore who eat the consecrated substance, actually eat the body of the Lord, no matter what their spiritual condition! It is not necessary to go into any details respecting the general sacramental theory of the Roman Church. It is enough to notice that the dogma of the sacrament of the Eucharist is in harmony with its general theory.

If this were all, we might reject the dogma upon the ground that it is founded upon an utter misrepresentation of our Lord's words, that it rests upon a false philosophy, and is defended by a vicious method. If this were all, we might protest against the right of any body of men to force a scholastic subtlety and a superstitious notion, the subtlety being woven round the notion, upon the belief of Christendom, or we might oppose it as we oppose the Lutheran doctrine of consubstantiation which is liable to the gravest objections, and there might not be an irreparable breach of the peace of Christendom. But something more remains, something immensely more serious, and this is contained in the dogma of the Mass.

It is the belief then of the Roman Catholic Church that our Lord at the *last supper*, offered to God the Father, His body and blood under the appearance (sub specie) of bread and wine; that He then and there appointed the apostles, priests of the New Covenant, and commanded them and their successors in the priesthood to offer the same, by the words, this do in remembrance of me.*

Here then we are presented articulately with the idea of a sacrifice in the Church of Christ which is offered by the priesthood. It is believed, moreover, that this sacrifice is truly propitiatory,† that as our Lord did truly at the last supper, offer

* Sess. XXII. Decretum de sacrificio missæ.—Cap. 1.

† "Et quoniam in divino hoc sacrificio, quod in Missa peragitur, idem ille Christus continetur, et inruente immolatur, qui in ara crucis semel seipsum cruento obtulit, docet sancta Synodus, sacrificium istud vere propitiatorium esse, per ipsumque fieri, ut si cum vero corde, et recta fide, cum metu et reverentia contriti, ac poenitentes ad Deum accedamus, misericordiam consequamur, et gratiam inveniamus in auxilio opportuno. Hujus quippe oblatione placatus Dominus, gratiam et donum poenitentis concedens, crimina et peccata, etiam ingentia dimittit. Una enim eademque est hostia, idem nunc offerens sacerdotum ministerio, qui seipsum tunc in cruce obtulit, sola offerendi ratione diversa

His body and blood as a sacrifice whereby God is appeased, so the priest, in the Christian Church, offers the same sacrifice. What the priest offers to God is what our Lord offered. The host is indeed the same victim that was offered upon the cross, and what is thus offered is available as a propitiatory sacrifice for the living and the dead, not indeed for all the dead, but for the dead in Christ not yet fully purged.

The offering of Himself then by our Lord is not, according to the Church of Rome, one act,* but a perpetual process going forward within the church through the agency of the priesthood. It is, once more, the identical sacrifice presented to God the Father by Jesus Christ, differing only in the conditions of its presentation. The power of the cross is not denied in terms. Our Lord is said to have redeemed us, "*per sanguinis effusionem*," by the shedding of His blood. All this we understand well enough. But the *sacrifice* was made or instituted in the night in which he was betrayed; and, in the system of Romanism, this sacrifice is everything. I do not see that the cross is necessary, for the stress falls upon the sacrifice of the altar, and the worshiper is directed to that sacrifice as vested with objective propitiatory virtue. The Church of Rome does not appeal to the Epistle to the Hebrews.

Here the idea of communion disappears. There is in all this vein of thought no suggestion of an act of fellowship upon the part of Christians with each other in the bonds of a common faith and of a common charity. The priest offers alone. What sacrifice does he present? What does he hold in his hands? Romanism replies—the Lord Jesus Christ. Communion is lost here. The one sacrifice for the sins of the world becomes simply the first of an unending series of sacrifices—the minister of the word and the dispenser of the sacraments is converted into a priest offering Christ upon an altar, and we feel that we are carried over into a strange world.

Cujus quidem oblationis cruentæ, inquam, fructus per hanc uberrime percipiuntur: tantum abest, ut illi per hanc quovis modo derogetur. Quare non solum pro fidelium vivorum peccatis, penis, satisfactionibus, et aliis necessitatibus, sed et pro defunctis in Christo nondum ad plenum purgatis, rite, juxta apostolorum traditionem, offertur."—*Ibid.*, cap. 2. cf. canon 3.

* See Epistle to the Hebrews, chap. x. 1—22.

We may be pardoned then if we ask what then is our Lord to us personally? According to the Roman Church He comes to the faithful daily upon innumerable altars, and yet He speaks no word. He is present with us, we adore that presence, but he is passive and lifeless in the hands of a priesthood. No sign or word comes from the pix. When the church is in travail over a new doctrine, recluse and learned men busy themselves in vast libraries in order to catch the *consensus* of Catholic tradition. A believer may be excused if, like Mary, he cries out—they have taken away the Lord, and I know not where they have laid Him!

In these two things then—the papacy and the mass, we behold the heart of Romanism—as it beat long ago, and as it beats to-day. If they last, and as they last, it lasts. If they perish from the belief of men, it perishes. The genius of the Roman Catholic Church is embodied in them. It seems to me as if every land and every race had its own genius. The old Romans worshiped Roma, the genius of the city, with peculiar fervor; the genius of Roman Catholic Christianity is felt to be the object of the almost idolatrous devotion of its adherents even, if they are unable to define it. All Romanism stands beneath the shadow of a sacrificing priesthood and receives its laws from the Pontifex Maximus, who is in the place of Jesus Christ upon earth. I scarcely wonder that an Italian in the fullness of his enthusiasm declared that Jesus Christ died in order to make a priest. These two things I repeat—the papacy and the mass make Romanism. They account for its development and for the forms of its piety. They are the two Hercules pillars of the system which one must pass in quitting the broad, free, though stormy Atlantic for the beautiful but treacherous Italian sea.

The question for us is, can we promptly meet the Church of Rome? Dare we assault her, or are we forced, by our own judgment, to act only on the defensive? If we are unable to attack, then it becomes us to lay down our arms and surrender at discretion. For either the Pope is the Vicar of God or else his claim is a monstrous pretension; either the sacrifice of the mass is a Christian truth or else it "is a fond thing vainly invented" to be repudiated at all hazards as contrary to the

mind and will of God. But how shall we attack, to what standard or tribunal shall we appeal?

As searchers after truth we must acknowledge some standard, and appeal to some recognized authority. Without this we must follow either our own mental bias, or else become the prey of every man who shall be bold enough to declare that he has and holds the truth of God. I fear, very much, we have lost sight of this need of appeal to a recognized standard of truth and duty. We are, in this new age, building apparently on the sand; or it would seem that what we had supposed to be rock, on which many were building, has become pulverized, and as the sands shift under the power of the stream, multitudes believe to-day what they did not believe yesterday, and to-morrow they may believe nothing at all.

I touch here a serious evil which is doing more harm to our Protestantism than any direct assaults of Romanism. We seem to be under some spell. Our spiritual ideas are resolving themselves into a series of dissolving views—and all because the mind has not the proper nutriment to impart health and vigor to our religious feelings and convictions. Upon every account it becomes us to recognize the fact that in religion we must have an actual, definite standard of appeal. This we must find either in Sacred Scripture, or in tradition, or in both combined. If we accept the traditions of the Church as law, we might as well abandon the contest with Rome, because the traditions gradually, as they gather force and headway in time, revolve around the papacy. The traditions in the long run have made the papacy; they are its chief support to-day. To accept them bodily, in mass, is to appeal to actual Christendom—to the historic Church, as to a standard and law, and not as to a *witness* of truth. It is to acknowledge the identity of Christian truth and the Christian Church visible. This brings us again to Romanism, for this is the postulate of the Roman Catholic apologist.

If to-day I ask *what is truth?* and if I allow every Church or sect to answer, I am stunned by a confused and unintelligible noise. If I allow one church to answer, and only one, in the midst of the crowd of Churches, by my procedure I submit myself in advance, to that one Church. But if I allow

none to answer for me, and I recognize nevertheless a divine historic revelation, I am compelled to go to Sacred Scripture, in order to learn what God requires me to believe. Shall we take the Sacred Scripture fashioned by Italian workmen? or by Greek, or by Anglican, or by German, or by American workmen? No! but the text in its purity and simplicity. Here we must take our stand whensoever we come to the question of what it is necessary to believe in order to be a Christian; whensoever, in a word, loyalty and the obedience of faith are required or even considered.

I do not mean, however, to deny and repudiate utterly the traditional principle. Christianity is historic. As a social interest, as an organized spiritual fact, it comes to us from the past. We cannot dismiss this past of Christian life and history, any more than we can dismiss the past of our civil life and institutions. The new generation as it succeeds the old, does not build again from the foundations. A. U. C. represented a fact to the Roman citizen which he never could forget. We measure time in the world's history by the letters A. D. We date our public documents in the United States from the declaration of our independence. We do not create the State anew; we administer it as an existing fact. So in religion. Many things, many words, institutions and the like have come to us from the past, which we accept and use as a matter of course. We baptize infants, we observe the first day of the week, we use the imposition of hands in ordination and confirmation, we employ the words sacrament, trinity, incarnation, &c., in theology. This is an illustration of the recognition of a traditional principle which is inevitable. We do not therefore maintain that we must have a sure and certain warrant of scripture for all that we may observe and do as Christians, because it is impossible to be confined to the written word under all circumstances, and during all ages. Much is left the conscience and judgment of individuals and of particular churches; but when we come to faith, to what it is necessary to believe as Christians, we must adhere firmly to the Bible, and never, for a moment, allow any one to impose upon the conscience anything, as requisite to a true reception of the

Gospel, which is not contained therein, nor may be proved thereby.

This, then, is our standard of appeal. Logically and morally it is the right and only standard of appeal in the discussion, especially of the claims and teachings of any and of every Church whatsoever. If this be not the tribunal to which we must go, then we must have recourse to the dictum of a church, and then, as we have seen, we allow a church to be its own standard of appeal. Consequently, when Rome proclaims her infallibility, we must allow her claim. When the Church of England disowns infallibility, we may or may not accept her disclaimer. If we do *not* accept it, then we prove her to be *fallible*, to be mistaken articulately in respect of her own quality and prerogative. We are reduced to absurdity.

We are forced back to sacred Scripture, and in the interests of Christian truth we are compelled to take our stand here. And I declare in all completeness of conviction, that with the Bible in our hands we are triumphant against the doctrine of the supremacy of the Pope, and of the sacrifice of the mass. This is to be triumphant against Romanism.

You will not of course look for an attempted refutation of the Roman Catholic position, nor for the true interpretation of the Bible upon the matters disputed. We have sought to exhibit the core or heart of the Roman system, and to show you where the true source of our Christian knowledge is to be found. We leave the subject here at present, in the belief that the way has been pointed out for every one who wishes to investigate it seriously and devoutly.

In conclusion, we will ask you to remember that the Roman Catholics have never liked our appeal to Scripture. They do not like it to-day any better than they liked it three hundred years ago. They endeavor to make a counter attack. When we boast of our devotion to Scripture, and of our efforts in its free circulation, they ask us—where did you get your Bibles? You are dependent upon us for your possession of Sacred Scripture, in the first instance. This is one of the common places of attack; and it has surprised us to find that it has disturbed some Protestants. Of course we

obtained the Bible through the Church. The Church, though corrupted and ignorant of Scripture, had always revered and conserved holy writ. Western Christendom, under the papacy, did not dream of corrupting the sacred text. The Protestants who had been educated in the bosom of the mediæval later Church obtained their Bible in the ordinary way. There is nothing here which we may not admit—nothing to cause us a moment's hesitation or doubt.

Again, it is said by Roman Catholics that the unrestricted use of the Sacred Scriptures has resulted in a confusion as great as that which fell upon the builders of the tower of Babel. From the days of Bossuet, the eloquent author of the *Variations*, &c., they have not ceased their attack upon this part of our line. We do not deny that ignorant men have displayed their ignorance in their handling of the Sacred Scriptures. How could this be otherwise? We do not deny that fanatics have caricatured religion and brought the Word itself into discredit. But why lay stress upon this as if this were our *mark*? Have we no scholars? Are our learned men in hopeless contradiction with each other? To-day, thank God, owing to a better learning, a more careful study, and a completer science, the best scholars in Protestantism are not more divided in their interpretation of the text of Scripture, than the Roman Catholics amongst themselves. We draw nearer to each other. There must always, however, be some differences of opinion, some diversity of judgment upon subjects which occupy and absorb the intellect of man. Such diversities are a stimulus to thought and inquiry. And as long as knowledge is reducing the *quantity* of this diversity of interpretation, our adversaries may continue to repeat their charge, and we shall, in the meanwhile, look forward confidently to a larger and nobler unanimity.

Let us pray for the light, for peace, for charity. Let us, as we think of our Lord's prayer that His disciples might be one, labor faithfully, that the bitterness, the wrath, the malice which come from a divided Christendom, may perish beneath the purifying fire of an holy love.

ARTICLE IV.—FORGERY IN POLEMICS: THE SECRET INSTRUCTIONS OF THE JESUITS.

The New York Observer, April 8, 1869. Article entitled "Secret Instructions of the Jesuits. A Charge of Forgery met and answered."

THE readers of the *New York Observer* were startled on the morning of April 8th, with an Article of unusual length, on an unusual subject, the joint product of three coöperating authors. We have given the title of the Article above. We proceed to give the substance of it.

After an inaccurate account of certain circumstances that had drawn attention to the so-called "Secret Instructions of the Jesuits," the Article cites a declaration of the authenticity [meaning the genuineness] of this document, from the Secretary of the British Protestant Association, and notes that an edition of the book had been published in 1831, at Princeton, N. J., a French version at Paris in 1826, and an edition by the *American Protestant Association* in 1844, which the *American Christian Union* (having succeeded to the effects of that defunct society) has been "not quite ready to suppress." It goes on then to give a history of the book, which we condense, in the language of the Article itself, as follows:

It was first printed in Latin, from the Spanish, at Cracow, the capital of Poland, with this title: "Monita Privata Societatis Jesu, Notobirge, Anno 1612," by an unknown editor, with various "Testimonies of several Italian and Spanish Jesuits," confirmatory of the truth of the "Monita." It was rapidly bought and everywhere circulated, not only in Poland, but in Germany, Italy, and France.

The "Monita" were regarded then as they have since been by Van Mastricht,†

*This Article is inserted in the *NEW ENGLANDER* on account of the importance of the literary question which it discusses; but with the personal bearings of the controversy, and with its relation to the policy and proceedings of the "American and Foreign Christian Union" the editors have nothing to do.—EDITORS OF THE *NEW ENGLANDER*.

† The statement of Van Mastricht is, "There is a report that Acquaviva was the author of them"—*Auctorem ferunt esse O. de Acquaviva*; and he quotes an anonymous writer in proof of the existence of such a report. "Symbola" quoted by Placcius,—*Theatrum Anonymorum*, No. 1,501.

and other judicious scholars, as the product of the pen of Acquaviva, General of the Order. It does not appear that he ever denied them.

A Commission to investigate the subject was appointed July 11, 1615, by the Bishop of Cracow. The bishop admitted that 'nothing is certainly known of its author, but,' he affirmed, 'it is reported and the presumption is that it was edited by the venerable Jerome Zaorowski, pastor of Gózdziec.'

Nothing came of the investigation; the author was not found. The ban of the Index was put on the book, May 10, 1616. The celebrated James Gretser, Jesuit, was appointed by his superior to refute the 'Monita,' and his book was published August 1, 1617. A second decree of the Index for the suppression of the book was issued in 1621.

In 1633, Gaspar Schöppe (Scioppius), a German Catholic scholar, but a genuine hater of the Jesuits, published his '*Anatomia Societatis Jesu.*' Among other things he presents a critique on a book that had come into his hands, that he calls '*Instructio Secreta pro Superioribus Societatis Jesu.*' His analysis of the book proves it to be the same, with slight differences, as the *Monita Privata*. But his copy could not have been of the 1612 edition, for he attributes the discovery of the work to the plundering of the Jesuit College at Paderborn, in Westphalia, by Christian, Duke of Brunswick. That was in 1622, ten years later. If his copy had been of the Cracow edition he could not have made so gross a mistake. This, then, was another source, independent of the first, from which the book was derived. It was credibly reported that another copy had been found at the capture of Prague, in 1631, only two years before.

The *Monita Secreta*, as the book was now called, was frequently reprinted. . . . In 1669, Henry Compton, afterwards Bishop of London, published "The Jesuits' Intrigues; with the Private Instructions of that Society to their Emissaries." The latter had been "lately found in a Jesuit's closet after his death, and sent in a letter from a gentleman at Paris to his friend in London." This, too, was the *Monita Secreta*, entirely independent of the others.

John Gerhard, the Lutheran theologian, 1679, refers to the book as a work of undoubted authenticity.

The next paragraph we give without abridgment:

At Strasburg, in 1713, Henri de St. Ignace, under the pseudonym of Liberius Candidus, a Flemish divine of the Carmelite order, published his *Tuba Magna*, addressed to the Pope and all potentates, on the "Necessity of Reforming the Society of Jesus." In the appendix the *Monita Secreta* is reproduced in full. In proof of its authenticity, he gives these three reasons: 1. Common fame. 2. The character of the document, wholly Jesuitical. 3. Its exact conformity with their practices. Besides its having been found in the Jesuit colleges. Although the Jesuit, Alphonso Haylenbrock, published his "Vindications" of the society in the following year, rehashing Gretser and Forer, the people could not be shaken from their belief in the authenticity of the book, for as De Ignace [sic] said in his second edition, 1714, "Nothing, or next to nothing, is contained therein that the Jesuits have not reduced to practice." A third edition of the *Tuba Magna* was published in 1717, and a fourth in 1780.

We shall have occasion to refer again to the foregoing paragraph by-and-by. The Article goes on to give a list, and by

no means an accurate one, of Dutch, English, and French editions, and cites the testimony of Reiffenberger, a Jesuit, that in his time (1764) the book was extensively circulated, and credited by many. It then proceeds:

"After the suppression of the order in 1773, a manuscript copy was found and printed at Rome, 1782, with this title, '*Monita Secreta Patrum Societatis Jesu; nunc primum typis expressa.*' The editor had never heard of a printed copy before! It contains numerous errors, such as would naturally arise from frequent recopying. A copy of this edition is in the New York Union Theological Seminary.

"A volume printed at Venice in 1596, once the property of a Jesuit College, has long been in the British Museum, and is curious only as containing, at the end of the book, several manuscript leaves on which the whole of the *Monita Secreta* is inscribed, the writing being evidently of ancient date, and in all probability the work of a Jesuit.

"Thus we have not less than five or six independent sources whence the printed copies of this book have been derived. Manuscripts of the work have been found elsewhere, in Jesuit colleges, since the suppression of the order in 1773, and previous to its restoration in 1814."

The author of this part of the Article, Rev. E. F. Hatfield, D. D., concludes his labors, which have been apparently of the most second-hand and inaccurate sort, with an indorsement of the genuineness of the book given by Dr. Hodge in the fourth volume of the Princeton Review.

The next part of the Article is by Professor Henry M. Baird, and is an extract from the *Analectes Beligiques* of M. Gachard, a scholar of excellent reputation, as follows:—

"When the '*Monita Secreta Societatis Jesu*' were published, a few years since, many persons disputed the authenticity of this book; others boldly maintained that it had been forged with the design of injuring the Society, by ascribing to it principles which it did not possess. *Here are facts that will dissipate all uncertainty in this respect:* At the suppression of the order in the Low Countries in 1773, there were discovered in one of its houses, in the college of Ruremonde (everywhere else they had been carefully destroyed at the first tidings of the bull fulminated by Clement XIV.) the most important papers, such as the correspondence of the General with the Provincial Fathers, and the directions of which the latter alone could have cognizance. Among those papers were the *Monita Secreta*. A translation of them was made by order of the government by the *Substitut Procureur-général* of Brabant, de Berg. It still exists in the archives of the kingdom, and I can vouch that it differs in nothing, substantially, (quant au fond) from that which has been rendered public."

The third part of the Article is from the genial pen of the Editor of the *Observer*, and is occupied mainly with cursing

a gentleman who had pronounced the "Secret Instructions" to be "an ascertained and acknowledged forgery," and demanding that he should be cast out of "standing in a Christian community" as "a calumniator." It winds up with this striking sentence:

"There is no disputed passage in the New Testament more triumphantly vindicated than is this publication of the 'American and Foreign Christian Union,' which has been wantonly pronounced a forgery."

We propose, in this Article, to give a full and fair account of the status which this book holds in literature. And, since we have got so far in the statement of evidence and authority in favor of the genuineness of the book, we will add here every additional fact on that side of the question which we have been able to find in a somewhat extensive investigation.

LUDOVICUS LUCIUS, an old controversialist against the Jesuits, prints the *Monita Secreta* in full as genuine, in his *Historia Jesuitica* (Basil. 1627), pp. 347-357. A copy of the work is in the possession of the Rev. William R. Williams, D. D., of New York.

An anonymous French work, now attributed to the Abbé GABRIEL MUSSON, entitled *Les Ordres Monastiques*, published during the last century, cites the *Monita Secreta*, and makes them the text of protracted denunciations of the Jesuits. But the learned and responsible German translator of *Les Ordres Monastiques*, L. G. CROME,* discredits and disproves the statements on which the French author relies for the authentication of the book.

WALCH, in his *Religions-Streitigkeiten ausser der Evang-luth. Kirche*, part ii., page 294, cites the *Monita Secreta*, in a somewhat non-committal way, but apparently accepting it as genu-

* The full title of Crome's work (which may be found in Yale College Library) is this: *Pragmatische Geschichte der vornehmsten Mönchsorden, aus ihren eignen Geschichtschreibern von einem ungenannten Franzosen gesamlet, und in einem deutschen Auszuge so vorgetragen dass der Geist und die innere Verfassung des Mönchsvesens daraus erhellet.* Leipzig. 1782. The French original we have not been able to find. Barbier (No. 18,445) gives the date of it as Berlin, 1751. It is curious that the exact date and authorship of a work extending to seven duodecimo volumes should have been so effectively concealed as to be unknown to the scholar who translated and annotated it.

ine. In a subsequent work, however, *Bibliotheca Theologica*, he enters it without comment in a list of books written *against* the Jesuits by their enemies.

The Rev. JAMES BREWSTER, a Scotch clergyman, in the *Edinburgh Encyclopædia*, 1830, s. v. *Jesuits*, cites it as genuine.

An anonymous controversial history of the Jesuits, London, 1816, attributed to a writer by the name of POYNTER, claims it as genuine, with the usual arguments.

An anonymous controversial pamphlet of the London Religious Tract Society, entitled "The Jesuits," makes a passing allusion to it as genuine.

The "Christian Times," newspaper, London, January 15, 1869, says, "there can be no question as to their truthfulness."

A book of "startling disclosures," entitled "The Secret Plan of the Jesuits Detected and Revealed, by the Abbate Leone," (London, 1848) gives the *Monita Secreta* a sort of indorsement. But inasmuch as the "*Secret Plan*" is more palpably an imposture than the "*Secret Instructions*," the value of the indorsement is not great.*

These (which amount to nothing) are absolutely all which we are able to add, after diligent inquiry, to the indorsements of the book given by Dr. Hatfield, with the following exception, which is important :

The "*Trésor des Livres Rares et Précieux*," a valuable bibliographical work by M. Grässe, of Dresden, has a note upon the subject in vol. iv, page 576. After giving some particulars of the history of the work, with an inaccuracy which indicates that he has not specially studied the subject, the author adds :

"As I am the owner of a copy of the above named very rare edition" [an edition of about the year 1617, without imprint of place or date,] "with criti-

*The reference of this work to the *Secreta Monita* is in the following terms :

"Agitated, carried away by a dizzy curiosity and an increasing anxiety, I seized a volume entitled *Confessions of Strangers*. I hastily glanced over a few lines, here and there, and the small portions that I read induced me afterwards to believe that everything in this order is done conformably to the rules of the little code known by the name of *Monita Secreta*, or *Secret Instructions*. It was, in fact, a collection of notes upon persons of every class, of every age, rich men, bachelors, &c." p. 18.

cal marginal notes on perplexed passages of the text, which belong without any doubt to a Jesuit who owned this copy, I am far from considering it a forgery; on the contrary, I regard it only as a manual intended for certain initiated members of the order, and not for the use of the public."

This is the total sum of literary authority in favor of the genuineness of the *Monita Secreta*. Before considering the evidence in the case, we will give a partial list of books and authors on the other side of the question. In the foregoing list we have excluded none on account of his partisan prejudice on the subject, otherwise we should have been compelled to exclude every name on the list, except two. Concerning the partisan position of MM. Gachard and Grässe in relation to the Jesuits we are not informed; we know them only as scholars. All the other authors cited are intense Jesuit-haters. On the other side of the question, however, we shall rigidly exclude all Jesuit testimony. Without a solitary exception, for the space of two hundred and fifty years, the testimony of all Jesuits has been unanimous against the genuineness of the *Monita Secreta*. With most fair-minded men, the testimony of a prejudiced and unscrupulous friend of the Jesuits would be held to be a perfectly fair and equitable offset to that of a prejudiced and unscrupulous enemy. Probably there are those whose Protestantism is of that lukewarm sort that they would deem the word and judgment of reputable Jesuit scholars of at least equal value with that of Scioppius, and Dr. Hatfield, and the late Dr. Brownlee. But allowing nothing for this, we put entirely out of the question the testimony of the Jesuits and of their friends, and give only that of impartial or hostile witnesses.

The authorities against the book are so multitudinous that for convenience' sake, they require to be classified.

A. ENCYCLOPÆDIAS AND WORKS OF BIBLIOGRAPHY.

1. We begin with the highest authority: BARBIER, "*Dictionnaire des Ouvrages Anonymes et Pseudonymes*," 2d edition, (Paris, 1822,—5), Vol. III, No. 20,985. Macvey Napier (*Encycl. Britan.* iv, 712) declares this to be "the last, and by far the best work in this department," and calls it, else-

where (*Id.* iii, 257) "a very valuable work." We must acknowledge, with Crétineau-Joly (*Histoire des Jésuites*, tome iii, pp. 372, 373, note), that "no one will accuse him of partiality in favor of the Jesuits," for he was Librarian to the Directory during the French Revolution, was employed by that ultra-Protestant body as a Commissioner to overhaul and dispose of confiscated Jesuit libraries, and was afterwards librarian to the first Napoleon. He begins his notice of the *Monita Secreta* with two decisive words: "*Ouvrage Apocryphe.*" His work is in most large libraries.

2. Placcius, "*Theatrum Anonymorum*" (Hamburg, 1708), No. 1,501, expresses a like view with Barbier, though not so peremptorily.

3. Mylius, "*Bibliotheca Anonymorum*" (Hamburg, 1740), tome iii, No. 1,356, does the same.

4. Walch, "*Bibliotheca Theologica*" (Jena, 1737,—65), ii, 179, et seq., places the *Monita Secreta* in the list of books written by the enemies of the Jesuits.

5. An article in Techner's "*Bulletin du Bibliophile*," 1845, pp. 168 et seq., maintains the same view.

6. ARTHUR DINAUX, a bibliographer of Valenciennes, in the same volume, page 363, cites the story of the finding of the *Monita Secreta* at the college of Paderborn, and says, "this anecdote is a fabrication (*controuvée*); the work is apocryphal." After noting the dates of different editions, he adds: "You see, then, that whenever there has been a contest with the Company of Jesus, this unmannerly weapon has been used and abused,—has been multiplied in very great numbers, and scattered in popular editions."

7. The *Penny Cyclopædia*, of the "Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge," vol. xi, page 114, London, 1839, says:

"The famous *Monita Secreta*, or pretended private instructions given to the higher and most tried members of the order, are now generally acknowledged to be spurious."

8. Chambers's *Encyclopædia*, 1863, vol. v, page 704, says of the book:

"The accounts of the time and circumstances of its discovery are suspicious and contradictory . . . and its apocryphal character is now commonly admitted."

9. ISAAC TAYLOR, in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, eighth edition, 1856, vol. xii, page 752, remarks:

"At a later time there was brought to light, unadvisedly, as it seems,* the *Monita Secreta*, believed, however, to be a spurious production."

10. One of the most authoritative of the German Encyclopædias is *Pierer's Universal Lexikon*, 1859, vol. viii, page 808. It declares the work in question to be "a satire" (Satyre).

11. The *Conversations-Lexicon*, seventh edition, 1827, (we have not been able to refer to a later edition), says, vol. v, p. 372: "The genuineness of them is not fully established."

12. The *Encyclopædia Americana* of Dr. FRANÇOIS LIEBER, Phila. 1831, vol. vii, p. 207, follows the language of the *Conversations-Lexikon*, on which that work is mainly founded.

13. HERZOG's *Real Encyclopædie für Protestantische Theologie und Kirche* is very high authority on all questions relating to the interests of Protestantism. In an article from the pen of Dr. G. E. STEITZ, vol. vi, p. 531, note, (Stuttgart, 1856), it says, that the *Monita Secreta* "are no production of the Jesuit order, but a satire." (. . . sind keine Ordensschrift, sondern eine satyre.)

14. The "*Dictionnaire général de la politique*" of MAURICE BLOCK, Paris, 1864, is highly esteemed among scholars. In volume ii, page 148, note, it says: "The *Monita Secreta*, which have been attributed to the Jesuits, appear stripped of all authenticity, but are none the less a very curious document." (. . . paraissent dépourvus de toute authenticité ; ils n'en constituent pas moins un document très curieux.)

B. PROTESTANT CHURCH HISTORIANS.

15. We will begin, as before, putting the highest authority first. It is the just verdict of criticism, that, "for thorough-

* The Rev. Dr. Hatfield, in the *New York Observer*, has the following fine exegesis of this passage: "Is this a denial? By some it was 'believed to be a spurious production.' Was Isaac Taylor of this number? What, then, does he mean by the pregnant expression, 'unadvisedly, as it seems?'" We should really suppose that he meant that the people who brought it to light do not, as it turns out, appear to have done a very judicious thing for themselves. Those who brought it to light, as all agree, were not the Jesuits, but their enemies.

ness of research, accuracy, and impartiality, no ecclesiastical historian stands higher than GIESELER." His "*Text Book of Church History*" is in course of translation by Prof. Henry B. Smith, of the Union Theological Seminary, of New York, and as fast as translated becomes the standard text-book in most Protestant Theological Seminaries in the United States. It is not the fault, but the misfortune, of the learned Dr. Hatfield, that the volume which comments on this subject was still locked from him in an unknown tongue, at the time of the publication of his "researches" in the *New York Observer*. It is vol. iii, Second Part, pp. 655—658, and notes (Bonn, 1853). Speaking there of the Jesuits, Gieseler says:

"Among the innumerable writings which appeared against them, the *Monita Secreta Societatis Jesus*, and the *Monarchia Solipsorum*, deserve notice particularly, as *excellent satires*."

Then follows a long note, after the manner of this author, showing that he had made the origin, history, and character of the book a subject of special study. He gives an account of some of the successive editions of the work: of the varying and inconsistent accounts of its discovery; and of how, in the course of the seventeenth century, the work underwent a remodeling at the hands of some of its anonymous editors, and assumed the form in which it is published now-a-days. He then praises the adroitness of the work, and adds:

"That the *Monita* are a satire is obvious on the face of it to an unprejudiced person; but it appears still more clearly when one reads the Address to the Reader, prefixed to the first editions, the language and style of which agree entirely with that of the *Monita*. They are, in form, an imitation of the *Regula Societatis Jesu*, and for a long time were regarded as genuine by the opponents of the Order, and ascribed to the General Acquaviva."

He adds, that "the time when the *Monita* appeared was altogether the time of the most violent struggles against the Jesuits;" and proceeds to give the titles of a multitude of other books, written at the same period against the Society, in exactly the same spirit and style with the *Monita Secreta*.

16. Next to Gieseler, the book of Church history most used as a text-book by Protestant teachers and students in America is HASE. In his *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte* (1848, 6th ed.) he nails the *Monita Secreta* as "a forgery" (untergeschoben).

17. Hardly inferior to these two in authority among Protestants, though of earlier date, is SOHRÖCKH. In his *Christliche Kirchengeschichte seit der Reformation*, Part iii, pp. 647, 650 (Leipzig, 1805) he comments on the book at length, speaks of it as of doubtful genuineness, and concludes by giving reasons external and internal for rejecting it.

18. The late Dr. JAMES MURDOCK, of New Haven and Andover, the translator of Mosheim, was never suspected by his friends of any leanings towards Jesuitism. In a note to his translation of *Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History*, vol. iii, page 90, (second edition, New York, 1847), he refers to the passage of Schröckh above cited, and remarks :

"The Jesuits have always, and constantly denied their genuineness: nor have the world the means of substantiating their authenticity, except by their coincidence with the visible conduct of the Jesuits."

19. NIEDNER in his *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, p. 649, note, (Berlin, 1866), declares the document to be "probably spurious, forged by adversaries." "*Unächte, supposititia von Gegnern aber mögen die Privata oder Secreta Monita Societatis sein.*" *

20. A brief *History of the Jesuits in Bavaria*, (Geschichte der Jesuiten in Baiern, Nürnberg, 1819), by KARL HEINRICH RITTER VON LANG, is referred to by Heeren (*Political System*

* This testimony of Niedner acquires additional weight from the fact that in the first edition of his History (Leipzig, 1846) he had considered one of the forms of this Protean document to be genuine,—to wit: the *Aurea Monita* or *Monita Privata*,—and had placed it among the primary sources of information concerning the Jesuits, although admitting that even that recension contained matter which was "*verdächtig genug.*" In the edition of 1866, which was "rewrought by the author shortly before his death," he makes no such distinction between the two recensions of the book, but rejects it altogether from the list of authorities as probably spurious.

For the careful collation of the two editions of Niedner, as well as for invaluable assistance in this whole inquiry, we are indebted to one of the most distinguished scholars connected with the library of Harvard College, whose instantaneous command of the literature of the subject was not more admirable than his prompt and patient kindness towards a total stranger, and the modesty with which he declines all public acknowledgment.

For a full account of the variations between the earlier form of the work (*Aurea* or *Privata Monita*) and the later form (*Monita Secreta*), see the "*Pragmatische Geschichte der vornehmsten Mönchsorden,*" by L. G. Crome, vol. ix, above cited.

of *Europe and its Colonies*, London, 1846) with high praise as "critical and impartial." It gives the following judgment on the genuineness of the *Monita Secreta*, pages 25, 26 :

"They are a manifest fabrication and parody (*sine offenbare Erdichtung und Parodie*) which was probably brought to light by the furious enemies of the Jesuits in Bohemia, under the pretense that it had been discovered at Paderborn in one of the Capuchin convents sacked by Christian, Duke of Brunswick. The oldest printed Latin edition is of the year 1685,—the oldest German translation, of 1668. It was circulated through the rest of Europe mainly from Amsterdam. By the Order, and by the Pope himself, it was indignantly denounced and suppressed as a calumnious fabrication. The Jesuits, Gretser and Tanner, have written refutations of it. The *Secreta Monita* are different from the *Privata Monita*, or *Aurea Monita* which came to the light from 1607 to 1618, and which being more fully worked up and paraphrased, became transformed into the *Secreta Monita*."

21. The *Dogmengeschichte* of BAUMGARTEN-CRUSIUS (Leipzig, 1840) remarks that "among the wrongs practiced in the struggle against the Jesuits is to be reckoned the employment of questionable documents claiming to be derived from the Order itself;" and cites as examples the *Privata Monita*, and *Secreta Monita*.

C. ANTI-JESUIT CONTROVERSIALISTS.

Whatever special weight attaches to the testimony of unwilling witnesses certainly belongs to the testimony of those authors who, with the strongest desire to make out a strong case against the Jesuits, nevertheless concede the spuriousness of the *Secreta Monita*. We name a few of the more eminent of these.

22. The first of these has already been cited on the other side. It is HENRICUS DE S. IGNATIO, otherwise called *Liberius Candidus*. His judgment *in favor* of the genuineness of the *Secreta Monita* would be of comparatively trifling weight, for he was one of the most intense and vehement enemies of the Jesuit order. But his judgment *against* the book would be of the gravest importance. And if it should appear that such a judgment was given after the author had already endorsed and printed the book as genuine, and had relied upon it in an argument against the Jesuits, it would seem that no circumstance short of martyrdom could have added to the moral weight of his opinion in the case.

But these are the simple facts. In the first edition of his "*Tuba Magna mirum clangens sonum, etc., de necessitate reformandi Soc. Jesu, Argentinae*, 1713, Liberius Candidus had considered the *Secreta Monita* to be genuine, and had printed them in that work in full. In the second edition of that work, however, published under the title *Tuba Altera, majorem clangens sonum*, he RECOGNIZED THEIR SPURIOUSNESS, and rejected them from his book, declaring justly, on page 188: "*Facile in intelligentiam cadit satis corruptum esse cor humanum, ut sese quibuscunque sceleribus et flagitiis dedat: ast non ita excœcata et obtusa est mens, ut præcepta scelerum et flagitiorum committendorum velit præscribere. Vult homo esse malus, et amat videri bonus.*"*

* See Gieseler, *Lehrb. der Kircheng.*, Vol. iii, part 2, page 657. We have not been able to verify the quotation, the only copies of the *Tuba Magna* and *Tuba Altera* of which we know, belonging to the Union Theological Library, New York, having been for some months withdrawn from the Library by the Rev. Dr. Hatfield, one of its Directors, who refuses permission to consult them.

This transaction of the Rev. Edwin F. Hatfield, D. D., deserves a place in the history of the Curiosities of Controversy, if that sad history should ever be written. We will not dwell upon its aggravations, except to call attention to the one wickedness of it most liable to be overlooked, and that is, that the injury of a fellow-minister was to be compassed by means, not only of a fraud upon the public, but also of false witness against our Roman Catholic neighbors. To a generous mind, the fact that his antagonists are helplessly shut out from a hearing before the greater part of those to whom he writes, would be a strong appeal for the most scrupulous justice. But some minds are not generous. We have observed that the consciences most torpid to any sense of wrong perpetrated against Jesuits, belong often to the very men who are in a continual squirm of virtuous indignation at the frauds and concealments committed by Jesuits. This is curiously illustrated by the gentle comment of an eminent scholar, who remarks, in calling attention to Dr. Hatfield's stratagem, "that it would seem as if he had practiced a little Jesuitism in the suppression of important facts."

Nothing but such transactions as this can give any color of justice to that otherwise absurd cavil of Dr. O. A. Brownson, who in one of his essays intimates that the Jesuits whom he has happened to know, have all been Nathanaels of the most guileless simplicity, and that if you are seeking the ideal Jesuit of the popular mind, you will find him in a Presbyterian minister.

P. S. Just as this is on the point of going to the printer, we have found in the library of St. John's College, S. J., Fordham, a volume which sheds additional light on this transaction of Dr. Hatfield's; and the more light we get, the uglier it looks. The book is entitled "*Difesa della Compagnia di Gesù, per Gviglielmo Turner.*" Naples, 1849. From this, it appears that even in the first edition of the *Tuba Magna*, the author "*non certo asserit opus Jesuitarum esse; propendit*

23. We come next to a great name, *clarum ac venerabile*. That man of all the human race who has most thoroughly known Jesuitism, in its principles, and acts, and documents; who has most suffered from its malice; who has fought it with the most strenuous, and protracted, and untiring warfare; who has hated it with perfect hatred, and counted it his lifelong enemy; was ANTOINE ARNAULD. There was nothing within the range of honorable controversy which he was not ready to do against the Jesuits. But there were some things that he could not do. Being a benighted Papist, and not having learned the ethics of controversy as they have been practised in the light of an open Bible, by certain Protestant divines in this free and happy land, he could not wink at a fraud, nor suffer his name to be used to maintain the credit of a lie. The following quotation is from his letters, in vol. iii, of his works, p. 143, Lausanne, 1775.

"Mais je ne saurois être de son avis par ce qui est des Monita Secreta. Il y a longtemps que je les ai vus. Mais j'ai toujours cru, et je le crois encore, que c'est une pièce qu' on leur a jouée, et qu' ils n'en sont point les auteurs."

"But I cannot agree with him about the *Monita Secreta*. It is a long time since I have seen them, but I have always believed, and I still believe, that this work has been fastened on them [i. e., the Jesuits] by a trick, and that they are not the authors of it at all."

The Rev. William R. Williams, D. D., of New York, to whom we are indebted for this valuable citation, adds this just comment: "Now in his '*Morale Pratique des Jésuites*,' Ar-

tamen in illam opinionem," "does not confidently assert that the book is genuine; nevertheless, he inclines to that opinion." In the second edition, he omits, bodily, the *Secreta Monita*, notifying the reader, in the preface, "Whoever the author of these instructions may be, they have been expunged from this edition, for reasons given on page 178." And on that page, he says, "These Instructions are rejected as impious by Huylenbroek, and justly He proves that that was a badly cobbled-up falsehood (*male consutam fabellam*) concerning the discovery of them, which had been prefixed to the various editions of the book. I cheerfully acknowledge it. . . . I freely believe (*sponsa igitur credam*) that these impious Instructions were never composed by the Jesuite." These considerations are in addition to the argument from internal evidence leading to the same conclusion, cited by Gieseler from page 188 of the same work.

nauld has certainly shown them no mercy; but in his thorough hostility, he was perfectly upright; and as the champion of the Jansenists, showed towards his foes of the Society of Jesus a candor which they never reciprocated."

24. A famous anti-Jesuit satire, contemporaneous with the *Monita Secreta*, was the *Monarchia Solipsorum*. The editor of an ancient translation of that work into French, who, as Schröckh remarks in citing him, "was certainly no friend of the Jesuits" (Kircheng. seit der Ref., l. c.) doubts the genuineness of the *Monita Secreta*.

25. The next witness no one would claim to be either fair or scrupulous, but for that very reason, his testimony in this case is the more effective, for on this point he is a most reluctant witness. It is ANDREW STEINMETZ, formerly a Jesuit novice, who, having left the order, has devoted himself to hard writing against it. No one has ever accused Steinmetz of yielding, through any weak scruple, any point that could possibly be held against the Jesuits. The fact that Steinmetz gives up the *Monita Secreta* as an authority shows that he believes it not only to be spurious, but to be *proved* to be spurious. His note on the subject is to be found in his History of the Jesuits, London, 1848, vol iii, pp. 363—366.

26. Another historian of exactly the same school is G. B. NICOLINI, whose "History of the Jesuits," written in an acrimonious anti-Jesuit spirit for the British market, was published in "Bohn's Illustrated Library," London, 1854. He gives the following as his reason for "omitting to extract from the *Secreta Monita*."

"The *Secreta Monita* are a collection of precepts and instructions, the most nefarious and diabolical, given, it is supposed, by the General of the Order to his subalterns, as if to show them the way to proceed in all their perfidious plots for the aggrandisement of the Company. . . . To confess the truth, our opinion is, that the book is *at best, apocryphal*. The Jesuits were too cunning foxes to expose their secrets to the risk of being discovered by leaving copies of such a book here and there. They were not yet so firmly established as to risk the very existence of their Order if one of these copies were discovered, or if a member should be tempted to betray the Society. Besides, from the knowledge we have of the Jesuitical character, we feel assured that no Superior would ever have inculcated such barefaced impudence, such abominable and execrable rules of roguery. So much are the Jesuits accustomed to dissemble and deceive, that even their conduct towards each other

is one continued act of deceit, and it is, to us, altogether inconceivable, that men who are thus mutually conscious that they are playing a part—who, in their common intercourse, and even when forming the basest designs, are careful always to speak in the character of the pious devotee—should so far forget their cue as to give a broad unvarnished statement of their whole system of roguery. For this, *and many other reasons* which we might adduce, we believe *the book is apocryphal*; but though apocryphal, it certainly gives a true representation of the horrible arts and practices of the Jesuits: and we are inclined to credit the Jesuits when they assert that the book is the work of a discarded brother, so deeply does it initiate us in the secret arts of the Society.

D. NEGATIVE AUTHORITIES.

It is the just remark of Schröckh, that if the *Monita Secreta* could be proved to be genuine they would be the most remarkable of all the internal sources of information concerning Jesuitism. Especially to the enemies of Jesuitism, they would be invaluable. The Jesuits themselves frankly acknowledge that they are utterly indefensible—that they are worthy only of “a den of thieves.”* Not to quote them, therefore, in any considerable treatment of Jesuitism, is to discredit them.

To cite all the authorities which have pronounced thus tacitly but decisively against the genuineness of the *Monita Secreta* would be, for substance, to produce a catalogue of the standard literature of the subject. We mention a few authors almost at random, including none that are friendly to the Jesuits.

27. *Rees's Encyclopædia* omits all mention of the *Monita Secreta*.

28. So does the *Encyclopédie Moderne*, Paris, 1850. The Article is strongly anti-Jesuit.

29. So does the *Encyclopédie des Gens du Monde*. Paris, 1841.

30. *Ersch and Grüber's Allgemeine Encyklopædie*, in an elaborate and exhaustive Article, fortified with the citation of

* Crétineau-Joly, *Histoire des Jesuites*, tome iii, page 378.

The author of the “*Difesa della Compagnia di Gesù*,” above cited, abandons every other defense besides the repudiation of the work as a forgery; saying that, if these *were* the instructions which regulated the Jesuit Order, “*questa sarebbe una setta la più scellerata di quante mai ne sono state al mondo, e i suoi componenti sarebbero peggiore degli atei, degl' increduli, degli assassini, e degli stessi demoni. Questa non è un'esagerazione.*” p. 248.

documents and enriched with an account of the literature of the subject, makes no mention of the *Monita*.

31. RANKE, in his *History of the Popes*, touching on every subject on which this document bears, quoting every authentic document pertaining to the society's organization, and verifying by secondary authorities points which this document would settle at once, makes no allusion to the *Monita Secreta*.

32. HEELEN, "*Political System of Europe and its Colonies*" (London, 1846), gives a full account of Jesuitism, with full references to sources of information, but makes no reference or allusion to the *Monita*.

33. DULLER, "*The Jesuits as they were and are*," a sharp anti-Jesuit work, published in an English translation from the German, with an introduction by the late Sir Culling Eardley (London, 1845), makes no mention of the *Monita*, though citing the genuine documents of the society, to convict it of intrigue and bad morals.

34. ELLENDORF, "*Moral und Politik der Jesuiten*" (Darmstadt, 1840), makes no citation from the *Monita*.

35. PAROISSIEN, "*Principles of the Jesuits*" (London, 1860), the design of which is "to exhibit the principles of Jesuitism in the words of the Jesuits themselves," in a very full catalogue of Jesuit documents cited against the character of the order, does not name the *Monita*.

36. PARTHENOPÆUS HERETICUS, the pseudonym of the author of "*Popery against Christianity*" (London, 1719), a work directed specially against the Jesuits, quotes their documents largely against them, but does not name the *Monita*.

37. D'ALEMBERT hated the Jesuits furiously and fought them unscrupulously, but never ventures, so far as we have examined, to quote the *Monita Secreta*. See "*Destruction des Jésuites*," and two papers in vindication of it, in his *Œuvres Philosophiques*, tom. v.

38. VOLTAIRE was not accustomed to let slip any good opportunity of abusing the Jesuits, but in his enormously voluminous writings we fail to find any citation of the *Monita Secreta*; and the same is true of the French Encyclopædia.

39. ALEXIS DE ST. PRIEST, peer of France, in his "*Histoire de*

la Chute des Jésuites au XVIII^e Siècle, 1750-1782” (Paris, 1846), writes with vehement animosity, and with a strong political purpose, against the Jesuits, and sustains himself by quoting original documents, but he does not quote the *Monita Secreta*.

40. MM. MICHELET and QUINET, Professors in the College of France, whose lectures on the Jesuits about the year 1846 did more than almost anything beside to defeat the designs of the Order on public instruction in France, do not deign to make any allusion to the *Secreta Monita*, although it is the only important document in the case which they do not allude to.

41. One of the most destructive attacks upon the Jesuit order, since the days of Pascal, is the work of VICENZO GIOBERTI, entitled “*Il Gesuita Moderno*.” It extends through five octavo volumes, no one of which, as far as we have discovered, contains any allusion to the *Monita Secreta*.

42. But the weightiest negative testimony that can be given is this: that in all the proceedings against the Jesuits which resulted in their expulsion by the government of France, in 1773, although every sort of allegation was made against them which could possibly be sustained by evidence, and although the whole power of the monarchy was set in operation to collect evidence, the *Monita Secreta*, which had then been for one hundred and sixty years divulged, are never mentioned.*

EXTERNAL EVIDENCE OF THE GENUINENESS OF THE MONITA SECRETA.

The three collaborators in the *New York Observer* have

*The Jesuit author of the “*Difesa della Compagnia di Gesù*” puts this very fairly: “Nel secolo scorso, principalmente in Francia si fecero tanti processi contro i Gesuiti; si allegarono tanti motivi per giustificare la sentenza della loro espulsione. Bastava quest’ unica prova: i Gesuiti sono una setta scellerata, ed eccone il codice segreto. A nessuno venne in mente quest’ argomento così decisivo: segno evidente che tutti eran persuasi della impostura di questo libello.”

The editor of a monograph on the *Monita Secreta*, published at Paris, 1828, makes the same strong point: “Les auteurs des *Comptes rendus* eux-mêmes, qui recueillaient tout, à qui tout était bon, n’avaient pas osé en faire usage.” For the use of both these works, we are indebted to the courteous and learned librarian of St. John’s College, S J., Fordham, N. Y.

done their best, although not the best that might have been done, to set forth this evidence in its fullness and strength. We propose to take up their "irresistible and inevitable" demonstration, in detail, correcting here and there a blunder, and adding what bits of additional evidence they were ignorant of, that the reader may feel assured of having the whole case before him.

1. The book first appeared in print without name of editor or printer, and under a false name of the place of issue (Notobirga) at Cracow, in the year 1612, at a time when violent attacks against the Jesuits were multiplied in all quarters.* The publication of it was managed so secretly that it was found impossible to trace it to any responsible editor or printer. It "gratified an intense curiosity" and was circulated all over Europe, both in manuscript† and in copies subsequently printed without name of editor or imprint of place or date.‡ The genuineness of the book was denied at once by the Jesuits, and has continued to be denied by them unvaryingly for two centuries and a half, down to the present time. Whatever presumption in favor of the genuineness of the book may be raised from these circumstances of its origin, should be freely conceded.

2. The first witness called to testify in the case is *Scioppinus*! And a beautiful figure he cuts upon the witness stand! A

* Gieseler, *Lehrb. d. Kircheng.*, l. c.

† Condemnation of the *Monita Privata* by the Administrator of the diocese of Cracow, Aug. 20, 1616. The document is given in full by Gretser, *Opp.* Tom. xi, p. 1012. The complete works of Gretser are in the library of the Redemptorist convent in Third Street, New York. According to this official paper, the *Monita* had already had a circulation in manuscript, before it was printed: "Libellus quidam famosus, *Monita privata S. J.*, falso inscriptus, primo quidem manuscriptus ex Hispanico (uti titulus ipseus præ se se ferebat) latinus factus; post impressus et typis evulgatus." There are many other allusions, in the paper, to the continued circulation of the libel in manuscript; the immediate occasion of the issue of the condemnation, however, was the recent appearance of a reprint, by unknown printers and editors.

These facts have an important bearing on the "entirely independent editions" of which the New York *Observer* makes so much account.

‡ Grässe, *Trésor des Livres Rares et Précieux*, Tom. iv, p. 576. Gretser, *loc. cit.*

man who has been impeached in every court in the commonwealth of letters. His character is thus briefly summed up by a high authority: "He was possessed of a fire of an uncommon kind, being a perfect firebrand, scattering around him, as if for his amusement, the most atrocious calumnies." (Encycl. Britann. s. v. "*Scioppius*.") "For his love of slander, and the furious assaults which he made upon the most eminent men, he was called the Cerberus of literature." (*Ibid.*) This man, according to the same high Protestant authority, "published more than thirty defamatory libels against the Jesuits." Many of these were under assumed names, and it is one of these anonymous libels of a notorious calumniator, which is quoted by the *Observer* as evidence in this case!*

But supposing the anonymous testimony of Scioppius to be credible, what does it amount to? Simply this: that a book, the *Monita Secreta*, had come into his hands (he does not say from what source) which he believes (he does not say on what evidence) to have been discovered at the sack of the Jesuit College in Paderborn, eleven years before he wrote, although we know, and he knew, and we know that he knew, that the substance of it had been circulating all over Europe, in various anonymous editions and in manuscript copies for twenty years before he wrote, and that the history and genuineness of it had been discussed by theologians with whose writings he was perfectly familiar. This witness may step down.

3. The next witness is Common Fame. "It was *credibly reported* that another copy had been found at the capture of Prague, in 1631, only two years before." It is hardly worth while to cross-examine this witness: *she* may step down.

4. The next witness is Henry Compton, of Oxford, afterwards bishop of London, who deposes and says that the *Monita Secreta* had, in 1669, been "lately found in manuscript, in a Jesuit's closet, after his death, and sent in a letter from a gentleman at Paris to his friend in London." But who the friend in London was, and who was the gentleman in Paris, and who was the Jesuit who owned the closet, and who the

* The character of Scioppius is just such as Bayle's Dictionary loves to expatiate upon. See that work, in which one will find it "painted with all the wrinkles."

honest man was who got into his closet after his death, and who told the story to Canon Compton, and where the man that told the Canon got the story from—these are points on which that undoubtedly excellent person does not find it important to inform us. It is hardly worth while to look longer at *that* evidence.

5. The next evidence is a copy of an anonymous edition of the *Monita*, published at Rome, in 1782, claiming to be the first edition ever printed. One copy of this edition is in Union Theological Library, and another in the library at Andover. It is safe to infer from this edition—either that the previous editions of a book which for 170 years had been circulated in every country in Europe, had been the subject of protracted and acrimonious debate among the most eminent writers, and had repeatedly been put on the Roman Index of Prohibited Books, were entirely unknown to the Roman editor and publisher of this edition, and that this was set up from one of the multitude of manuscript copies that were in circulation—or, on the other hand, that the printer lied, and hid his name accordingly. It is entirely indifferent to the question in hand, which of these two theories is considered the more probable. But it is a little difficult to conceive any other reason than that just suggested, for printing this edition *secretly* at Rome, at the time when it was the general fashion on all hands to abuse the Jesuits.*

6. Besides these, we have a manuscript copy of the book written on blank leaves at the end of a volume in the British Museum, which, according to somebody's opinion, it does not appear whose, is "in all probability the work of a Jesuit," a thing which may be or may not be, but in either case proves

* Niedner (loc. cit.) intimates his belief that this edition is a fraud in its very title, and speaks of it as "the pretended [angeblich] Roman edition of 1782." If so, it would be exactly parallel with a later fraudulent edition, printed and circulated in Palermo in 1848, with the sweetly impudent imprint that it was *stampata in Roma, nella tipographia della Propaganda, e con permissione.* For so intensely genuine a document, it has been most unlucky in the circumstances of its publication. An edition printed at Paris in 1761 was disguised with the false imprint of *Paderborn*, and is probably the one referred to by the learned Hatfield as having been "published in 1661 at Paderborn, under the eaves of the Jesuit College."

nothing but that this notorious document was matter of interest to any one interested in the Jesuit controversy.*

Strangely enough, here the Rev. Dr. Hatfield rests his case. For, either he is ignorant (which is in the highest degree probable) or he is incredulous (which, with his faculty of deglutition, is very unlikely) of the East Indiaman, captured by the Dutch about the beginning of the eighteenth century, with all the secret papers of the Jesuits aboard, and the "Secret Instructions" among them—which is one of the favorite pretenses under which the book has been sold†—and of the Amsterdam story narrated by the logical Brownlee‡ on the authority of that judicious work "McGavin's Protestant," and authenticated by the following "clinger" in the way of testimony—that "*the account is said to be taken from two Roman Catholic men of credit.*" It is a curious question in logic, how many such statements, no one of them sustained by a particle of testimony, and no one of them proving anything to the purpose, if it *were* sustained, it takes, to make out a "triumphant vindication," and a demonstration "which can neither be evaded nor resisted."

All the testimonies which we have now reviewed have been known to all concerned for a hundred years, and most of them for two hundred; and as we have seen, and as we might have expected, the spuriousness of the *Monita Secreta* has, in full view of them, been conceded by the great mass of Protestant writers, including the bitterest enemies of the Jesuits.

But there are two bits of information of more recent date, which perhaps have not yet had full consideration in the controversy, and which ought to be thoroughly pondered and investigated before finally concluding against the genuineness of the book.

The first of these is the brief paragraph cited from M. Gachard, by Prof. Baird. So far as his personal testimony goes, it amounts to this, only, that a certain translation of the *Moni-*

* We have taken steps to get a fair account of this MS. from one of the learned bibliographers connected with the British Museum.

† *Pragmatische Geschichte der vornehmsten Mönchsorden*, vol. ix, p. 220.

‡ *Historical Introduction to Secret Instructions*, published by Am. and For. Christian Union, p. 26.

ta Secreta, made by order of the government of Brabant, does not differ essentially from other translations. He also gives it as a fact, that the original of this translation was discovered among secret papers in the Jesuit College of Ruremonde, in 1773; but does not give the evidence on which he believes this; he does not speak as if he had seen the original. The standing of M. Gachard is such as to make a mere expression of his opinion worthy of consideration and inquiry. But it cannot give his *opinion* the force of *evidence* on a question of fact, especially as on this subject he manifests a disposition to speak somewhat peremptorily on mere inference. It does not add to the weight of his testimony, that he delivers as a fact, what can hardly be more than the merest conjecture and begging of the question, that "everywhere else [than at Ruremonde] they [the *Monita*] had been carefully destroyed at the first tidings of the Bull fulminated by Clement XIV." We are glad, however, to be able to eke out the defects of the testimony of M. Gachard, by means of the following paragraph which we have happened on in the *Bibliophile Belge*, Tom. ii, p. 68, (1845). "We remember seeing, some years since, a copy of the *Monita*; it came from the college of Ruremonde, where it had been seized by Mr. Attorney-General de Berg, author of an unpublished French translation of these Instructions; to whom, according to a family tradition, very advantageous promises were made, for himself and his friends, if he would be easy and accommodating in the discharge of his commission. But I was not able, at the time, to compare the printed text with the manuscript." The paragraph is signed "De Ra."

The questions which arise on these statements, and which can hardly be decided until we get more information (for which we have sent) from Belgium, are these:—1. Were the *Monita* found, as alleged, among confidential papers at Ruremonde? 2. If they were, is there any certainty that they had not been introduced there by trick—the discovery being made at a time when the suppression of the Jesuits was the great object of political intrigue and influence? 3. If they were found fairly among the Jesuit papers, is there any evidence that they were an official document? It is obvious that the *date* of this dis-

covery is rather against it. If it had been 1613, instead of 1773, the story would make a better show. But it will require a good deal of evidence to overcome the improbability that *one hundred and sixty-one years* after this document had been blown and trumpeted all over Europe, when it was extant in every language, and purchasable at every book-stall, and when five generations of Jesuits had denounced it as a calumny, it was still *secretly* circulated among the initiated, and left, not in cipher but in a legible handwriting, at a time when the Jesuit houses were liable, moment by moment, to be broken up, in such places as to be snapped up and appropriated by the "*procureur-général*."

The other bit of recent evidence (if such it may be called) is that which we quoted in full, early in this Article, from Grässe's "*Trésor des Livres Rares et Précieux*," vol. iv, p. 576. The greater part of M. Grässe's paragraph is opinion, not evidence, and is entitled to such consideration as is due to the opinion of an eminent bibliographer who has not studied his subject. The ground of his opinion, as stated by him, seems almost frivolous. The statement which he makes depends for all its force on the oracular judgment which he delivers "*sans aucun doute*." And until he gives the public some opportunity of judging for themselves of the character of the facts on which his conclusion depends, it will hardly be time to revise in his favor the almost unanimous judgment of scholars.

We conclude this survey of the external evidence in the case, with the summary made ready to our hand, in view of all the facts thus far adduced, in a private letter from one of the most learned and impartial of living bibliographers. He says:

"So far as I can discover, none of the editions purporting to be printed from manuscripts found in various places has been published under the name of a responsible editor.

"The existence of manuscript copies in Jesuit hands of so ingenious a satire (supposing it to be such) does not seem to me to be strange. When printed copies had become scarce, manuscript copies of so short and so curious a work might well be made. A Jesuit might think that he could, at any rate, get some good hints from it. But does any manuscript copy exist

which bears clear marks of being an official document?* Unless this is the case, *I do not see that we have any external evidence for the genuineness of the book.*"

INTERNAL EVIDENCE.

Several minor points of internal evidence have been taken against the book. But we shall barely allude to them. The close resemblance of the style of the *Monita* to that of the *preface* of the first edition of the book at Cracow is noted by Gieseler. The same critic, and others, have recognized a labor-ed imitation of the style of the Constitutions of the society.† Indications have been found in the text of a Polish rather than a Spanish origin. And above all there has been pointed out the intrinsic absurdity of supposing that shrewd men would contrive a secret the discovery of which would bring ruin upon their enterprise and then intrust it for safe keeping to several *thousands* of confidants, to be delivered to as many thousands more from generation to generation.

The main argument *in favor of* the genuineness of the book from the internal evidence is thus stated: The "Instructions" contain nothing but what the Jesuits have habitually practiced. On this one argument the vindicators of the book as genuine must now depend.

It is reasonable to doubt the controversial value of a book which has to be authenticated by means of the very facts

* The title-page of the first edition (1612) represented the book as having been translated into Latin from the original *Spanish*. The repeated discovery of "original manuscripts" of the work, which are none of them in Spanish, but all in Latin, shows either that the first edition was a false pretense, or that the subsequently discovered manuscripts, which show a *verbal* agreement with the translation of Cracow, were taken from that translation, and are neither "originals," nor even independent translations. The collation of the different recensions of the work—the *Privata*, and the *Secreta Monita*—shows *verbal* agreements, and *substantial* variations. For the results of such collation, in parallel columns, see "Pragmatische Geschichte der vornehmsten Mönchsorden," vol. ix, pp. 220–260.

† "Quelquefois le faussaire copie des phrases entières, ne faisant autre chose qu'effacer les mots *charité, gloire de Dieu, salut des ames, progrès de la religion*, etc., pour les remplacer par ceux-ci: *donations, successions, pouvoir de la Société, honneurs et crédit de la Société, richesses de la Société*, etc." "*Instructions Secrètes*," Paris, 1828, page 18.

which the book itself is intended to prove. This controverted document is put in evidence to show that the Jesuits are dangerous intriguers; and to show that the document is genuine, it is to be proved that the Jesuits are just such dangerous intriguers as the document represents—and if you don't believe that, there's the document which proves it. So there you go, round, round, round.

But waiving the question of the *usefulness* of the *Secreta Monita* as a polemic document, and coming back to the critical question on its genuineness, we object to this internal evidence, that it is not applicable. The fact of wrong-doing, in individuals or in a community, does not justify us in imputing to them a studious, deliberate, settled plan of wrong-doing, mutually enjoined and acknowledged, and drawn out into a system of methods and expedients.

Let us illustrate this by a parallel case. Those who are accustomed to read such authors as Eugene Sue and Dr. Brownlee, fall unconsciously into the habit of associating with the name *Jesuit* ideas of the supernatural and the diabolically miraculous, such as are fatal to sober reasoning on the subject. In order to relieve the case from these prepossessions, and get a fair judgment on it, it is necessary to proceed (according to the precedent furnished by the prophet Nathan) by means of an analogy.

Suppose then that some zealous contributor to a religious newspaper should be detected in having falsified his citations from a rare book, and then keeping the only known copy of that book (belonging to a public library) concealed from public access. Suppose further, it should be alleged that a curious correspondence had been filched out of his back-office, or picked, by some inquisitive person, from under the lining of his hat, in which all this was planned in concert, on this wise:

I. *Editor to Contributor.*

DEAR ———: That troublesome colleague of ours is out in print with some ugly facts about our Society. What can be done about it? If a man may blurt things out in that style, "no religious institution is safe." He must be crushed, A. M. D. G.; and you must do it. I can't. Ed.

II. *Contributor to Editor.*

DEAR ED.: All right. "*Ecrasez l'infame*." But how shall we do it? The facts are all against us. I thought I had found something this morning in a rare book. But reading on, I found that it did not amount to much after all; and in the second edition of the book, the writer takes back the little he had said in the first. So we are worse off than before.

Yours truly, ———.

P. S. Considering the interests of immortal souls and benevolent societies, mightn't it do to fix up—just a little—a quotation from the first edition, and say nothing about the second? I have got safe possession of the only copy in the country, so far as I am aware. A. M. D. G., you know.

III. *Editor to Contributor.*

DEAR ———: You are a man after my own heart. Go ahead and get up the facts, and I will follow them up with the virtuous indignation and demand that the fellow be cast out of Christian society (which means us, of course). Only mind that you keep those books in a snug place till this business blows over.

Yours, Ed.

Suppose, now, the evidence that this correspondence had been found in the contributor's back office or under his hat lining to be inconclusive, could not the letters be proved genuine from *internal* evidence; because there was nothing proposed in them but what these two gentlemen had actually done? Certainly not. The internal evidence would be all against them. They do not represent the process by which such devout persons bring themselves to do such unpleasant work. There is no reason to suppose that the contributor ever whispered to a mortal his little arrangement for deceiving the public; and if, perchance, his editorial friend had knowledge of it, instead of plotting and chuckling over it together, like a couple of evangelical Guy Fawkeses, more probably all allusion to it was dropped by tacit consent, and the unpleasant feelings which the consciousness of it might naturally engender in a sensitive mind, were assuaged by that resolute "directing of the intention" towards the holy object to be achieved, the invention of which we owe, possibly, to Jesuit theologians, but which has comforted a good many Protestant consciences in its day.

We cannot get over the feeling that there is considerable human nature in Jesuits. The attempt to reason about them on

the supposed principles of the diabolical nature imputed to them, cannot but mislead. We have not the slightest doubt that in their three centuries of history they have often shown themselves a very tricky and mischievous corporation. But we apprehend that the psychology of sin in a Jesuit is not so very unlike what it is in a Protestant minister, and that when a father-rector cheats in a controversy, or uses foul means to injure the character and standing of a brother, it is no more a proof of systematic, methodical wickedness, reduced to written rule and plan, than it is when a Protestant religious newspaper does the same thing. We stand ready to protect either of them from such injurious inferences.

This discussion has already taken much space, but we are unwilling to leave it without pointing its application in two or three particulars which are prominent in the Article which we have been reviewing.

1. We assure the "American and Foreign Christian Union," whose intense horror and indignation at all Jesuit frauds and concealments is strongly set forth in the preface to their edition of the "Secret Instructions," and in other of their publications, that they need not have the slightest fear of mistake in recanting the statement that "the authenticity [of the Secret Instructions] is not for a moment doubted among all scholars, both Papal and Protestant."

2. It admits, at least, of serious doubt, whether "the Christian community" had better hastily take in hand the spirited proceedings recommended by the *New York Observer*:—to eject from "standing" within itself, as "a wanton calumniator," every person who holds the "Secret Instructions" to be "an ascertained and acknowledged forgery." It really seems as if milder measures ought to be tried first, and this bull fulminated only as a last resort. For it is very clear that the forgery of that document has been "acknowledged" by the best Protestant scholars, and one might, almost innocently, infer from this that it had been "ascertained."

3. We feel bound to say a reassuring word to those trembling believers in the Christian revelation who may have been shaken in mind by the cavils of the *New York Observer*. There really is no ground, in the judgment of the best biblical

critics; for the assertion of that paper that "there is no disputed passage in the New Testament more triumphantly vindicated" than the "Secret Instructions." The only disputed passage of the New Testament to which this comparison can be applied with any sort of fitness, is the text of "the three witnesses," which had the misfortune to be vindicated by the same champion—the late Dr. Brownlee. The foundations stand sure. The integrity of the New Testament has nothing to fear, either from the open opposition of infidelity, or from such dark insinuations and secret wounds as this from the *Ob-server* office.

ARTICLE V.—MORAL RESULTS OF ROMANISM.

Evenings with the Romanists, by the Rev. HOBART SEYMOUR. Carter & Brothers, New York.

The Catholic World, Vol. IX, No. for April, 1869. Article entitled "Comparative Morality of Catholic and Protestant Countries." Catholic Publication House, New York.

ONE of the most effective answers ever made to the pretensions of the Roman Catholic Church, is the opening chapter of "Evenings with the Romanists," by the Rev. M. Hobart Seymour, M. A., of the Church of England. The chapter is entitled "The Moral Results of the Romish System," and is a sober and, to all appearance, fair and honest comparison of the criminal statistics of various European countries, as furnished by their respective governments, from the censuses next previous to the year 1854, when Mr. Seymour's book was published.

The details of this comparison we will not undertake to give at length, although the details intensify and confirm the impression made by the general results. These results may be briefly stated in a tabular form, beginning with the matter of criminal homicide. The proportion of such homicides to the population, in one year, appears from the following table to be pretty nearly in direct ratio with the dominance of the Roman Church.

Homicides in Roman Catholic Ireland,				19 to the million.		
"	"	"	"	Belgium,	18	" "
"	"	"	"	France,	31	" "
"	"	"	"	Austria,	36	" "
"	"	"	"	Bavaria,	68	" "
"	"	"	"	Sardinia,	20	" "
"	"	"	"	Lombardy,	45	" "
"	"	"	"	Tuscany,	56	" "
"	"	the Papal States,		113	"	"
"	"	Roman Catholic Sicily,		90	"	"
"	"	"	"	Naples,	174	" "
"	"	PROTESTANT ENGLAND,		4	"	"

The comparison on the matter of sexual immorality is conducted with full consideration of the circumstances which affect it,—such as the difference between city and country life—between northern and southern climates, &c., &c.; and the author takes pains to set over against each other the regions most nearly alike in every aspect but that of religion. Of course the criteria of the prevalence of this sort of crimes are less exact than in the case of homicide and other crimes of violence. The most obvious criterion is the number of illegitimate births. The comparison of some of the leading capitals of Europe on the proportion of the number of illegitimate births to the whole number of births, results as follows :

Illegitimate births in Roman Catholic Paris,	33 per cent.
“ “ “ “ “ Brussels,	35 “ “
“ “ “ “ “ Munich,	48 “ “
“ “ “ “ “ Vienna,	51 “ “
“ “ “ Protestant London,	4 “ “

A comparison of ten leading cities in Protestant England with a like number in Catholic Austria, gives to the former an average of sixty-three (63) illegitimate out of every thousand births; to the latter an average of *four hundred and nineteen* (419) in the thousand.

Five leading English cities being compared with the five former capital cities of Italy, it appears that in the former, on an average, fifty-eight (58) births out of a thousand are illegitimate, in the latter, *two hundred and sixteen* (216) out of a thousand.

The ten largest and most populous cities, respectively, of Protestant Prussia and Roman Catholic Austria being compared, the number of illegitimate births in the former is one hundred and fifty eight (158) to the thousand births—in the latter *four hundred and fifty-four* (454) to the thousand.

These comparisons, founded on official government statistics, are continued by Mr. Seymour in detail, with great particularity, and with great constancy of results. He does not shrink from the statistics of the most immoral of the Protestant nations, but confronts them with the statistical confessions of worse depravity on the part of Roman Catholic populations.

The effect of this exhibit on the mind of the reader is overwhelming. To the Protestant reader, it seems to close the

case at the outset against the pretensions of the Roman Catholic Church to be the institution ordained of Christ to destroy the works of the devil. And even the *Catholic World* openly acknowledges that Mr. Seymour's conclusions, "if fairly proved, would be a practical argument of overwhelming force, sufficient to close the mind against all that can be said in favor of the Catholic Church."

Now it makes a terribly strong presumption against this institution, that such charges as these, so explicit, so responsible, admitting of such conclusive refutation if false, but acknowledged to be, if unrefuted, so destructive of the claims of Roman Catholicism,—should have been circulated for thirteen years in Great Britain, in America, and on the continent of Europe, without having been answered. We are assured on the best authority (there can be no impropriety in saying that our authority is that of Mr. Seymour himself), that on their publication in 1854, these figures "were copied into the newspapers of France, Switzerland, Germany, and Italy. They were circulated in a thousand different forms in England. They were mentioned in Parliament. But there never appeared a reply. There was not an effort to reply. It was thought best to let them pass by. No Romish newspaper or magazine in England, or in any Roman Catholic country on the continent, denied or replied."

What was the reason? Mr. Seymour's statistics purported to be taken from governmental returns. These returns may be consulted for the asking in every great public library. How easy, then, to look up his authorities and refute him at once!

Easy, forsooth! This was the very difficulty in the case. The authorities were so accessible to every one that it was impossible to contradict them.

But the *Catholic World* for April last crushes these formidable allegations with one single stroke of a *a priori* argument: "We know that she [the Roman Church] is Christ's Church, and that just in proportion as she exerts her influence, virtue and morality must prevail; and that it is impossible to prove, unless through fraud and misrepresentation, that the practical working of her system produces a morality inferior to that of

any other.”* This, of course, is “the end of controversy.” To go into details of argument would be superfluous, not to say ridiculous, after a demonstration so sweeping. But scorning criticism and ridicule, straightway down into details and figures marches the *Catholic World*. Having at the start announced it as *de fide* that the figures must be so found and so added up as to show a satisfactory balance in favor of his side, or else the foundations of the faith were destroyed and the hope of salvation cut off, he proceeds to the statistical business with that eminently fair, candid, and philosophical spirit which might be expected to result from such convictions.

Now, before following the *Catholic World* in its hunt after figures to sustain a foregone conclusion, we want to clear our own mind upon a question of casuistry. We have learned, and shall presently prove, that the figures of the *Catholic World* are outrageously false. But it also appears that the Article is taken, for substance, from another source. The question is whether the author, having “conveyed” a mendacious Article, is to be held responsible for the falsehoods that it contains. Not having time to consult our Liguori, Dens, Busenbaum, and Escobar, on this point, we agree to give our Roman Catholic brother the benefit of the doubt, and to accept the fact that he took his statistics ready made, as discharging him of responsibility for the fact that they were made so badly.

The gist of the Article in the *Catholic World* is taken from one in “*The Church and the World*,” an ultra-ritualist journal, London, 1867. It was promptly answered by Mr. Seymour in the *Record*, and to this answer no rejoinder has been attempted, notwithstanding the damaging exposure which it makes of the dishonest devices of the defenders of the Romish system. We shall not attempt to do more, in this Article, than to give the substance of Mr. Seymour’s refutation of their defense. Without wearily following them step by step through all their crooked ways, it will be sufficient to expose their misdemeanors in so many instances as will put the public on their guard against being deceived by any word or figure which they have printed.

The most striking distinction, at the outset, between Mr.

* *Catholic World*, vol. ix., p. 58.

Seymour's paper and that of the *Catholic World* is that the former is founded on the best authorities—on government returns: the latter *never* quotes government statistics, but refers to "*cooked*" statistics prepared and arranged to accomplish a purpose, and takes even these at second or third hand. The result of this sort of management is sometimes strange enough.

The *Catholic World* borrows from its ritualist contemporary the somewhat bold argument that the vast proportion of illegitimate births in Roman Catholic cities is a proof rather of morality than of immorality, since (it claims) the comparative fewness of such births in England arises from the greater prevalence of prostitution. But the official returns dispose of this argument by giving the facts in the case. From these, it appears that the number of prostitutes is

In Roman Catholic Paris 40 to every 10,000 persons.

" " " Dublin 33 " " " "

" Protestant London, 17 " " " "

While, therefore, the extent of prostitution in Paris is more than twice what it is in London, the illegitimate births are actually more than *eight times* as frequent as those of London.

Let us hope that it was only a blunder, to have represented the prostitution of England as greater than that of France. Perhaps the author had not examined the French statistics. But when we look at his English figures, this hope fails us. We come to monstrosities of falsehood which the hypothesis of blunder will not account for. The writer has actually taken the police figures for the prostitutes of all England,—London, Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Sheffield, &c., &c., and has set down that total as the amount for London alone! It amounts to the sad total of 28,000, and this is charged to the account of London, when the true figure for the year in question was 5,619!

The Article in the *Catholic World*, borrowing still from the English periodical, makes the following representation concerning the rate of illegitimacy in Great Britain: that it is

In England and Wales, . . . 6.5 per cent.

In Scotland, . . . 10.1 " "

In Catholic Ireland, . . . 3.0 " "

and it reinforces this last statement by giving its readers the assurance that the English writer "probably has access to the Registrar's reports" for Ireland. Of course the argument from this comparison is an exultant proof of the power of the confessional in preserving female virtue.

What will be the amazement of the reader to be informed that there are no "Registrar's reports" for Ireland; that the Romish priests and the Romish party have constantly succeeded in preventing, for reasons satisfactory to themselves, any act of Parliament for securing such returns from Ireland; and that the supposed "Registrar's report" of three per cent. of illegitimate births is a mere fiction!*

But the answer to the statistics of the *Catholic World* goes further than this. The "Evenings with the Romanists" was published in 1854. The first attempt to refute them was printed in England, in 1867, and in America in 1869, thirteen and fifteen years later. In order that the statements in behalf of Protestantism may squarely meet the counter-statements in behalf of Romanism, Mr. Seymour has produced the results of the comparison of the most recent statistics—those of 1866.

The Article in the *Church and World* on which the *Catholic*

* A delay in the publishing of this number of the *New Englander* enables us to add, at the last moment, a confirmation of this statement, from the *New York World* (not the *Catholic World*, but the newspaper of that name), of July 7th. This paper announces that "the last British mail brought to us a summary of 'The First Annual Report of the Registrar of Marriages, Births, and Deaths in Ireland,'—which is the first complete and authentic statement ever made by official authority concerning these evidences of the social habits, the morals, and the health of the people of that portion of the British dominions." The Article goes on to cite figures from this "summary" in vindication of the superior morality of Ireland over that of England, and of the superior morality of both these countries over that of Scotland. It is premature to discuss these statements of *The World*; first, because they only profess to be taken from a "summary" of the official report, prepared no one knows by whom, nor with what intent, and not from the official document itself; secondly, because they appear in a newspaper which is distinguished among journals for a dexterous sleight-of-hand in dealing with statistics, on matters on which it has any prejudice or bias of interest. Seriously to controvert statements put forth under such influences by the proverbial "mathematician of the *World*," would be superfluous. What the bias of that paper is on the present question is well enough understood. It is edited in the interest of "the Established Church" of New York.

Whenever the official figures of the last Irish census shall be accessible, we shall gladly make any correction of our conclusions which they may require.

World has relied mainly for what it would call its *facts*, had taken the statistics of English crime for the year 1864, when the figures were the highest ever known in England, and had compared them with the statistics of French crime for the year 1842—the lowest known in France for a quarter of a century! But taking the most recent statistics of both countries, covering, for each, the year 1855–6, the results of comparison between them, in respect to the various graver forms of crime, are given in the following tables.

I. MURDER.

In France, the convictions were:

Murder,	80
Attempts at murder,	36
Assassination,	117
Attempts at assassination,	50
Parricide and attempts,	11
Infanticide and attempts,	148
Poisoning and attempts,	16
Total,	458

This list does not include the murders committed by soldiers and sailors, whose crimes are tried before military tribunals, and never published in the yearly returns. They average about 200 yearly—but we leave them out of the account.

In England the convictions were:

Murder,	16
Attempts at murder,	8
Parricide,	1
Infanticide,	9
Total,	34

Calculating for the difference of population, the proportion of convictions was:

In France 12 convictions to each million.

In England $1\frac{1}{2}$ " " " "

II. INFANTICIDE.

Each country has its peculiar nomenclature for the classes of this crime, and in each country, as in all others,

there is a disposition on the part of tribunals of justice to lean towards favorable construction, and conviction on the lower rather than the higher counts of the indictment.

The convictions are as follows :

IN FRANCE.		IN ENGLAND.	
Infanticide, . . .	148	Infanticide, . . .	9
Homicide of Infants,	145	Concealment, . . .	94
Exposure of " . . .	102	Abandonment, . . .	8
Total, . . .	395	Total, . . .	111

Thus the proportion of infanticides to the population is, in round numbers :

In France, 10 to the million.

In England, 5 " " "

III. SUICIDE.

The following are the returns for four consecutive years :

Year.	IN FRANCE.	IN ENGLAND.
1862	4,770	1,206
1863	4,613	1,385
1864	4,524	1,387
1865	4,946	1,397

Taking the average of these four years, the suicides in France are double those of England in proportion to the population, being

In France, 127 in the million.

In England, 64 " " "

IV. VIOLATION OF WOMEN.

The convictions in the two countries for this crime, and for attempts, are :

In France, 808, or 22 to the million.

In England, 250, or 12 " " "

V. ILLEGITIMATE BIRTHS.

The official returns for both countries, in 1865, are as follows—the figures showing the proportion of illegitimate births to the total number of births :

In Paris,	29	per cent.
In London,	4	"
In Department of the Seine,	23	"
In County of Middlesex,	4	"
In all France,	7	"
In all England,	6	"

VI. FORTITUDE.

This crime is so prevalent in France, that in connection with another that is nameless, it has revealed itself in the fact that while in England the natural annual increase of the population by birth is *thirty-seven* in every thousand of the population; in France it is only *twenty-eight* in the thousand.

VII. PROSTITUTION.

The comparative statistics of the two countries respecting "the social evil" have already been given. We merely repeat that according to the most recent returns, the number of prostitutes to each ten thousand of the population is

In Roman Catholic Paris,	40
In Protestant London,	17

These figures are collected by Mr. Seymour directly from official returns. The figures with which the *Catholic World* attempts to vindicate the superior morality of Romish over Protestant countries, are taken from a discredited and refuted writer in the *Church and World*, who got them, in his turn, avowedly from an Article in the magazine called the *Statistical Journal*, written by a person who got his figures from "a well-known French writer on statistics." If one had been in search of the truth, how much easier and better to go to the census returns, and get facts that can be trusted. But when the object is, as with the *Catholic World*, to find figures which shall tally with a conclusion already determined by theological considerations, doubtless it is well to keep clear of authoritative documents, and take only such figures as have

been manipulated in a succession of magazine articles, constructed to serve a purpose.

For a further illustration of the erratic use of figures into which the *Catholic World* has been betrayed by its too affectionate confidence in its ritualistic brother, the *Church and World*, we cite its statement of the number of brothels in leading English cities in the year 1864, and compare it in parallel columns with the government returns for the same year.

<i>Brothels in</i>	<i>According to Catholic World.</i>	<i>In fact.</i>
Birmingham,	966	183
Manchester,	1,111	410
Liverpool,	1,578	906
Leeds,	313	63
Sheffield,	433	84
Total,	4,401	1,646

Some inquisitive gentleman, being struck by this trifling discrepancy, has spent some time in investigating whether it was to be explained merely as an unusually bold flight of pure imagination, or whether there could be discovered in it any of those traces of patient and conscious elaboration which mark the productions of industrious talent as distinguished from genius. It proves to bear these latter marks. The impressively large figures of the *Catholic World* are found to be made up each of several different figures picked out of separate columns of the British police returns, and added to the number of houses of ill-fame in such wise as to give a most thumping total. The columns relied on for this result are those which give the number of the licensed lodging-houses for mendicants, of the houses known to receive stolen goods, and of the lowest class of beer-houses.

We have given facts enough, now, to discredit, without any particular refutation, whatever else of assertion may be contained in the Article on "The Comparative Morality of Catholic and Protestant Countries" in the *Catholic World* for April, 1869. We do not need to rebut the testimony of this Article point by point. The witness himself is impeached and kicked

out of court with a very ugly letter burned too deep on his forehead to be rubbed out. We are glad to acknowledge that the *Catholic World* is not the guilty author of these impostures, and to express our unfeigned and most willing belief that that every way respectable magazine would be incapable of contriving such tricks.

This imposing attempt to refute the notorious facts concerning the greater immorality of Roman Catholic countries having ignominiously failed, the statements of Mr. Seymour's paper on "The Moral Results of Romanism," in "Evenings with the Romanists," stand before the public, not only unrefuted, but now proved to be irrefutable. We would be glad to hope that the writer in the *Catholic World* would lay to heart his own declaration that the theme of Mr. Seymour's paper, "if fairly proved, would be a practical argument of overwhelming force, sufficient to close the mind against all that can be said in favor of the Catholic Church." But this would be hoping against hope. He stands in a position where facts are of no account in an argument. He "knows that she is Christ's Church, and that just in proportion as she exerts her influence, virtue and morality must prevail;" and if facts controvert this position, and show the exact opposite of it to be true—why, "so much the worse for the facts." If statistical science demonstrates it, then statistics must be avoided as a temptation of the devil.

The only original points in the *Catholic World's* Article relate to Feticide and Divorce, which it charges as characteristically Protestant immoralities. Concerning these, we shall admit everything that can justly be alleged against the morality of Protestant society. And if it appears that our communities suffer in comparison even with Roman Catholic populations, instead of denying or blinking the fact, we shall reiterate it, with the fidelity of the prophet who said "I will provoke you to jealousy by them that are no people, and by a foolish nation will I anger you." We would much rather *bring* our people right than *prove* them right. We make no complaint when we find the very statistics which have been produced in the *New Englander* in order to promote the reform of what we deem a very grave and scandalous abuse in our social state, transferred

to the organs of a hostile and alien religious system, as a stigma on our honor. We welcome even such malevolent coöperation in our enterprise of reform.

In the matter of *feticide*, after making the large allowance in the summing up of our Vital Statistics which is demanded by the fact that in consequence of the movements of population, a comparatively small proportion of the native population, but a very large proportion of the foreign population, in the older States are in the prime of life,—after making a fair offset for the prevalence of feticide in Roman Catholic France,—there still seems to be a great residuum of just reproach against the American name, and the Protestant name, on this account. Dr. Horatio Storer's declaration that hundreds of Protestant women have confessed this crime to him, but only seven Roman Catholics, after every abatement, is full of shameful significance. In concealing the facts, we concede the inference that the comparative absence of this crime among Roman Catholics in this country is to be set down to the credit of the Roman Church as here administered,—that the confessional has operated to produce this result; and that on the other hand the prevalence of this crime, even in more or less religious families among Protestants, is due to a defect both of public and of private instruction concerning God's law in its application to the family. There are two remedies for this defect. One is the faithful declaration of God's law against murder, and the unflinching application of it to the consciences of men and women, by all the just expedients of the ministry of the gospel; and this is a remedy approved by eighteen centuries of successful experiment. The other is the enforcement of bachelor clergymen—professionally trained to the art of extracting reluctant secrets—upon the inmost secret intimacy of the husband and of the wife, each apart,—and especially of the wife; and whether or not this remedy involves consequences worse than the disease, may be judged by the whole series of facts already cited in this Article, and by a multitude besides, such as the horrible history of Spanish "*solicitants*," and the almost universal debauchery of the Spanish-American clergy, and in general by the history of the auricular confession for the 850 years that have passed since it began to be enforced by the Church of Rome.

As to the subject of *Divorce*, we deliberately say that while there are few claims of the Roman Church more plausible than its claim to be reckoned the preëminent vindicator of the sanctity of marriage, there are few of its claims more baseless. The opinions of the *New Englander* are pretty well known as to the wretched condition and administration of the law in this commonwealth of Connecticut, where the ratio of annual divorces to annual marriages is nearly ten per cent. But we doubt whether even Connecticut, with this disgraceful record, does not hold a more honorable position with reference to the legal sanction of the Christian family, than any state in Christendom the form of whose laws has been controlled by the influence of the Roman Church. In Connecticut legal divorce is doubtless frequent. But then, in Connecticut marriage amounts to something before the law; for adultery is a felony. So it is in the other New England States. So it is in Scotland. But where the forms and traditions of the law have been moulded by the influence of the Romish Church, the courts of justice "take no cognizance of the crime of adultery otherwise than as a private injury."* This and like crimes, from the time when the religious Protestantism of England was overborne, at the Restoration of the Stuarts, "have been left to the feeble coercion of the spiritual courts, according to the rules of the canon law; a law which has treated the offense of incontinence, nay, even adultery itself, with a great degree of tenderness and lenity; owing, perhaps, to the constrained celibacy of its first compilers."* What demand is there likely to be for legal divorce, relieving from the legal enforcement of marriage, where there is no legal enforcement of marriage from which to be relieved? The frequency of divorce in Connecticut we hold to be a pernicious wrong, which we hope to see reformed. Would it, on the whole, mend the matter, to introduce the system of Roman Catholic states, and, by the repeal of all statutes against adultery and fornication, to institute, by act of legislature, a general license of concubinage? The *Catholic World* laments, from that cloistered celibacy from which it issues month by month, the lack of domestic

* Blackstone, Comm., B. IV, chap. iv, § 11.

virtue to which Protestantism has reduced New England: would it seriously recommend to us to substitute the morality of that favored land which has enjoyed the personal presence of the Pope himself, and the unobstructed influence of the huge army of his clergy, and—by adopting the foul and flagrant *cicisbeism* limited by assassination, which, under the very eyes and nostrils of the pope and his clergy, has been for centuries the predominating characteristic of the “best society” of Italy—to make divorce an unnecessary form? We know the well defined Roman policy, so beautifully illustrated in the Holy City itself,* and boasted by our writer in the *Catholic World* (p. 55), of dissuading from abortion and infanticide by reducing the shame of inconveniences of illegitimacy to a minimum by means of ingeniously constructed foundling hospitals, where infants may be dropped unobserved, like letters in a post office. But we hesitate to believe that our new religious advisers would allow “the impulse of Christian charity,” to which they ascribe this humane invention, to carry them so far as to recommend that our Protestant statutes against adultery be abrogated, in order to relieve human nature of the “too strong temptation” to seek divorce.

We are happy to announce it as a result of the attack of the *Catholic World* on this opening chapter of Seymour's *Evenings with the Romanists*, that a new edition of that capital book will shortly be issued by Messrs. Carter & Brothers, to which a vindication of the chapter in question will be prefixed.

* According to the best attainable evidence, the total number of births in Rome in 1886 was 4,873; the yearly average of foundlings was 3,168. See Mr. Seymour's Introductory chapter, page 43.

ARTICLE VI.—THE ALABAMA QUESTION.

THERE is a strong and a general impression among the people of the United States that the British government, and a part of the British nation, desired the ill-success of the Northern States at the beginning of our late war. The growing greatness and prosperity of the country was looked on, it is thought, with apprehension; our disruption was fervently wished, and that government was quite willing that any aid should be afforded to the Confederate States, which did not clearly conflict with the laws of neutrality, as understood in England. From this feeling was derived, it is thought, the recognition of the belligerency of the rebels, made with indecent haste before the proper outbreak of hostilities; and to this recognition it is ascribed that the Confederates could send out privateers upon the ocean, made in England on their account, to burn our ships and to drive our shipping from the seas. The case of the *Alabama*, though a strong proof of the negligence of the British government, was not the only one, nor are our claims of compensation for the ravages of this successful privateer the only claims we can justly make. All the positive injuries inflicted by all the privateers built in England, all the loss of trade and increase of expense, due to the expulsion of our vessels from the ocean, are to be put to the account of the unfortunate proclamation of neutrality, and the claims are to be urged with the more spirit, because, when we were engaged in a struggle of life and death against slavery, we got no sympathy from a land that prided itself on its opposition to slavery—we got nothing but blockade-runners and insults in the *Times*.

With the existence of an unfriendly feeling on the part of leaders of opinion in Great Britain, we shall not concern ourselves at this time; we should rejoice to be able to believe that no such malevolence expressed itself in our distress through that English speech which we inherit, or was harbored in English hearts with which ours most readily beat in unison.

But in considering the case of the Alabama, we must not let indignation prevail over reason; we must not be made by fervid rhetoric to believe that all the evils to us which followed the proclamation of neutrality grew out of it, and would not otherwise have had an existence; we must be cautious lest we impute the inevitable course of events to an unfriendly spirit.

But we go farther. Admitting that there was an unfriendly spirit in the British nation, or in those who had the conduct of affairs, we cannot take that unfriendliness into account, unless it expressed itself in some illegal way, and led to some injustice toward ourselves. Nations may feel resentment for manifestations of ill-will, when they come from public authorities in official acts; but the spite and malevolence of individuals towards foreign nations has never yet, that we are aware of, been considered worthy of entering into public quarrels. Still less has international law ever thought of demanding apologies for feelings of the heart, indulged with no violation of right nor infliction of injury.

Dismissing, then, all question of British unfriendliness, except so far as it shows itself in outward acts, we inquire, first, whether the Queen's proclamation was such a paper as a neutral in the circumstances might lawfully issue; whether, in other words, the neutral government, most deeply interested in our affairs, had any good reason for thinking that hostilities had commenced in this country, when the last news before the issuing of the proclamation came to their knowledge. Then we may look into the effect of the proclamation; was it an encouragement to "piracy," and would there have been no war on our commerce if it had not been issued? And, finally, when we have considered these first complaints against the British government we may look into the case of the Alabama, as it stands by itself.

There is no doubt that, as a nation on declaring war may issue what de Martens calls *lettres inhibitoires* against commerce and correspondence with an enemy,* so neutrals may issue proclamations to their subjects warning them against actions in violation of the rules of neutrality, or of the neutral's

* De Martens, *précis*, § 269.

own laws in protection of such rules. The obvious reason for such proclamations is to prevent the subject from engaging in schemes calculated to involve him in loss from the belligerent's movements, or to expose him to fine or imprisonment from the operation of domestic laws.

But there is a special reason for a government's announcing that there is a state of war, when the parties to it are an established government and a portion of a State in revolt or insurrection. In ordinary cases, the commencement of a war is tolerably certain, even though there be no declaration of its existence; for the diplomatic relations of two nations keep them informed of the approach of hostilities, and a suspension of such relations announces the beginning of an armed conflict. But where civil war bursts out, there is, in general, no such index. Even a declaration of war on the part of the revolters, or a certain amount of armed resistance from them against the national government, might not be enough to give satisfactory evidence to neutrals of a state of war. But, on the other hand, a denial on the part of the government that a state of war exists, or an attempt to conceal war under the garb of the movement of an armed police, or of repressing a local insurrection, ought not to deceive the neutrals. They are not bound to take their views of the state of things from an interested party. They must judge from the facts of the case which are within their reach, but are obliged, also, to exercise caution, and to move slowly towards their conclusions. And it is evident that, with all due caution and the best disposition to form an impartial judgment, they are liable in cases of this kind to arrive at wrong conclusions, which ought not, without clear proof, to be imputed to a hostile mind.

The proclamation of the Queen of Great Britain, issued May 13th, 1861, after declaring that "hostilities have unhappily commenced between the government of the United States of America and certain States styling themselves the Confederate States of America," and after citing the most important parts of the foreign enlistment act, as it is commonly called, passed in the fifty-ninth year of George III., concludes as follows:

"And we do hereby warn our subjects . . . that if any

of them shall presume . . . to do any acts in derogation of their duty, as subjects of a neutral sovereign in said contest, or in violation or contravention of the law of nations in that behalf;—as, for example and more especially, by entering into the military service of either of the said contending parties, as commissioned or non commissioned officers or soldiers; or by serving as officers, sailors, or marines on board any ship or vessel of war or transport, of or in the service of either of the contending parties; or by serving as officers, sailors, or marines on board any privateer, bearing letters of marque of or from either of the said contending parties; or by engaging to go or going to any place beyond the seas with intent to enlist or engage in any such service, or by procuring or attempting to procure within her majesty's dominions, at home or abroad, others to do so; or by fitting out, arming, or equipping any ship or vessel to be employed, as a ship of war, or privateer, or transport, by either of the said contending parties; or by breaking or endeavoring to break any blockade lawfully and actually established by or on behalf of either of the said contending parties; or by carrying officers, soldiers, despatches, arms, military stores, or materials, or any article or articles considered and deemed to be contraband of war, according to the laws of modern usage of nations, for the use or service of either of the contending parties;—all persons so offending will incur and be liable to the several penalties and penal consequences, by the said statute or by the law of nations in that behalf imposed or denounced." It is then added at the end, that all persons entitled to the Queen's protection, who shall misconduct themselves in the premises will do so at their peril, and will obtain no protection from her majesty, but, on the contrary, incur her displeasure by such misconduct.

A proclamation of this kind has no immediate use, unless the subjects of the sovereign who issues it are warned against doing illegal acts. Still it may have an ultimate effect of no small weight. The uses direct and indirect may be said to be these :

First, it may bring before the minds of subjects the municipal law of the neutral state, designed to protect the law of nations, and especially the rights of neutrals. The announce-

ment of war is an announcement of the rights of blockade, of capture for various reasons, and of search, as well as of the danger incurred by unneutral acts of every kind and on both elements.

Secondly, the proclamation, if it declares that a state of war exists, implies that subjects of the neutral power, who may be captured by either belligerent, are engaged in regular warfare, and therefore, if taken on the sea, ought not to be visited with the penalties of piracy.

Thirdly, it may possibly release the State, thus pronounced to be in a state of civil war with the inhabitants of a part of its territory, from claims to damages inflicted on the neutral by the insurgents. For, when the neutral declares that a state of war exists, it is precluded from all claims of this description.*

Fourthly, it may prevent complications of other kinds. For example, if there is no war, the cruisers, neither of the parent-state nor of the insurgents, can touch neutral trade on the ocean in articles contraband of war. But if the neutral nation agrees to the fact that there is war, she concedes thereby that such articles on her subject's ships may be lawfully captured, even if the so-called belligerents make no declaration whatever of the state of things, as they regard it.†

Let us now look at the circumstances attending the issue of the Queen's proclamation. Here we must admit that the advisers of this step are chargeable with haste, bad judgment, and a certain unstatesmanlike indifference to results,—affording thus another example of what the old Swedish Chancellor said, "*nescis, mi fili, quantula sapientia regitur mundus.*" They seem, moreover, when called upon to defend the measure, to have fallen into the predicament of finding motives in knowledge obtained after the fact. On the sixth of May, Earl Russell (then still Lord John Russell) wrote to Lord Lyons at Washington, in the following terms: her majesty's government "feel that they cannot question the right of the South-

* See Dana's note on Wheaton, p. 35.

† Compare Lawrence on Wheaton, second annotated edition, note 15; Dana on Wheaton, note 16.

ern States to claim to be recognized as a belligerent, and as such invested with all the rights and prerogatives of a belligerent," and, again, that they do not wish Lord Lyons to make any mystery of that view. On the same day Earl Russell announced in the House of Commons that the government, "on consultation with the law officers of the crown," "had come to the opinion that the Southern States, according to those principles which seemed to them to be just principles, must be treated as a belligerent." On the ninth, it was again announced by another officer of the government, that such a proclamation was about to be issued. It was accordingly issued on the fourteenth of May, but the motive for making it had existed before the sixth of May, when no official account of President Lincoln's proclamation could have reached England. Earl Russell assigned at one time the blockade as the motive, at another the magnitude of the insurrection. There seems to have been a marvelous hurry in thus recognizing the belligerency of the Confederate States; the government was not bound to take this step by any sudden necessity of protecting their own seamen, for there was not a Confederate vessel afloat; Mr. Adams was on his way and actually reached London the thirteenth; so that it seemed as if there was a desire to have everything cut and dried before the arrival of the new ambassador. Well might Mr. Adams say immediately afterwards to Mr. Seward, that Lord Russell's declaration on the 6th of May, showed "not a little precipitation in at once raising the disaffected States up to the level of a belligerent power, before they had developed a single one of the real elements which constitute military efficiency outside of their own geographical limits." And, again, he adds in very mild terms, that "the inference seemed almost inevitable that there existed a disposition at least not to chill the hopes of those who are now drawing the very breath of life only from the expectation of sympathy in Great Britain." This inference may be further supported by the words of Lord Chelmsford in the House of Lords, uttered on the 16th of May, that "if the Southern Confederacy had not been recognized as a belligerent power, any Englishman aiding them by fitting out a privateer against the Federal Government, would be guilty of piracy."

Why wish to screen them so soon, unless with the expectation that they would, in greater or smaller numbers, rush into this business, and with the desire to exempt them from all penalties but the insignificant ones of the foreign enlistment act?*

But, if we admit that the proclamation was a hasty, ill judged, and possibly unfriendly measure, the main question still remains to be considered; was it in any sense a step not authorized by the law of nations? There were hostilities between the United States and the rebels at some time or other. When did they begin? Did it rest with the United States to say what was their commencement, or was each neutral to judge for itself in that regard? If this judgment is a biased one, if it can be shown that the neutral's wish is father to his opinion, and that his opinion is published to work evil to a professed friend, let the due amount of resentment be felt for such conduct. But if the neutral can make a fair plea for what he did, based on the facts themselves, let it not be said that his published opinion, to the effect that certain facts, transpiring in another part of the world, deserved the name of warfare, ought to be regarded as contrary to international law. You must separate his motive from his act; if this was justifiable according to the law of nations, you cannot say that he has treated you with injustice, or that the consequences of his lawful act are to be charged to his account.

We maintain that in the state of things which then existed there was no necessary malignity in pronouncing our relation to the Confederate government one of war. This is shown, *first*, by the opinions expressed at the time. And here we shall cite opinions expressed, it may be, a week or two later, without fear of being accused of dealing unfairly with facts. After President Lincoln's proclamation of blockade, there was no point of time when it could be said with more truth that war had begun than just then. To fix on that point as the beginning was surely no great crime, and possibly a man or a government might be pardoned if he assigned to it an earlier

* For much in this paragraph, see Mr. Bemis's "hasty recognition of rebel belligerency," etc., Part I. See, also, Mr. Adams's correspondence in *Message of the President and Documents of 1861-2*. 1. 85 seq., etc.

commencement. But let us see what opinions were expressed by friends and foes, and by observers on both sides of the water.

Mr. Everett, in an address at Roxbury, Mass., May 8th, 1861, uses this language: "The war, for a long time, though in profound peace, secretly prepared for, has been openly commenced by the South, by the seizure of the undefended forts, arsenals, dock-yards, mints, and custom-houses of the United States," etc. Then he adds, "but even these acts of treason and rebellion, for such they are, are thrown in the shade by that unutterable outrage upon the flag of the Union at Fort Sumter," etc. That is, the war began before the attack on Fort Sumter, in the opinion of this eminent man, a statesman, an ambassador, and one who himself had it in contemplation at one time to write on international law. The speech abounds with similar expressions.

The same thing in substance is implied in a letter of the Secretary of State, to the agent of a steamship company, on the 16th of May, who had accepted or proposed to accept an offer of Governor Letcher to sell to him certain steam vessels, which that governor of a seceding State had seized in the waters of Virginia. "The executive authorities of the State are parties to [the] insurrection, and so are public enemies. It is treason for any person to give aid and comfort to public enemies. To sell vessels to them which it is their purpose to use as ships-of-war is to give them aid and comfort." But of a still earlier date, of the fourth of the same month, is the letter to Mr. Dayton, the Minister at Paris, in which the Secretary says that "the insurgents have instituted revolution, with open, flagrant, deadly war, to compel the United States to acquiesce in the dismemberment of the Union. The United States have accepted this war as an inevitable necessity."

So also thought Stephen A. Douglas, who is reported as saying in Chicago, on the first of May, that "armies have been raised and war is levied to accomplish [a Southern conspiracy];" and again, "we cannot close our eyes to the sad and solemn fact that war does exist."

That excellent man Joseph Holt, the Judge-Advocate General, was of the same opinion. In a letter to a gentleman in

Kentucky, dated May 31, after speaking of the design of the Southern leaders to precipitate a collision of arms, in order to induce the border States to array themselves against the government, he comes to the attack on and the capture of Fort Sumter, and then says, "a more wanton and wicked war was never commenced on any government whose history has been written."

The same views appear in certain resolutions of the Chamber of Commerce, of New York, which were published on the 20th of April. "The so-called secession of some of the Southern States," they say, has "culminated into war," and "that, while deploring the advent of civil war, which has been precipitated upon the country by the madness of the South, the Chamber is persuaded that policy and humanity alike demand that it should be met by the most prompt and energetic measures." They then urge on the government to treat vessels with commissions from the Confederate government as pirates, and urge the blockade of ports in those States which have commenced war against the constitution and government of these United States, "as a measure demanded for defense in war."

Nor ought we to neglect adding that Mr. Caleb Cushing spoke, on the 24th of April, of "the dire calamity of civil war that is upon us," and of his having "labored for many years, first for the conservation of the Union, and then to avert the evils of a fratricidal war. But the day of discussion had passed and the day of action had arrived."

But let us see how Americans of distinction, who happened to be abroad, looked on the state of things. The eminent historian and ambassador, Mr. Motley, shall represent them. The excellent letter which he wrote to the London *Times*, the date of which is not given in the copy before us, but which, as its contents show, belongs to the month of May, begins in this strain: "The *de facto* question in America has been referred at last to the dread arbitrament of war." "It is often asked why have the Americans taken up arms? Why has the United States government plunged into what is sometimes called 'this wicked war?' Especially it is thought amazing in England that the President should have called for a large

army of volunteers and regulars, and that the inhabitants of the free States should have sprung forward as one man at this call, like men suddenly relieved from a spell."

To these opinions of our own countrymen, showing that in their judgment war existed at a date anterior to the Queen's proclamation, we subjoin a single sentence from an able and dispassionate Article in the *London News* of May.9. "The effect of the civil war in America," says the writer, "upon European commerce is certainly one of the most important questions which ever engaged public attention." This Article is remarkable for some views and suggestions in regard to the mode of conducting the war, and for fully expecting that the sea would be filled with cruisers both of the United and Confederate States. Other extracts from English papers show that it was thought that hostilities began with the fall of Sumter.

That the Southern Confederacy considered themselves to be at war with the United States will, perhaps, be thought hardly to need proof. They wanted to make the most of everything, just as our government wanted to make the least. It was important to drive things to an extremity that the halting slave States might take sides with them, as it was important for our government to represent that the difficulties were obstructions in collecting the revenue, and that the opposition to law came from armed mobs. A sentence or two will suffice to show how the Confederates expressed themselves. The Secretary of War of the Confederate States, Walker, said on the 12th of April, "no man could tell where the war, this day commenced, would end." A. H. Stephens spoke on the 30th of April to this effect: "a threatening war is upon us, made by those who have no regard to right." Jefferson Davis in his message to the Confederate Congress of April the 29th, uses the following words: "Scarcely had the President of the United States received intelligence of the failure of the scheme which he had devised for the relief of Fort Sumter, when he issued the declaration of war against this Confederacy which has prompted me now to convoke you." And the act of the Confederate Congress, after reciting what had been done by the government of the United States to their detriment,

authorizes their President "to use the whole land and naval force of the Confederate States to meet the war thus commenced, and to issue to private armed vessels, commissions or letters of marque and general reprisal," etc. The rest of the act is taken up with regulating privateers, captures, and adjudications in the courts of the Confederate States.

Thus persons of all descriptions agreed, early in the month of May, and even in April, 1861, in holding that a state of war had commenced. Was it strange that the British government should share this opinion?

But we go farther and say that facts looked strongly in the same direction. What these facts are a few words are sufficient to indicate. First, we notice the secession of a number of States beginning with that of South Carolina (Dec. 1860), followed by Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, and Louisiana, in January, by Texas, in February, and Arkansas in the first days of May. Then ensued the framing of the constitution of the Confederate States by seven States—those mentioned above with the exception of Texas and Arkansas, and with the coöperation of delegates from North Carolina. This occurred in February. Then came the choice of a President and other public officers, the inauguration of Davis, the Confederate States army bill, the proclamation of Davis on letters of marque and reprisal, and the act of the Confederate Congress once before referred to, recognizing the state of war, sanctioning their President's proclamation and legislating with minuteness on the matters of cruisers and capture. The last of these was made known May 6, and could not have come to the knowledge of the English government before the 13th of May; but the others, which must before that date have been well known in England, certainly showed a settled purpose of separation and a sort of established government.

Next, the acts of violence which occurred in these earlier months of the year are to be brought into consideration, such as the seizure of all the forts on the Southern coast with the exception of fort Pickens, the capture of the *Star of the West*, and that of 450 United States regulars, both by Van Dorn, in Texas, and in the month of April, the firing on vessels sent to relieve fort Sumter, and the bombardment of that fort itself.

All this was known in England before the 13th of May, at least with the exception of the events in Texas.

And lastly, the two proclamations of Mr. Lincoln are to be taken into account, the one of April 15, calling for 75,000 men of the militia of the Union, on the ground that combinations of persons in certain States, too powerful to be suppressed by courts or marshals, had obstructed the execution of the law; and the other of April 19, after the proclamation of Davis inviting applications for letters of marque and reprisal had become known at Washington, announcing that the President deemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade of the ports within seven States where an insurrection had broken out, which might be made the rendezvous or the sallying point of privateers. In these proclamations the movements of the Southern Confederacy were not called by the name of war, although an insurrection falls not far short of the import of that word, for it was prudent for the government to put the mildest title on events, and perhaps Mr. Lincoln, if asked might have denied that war existed. Yet, as we have said once before, the neutral was not to judge of events by the names given to them so much as by their essence. The whole stream of events ran with resistless flow in the direction of severance of the Union, of a Southern Confederate government, and, if resistance were to be offered, of armed rebellion.

Nor was it necessary that the definite point of time or the precise act should be specified from which the war began. Different persons would entertain different opinions, while all agreed that it began in the spring of 1861. Such differences existed on this side of the water. Supposing that the British government made a mistake in regard to such a point of time, was it a mistake confined to them or necessarily implying designed hostility to this country?

Here we come to another important head of our subject. Whenever the war began, is the President's proclamation of blockade to be regarded as an act of war, so that if war had not commenced before, that act was its initiation? It is sometimes said that the proclamation announced only an intention to lay a blockade. This is true. It did not make the world to know that a blockade had already been instituted. But it declared

that a competent force would be posted so as to prevent entrance and exit from the ports of certain States. A declaration of war is not war in one sense, but a state of war may certainly be said to commence at such a declaration. And so a proclamation of blockade, if blockade means war, is the beginning of a state of hostilities.

But does blockade mean war, or might not Mr. Lincoln have set on foot a *pacific blockade*? Here the doctrine of *pacific blockade* meets us, which a man so well informed as Mr. Sumner, in matters relating to international law, has advocated in his speech. One may be sure that where such a close and thorough student as he, takes up a side on a question of public law, there is something of weight to be said in its favor; and yet we hope to make it appear that there is no sufficient authority for the notion of a *pacific blockade*, that all blockade known to the law of nations is a belligerent act, and that it is no safer for our government to put faith in such a doctrine than to do what it did in the case of the Trent. Mr. Sumner, to his lasting honor, taught the country good doctrine then; may he see the truth in the present controversy also, and appear again in the attitude of a public benefactor.

A person, we believe, may look through all the old books on international law without finding so much as a hint that such a thing as *pacific blockade* was dreamed of. Its birth is a very modern one. It is hardly forty years of age, and for more than thirty has slept a most profound sleep. Its parentage is due to the fertile genius of those nations who imposed a paper blockade upon the neutrals of sixty years ago. Let us look at it as it appeared in its active state, and what can be said for and against it.

The theory of *pacific blockade* was first acted upon in the year 1827, from which time until 1838, when the last application of the pretended principle occurred, there were in all about five cases of it, one, or perhaps two, in European waters, and three in South American.* The first was the blockade of

* Heffter (§ 112, note 3) mentions four cases, that first spoken of in our text, a blockade of the coasts of Portugal by France, in 1831, one of New Granada by England, in 1836, and the Mexican blockade by the French, in 1836. He omits

all the coasts of Greece to prevent troops and other supplies from reaching the Turkish army in that country, and to blockade the fleet of Egypt and Turkey within the harbor of Navarino. This was set on foot after the refusal of the Porte to accept the mediation or intervention contemplated in the treaty of London of July, 1827. The neutrals were duly notified of the blockade, and the three powers, Great Britain, France, and Russia, through their representatives at Constantinople, declared that a state of peace and friendship with Turkey had not ceased. The end of this state of affairs was the destruction of the blockaded fleet at the battle of Navarino, October 20, of the same year. We ask, in passing, whether the peace ended at the beginning of this fearful sea-fight or lasted through it? and to this we add that no one now will question the justice of this interference on behalf of oppressed Greece; but the right and the righteousness of calling things by the wrong names, so that the evil becomes good and the unlawful lawful, is most emphatically questioned. When after the battle of Navarino the ambassadors assured Perter-Effendi that amity was unbroken, he replied, "it is exactly as if I had broken a man's head and at the same time assured him of my friendship. Would not such conduct be absurd?"

Two other noteworthy cases of the exercise of this pretended right, were the blockade of the Atlantic ports of Mexico by the French, commenced in 1838, and that of the Argentine Republic's ports by France and Great Britain in the same year. In the first case, the French took the fortress of St. Juan d'Ulloa, and Vera Cruz, still preserving profound peace: thereupon war was declared by the Mexicans and a treaty of peace, after the old fashion, was soon made between the parties.*

the blockade of the Argentine Republic, in 1838, the most remarkable of all. Comp. Hautefeuille, II., 272 seq., 2nd ed., and Gessner, in the work soon to be spoken of, p. 215, seq.

* The blockade became effective for Vera Cruz the 16th of April, 1838; St. Juan d'Ulloa was given up by the garrison Nov. 28th, of the same year; and on the same day a convention was made between the French admiral and the Mexican commander of the department of Vera Cruz, engaging that a Mexican garrison of only one thousand men should be retained in the city, and that the blockade should be suspended during eight months. Two days afterwards, the Mexican government passed a decree that there was a state of war between them and

In the other instance, the blockade lasted as long as the siege of Troy. The proceedings, as far as neutrals were concerned, were all regular. In 1848, a Brazilian vessel, the *Comte de Thomar*, was seized for breach of blockade. In the French court of first instance, it was released on the ground of a want of special notification, although a part of the cargo, consisting of contraband of war, was condemned. In the higher court this decision was reversed, because there could be no such thing as contraband of war save in time of war, while this was a pacific blockade.* The logical French felt that if there was a state of peace, they must come to this conclusion, but the sound sense of the English stuck to the ordinary rule that breach of blockade involved confiscation of the guilty vessel.

The proceedings of the French in Portugal, in the year 1831, cannot, without impropriety, be classed among the few instances of pacific blockade. This will appear from the briefest sketch of the affair. Don Miguel's courts having condemned certain Frenchmen to disgraceful punishments on account of political offenses, the French government, which had not recognized him, and was not in amicable relations with him, sent a fleet to the Tagus to demand, and in case of refusal to obtain by force, satisfaction. The demands being rejected, the admiral sailed up the river, silenced the forts that opposed his passage, took the Portuguese fleet after a short resistance, and anchored his ships along the streets of Lisbon which bordered on the water. The government did not yield until he threatened to commence hostilities upon the city. Then satisfaction was rendered, but certain vessels of war that had been captured were carried away by the French. The Portuguese government, although unrecognized by Great

the French government. This led the French to revoke their suspension of the blockade so far that the neutral vessels could now only enter the port of Vera Cruz without discharging their cargoes. (Circular of December 22d.) Peace was concluded the next year. See de Martens, N. Recueil, 15, 808-817.

* Compare Gessner, p. 216, and the French notification of blockade in de Martens, N. Recueil, 15, 508, where it is said that "measures of rigor, authorized by the law of nations, will be taken against vessels seeking to enter the blockaded ports after being warned of the blockade by one of the French vessels of war."

Britain, besought that ancient ally to intercede with France for the restoration of the vessels. Lord Palmerston declined doing so, and added that, in accordance with legal advice, he considered the vessels just prizes of war. Certainly this instance given by Heffter must be taken out of the class in which he puts it. There was war here, and nothing else. *

The writers of international law, who have written since this doctrine of pacific blockade was hatched, have by no means all noticed it—in fact, the greater part have passed it over in silence. Without looking very far, we believe that we have a right to say that it has lain outside of the notice of all the principal English and American writers.† Hautefeuille, perhaps, was the first to draw attention upon it, which he did, with the denial of its right to form a part of the law of nations, in his first edition of 1848. The protest was renewed against it in the greatly altered edition of 1858. Meanwhile Heffter, in his third edition of 1855, advocated it with some reference to what the French author on neutral rights had written. Since then, Ortolan, by not mentioning it in his “diplomacy of the sea,” seems to show that he views it with no favor. De Pistoye and Duverdy, in their *Traité des Prises*, have denied that there is any such blockade, Cauchy has defended it, and Gessner, a German author who has written in French (*le droit des neutres sur mer*, Berlin, 1865), is decided in his condemnation of the doctrine.

We give the views of Heffter, as representing his side of the question. “A state of blockade,” says he (§ 112, ed. 3, of the German original), “can be set on foot, even before war and without a complete opening of war, whether for the purpose of practising reprisals, or for that of hindering an imminent violation of rights,—as, for instance, to prevent the running out of a squadron or the conveyance of succor to the enemy, before the foreign state has distinctly declared itself in regard to its intentions, which, meantime, arouse suspicion. It is true that examples of this kind of blockade, as of a sort

* See the documents in Murhard, N. Supplement 3, 570–613, and A. L. von Rochau's *Gesch. Frankreichs* 1, 314.

† We do not mean to be understood that the editors and annotators of Wheaton have not noticed it. See Lawrence's *Wheaton*, 845, 846; Dana's, 36, 37.

of reprisals without formal war, are first furnished by the most recent history; yet there can be no doubt that this step is a perfectly justifiable one, and that even neutral powers are bound thereby. Only no confiscation takes place, except where there is a state of war." And, in a note, he adds, that "these measures, as being hitherto little used, might awaken some scruple, but, so far as is known, they have not been decidedly attacked by other powers." And then, after referring to Hautefeuille, he winds up by saying, that "humanity can only rejoice in this new usage of international law."

The arguments on the other side are, *first*, that blockade has always, except in these few instances, been considered a war-right, and classed with such rights by all the old writers. These writers were well acquainted with reprisals and embargoes, or detention of vessels, for the purpose of securing justice, which were far more common in the early times than they have been in the most modern; and yet the first instance has not been found of a resort to blockade in a time of peace, or of an earlier writer suggesting or advocating such a measure. "All the treaties," says Hautefeuille, "which have spoken of blockade, express themselves in the same manner, if not in the same words at least in the same sense. All, without exception, suppose that one of the contracting parties is engaged in a war against a third power, that the other nation signing the treaty is neutral; and they establish the rights of the attacking power and the duties of the pacific party. It is impossible to deny, to fail to perceive, this fact. From the most ancient treaties down to our days, there is not one of these treaties that does not make use of the expressions, *enemy*, *belligerent*, *neutral*, and which, in the whole of its provisions, does not indicate clearly that blockade is an act of war."

Secondly, pacific blockade is not justified by the analogy of reprisals. It seems strange to us that Heffter takes refuge under so weak an analogy. Reprisals are acts, the operation of which is confined to the parties between whom a dispute exists. They resemble distraining goods for failure to pay rent. But pacific blockade obstructs the pathway of neutrals; it interferes with their ordinary rights; it imposes new laws upon them; it even captures their vessels and, it may be, sub-

jects them to confiscation. Where else do we find a right exercised in a state of peace by armed force with such effects on neutral powers?*

Thirdly, Cauchy, not satisfied with Heffter's defense of such blockades, regards them as a particular species of war, a war of siege. But to this Gessner replies in language which we accept as best expressing our opinions, that "the French writer does not suppress the contradiction that there is in carrying on a partial war, which strikes a blow at a part of the state without striking it at the state considered as a whole. If the state were merely an inert mechanism, perhaps one of its parts could be injured while the others were unaffected. But the state is a living organism, and that which wounds one of its members wounds them all. A particular kind of war, which is confined to certain parts of the state, is as great an absurdity as to say that a slap on the cheek is not an insult to the entire man. During the last war in the East, it was proposed in the British Parliament to blockade the Baltic ports of Prussia, because Prussia would not take part in the war against Russia; this proposition was rejected only by a small majority. If this proposition had been put into execution, would it have touched the Prussian ports only? Would it not have been equivalent to a declaration of war against Prussia?"†

Fourthly. It cannot fairly be said that such a practice, if introduced, would be a gain to humanity. The blockades of this kind have, except in about two instances, been followed by an actual state of war, and by the destruction of men and of public property. In one of those two instances, the siege or blockade continued ten years, and left Rosas, the author of the difficulties, at the head of the Argentine Republic. There have been wars without a declaration, concentrated in one maritime enterprise, often brief in their continuance, but their brevity was owing to the fact that great nations were engaged in operations against small ones. Suppose they had declared

* De Martens (§ 61, ed. of 1858) speaking of reprisals, says, "les moyens choisis à cette fin devraient ne jamais porter atteinte aux droits d'une tierce puissance amie."

† Gessner, p. 219.

war and called their movements war, might not these movements have then been as limited in place and time as they actually were? Is a nation obliged, because it is at war, to wage it on both elements, or is a real war necessarily a protracted one? Has not a six weeks' war on the land but just now changed the political balance of Europe?

Nor is Heffter's plea that neutrals did not protest against these pacific blockades of any weight. To them these operations were war, with its usual notifications of blockade and its dangers to neutrals. Their relations to the states between whom a controversy existed were the same as in war. They did not need to look beyond the facts, which were facts of war.

But the most serious fault which we find with the views of Heffter is, that he can be willing to make international law out of a few instances of confessedly novel practice on the part of one or two great states. Certainly if it is to be degraded into a fashion set by the leaders of national custom, it must be of a very shifting character.

There is, then, as it seems to us, really nothing to be urged in favor of pacific blockades, on the score of authority, or of reason, or of humanity, and they must be classed with those other inventions of nations powerful on the sea, which juster views and more accurate science have brushed away.

President Lincoln's blockade, then, was not a pacific blockade, because there is no such nondescript, half lion, half lamb, known to the law of nations or to right reason.

But if there were such a peaceful procedure, having the effect of war on neutral trade, the decisions of our courts shut us out from making use of it in any argument, which aims to show that there was no war between the United States and the rebels when the Queen's proclamation was issued.

This question, after being first argued before district judges in Massachusetts and New York, was brought on appeal before the Supreme Court of the United States in the December term of 1862. The point to be decided was the validity of the capture of certain vessels—the *Amy Warwick*, *Hiawatha*, *Crenshaw*, and *Brilliant*—all of which were made between April 19th, the date of the President's proclamation of blockade, and July 13th, when Congress sanctioned that and other

measures of our government. Of these vessels the *Amy Warwick*, owned in Richmond and bound from Rio de Janeiro to that or some other port of the United States, was taken, in ignorance of the war, off Cape Henry, on the 10th of July, 1861; and the *Hiawatha* was an English vessel, which left Richmond, May 17th, and was taken on the 20th off Hampton roads. Passing by the pleas set up by the counsel in favor of the claimants, we come to the decision of the majority of the court. It contained these statements of principles: 1. That a civil war is never solemnly declared, and becomes such by its accidents. The true test of its existence may be thus summarily stated: "when the regular course of justice is interrupted by revolt, rebellion, or insurrection, so that the Courts of Justice cannot be kept open, civil war exists, and hostilities may be prosecuted on the same footing, as if those opposing the government were foreign enemies invading the land." 2. Although by the Constitution Congress alone can declare war, and the President has no power to initiate a war either against a foreign enemy or a domestic state, yet, if war be made by invasion or organized rebellion, the President is bound to resist force by force. Nor is a war any the less war, though the declaration of it be unilateral, for war may exist without any declaration on either side. The battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma had been fought before the passage of an act of Congress of May 13th, 1846, which recognized a state of war as existing by the act of the republic of Mexico. 3. Because a war is called an insurrection [as the President called it in his proclamation] it is not the less a civil war. It is not necessary that the independence of the revolted province or state be acknowledged, in order to constitute it a party belligerent in a war, according to the law of nations. In the case of the *Santissima Trinidad*, the Supreme Court said, "the government of the United States had recognized the existence of a civil war between Spain and her colonies, and had avowed the determination to remain neutral between the parties; and that each party was deemed by us a belligerent nation, having, so far as concerns us, the sovereign rights of war." 4. After such a proclamation as that of the Queen of England recognizing hostilities as existing between

the government of the United States and *certain States*, styling themselves the Confederate States of America, and after similar declarations or silent acquiescence by other nations, a citizen of a foreign State is estopped to deny the existence of a war with all its consequences as regards neutrals. They cannot ask a court to affect a technical ignorance of the greatest civil war known in the history of the human race, and thus cripple the arm of the government and paralyze its power by subtle definitions and ingenious sophisms.* 5. The proclamation of blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence to the court that a state of war existed, which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a measure under the circumstances peculiar to the case. The question whether the President, in fulfilling his duties as Commander-in-Chief in suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile resistance, and a civil war of such alarming proportions, as will compel him to accord to them the character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him. He must determine what degree of force the crisis demands.

The court was of the opinion that the President had a right, *jure belli*, to institute a blockade of ports in possession of the States in rebellion, which neutrals are bound to regard. Nor did the court doubt that a blockade of ports, properly under the jurisdiction of the United States, but in a territory where rebellion actually existed, was as valid as a blockade of foreign ports.

The minority of the court dissented from this decision on constitutional grounds. The President, not having the right to declare war or recognize its existence within the meaning of the law of nations, and thus to change the country and all its citizens from a state of peace to a state of war, they judged that he had no power to set on foot a blockade under the law of nations, and that therefore all captures before July 13, 1861, when Congress recognized the state of civil war, were illegal and void. It is to be observed that this minority did not doubt that the blockade was an act of regular war, nor

* This applies particularly to the case of the *Hiawatha*.

that a State can blockade its own port, nor that a civil war affects neutral rights in the same way as any other kind of hostilities. They only denied, and let us add, most technically and formally, that the blockade was proclaimed without competent authority. Perhaps if they could have consented to urge the doctrine of a pacific blockade, their argument from that source would have been about equally satisfactory.*

Thus war existed according to the judgment of our highest court *before* the President's proclamation, which he recognized by that measure, and against which, by this as well as by various other measures, he endeavored, as was his duty, to defend the country. There existed then, according to this authority, a state of actual war, a considerable time before the Queen's proclamation. That the majority of the court took a right view of the matter we fully believe, but whether they were right or wrong, in their opinion, it weakens whatever arguments to the contrary, our government or our statesmen can urge† or have urged on the other side.‡

We proceed now to a brief examination of the consequences which have been attributed to the Queen's proclamation. By conceding ocean belligerency to the rebels, and thus saving them from the penalties of piracy, it encouraged British subjects to join their cause;—it, in fact, created war against the United States upon the sea. "At the early date when this was done," says Mr. Sumner, in his speech of April 13th, "the

* In that case compensation might have been justly claimed by the British government for these condemned vessels according to the principle of the French courts, to which we have referred, but not in accordance with English practices. The French principle alone can stand.

† See Black's reports, 2, 685-689. We have stated those opinions which bear on our subject, and chiefly in the words of Judge Grier and Judge Nelson, without the trouble of adding quotation marks. See also the note of Mr. Dana—who was counsel for the Libellants, in the case of the *Amy Warwick*—on Wheaton 374-375, and Mr. Pomeroy's introd. to constitutional law, §§ 447-458. The opinions both of the majority and minority of the court are to be found in the supplement to Lawrence's Wheaton, (2nd ed.) p. 13.

‡ May it not be added that if Mr. Lincoln's blockade was a pacific one, if there was no actual war, he had no authority to take this step. Actual war may be constitutionally repulsed and put down by measures of war. But who gave him a right in time of peace to adopt a measure which seriously affected the trade of neutrals?

rebels were, as they remained to the close, without ships on the ocean, without prize courts or other tribunals for the administration of justice on the ocean, without any of those conditions which are the essential prerequisite to such a concession ; and yet the concession was general, being applicable to the ocean and the land, so that by British fiat they became ocean belligerents, as well as land belligerents." And again, "had it not been made, no rebel ship could have been built in England. Every step in her building would have been piracy. Nor could any munitions of war have been furnished. Not a blockade-runner laden with supplies could have left the English shores, except under a kindred penalty. The direct consequence of this concession was to place the rebels on an equality with ourselves in all British markets, whether of ships or of munitions of war." This is confirmed by the authority already cited of Lord Chelmsford, who said in Parliament that "if the Southern Confederacy had not been recognized as a belligerent power, if any Englishman were to fit out a privateer for the purpose of assisting the Southern States against the Northern States, he would be guilty of piracy." And on this action of the proclamation a claim of immense damages is made to depend.

There is something that is true in these fervid sentences, and more that will not stand examination. We will look at the weak points first.

We say then at the outset that if there was a state of war, as our courts judged, even before Mr. Lincoln's proclamation, there was no violation of international law, and no injury of the United States in publishing the fact. Whatever unhappy consequences grew out of an authorized act, it does not appear that Great Britain ought to be made responsible for them. This is most obviously true, unless such consequences were clearly foreseen, and the Queen's proclamation chosen deliberately as the means for bringing them to pass.

Again, it is not true that the rebels had no ships on the ocean and no prize courts, nor that ocean belligerency on their part was created by the Queen's proclamation. They were indeed quite poorly off as it respects skill in constructing vessels, means of obtaining machinery for steamships, skilled en-

gineers and sailors, but they had at a very early date of the war a settled purpose to prey on our commerce upon the sea, just as they plundered our property on the land. In his message to the Confederate Congress of April 29, Mr. Davis announced that "two vessels had been purchased and manned, the Sumter and McRea, and are now being prepared for sea at New Orleans with all possible despatch." The Savannah, a pilot boat which was fitted out for a sea expedition in May, was taken by the Perry after capturing one vessel, and carried as prize into New York, where it arrived June 15. This was the vessel whose crew were tried for piracy and were afterwards treated as prisoners of war. The Sumter, mentioned above, ran out to sea, early in July, escaping the blockading squadron at the mouth of the Mississippi, pursued a career of plundering in the West Indian seas, and then crossed the ocean, to lie useless and inactive under the watch of the Tuscarora in Spain. Its commander was that most self-satisfied mortal, Raphael Semmes, afterwards of the Alabama. The York, another of this fraternity, was burnt by the United States steamboat Union, in August. The privateer Jefferson Davis, after taking the bark Alvarado, was wrecked on the bar of St. Augustine in the same month. The little Confederate privateer Nixon ran out of the Mississippi and escaped the clutches of the Niagara on the first of August. The privateer Judah was burnt by men of the Colorado, in September, while getting ready, at Pensacola, for a plundering cruise. The steamer Nashville ran the blockade at Charleston, in October, and destroyed the Harvey Burch on its passage across the ocean. These, we are aware, were small and inferior vessels, but they initiated ocean belligerency before, and long before, any of the large gunboats built in England began their work of destruction.

Again, it is not true that the Confederates were without prize courts, if it be meant that no provision was made by their laws or their constitution for adjudication upon captured vessels. The constitution was copied after ours in this respect. The act of the 6th of May, to which we referred once before, is almost entirely taken up with the conduct to be observed by privateers. Enemy's property on neutral vessels is not to

be seized ; the usual bonds are required, prize money is to be distributed according to certain rules ; property of amicable powers recaptured is to be restored on the payment of reasonable salvage ; captured vessels are to be brought into some port of the Confederate States or of some amicable nation, and to be proceeded against before a competent tribunal ; and in the case of captured vessels, goods, and effects brought within the jurisdiction of the Confederate District Courts of said States are to have exclusive original jurisdiction. These are some of the provisions of the Act, which also offers a bounty for burning or capturing vessels of the United States, and allows a reduction to be made of $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. on the amount of duties imposed by law, whenever any captured wares or merchandise are brought into port. This act, it is probable, will be found to have been copied, to a great extent, after our own ; but it shows that from the very first, war on the sea, in a manner conformable with the rules of civilized warfare, was within the contemplation of the Confederates.

Again, it cannot be true that there would have been no building of privateers in England, nor blockade running, nor trade in the munitions of war, but for the Queen's proclamation. The argument of Mr. Sumner is, that the fear of the penalties of piracy would have deterred from all such aid to rebels and traitors. But as soon as it was established by our courts that Mr. Lincoln's blockade implied the existence of war, every other nation could have protested against visiting the pains of piracy upon its subjects. Moreover, the penalties would not have been executed. The fear of a bitter retaliation, and the singular gentleness of Mr. Lincoln's spirit, to whom vengeance "was a strange work," would have made them a dead letter, and this would have been found out by all the world. As for blockade runners in particular, we are not sure that we understand what Mr. Sumner has in view, when he says that not one of them "could have left the English shores except under a kindred penalty," that is, a penalty kindred to piracy. But what penalty worse than confiscation of ship and goods would the United States have inflicted on them ? Or would the dread of this have outweighed commercial cupidity and the pleasurable excitement of such business,

when the highest penalties of the law never put an end to the slave trade—a far more disgraceful traffic. These blockade runners it was that protracted the Southern rebellion. The privateers, built in England, harmed us by actual loss, and, to a considerable extent, drove our commerce from the sea. But the actual loss was a limited and a definite one, to be estimated in dollars and cents, as Mr. Seward estimated it in one of his despatches to Mr. Adams. On the other hand, the evil inflicted by the blockade-runners was an immense one. Every gun, all the powder imported, all the cotton taken back, was so much fuel for a long war, warming the rebels into hope when they were nigh despair. But the proclamation of neutrality, as we conceive, had a small effect in calling into life this traffic; and if there had been no such proclamation, supplies would have been furnished.

We freely concede that the rebels drew hope from the attitude of England, as judged of by that measure, and from the attitude of the governing class toward the United States, that they would be recognized as an established government. We conclude, also, that the proclamation was not called for by any pressing necessity, and so far forth was dictated by a misjudgment of probabilities, or by a wrong bias. There was, as we all thought, a wish that the country might be divided, and this was as well known to rebel agents and the rebel government as to us. Let this hostile mind come in as evidence, if any is needed, whenever the Alabama claims are argued before an arbitrator, in case the negotiations are to take that shape; let it be remembered, if that must be, as a ground of war, but there let its influence stop.

It is the inevitable conclusion from the foregoing argument, that no consequences flowing out of this proclamation, be they as great as Mr. Sumner's imagination makes them, or as small as a professed advocate of England would make them, can swell our claims on England or come with justice into the discussion of the Alabama question. For, if President Lincoln had declared in effect that a state of war existed, if, according to the decisions of our courts, reviewing the circumstances of the time, such was the fact, if the blockade imposed on Southern ports could not be called a pacific one, if from the

fall of Sumter our first men regarded a state of war as having begun ; the British government cannot be chargeable with any offense against international law, in making known the same fact to British subjects, and in warning them of the municipal as well as of the international penalties of transgressing against the laws of neutrality. Can they not fairly say, "there was war, and we warned against the temptations incident to a state of war to which neutrals are exposed ? How are we responsible for any disastrous results, near or remote, flowing out of the announcement of such a fact and of the dangers to which it might expose our countrymen ?"

Another inference from our argument is, that no apology ought to be demanded from Great Britain. Apology is a kind of reparation most honorable to one who has committed a violation of international law. But international law does not require confession for the sins of the heart. One nation never takes the stool of penitence to make confession to another except for some positive outward act. The case of the *Caroline* and Lord Ashburton's regret that such a thing had occurred, have been adduced as a wrong and a reparation, showing to us what we have a right to expect in the present instance. But the *Caroline* was invaded within our waters ; the Canadian leaders of that expedition committed an offense of an overt kind against the laws of neutrality. But what overt act of wrong was there in the proclamation of neutrality ? The moment we overthrow the position that there was no war, and Great Britain ought to have acted as if there were none, that moment all possibility of calling for an apology is cut off. There is nothing to apologize for unless a sin of the heart. And would a high spirited nation listen to the suggestion to make such an apology ? Would it ever say, on compulsion or at the prompting of another state, that it had acted unwisely ?

If we have been successful in the foregoing remarks, we have performed our main task, which was to brush away all those extraneous considerations that have accumulated around the question of the *Alabama*. They do not properly go with it, they have no pertinency to it, they ought not to be taken into account. We might, therefore, here come to a close, but the simple case of the *Alabama* itself, perhaps, needs to be

presented to our readers, who may have been familiar enough with the discussions arising out of it several years ago, but may have now forgotten some of those facts and those points of international law which ought to be looked at, if we would take a just view of the case.

More than a year had elapsed since the date of the Queen's proclamation, when our minister at London became certain that a formidable gunboat was in building for the Confederate States, at the shipyards of the Lairds, on the other side of the Mersey from Liverpool. On the 23d of June, he writes to Earl Russell that a war-steamer more powerful than the gunboat *Oreto* (or *Florida*) and built in the dock-yard of persons, one of whom was at the time a member of the House of Commons, had been launched and was now fitting out for the especial and manifest object of carrying on hostilities by sea, and that it was "about to be commanded by one of the insurgent agents, the same who sailed in the *Oreto*." "The parties," he adds, "engaged in the enterprise, are persons well known at Liverpool to be agents and officers of the insurgents in the United States, the nature and extent of whose labors are well explained in the copy of an intercepted letter of one of them, which I received from my government some days ago, and which I had the honor to place in your Lordship's hand on Thursday last." He now transmits, by way of confirmation of what he had said, new evidence received from the American consul at Liverpool, and begs that either the projected expedition may be stopped, or the fact be established that its purpose is not inimical to the people of the United States.

Earl Russell replies (June 25th) that the matter has been referred to the proper department of the government, and again, in a note of July 4th, suggests to Mr. Adams that the consul of the United States at Liverpool be instructed to submit to the collector of customs there the evidence in his possession relating to the destination of the vessel.

Meanwhile, the Lords Commissioner of the Treasury, "the proper department of the government," as we suppose, report (July 1st) that they have, through the collector at Liverpool, found the description of the vessel to be correct, "that she

is evidently and avowedly intended for a ship of war, that she has several powder canisters on board, but, as yet, neither guns nor canisters, that the current report in regard to the vessel is that she has been built by a foreign government, which is not denied by the Messrs. Laird with whom the surveyor has conferred; but they do not appear disposed to reply to any questions respecting the destination of the vessel after she leaves Liverpool, and the officers have no other reliable source of information on that point; and, having referred the matter to [their] solicitor, he has reported his opinion that at present there is not sufficient ground to warrant the detention of the vessel or any interference on the part of this department, in which report [they] beg to express [their] concurrence." To this they add the advice that seems to have led to Earl Russell's letter of July 4th, that the American consul should submit his evidence in regard to the destination of the vessel to the collector at Liverpool, since, without full evidence to justify their proceedings, "the seizing officers might entail on themselves and on the government very serious consequences."

The consul, under Mr. Adams's direction, acted in accordance with this recommendation, but as he did not affix to the paper which he submitted to the collector the legal form of evidence, it was rejected. This omission was afterwards supplied. The evidence in the possession of our minister and of the consul was submitted to a legal adviser, Mr. R. P. Collier, Queen's counsel, whose opinion (given July 16th) was, that the evidence was almost conclusive in favor of the vessel being fitted out as a privateer for the use of the Confederate government, in contravention of the provisions of the foreign enlistment act. He also advised that the chief officer of customs at Liverpool should be immediately applied to, in order to seize the vessel, as the said act authorized him to do, with a view to her condemnation, an indemnity being given him if he required it. It would at the same time be proper, he thought, to inform the foreign secretary of the fact, and to add the request that the government would direct the vessel to be seized, or to ratify the seizure, if it had been made. "If the matter were not urgent," says he, "I would advise no other steps being taken until it was known whether or not the govern-

ment thought fit to interfere; but inasmuch as the government might not unreasonably take some little time to determine what course to pursue, during which time the vessel might escape, I advise the more prompt remedy."

Mr. Adams, feeling the urgency of the case, now sends to Earl Russell copies of those same depositions which the consul had placed in the hands of the collector at Liverpool, and two days afterwards—July 24th—submitted to him two more depositions relating to the same matter, together with a second opinion given by Mr. Collier. This opinion contains the following expressions: "I am of opinion that the collector of customs would be justified in detaining the vessel. Indeed, I should think that if he allows the vessel to leave Liverpool, he will incur a heavy responsibility,—a responsibility of which the board of customs, under whose direction he appears to be acting, must take their share. It appears difficult to make out a stronger case of infringement of the foreign enlistment act, which, if not enforced on this occasion, is little better than a dead letter. It well deserves consideration whether, if the vessel be allowed to escape, the federal government would not have serious grounds of remonstrance."

On the same day that Mr. Collier gave that opinion—July 23d—another legal agent of Mr. Adams writes to the Board of Customs, and puts into their hands two new affidavits, the same to which Mr. Adams had called Earl Russell's attention, together with Mr. Collier's opinion. He adds, that he had that morning learned that instructions were forwarded the day before to the collector at Liverpool not to exercise the powers of the act in this instance, on the ground that the facts disclosed in the affidavits made before him were not sufficient to justify the collector in seizing the vessel. He asks, on behalf of the government of the United States, a reconsideration of this matter, "as involving consequences of the greatest possible description," and closes by saying that the gunboat was now lying in Birkenhead docks, ready for sea in all respects, with a crew of fifty men on board, and might sail at any time, for which reason he had sent the depositions directly to the Board of Custom, instead of transmitting them according to ordinary rule through the collector.

This letter induced the Board of Customs to refer the matter to the law officers of the crown, whose opinion would be followed—they say—as to the matter of seizing the vessel.

It must have been at this time that the unfortunate delay occurred, of which Earl Russell spoke in a conference with Mr. Adams on the 1st of August. His lordship—says our minister—first took up the case of “290” (the Alabama) “and remarked that a delay in determining upon it had most unexpectedly been caused by the sudden development of a malady of the Queen’s advocate, Sir John Harding, totally incapacitating him for business.* This had made it necessary to call in other parties, whose opinion had been at last given for the detention of the gunboat, but before the order got down to Liverpool the vessel was gone. He should, however, send directions to have her stopped if she went, as was probable, to Nassau.” Mr. Adams subjoins these words: “I said I was aware that the gunboat was off, but I did not say what I myself have little doubt of, that her sudden departure was occasioned by a notion, obtained somehow or other, that such a proceeding was impending.”†

The opinion of the legal advisers of the Crown was given on the 29th of July in favor of detaining the vessel, but the same day she sailed out of Liverpool without register or clearance, as if on a pleasure trip, with the builders and members of their families, and with other invited guests. Earl Russell, in 1864, referring to this transaction, quotes a passage from Fullam’s cruise of the Alabama, to the effect that the hasty departure was due to news received that the customs’ authorities had orders to board and detain the vessel that morning, and adds that such was the fact, and that there certainly seemed to have been treachery on the part of some one furnishing the information.

But let us complete our sketch of the course of the priva-

* There seems to be no doubt that this was a veritable and alarming malady.

† Thus far we have drawn from the Executive documents for 1862–63, Vol. 1. It is hardly necessary to refer to the pages, which are between the 188th and 168d. In the ensuing references we follow an article of Mr. Bemis, in the Supplement to the Boston “Daily Advertiser,” November 11th, 1865.

teer. Towed down the Mersey by a steam tug, she lay for a while in Beaumaris or in Maelfra Bay, until the tug could return and bring out a portion of the crew. The American consul watched the movements, and on the 30th of July informed the chief officer of the customs at Liverpool, that the *Hercules* was then at a landing stage, taking on board men, forty or fifty in number, beams evidently for gun-carriages, and other things, and that a quantity of cutlasses had been taken on board a few days before. He says, also, that the master of the tug stated that the gunboat, which was cruising off port Lynas, had six guns below and was taking powder from another vessel. The surveyor of the port on the same day writes to the collector that he visited the tug, and, although he found no guns or ammunition on board of her, saw there a considerable number of persons, male and female, some of whom admitted to him that they were a portion of the crew, and were going to join the gunboat. He found, however, nothing on the tug which could call for the collector's interference. The captain of the tug again made affidavit that on this second voyage of his he took with him from thirty to forty men, who, according to his belief, were to be employed on board as a part of the crew. We know from subsequent testimony of one who was concerned in the affair, that the men signed articles on that night of the 30th.*

Thus we have pursued the facts relating to this "fatal and perfidious bark," down to the time when she was ready to leave the nest where she had been cherished and guarded, until she was fledged and fitted to fly abroad. It was supposed that she might go into Queenstown harbor. But no message was sent to seize her there before July 31st, on which same day the collector of Liverpool received the empty order to lay hands upon her, as if it was really thought she would run back into the jaws of the lion. Her further progress has no especial bearing on our subject. She made for the Azores, and at Terceira "was shortly joined by a barque, the 'Agrip-

* Clarence Yonge, paymaster on the *Alabama*, who changed sides, and gave Mr. Adams a detailed account of the contract for making the vessel, its escape, and cruise. Exec. Doc. for 1863-'64. 1., 24 seq.

pina,' which had sailed from the Thames, with the greater portion of the privateer's guns and stores on board. The barque discharged her cargo into the '290,' which was still flying the British ensign, and when the Portuguese authorities interposed, the person Butcher, it is alleged, represented his vessel to be English, aiding the English barque, which, he said, was sinking. Another vessel shortly arrived from Liverpool, the steamer Bahama—conveying the Confederate officer Captain Semmes, with Bullock and fifty additional men, and stores for the privateer. The Portuguese authorities then ordered all three vessels off, but they merely went to a secluded part of the coast, and completed the transshipment of the stores. The Bahama cleared from Liverpool on the 12th of August, having on board nineteen cases, containing guns, guncarriages, shot, rammers, etc., shipped by a firm of engineers and ironfounders. These cases were professedly shipped for Nassau. After the transfer of the cargo had been concluded, Semmes took command, ran up the Confederate flags to the masthead, and christened the new steamer the 'Alabama.' He read to the crew his commission from Jefferson Davis, as captain, and then made a speech, in which he explained the kind of warfare he proposed to wage, and called for volunteers. One hundred and ten of those on board consented, and forty refused, returning in the Bahama to Liverpool." Of those who remained, a considerable part belonged to the English naval reserve, and were all trained gunners.*

Of the reception of the Alabama in the British Islands, and of her successful career of plunder and destruction, we do not intend to speak. The number and value of her prizes may be found, as given by the Secretary of State, in the diplomatic correspondence for 1866–1867. (Executive Documents 1. 180–192.)

It is plain on the face of these transactions that our government was not unreasonable in making complaint and demanding redress. Nor was it strange, when every steamer was bringing news of the open sympathy of the most influential

* From an extract from a pamphlet published in London entitled "the Alabama," given in a note of Mr. Grosvenor B. Lowrey's "English neutrality," New York, 1868.

class of society in England, that the same feeling was imputed to the government, and that to the connivance of the government was imputed the escape of the Alabama, as well as many other violations of neutrality. The aristocracy seemed to us to resemble "the children of Edom in the day of Jerusalem, who said raze it, raze it to the foundation thereof." The time when the "290" was getting ready for sea was that in which news reached England of the ill success of General McClellan before Richmond. The friends of the Confederate cause were encouraged. In the House of Commons, not less than four-fifths of whom Mr. Adams thought, some months afterward, to be no well-wishers to anything American, there were motions looking towards recognition and intervention by "peaceable means or otherwise." He was assured that the apprehension of distress and of agitation among the laboring classes, growing out of the failure of the cotton supply, might "lead the governing powers of France and England to some joint representation to the Government of the United States, they being in no condition to withstand any great severity of pressure of this description."

In a word, the strong sympathy at this time for the Confederates, the ill success of our armies, the great desire for industrial reasons to have the war come to a speedy end, are sufficient to account for a failure of the British Government to do its duties of neutrality, if any such failure can be made out on probable evidence to have existed. The delay and reluctance to detain the vessel are thus readily explained, and an intention not to do right runs *prima facie* through all the proceedings.

But was there a failure of that government to do its duties of neutrality? Here two questions meet us. Could the vessel have been stopped according to the provisions of the enlistment act, and was there sufficient ground for the government to intervene according to the law of nations. To us it is of minor importance what the enlistment act requires or forbids; the main point is what international law requires or forbids to be done. Suppose that there had been no enlistment act,—and the present act bearing that name was not passed until near the end of the reign of George III.,—and that there were no pro-

cess known to English law by which certain infractions of the rights of neutrals could be reached, would that defect of the law shut neutrals off from complaint and claim of reparation? Certainly not. The object of the enlistment act, and of our earlier neutrality acts, was to defend the law of nations by the law of the State, to protect other States from being wronged by private persons enjoying the protection of the government, and to prevent collisions of States with one another, which would be sure to arise, unless civil law and the courts were constituted the guardians of that law between States, which must otherwise rely on armed force alone for its conservation. When a nation receives injuries from subjects of another, it needs not to stop and ask whether those subjects are violating the laws of their own State; if they are committing a breach of international law that is ground enough for reclamation and demand of redress.

Thus the principle is logically necessary that no nation can be excused for any international injury committed within its jurisdiction by the plea that its municipal law is defective. "That is your own affair," would be the just reply to such a plea; "it is your duty to have efficient laws, but whether they are efficient or inefficient, or if you have no law at all, it is all one to us who are injured. We are wronged, and under the law of all Christendom which you and we profess to obey, we demand some kind of reparation."

This view of duty has governed the United States. Before the law of 1794 had been passed, and in the very infancy of the government, President Washington declared in a proclamation that he had given instructions to those officers to whom it belonged, to cause prosecutions to be instituted against all persons who should, within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, violate the law of nations with respect to the powers at war or any of them. Shortly after, on the representation of the British Minister at Washington, that the *Little Sarah* was fitting out as a French privateer, she was seized, and being found to contain a suspicious armament, was prevented from sailing. A number of prizes were restored to their owners on proof that the capturing vessels had been fitted out in the United States. The governors of the States were called

upon to arrest vessels about to depart. These are but a specimen of what was done in a country without precedents to be followed, and guided by views of international obligation. The neutrality acts of 1795 and of 1818 grew out of this feeling; and, when in 1823 the repeal of the foreign enlistment act was moved by Lord Althorpe in the House of Commons, Mr. Canning could say, "if I wished for a guide in the system of neutrality I should take that laid down by America in the days of the Presidency of Washington and the Secretaryship of Jefferson."*

Nor was there in this anything supererogatory on the part of our government. It is believed that international law has a right to demand for every independent State such protection. If we cannot say that whatever a State could not do without placing itself in a hostile attitude it could not allow a private person within its jurisdiction to do, we may say thus much: that no act can be permitted or overlooked, by which a private person procures for a belligerent either men or vessels intended for the service of war. In the present imperfect state of the law of nations, a neutral may perhaps shut its eyes to the conveyance of contraband articles as a matter of trade, but even such connivance is a refusal to prevent unneutral acts and an indirect administering of fuel to the flames of war. Beyond this, to act as an agent of a belligerent, to make a ship of war or transport, to enlist men to serve in his army or navy, this is so palpable an identification of neutral subjects with the belligerent, that it is the obvious duty of neutral States to prevent it and to punish it, as truly as it is their duty to punish plots concocted within their borders to assassinate a foreign sovereign. And this is a duty prior to any law passed to that effect, a duty which demands that laws be made to enforce its fulfillment.

An extract or two will show that this doctrine, drawn from the nature of neutrality itself, has been current among the modern writers on the law of nations. Klüber uses such language as this: "A neutral State is neither judge nor party. It is obligated, not only to allow itself and its subjects to commit

* See Phillimore iii, § 147, Twiss *Rights and Duties in War*, § 281, and Mr. Lowrey's Pamphlet, p. 12 seq.

no act, the aim of which is to favor or support one of the belligerents in their undertakings, but also to endure a violation of its neutrality from no belligerent power. A violation of complete neutrality on the neutral State's part would accordingly be not only every sort of assistance in war or allowance of the same to its subjects—as, for instance, that they should serve one of the belligerents as privateers—but also every voluntary concession to one of the belligerents to make immediate use of its lands and seas for purposes of hostility.”

Dr. Wheaton, in referring to the right asserted by the Minister of France of arming and equipping vessels of war and of enlisting men within the territory of the United States, being a neutral nation, thus speaks: “examining this question under the law of nations, and the general usage of mankind, the American Government produced proofs, from the most enlightened and approved writers on the subject, that a neutral nation must in respect to war, observe an exact impartiality towards the belligerent parties; that favors to the one, to the prejudice of the other, would import a fraudulent neutrality of which no nation would be the dupe; that no succor ought to be given to either, unless stipulated by treaty, in men, arms, or anything else directly serving the war; that the right of raising troops being one of the rights of sovereignty, and consequently appertaining exclusively to the nation itself, no foreign power can levy men within the territory without its consent; that, finally, the treaty of 1778, making it unlawful for the enemies of France to arm in the United States, could not be construed affirmatively into a permission to the French to arm in those ports, the treaty being express as to the prohibition, but silent as to the permission.”

We only add a citation from Dr. Phillimore's work bearing on the responsibility of the nation for acts done within its territory. “The maxim adverted to in a former volume of this work, is sound, viz.: that a State is *prima facie* responsible for whatever is done within its jurisdiction, for it must be *presumed* to be capable of preventing or punishing offenses, committed within its boundaries. A body politic is therefore responsible for the acts of individuals, which are acts of actual meditated hostility towards a nation, with which the govern-

ment of these subjects professes to maintain relations of friendship or neutrality. '*Culpa caret qui scit sed prohibere non potest,*' is the doctrine of the Roman law ; but such an avowal, actual or constructive, on the part of the unintentionally injuring, State justifies the injured State in exercising, if it can, that jurisdiction by foreign force which ought to be, but cannot be exercised by domestic law."*

We are aware that the views of the duties of neutrals are somewhat modified in modern times, that, for instance, of old to allow a belligerent to enlist troops within the neutral's territory, if the same privilege was granted to both adversaries, was not held to be a participation in the war ; while now complete separation from all aid to either of the hostile parties is considered obligatory. Perhaps, owing to this change in the views of neutral duty, as consisting not in impartiality, but in standing entirely aside, nations differ somewhat in their feelings ; those which have generally been neutral may have a nicer sense of what is right than those which have waged the great historic wars of modern times ; but the tendency seems to be as we have represented it. And this is a tendency towards righteousness and peace. Moreover, the neutrals have gained vastly by modern law in the security of their maritime commerce ; why should not with these privileges the definiteness of the line of their duties increase also ?

The English enlistment act, although less stringent than our neutrality laws, was intended to protect the law of nations and generally serves that purpose. Let us now see whether there was good ground under that act, and according to the spirit of international law, in detaining and trying "No. 290," and also whether the English Government seems to have done its duty.

First, the Oreto had left the port of Liverpool, not six months before this gunboat went to sea, and appeared on the ocean as a Confederate privateer. There were men who could be shown to be in all probability agents of the same parties, and intercepted letters proved an intention to procure vessels from England in order to prey on our commerce.

* See Morstadt's Klüber, § 284 ; Wheaton's Elements, § 425 (part 4, chap. 3, § 6) ; Phillimore's Comment, vol. 3, §§ 148, 149.

Secondly, the Alabama, as we will call it by prolepsis, was being built, as the Lairds admitted, by a foreign government—not by themselves as a commercial adventure, which the act did not forbid—and they were indisposed to answer any questions respecting the destination of the vessel after she should leave the port of Liverpool. They did not attempt to disguise what was most apparent, that she was intended for a ship of war.

Was not the probability greatly heightened by these admissions, that this was the beginning of a hostile expedition? Why conceal the fact that a ship of war was built for a government at peace with mankind, and why not even swear to it, if such were in reality the fact?

Thirdly, the evidence submitted to Mr. Adams's counsel led him to advise an application to the authorities at Liverpool that the vessel should be seized. The position was almost conclusive to his mind that she was being fitted out as a privateer for the use of the Confederate Government.

And again, in an opinion given seven days afterward on new evidence, he thinks that a stronger case of infringement of the foreign enlistment act could with difficulty be made out. It is little better than a dead letter, he says, if this vessel can escape. He thinks that in such a case the Federal Government would have serious grounds for remonstrance.

Fourthly, there was direct evidence given by at least one person that the Alabama was going out as a Confederate privateer. William Passmore, who is mentioned by Mr. Sumner in his speech, and whose name appears among those whose affidavits were submitted by our minister to Mr. Collier, swore that he was engaged to go with the vessel on her cruise, and was distinctly told by the captain that the ship was to fight for the Confederate States of America. The elder Laird, the member of Parliament, in a speech delivered at Liverpool in October, 1863, refers to this testimony in the following words: "Does any shipowner present believe, or any man connected with shipping, that the captain of a vessel, supposed to be going upon an extraordinary voyage, would go and tell a man who appears to have been a hired agent or spy of a certain gentleman in London? Would the captain of a

ship on such an expedition go and tell a common sailor, at the sailor's home, all the ins and outs of his intentions regarding the ship?" And then he quotes the solicitor general as saying, in a speech delivered some months before, that "of the six depositions transmitted on the 22d of July, only one was good for anything at all, viz.: the evidence of a person named Passmore, which was sufficient to prove the material facts. Two more were sent, corroborating Passmore, on the 24th, and were received by Earl Russell on the 26th." To which Laird adds, "Passmore was the man who made the affidavit that he was told by the captain where the ship was to go. I don't believe him, and he must have got up the evidence for the occasion." The solicitor evidently regards the testimony of this man and of two others as important, and Laird rebuts it by charging him with a falsehood, on the ground that a captain bound on such a business would not have been such a fool as to admit him into his secrets. Very well, but there the testimony was, and, until it could be shown to be false on the trial of the vessel after seizure, it was good ground for the action of the government.

But the government at length admitted that there was good ground for detaining the vessel by sending orders to that effect. What shall be said of the delay before such action was taken, but that the government was responsible for its consequences! No reason has been given which justifies such delay. The evidence was in a nut shell. The ship was known to be almost ready to sail. If the Queen's advocate was too ill to give advice, new counsel could be employed. The Board of Customs resolved so to do on the 25th of July. Could not an opinion have been reached in a few hours? It looks to persons at this distance from the transaction as if cowardice or indifference, reluctance to detain the ship in the face of a strong public sentiment, or regardlessness of the interests of a friendly state, if not willingness that its commerce should suffer, had seized upon those whose business it was to act with promptitude and vigor.

But how far does the fact that no armament was taken on board in English territory affect the question? Lord Palmerston said in Parliament, that he had great doubts whether, if

the Alabama had been seized, there would not have been a liability for considerable damages on account of the seizure. "It is generally known that she sailed from this country unarmed, and not properly fitted out for war, and that she received her armament, equipment, and crew in a foreign port. Therefore whatever suspicions we may have had—and they were well founded, as it afterwards turned out—as to the intended destination of the vessel, her condition at that time would not have justified a seizure." To this it might be replied, that the orders for her detention were based not on her having an armament on board, but on one or more persons having been enlisted with the understanding that she was to be a Confederate privateer. Moreover, such an evasion of the law is manifestly possible in every similar case. Ought the aggrieved nation to forbear complaining and demanding redress, because the law was a dead letter, and the government could be so easily cajoled? Suppose the captain of the vessel had published in the newspapers that the gunboat belonged to the Confederate States, that it was to go out of English waters unarmed, and to take guns and ammunition on board in a foreign port, or, if worse came to worse, on the sea; suppose he had invited the Board of Customs to take a pleasure excursion to Beaumaris Bay,—her condition under such circumstances would have been precisely that which it was, when, as Lord Palmerston said, it would not have justified a seizure. If this be so, the neutral has no redress under the laws of Great Britain for any depredations on his commerce: only have a rendezvous for two or three vessels in some place like the Azores, where there is no danger from the public authorities, and you may do what you will.

We forbear to add that when the bird had flown, it was the duty of the government, under circumstances which confirmed the more than suspicions of its destination, to send out a swift steamer in pursuit. This was talked of, but never, if we are well informed, was it carried out.

In a letter to Earl Russell of October 23d, 1863, Mr. Adams uses this language: "That this vessel was built with the intent to make war against the United States by British subjects in a British port, and that she was prepared there to be armed and

equipped with a specific armament adapted to her construction for the very purpose she is now pursuing, does not appear to [the United States] to admit of dispute. Furthermore, it is sufficiently established that when this vessel was ready, and her armament and equipment were equally ready, she was clandestinely sent, by the contrivance of her British holders, and the armament and equipment were at the same time clandestinely sent, through the contrivance of the same or other British subjects who prepared them, to a common point outside of the British waters, and there the armament and equipment of this vessel as a warship were completed."

"From a review of these circumstances, the United States understand that the building, armament, equipment, and expedition of this vessel carried with it one single criminal intent, running equally through all the portions of this preparation, fully complete and executed when the gunboat, No. 290, took the name of the *Alabama*; and that this intent brought the whole transaction, in all its several parts here recited, within the lawful jurisdiction of Great Britain, where the main portions of the crime were planned and executed."

He then goes on to say that the United States gave due notice of this criminal enterprise to the British government, and that if they had acted with the required energy, the whole scheme must have been frustrated. This country, then, "cannot consider the justice of their claim for reparation liable to be affected by any circumstances connected with the mere forms of proceedings, on the part of Great Britain, which are exclusively within her own control." He adds, "that he is instructed to say that his government must continue to insist that Great Britain has made itself responsible for the damages which the peaceful, law-abiding citizens of the United States sustain by the depredations of the vessel called the *Alabama*."

These are words which have not yet lost their power. And in reading them, as well as many other papers from the same hand, written about the same time, one cannot help entertaining high respect for the minister, who never lost his patience nor his temper, who maintained the dignity of his country with a noble calmness, and, when he was forced to feel indignation, confined it within those bounds which were prescribed

by the great cause which he represented, and by the trying circumstances in which he was placed. Would that all our statesmen could thus govern themselves !

We have finished our work, and have no intention to discuss the question, What ought now to be done ? It is a pity that the recognition of the belligerency of the Confederates was ever mixed up with that of the Alabama claims. But when the policy of the government was changed, and a treaty submitting this simple question to arbitration was made, it is a greater pity that it was rejected by an almost unanimous Senate. For what is to come next ? Shall we go to war ? On what pretext, when the adverse party is willing to have the differences settled amicably—and at what cost ? Shall Mr. Sumner's position be accepted, and England be called upon to pay damages for every possible result of the first step which she took at the beginning of the war—we ought rather, if we take this position, to say, before the war ? But neither will she nor ought she to think of this ; and we may be sure that such a claim will be scouted at and laughed at everywhere in all impartial countries. Shall we return on our steps and make a new treaty on the basis of the one just rejected ? But that will involve a loss of national character. We shall seem to have acted like children. Shall we let the matter drag along, to be settled some ten years hence ? But we may be sure that better terms will never be obtained than we might have now, unless, indeed, the mean policy be in contemplation of waiting for some time of public distress in Great Britain, and screwing our claims, just or unjust, out of her necessities. We make no reply to these questions of our own asking. Being *inopes consilii* ourselves, we offer no counsel to the country, and are only sorry that those who are responsible for counsel did not look before they leaped.

And now, in closing our remarks, we wish to express our regret that what we have said is in direct opposition to the views of a man whom we esteem and honor. Mr. Sumner is a highly ethical man, he is a peace-loving man, he is one of the best informed men we have ever had in the United States, he has rendered many and varied services to the country, he has endured, in maintaining a righteous cause, what public men

rarely endure. That he desires a protracted quarrel between our country and Great Britain, we cannot for a moment believe. His suggestions, false as they appear to us, do him credit, for it seems to his fervid soul that Great Britain in our contest had a direct complicity with slavery. We cannot suspect him of political management, for he is a scholar and an orator rather than a manager. We shall not cease to hold him in honor, although we think that he has chosen, on the subject of the Alabama claims, an untenable and an unwise position.

Though we disclaim the intention of giving counsel in regard to the negotiations with which Mr. Motley is entrusted, we may be allowed to say that the present moment seems to us to be the very best opportunity for the two countries to settle some points touching neutral rights for the future. To do this is for the highest interests of both nations; it would be honorable for both, and humiliating to neither! The English may be assured that, whatever becomes of the Alabama claims, the memory among us of what they felt and allowed in the late rebellion will not soon sleep, if things remain as they are; and that the next war, in which they become involved, will see more than one Alabama issuing from our ports to rob and burn their shipping. The United States on their part need and demand some assurance that the present loose practice in respect to neutrality will not be persisted in hereafter. Nor is it well for us—either for our character or prosperity—to chew the cud of wrath and brood over supposed wrongs. It is far more important to agree on general rules for the future than to determine how the claims for damages not exceeding, at the utmost, a few millions of pounds, are to be adjusted. We write this in the interests of lasting peace, and in the belief that the present system of rules in regard to contraband is wholly wrong. War now, to no small an extent, is carried on by neutrals and for neutrals: they are the capitalists in the workshop of death. Let the countries agree by treaty that hereafter, when either is a belligerent, no ships of use for the purposes of war shall be built in and sail from the ports of the

other, being a neutral, without heavy bonds given by the parties interested restraining such vessels to an innocent employment. Let blockade running and the export of contraband articles be placed under similar restrictions. Let a trade more bloody than the slave trade be stopped, as far as law and police can stop it. When it is once expressed in honest treaties that such trade is to be frowned upon, the future of the world will be more hopeful.

ARTICLE VII.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

[On account of delay in the printing office a large number of notices of important books are deferred to the next number.]

BIOGRAPHICAL.

LIFE OF DR. SAMUEL MILLER.*—The author of these volumes, so far as we can judge from the examination of their pages, seems to have had two objects in view in presenting them to the public. The first was to give a biographical sketch of his honored father; the second to do what he could, in a side way, to prevent the reunion of the two branches of the Presbyterian Church. If the publication had been delayed two or three months, the size and consequently the expense of the book might have been diminished, while, at the same time, greater unity in the design would have been secured. As the vote in the Old School General Assembly against the proposed reunion was only five, as compared with two hundred and fifty, or more, in its favor, we can hardly avoid the feeling that the delay would have been a decided gain on the whole; but, as the author has doubtless satisfied his own conscience, and as the five brethren need all the support which can be afforded from any source, we are not disposed to insist too earnestly upon this point.

The subject of the biography, as the title indicates, is the late Dr. Miller, who was for more than thirty years a professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton and who ought to be regarded, as truly perhaps as any other man, as the originator of that Institution. Nineteen years have elapsed since his death, but only at this late day has any record of his life been given to the world. The reasons for so long a postponement of the work are not very clearly made known; but it is well that men as prominent and useful as he was should be commemorated, even if it be after another generation has come forward upon the stage of action. We

* *The Life of Samuel Miller, D. D., LL. D., Second Professor in the Theological Seminary of the Presbyterian Church at Princeton, New Jersey.* By SAMUEL MILLER. Philadelphia: Claxton, Remson, and Haffelfinger, 1869. 12mo. 2 vols., pp. 381, 562.

are glad to see the book, and we have read it with much interest. Dr. Miller was not a man of brilliant or great powers, as his son, the author of these volumes, and, indeed, most of the writers whose opinions are cited by him, admit. Yet he had a good mind, sound and well-balanced, thoroughly under his control, inspired by more than ordinary enthusiasm, and supplied with more learning than most of the men who surrounded him. By constant and methodical working, he became prominent in his denomination as a scholar in the ecclesiastical field. He was a writer of reputation, particularly in respect to subjects connected with his department, and was regarded by his Presbyterian brethren as an authority of much weight. Even to extreme age he was constantly active with his pen, having published his last work when he was seventy-nine years old. He discharged all the duties of his professorship almost to the very close of life, and was removed by death while still retaining the fullness of his powers. But it was in his character that he seems to have stood preëminent. The graduates of the Seminary, and the leading men of the Old School body in general, looked upon him as a man of extraordinary goodness. His pupils remembered him in after years with the utmost reverence, esteeming it as one of the privileges of their early life that they were brought under his influence. Their praises of him in this respect, as given in the Biography, are almost unmeasured. The record of such a life can scarcely fail to be interesting and useful to many who read it attentively. In the limits of a brief notice of such a book, it is impossible to review the narrative or call attention to the events which are recounted. We only propose to suggest one or two points which have occurred to us, and then to commend to our readers the perusal of the volumes, if they desire to know the history of this distinguished divine.

Dr. Miller was a man of much larger spirit than most of his Old School contemporaries in the great conflict which divided the Presbyterian body thirty years ago. The story of his life, during the period which immediately preceded the disruption, shows clearly that he did not sympathize with the extremists of his party. The right of private judgment was a right which he respected. The possibility of differing on minor points, and yet of being within the bounds of the orthodox faith, was a possibility which he fully acknowledged. To the last moment, he resisted the course of those who were willing to cast off not only all New England Congregationalists of a more liberal character, but all New School

men in his own branch of the Church. We cannot help believing that, if his counsels could have been followed throughout the whole crisis, the disgraceful scenes of 1837-8 would have been avoided. True it is, indeed, that he finally united himself with the more violent partisans, and acted wholly on their side. But the yielding, at last, was only the yielding of a more generous mind, overborne by the almost resistless force brought to bear upon him, and compelled, as it were, to contradict the nobler utterances of former years. The change which came over him and his associates in the seminary, according to the statements of Dr. S. J. Baird and the hints which are found even in these volumes, was not brought about altogether in the noblest way—yet as for Dr. Miller at least, for he alone is the subject of this book, we are willing to regard it, for the sake of his Christian charity so often manifested, as the change of a man who was as little conscious of the less worthy influences as was possible. The fact of the case was that no man could be a prominent leader in the Old School body, after a certain time, without uniting his voice with the extreme and anathematizing party; and the Princeton gentlemen succumbed to the necessities of the crisis, rather than lose their positions or abandon the old views. It is a little remarkable, that when, in the progress of time, the Presbyterian body has come to a reunion, the successors of those gentlemen have opposed it to the last moment, and then have yielded to a necessity upon the other side. There is nothing more lamentable in such violent movements, as that in 1837 to which we allude, than the failing of men like this honored servant of God, who have stood firm for a while in their large-heartedness and conciliatory spirit. But it is hardly to be wondered at, that so many of them are unable to endure the pressure which comes at the final moment, or to oppose the furious onset of other men who are as bold as they are narrow-minded.

Dr. Miller, it may be remarked again, was a man of a former generation in his manner and style of character, as well as the time in which he lived. The reader will not fail to be interested in observing the change which has come upon society, as he peruses the letters with which the volume is largely filled, or listens to the commendations which his admirers bestow upon their venerated friend. The gentleman of the "Old School" was a type of man quite different from anything that we see in these days. He was vastly more precise and formal, and, so far as dignity consists in manners, he was much more dignified than his more modern

successor. There was a stateliness in his every-day life, in his familiar conversations, even in his amusing stories, which the busy and hurried character of the present time scarcely allows in any man on any occasion. The rapidity with which this entire transformation has taken place is only equaled by its completeness. We can hardly avoid calling attention to this point, and saying that the Princeton professor seems to have been a fine specimen of the old style of man. We do not wonder that, as he lived on to extreme old age, his pupils revered him as having a peculiar glory which they would not be likely to see again.

In regard to his views on many subjects, also, he differed widely from the generality of men in the present day. Dancing he regarded as wrong in itself. "The dancing of the two sexes together," he says, "is most unholy in its very origin and inherent nature"—and, when asked the reason why he so regarded it, he said, "because it is strictly pantomimic and all its motions are but the dalliance of sinful passions." To-day, probably, one half of the members of the Old School Presbyterian Churches in our larger cities allow "the dancing of the two sexes together" in their parlors; and of those who do not we presume there is scarcely one to be found who would condemn it as sinful because it is "pantomimic!" His views in regard to novel-reading were, likewise, those of his time, though on this point there are probably larger numbers now who would agree with him. In the light of what we see on every side in these days, it is almost amusing to read the following sentences in commendation of his wife. "Not long after our union, before she became pious, she proposed to purchase some expensive and showy articles of furniture. This proposal was then resisted, and she readily acquiesced. But after she became decidedly pious, her whole taste and judgment seemed to undergo an entire revolution in regard to this as well as to other matters. From that hour . . . costly and ostentatious living seemed to be her aversion. All her counsels and all her efforts seemed to be directed to the maintenance of moderation in every personal and domestic indulgence." Truly we are reading of another age and of another order of men and women. But the opinions of a former time were held by him on other subjects besides those relating to social life. In one of his letters he assures his correspondent, that "the New Haven view" of the "days" in the first chapter of Genesis as being "demiurgic" is one which he cannot accept, being fully persuaded that they were

six ordinary days of twenty-four hours. And in addressing the distinguished Unitarian writer, Rev. Jared Sparks—though his opinions may be shared by many orthodox persons at the present time—he adopts a mode of expression which most Presbyterian clergymen would now hesitate to employ. “Here then, my dear Sir, I bid you a respectful but melancholy adieu. Be assured I have not, and never had, toward you, an unkind feeling. But when I see you, with endowments rendering you capable of highly valuable services to the Church and to the world, groping in darkness concerning the plan of salvation, and exerting yourself to the utmost to propagate those fundamental errors, which must, if persisted in, conduct both yourself and all whom you persuade to embrace them to eternal perdition—when I see this, ought I not to be grieved?”

Dr. Miller, we can only add, was a man of energy to carry forward good enterprises, and of wisdom to counsel others in their work and wants. The Church with which he was connected found in him one of the most earnest promoters of all her interests. He early saw the importance of having institutions for theological education, and pressed his views upon the attention of those around him. It was but a just recognition of his services in establishing the Seminary, as it was but the dictate of the highest wisdom in view of its future well-being, when he was appointed, by the General Assembly, one of the first two Professors at Princeton. Thirty-seven years of faithful work showed how devoted he was to its success, and how well-fitted he was to influence and guide its students.

But we cannot dwell longer upon this Biography. Of the style in which it is written, we think its readers will judge favorably. There is no excessive adulation. There is no want of discrimination in regard to the character of which it speaks. Of the author's attitude toward those who differ from him, we are not able to express so much approbation. He is evidently one of the more exclusive of his party, and ready to reiterate the false charges of Pelagianism against his opponents. It is a pleasing thought, however, that the reunion, now so sure to be accomplished, is enforcing the spirit of toleration, and that it has not been assented to by the New School body without the emphatic declaration on the part of some of their leading divines, that they will not give up what they have learned from New England, and from New Haven. The day is nearer than it once was, when the spirit of Christ will teach even

those theologians who are the slowest to learn the lesson that the calling their Christian brethren by harsh sounding names is a thing which does not come of a heavenly inspiration.

As for the publisher's part of the volumes, the book is of convenient size, and of respectable character as to type and paper. The proof-reading, also, in general, has been moderately well done; but we cannot forbear citing a single case out of two or three, where the printer's confusion is greater than we have ever noticed in any other book. On page 18, of the second volume, we have the following: "The difficulty of meeting its requisitions [i. e. of the office in Princeton] would be great under the most advantageous circumstances, but in his case it was materially enhanced by the novelty of his oo o hfisistpn." Leaving our readers to arrange these letters in a satisfactory order, we take leave of the book, recommending it again to their attention, if they wish to know the history of the life of which it treats.

SPRAGUE'S ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN PULPIT, Vol. IX.*—After the lapse of some years we have at length received a new volume of this work,—the ninth—including the "Annals" of five of the smaller denominations. It is scarcely necessary for us to do more than simply announce to our readers the fact that the volume has been published. The public are too well acquainted with the character and merits of the book to need any new commendation of it as its successive parts appear, and we refrain from adding anything beyond what has been often said by us heretofore in its praise. Dr. Sprague, of all men in the country, is the man for this great work. He has the wide-extended information which is so necessary, the taste for investigations of this character, without which no man could ever hope to be successful, and the genial and kindly feeling toward every one which lead him to speak with charity and the spirit of love everywhere. The pages of his "Annals" bear evidence, alike in every denomination, of faithful Christian service on the part of our American ministers in all the generations. The perusal of these pages cannot but make any man, who is not hopelessly fettered by his bigotry, more

**Annals of the American Pulpit*; or Commemorative Notices of Distinguished American Clergymen of Various Denominations from the early Settlement of the Country to the close of the year Eighteen Hundred and Fifty-Five, with Historical Introductions. By WILLIAM B. SPRAGUE, D. D. Volume IX, Lutheran; Reformed Dutch; Associate; Associate Reformed; Reformed Presbyterian. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1869. 8vo.

large-hearted and more ready to rejoice that Christ is preached, whether by his own party in the Church or by others. Religious controversy of the narrow order grows meaner the more we see of good men on both sides of the dividing line. It springs from the spirit of Judaism and Pharisaism which have never died away, even from the Church.

THE LIFE OF FATHER DE RAVIGNAN* comes to us from the Catholic Publication Society in an elegant dress, and abounding in the most interesting matter. We earnestly wish for it an extensive circulation, and are sorry that its expensive form is likely to prevent our wishes from being realized. We wish it may be circulated for two reasons: *first*, because it sets forth the excellent Christian characteristics which are exhibited by many of the most devoted Romanists, and we desire that their excellences may be better appreciated than they are by many intelligent Protestants; and *second*, because the inherent defects of this system stand forth in so bold a relief against the back-ground of such remarkable Christian virtues as were possessed by Father de Ravignan.

Father de Ravignan was of a distinguished family—was trained as a lawyer, and on the direct road to the highest distinction in his profession, when he gave himself to the priesthood. In due course of time he became a Jesuit, and rose to high position and influence in that celebrated society. He was also well known and greatly admired as a popular preacher; having been selected to deliver the celebrated conferences in the church of Nôtre Dame in Paris, for a series of years. He was also the confessor and spiritual guide of a great number of distinguished personages, and gained many Protestants over to the Romish faith. In all the relations of life, he appears to have been singularly self-denying, bold, earnest, zealous, and spiritual, and strangely indifferent to the temptations which are supposed by Protestants to assail the Romish priesthood. His character must have been distinguished by many of the Christian virtues in eminent perfection. We wish that the record of such a character may be extensively known, not only that it may serve to stimulate other Christian believers to imitate it, but, as we have said, that it may correct

* *The Life of Father de Ravignan*, of the Society of Jesus. By Father DE PONTREY, of the same Society. New York: The Catholic Publication Society, 126 Nassau street. 1869.

many prevalent notions respecting the Romish system. Protestants cannot too soon lay aside the prejudices which have blinded them against the recognition of Christlike piety whenever it is seen in this church, or which have led them to overlook the power of those truths and those duties which the Romish church enforces with especial emphasis and effect.

On the other hand, the fatal defects of the Romish system are here exhibited in forms which must be fearfully repellant to any truly enlightened Protestant Christian. The views with which Ravignan dedicated himself first to the priesthood and next to the Jesuit society, were obviously unchristlike in their extreme ascetical character, and the notions of what constitutes the most exalted Christian virtue were so plainly un-Pauline, that the intelligent reader of the New Testament cannot but pronounce at once that they were far removed from the practical views of Christianity taught in the discourse of our Lord and enforced by the great apostle. As we read on and find that in his progress toward perfection, he subjected himself to sharp and oft repeated bodily torture, wearing often, perhaps constantly, next to his person a band interwoven with needle points, which he could at any time force into his flesh, that he believed in the virtue of obedience to the direction of his superior as to the word of the living God; that two of his devoted admirers, of high cultivation, are represented by his biographer as having by solemn devotion given up in exchange their own lives in place of his to the arbiter of life and death, in consequence of which his own was prolonged—when we find that he is represented also as having been inspired to enter into intimate, mystical relations with the spirit of the great Loyola, and to have required the experience of years to enter into the profound meaning and to become a proficient in the edifying use of his Spiritual Exercises in conducting *Retraites*—as we meet with these aspects of the faith of Ravignan, set forth by his biographer with such surprising simplicity, such unconscious *naïveté*, as most lovely and divine, we are constrained to pronounce the tree which brings forth such fruit as seriously defective and radically unsound. . The Memoirs of the *de Guerins* and of Madam Swetchine and other books of the kind, give one side, and that the fairest of the practical workings of the Romish faith in natures singularly refined and highly cultured. The life of Father Ravignan gives both sides—that which is most attractive and that which is equally repulsive to a refined and

Christian soul. After reading such a book we are more devoutly thankful for the Reformation and the gospel that knows no priesthood except that of Him who, once for all, by the sacrifice of himself, has passed into the Heavens; that teaches that the truth which Peter confessed, and not the person of Peter, is the rock on which Christ has built his church, and that the Christian faith elevates, and enlarges, and purifies every spring of human action, without repressing, mutilating, or dishonoring a single one, making the believer a perfect man in Christ Jesus, and none the less a man, because he is a Christian.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

EADIE ON GALATIANS.*—This is the fourth volume of Dr. Eadie's Commentaries on the Epistles of Paul; those on the Epistles to the Ephesians, Philippians and Colossians, having been already before the public for a considerable period. In its character and peculiarities it is very similar to the previous volumes. The author has quite manifestly determined upon a certain plan, which, at least for himself, he regards as the best one to be followed out, and he proposes not to deviate from it at all, but only to endeavor to fulfill the idea of it as perfectly as possible. We think his plan is faulty in some respects. His books are too long. There is too great a mass of matter in them. They are deficient in conciseness, and in the simple and sharp presentation of the results which the student wishes to know. Dr. Eadie is not, indeed, so trying in this respect as some of the German writers, who, in abandoning the extremest brevity, seem to lose all control of themselves, and to wander off on unbounded seas without any chart or compass. But he is, nevertheless, oppressive and burdensome in no inconsiderable degree. He is, however, a man of very extensive learning and of much exegetical ability. The very opposite, in the point just alluded to, of his English fellow-laborer in the field of Biblical studies, Bishop Ellicott, he seems to be quite the equal of that distinguished gentleman in other respects. The two men are an honor to English scholarship. If they could be so united together

* *A Commentary on the Greek Text of the Epistle of Paul to the Galatians.* By JOHN EADIE, D. D., LL.D., Professor of Biblical Literature and Exegesis to the United Presbyterian Church, Scotland. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Scribner, Welford & Co., 1869. 8vo. pp. 480. Price, \$5.25.

that the one could gain and the other lose in the matter of conciseness, they would both be more useful and better commentators.

In addition to the commentary on the text, which is very minute, the volume contains essays or discussions respecting all the more important points which the Epistle suggests. The longest of these is the one on the relationship of James, "the Lord's brother," to Jesus, which covers nearly fifty pages. The author believes him to be the brother of Jesus in the ordinary sense of that word—the son of the same mother—and, thus, a different person from James, the son of Alphaeus. This view, which we believe to be the correct one, he sustains with much energy and force. The celebrated passage in the twentieth verse of the third chapter of the Epistle, of which from two hundred and fifty to four hundred explanations have been given, is, of course, not passed over without due consideration. His own explanation is as follows:—"God is one and, therefore, mediatorless. God himself, without any intervention, speaks the promise to Abraham; the promise is conveyed through no third party, as was the law. Whatever contingency might be in the law and its conveyance by a mediator who went between God and the people, there can be none with regard to the promise, the direct and unconditioned word of Jehovah himself alone." It is somewhat presumptuous, perhaps, to pronounce any very decided judgment in a case where the doctors have so completely failed to agree, but we think we may say, with confidence, that Dr. Eadie is nearer to the truth than a good many among the "four hundred." It is a matter of course, however, that he borders, in his view, very closely upon those of some others, and only adds whatever strength his authority may afford to their previously given explanations. The final verses of the Epistle (vi. 11 ff.) he regards as a sort of postscript, but, at the same time, he supposes the apostle, when he speaks of "writing with large letters," to have reference not to this postscript but to the whole Epistle, which, contrary to his ordinary custom, he had written with his own hand. In this last view we are persuaded that he is wrong. We believe the postscript to be complete in itself and to be the only portion of the whole letter which was penned by the Apostle. But we must pass over without further notice these points and many others, which deserve a careful examination whenever such a book as this makes its appearance. A thorough review of it would require extended discussion and many

pages. We can assure our readers that it is an addition to our means of studying this Epistle, and that it merits the most respectful consideration. It will be noticed that it is published, in this country, through Messrs. Scribner, Welford & Co., of New York, who are the agents of Messrs. T. & T. Clark, the original publishers in Edinburgh.

ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES,* and HOW TO STUDY THE NEW TESTAMENT.†—The latter of these two books is one of three volumes which Dean Alford has recently given to the public, for the purpose of guiding ordinary readers of the English Bible to a better understanding of it. In this volume he examines and discusses the greater part of the Epistles of Paul—his method being as follows: Taking the Epistles in their chronological order, he gives, in the first place, a brief general introduction to each, in which the circumstances under which it was written, its date, design, and contents are set forth; and then, secondly, he suggests, in the different chapters and verses, amendments and improvements in the translation, wherever they seem to be required in order to the clearest presentation of the idea contained in the text. Considering that the work is so brief, and that it is designed for those who have no knowledge of the original language, we think it may be regarded as quite useful. And yet it hardly seems to us to fill out the full idea of its title, and we fear that many will examine it with a feeling of disappointment that it gives them only so partial a help. The author may have satisfied his own mind in respect to the accomplishment of his design, but, if so, his design was a more limited one than his title-page would indicate; and persons who are looking for a guide in this matter should see what the book is and just how far it opens the way before them.

The former of the two books is a volume of essays and addresses, which the author had prepared on various occasions, and which are thus collected together for more permanent preservation. They have almost exclusive reference to subjects which peculiarly con-

* *Essays and Addresses, Chiefly on Church Subjects.* By HENRY ALFORD, D. D. New York and London: Strahan & Co., 1869. 8vo., pp. 195.

† *How to Study the New Testament.* The Epistles (First Section). By HENRY ALFORD, D. D., Dean of Canterbury. New York and London: Strahan & Co., 1868. 16mo. pp. 278.

cern the Church, and, in the special points considered, the Church of England. At the same time, they will have a general interest, partly because some of the topics discussed have a general importance, and partly because the views of so prominent a man are necessarily interesting to all who watch the progress or forecast the future of the English Establishment. Two of the essays are on the Education of the Clergy; one on Preaching, its Adaptation to the Present Time; one on the Christian Conscience; one on Charity, the End of the Commandment; one on the Union of Christendom considered in its Home Aspect; and one on the Church of the Future. Some of the remarks with reference to the methods of educating the clergy are founded on the peculiarities of the English system. But, in general, the author takes the strongest ground in favor of a thorough and wide theological education. Dean Alford is evidently a liberal scholar, not afraid of the truth and not bound to old ideas simply because they are old. As a writer on the New Testament he has done a great deal to elevate the standard of Biblical scholarship among his countrymen, and to introduce them to the results of the learning of the best German commentators. He knows too much to be what many English and American authors are. His works are free from the faults with which, as he says, "the great majority of our English expository works are tainted"—namely, "the fault of inquiring less what Scripture has said, than what it ought to say and may be made to say." We are glad to see such strong and much-needed words on the subject of ministerial training in this department, and especially as addressed to those who belong to his own people. But he is equally earnest in other departments. He evidently sees the necessity of a thorough change and a radical improvement of the entire English system, before the body of the clergy can be the educated and earnest men that they should be. On the subject of the relations of the English Church toward dissenting bodies, and of the future of the English Church itself, he speaks like a reasonable man and a Christian. He admits the fact of the "disestablishment" of the Anglican body as an inevitable fact of the future, and urges his associates in that body to prepare for it and make up their minds to meet it. He points out the advantages which will result to themselves from that inevitable fact. The "Church" will be better then, than it now is. The gain will not be only on the side of the non-conforming bodies; it will be also with those who, so generally, have been accustomed to regard the alliance with the State as a great strength and means of safe-

ty, which could not be given up. The haughty assumption of some Episcopalians in this country, as well as in England, will find a fitting rebuke on many of Dean Alford's pages. But there are men whom nothing will influence except the very blast of destruction fall upon their whole system, and such men are the High Church party in every denomination. And yet as every new voice of scholarly and large-minded and Christian men of the free and Pauline order is raised against them, the day of better things is hastened in its coming. The eminent English scholar, whose voice we now hear, may well receive the thanks of all, of whatever name, who are contending in the same great cause.

COMPANION TO THE BIBLE.*—Professor Barrows, lately of the Theological Seminary at Andover, has furnished in this volume a useful aid to Sabbath-School teachers and others who desire to study the Scriptures. He discusses the Evidences of Revealed Religion and the Principles of Biblical Interpretation, and gives both General and Particular "Introductions" to the Old and New Testaments. The chief excellence of the book lies in the concise and readily available form in which the matter has been presented. The learning of the author is evidently extensive and his views are sound, but he has not attempted to go beyond the wants of those to whom the original sources are mainly closed. To all such persons the book may be heartily commended. It will be found serviceable also, we think, to ministers when they wish to find in a few pages the main points of the subjects of which it treats. Dr. Barrows has dwelt earnestly upon the Unity of Revelation in several chapters. That the Bible is one whole, steadily progressing and growing from the beginning to the end—the New Testament resting upon and being the perfection of the Old, the Old pointing forward to and finding its prophecies fulfilled in the New—is one of the great foundation truths for which the Church must contend. It is also one of those truths which must be fully appreciated before we can enter into any proper understanding of God's plan, or any right and reasonable study of His Word. Destructive criticism may lose sight of this fact and deny it, but if so, it is because it does not and will not open itself to those influences and that sense of the Divine, which are essential if we

* *Companion to the Bible*, by Rev. E. P. BARROWS, D. D., Professor of Biblical Literature. Published by the American Tract Society. New York, 1869. 16 mo., pp. 639.

would know anything of the truth as we ought to know it. In the Introductions, both General and Special, the facts and arguments are presented carefully and fairly, and, as a whole, the author has succeeded remarkably well in carrying out his purpose. It is gratifying to see such a scholarly gentleman, after having laid aside his active work of theological instruction, devoting the later part of life to the studies of his department and giving to the world—to the large numbers who cannot know all that he does—the results of his life's labors. We shall gladly see the volume or volumes which he proposes to publish hereafter.

THE OFFICE AND WORK OF THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY.*—A complete, systematic discussion of this important subject has long been a *desideratum* among clergymen and theological students, Professor Hoppin's experience as a pastor and, also, as a theological instructor, his opportunities of personally studying the pulpit of other lands, and his excellent taste and judgment, are among the qualifications which fit him to supply this want. The volume before us comprises the results of his thought and experience on the themes of which it treats. It is the fruit, also, of a wide examination of the previously existing literature bearing on the topics which are handled. The general aim and object of the work are thus stated in the preface: "This volume is chiefly designed as a *text-book* in Homiletics and Pastoral Theology, for those who are in a regular course of training for the ministry of the Gospel. While I hope that pastors may find in it something of value to themselves, it is mainly intended to be used by theological students in the class-room, for the purpose of recitation; and this will account for the broken-up and analytical style of the book, that being necessitated by the treatment in condensed, rather than expanded, forms of discussion of so many and varied themes. This will also explain the formal arrangement of the book, for the effort has been, not so much to depart from the ordinary plan, as to produce a good text-book of judicious rules; not so much to express private thoughts and opinions, as to state general and well-grounded principles."

The first part of the book is taken up with the discussion of the

* *The Office and Work of the Christian Ministry.* By JAMES M. HOPPIN, Professor of Homiletics and Pastoral Theology in Yale College. New York: Sheldon & Co., 1869. 8vo. pp. 620.

history and art of preaching, and of the application of the principles of rhetoric and style to preaching. Preaching is clearly defined ; and it is traced from its germinating idea in the Scriptures through its historical development in the different ages of the Christian Church. The true object and design of preaching are set forth, as well as its difficulties, faults, and right methods. The Sermon itself, in its various parts, as a religious discourse, aiming at instruction and permanent impression, is carefully analyzed, although it is recommended that there should be no stereotyped form of sermonizing ; and under the head of the "Development" of the sermon, we notice the following generalization of what might perhaps be considered the author's view of the Sermon : " We might conceive the ideal of a Christian sermon, not yet attained, or not attained by all, but which is adapted to the needs of our highest modern civilization, while it does not lose the earnestness and practical aim of the Gospel. It is unpretentious, devotional, springing from the meditation of a holy soul upon the Scriptures, with Christ as the central burning theme ; tender and full of love, but strong in apostolic faith, like the preaching of masculine Paul and Luther ; courageously hopeful for man, and filled with the true 'enthusiasm of humanity ;' thoughtful and substantial in reasoning, but not intellectual so truly as *spiritual* ; not confined in any set forms, but free with that liberty wherewith Christ makes free ; with an internal rather than external method of thought ; of the highest literary style, because fresh and simple, almost plain and homely, so that the ignorant man and the child may understand what feeds the most highly educated hearer ; as well fitted for backwoodsmen as for philosophers, because it is deep and penetrating, is drawn from the common wells of truth and salvation, appeals to the common wants and desires of the heart, and is fitted to convert men from sin, and to lead them to the life of God. Nothing could be so simple, and yet nothing so high and difficult, as such a sermon. It could not be learned in the schools, for it is not theological, though it teaches a true theology. It must be taught by the spirit of Christ to the consecrated mind that has conscientiously and laboriously done its part in the way of thorough preparation."

In the more general application of the principles of rhetoric to preaching, such important topics are treated of as the uses of reasoning to the preacher, the study of language and English literature, delivery, taste in preaching. The qualities of the true sub-

ject, preaching upon Christian doctrine, Christian morality, and Christian experience, and the characteristics of an effective pulpit style ; wherein while a high literary standard is held up, the truth seems to be everywhere strenuously insisted upon, that the real power of the preacher consists in a conformity of his own spirit and life to the divine word that he preaches. The second part of the book is devoted to the treatment of the Pastoral Office, and may be briefly summed up in the author's own words: " Our method will be from the discussion of the pastoral office itself, and its formations in nature and Scripture, or the absolute view of the subject, to pass on to the actual embodiment of the office in the fit personal instrument ; and from that, to discuss the pastor's general relations to society and the world around him ; and from that, to come to his more special, profound, and enduring work in the care of souls, in the realm of spirit, and in the extension of Christ's eternal kingdom." In the carrying out of this plan many practical subjects of vital interest to the church are discussed, among them the theory and form of public worship, the treatment of religious doubts and difficulties, Christian nurture, and the Church's benevolent activity. One main idea which the author has wished to bring out is—that the preacher is, above all, an *interpreter of the Word of God*, and that preaching therefore should be drawn directly *from the Word of God*, that it should be scriptural, exegetical, textual ; that it should have its real root and inspiration in the Scriptures, and not in philosophy or theology. There should be less of topical preaching and more of simple, spiritual, scriptural preaching—bringing the Word of God to meet the real wants of the soul. At the same time Professor Hoppin recognizes the need of more severe and original thought, and a broader culture in the preacher than formerly there was, in order to meet the scientific and literary progress of the age.

THE DAY DAWN AND THE RAIN.*—A volume of extraordinary merit, as we trust some of our readers have already discovered for themselves. The prefatory notice from the "Edinburgh Daily Review" commends it in terms which at first we feared must be extravagant, but on reading the Sermons we are moved to indorse rather than to qualify the eulogy. We do not remember any col-

* *The Day Dawn and the Rain, and other Sermons.* By the Rev. JOHN KER, Glasgow, Scotland. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 12mo. pp. 450, 1869.

lection published for many years past, on the whole, superior in the combination of all the qualities demanded in printed sermons—which is saying the more because the press has of late multiplied works of this kind, as the public taste has craved them, both in newspapers and volumes, more than in preceding generations. They are unlike Robertson's, but not inferior, and to many intelligent and devout readers will prove to be more satisfactory and healthful. For freshness, discrimination and delicacy of thought, felicity of illustration, purity of style, and the effective use of Scriptural incidents and language, we recommend them to ministers and to their hearers. Without being formally "Doctrinal" they have a rich evangelic flavor, and while pursuing independent trains of thought on grave topics, they everywhere breathe a devout and kindly spirit. The first sermon, which gives the volume its title, is enough to secure attention for the series of twenty-four. For example, the thought that many of the ancient predictions have successive fulfillments, terminating only in Christ, is thus set forth:—"The promises of the Old Testament are waves which urge each other on, to rise and fall in many a deliverance, until at length they break on the great shore of all safety—the salvation which is in Christ, with eternal glory." And in the sermon on "Work and Watching," the two offices are thus depicted: "In every soul there should be the two sisters of Bethany, active effort and quiet thought, and both agreeing in mutual love and help. But Mary no longer sits at the feet of Christ and looks in His face. She stands at the door and gazes out into the open sky to watch the tokens of his coming, while in this hope her sister in the house still works." We could easily multiply beautiful selections, but the appreciative reader will enjoy them the more in their appropriate settings. The author's preface speaks gracefully of a reason for the publication, "for the sake of those whom he was accustomed to address by the living voice, and whom he can, at present, reach but seldom through that means." If we are to understand that he is disabled in health for pulpit service, the regrets of his hearers may be compensated by the satisfaction thus given "beyond their circle."

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

Conybeare & Howson's *Life and Epistles of St. Paul*. The only Complete and Unabridged Edition. The two Volumes of the London Edition in one, with the Text and Notes entire, and the Maps and Illustrations, at the reduced price of \$3. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. Royal 8vo. pp. 556.

Jeremiah, and his Lamentations, with notes, critical, explanatory, and practical, designed for both pastors and people. By Rev. Henry Cowles, D. D. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 434.

The Four Gospels: Translated from the Greek Text of Tischendorf, with the various Readings of Griesbach, Lachmann, Tischendorf, Tregelles, Meyer, Alford, and others; and with critical and expository notes, by Nathaniel S. Folsom. Boston: A. Williams & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 476.

The Mystery of Iniquity Unveiled: or, Popery Unfolded and Refuted, and its destination shown in the light of Prophetic Scripture, in seven discourses. By Chandler Curtis. New York: Protestant Publication Society, 85 Nassau street. 1869. 12mo. pp. 417.

Jesus on the Holy Mount. By Joseph Sanderson, D. D. New York: American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street. 1869. 12mo. pp. 278.

The Parables of our Lord explained and applied. By Rev. Francis Bourdillon, M. A., Rector Woolbeding, Sussex. New York: American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street. 12mo. pp. 320.

The Divine Human in the Incarnate and Written Word; and some Thoughts on the Atonement older than the Creeds. By a member of the New York Bar. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 201.

God's Thoughts fit Bread for Children: A Sermon preached before the Connecticut Sunday-School Teachers' Convention, at the Pearl-street Congregational Church, Hartford, Conn., March 2d, 1869. By Horace Bushnell. Boston: Nichols & Noyes. 1869. 16mo. pp. 38.

The Marriage of the King's Son, and The Guilt of Unbelief. Two Sermons, By Rev. William James. With some memorials of his Life. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 142.

The Controversy between True and Pretended Christianity. An Essay delivered before the Massachusetts Methodist Convention, held in Boston, Oct. 15th, 1868. By Rev. L. T. Townsend. Boston: Lee & Shepard. 1869. 16mo. pp. 82.

Mutual Relations of Natural Science and Theology. An Oration pronounced before the Connecticut Beta of the Phi Beta Kappa Society, [Hartford, Conn., July 7th, 1868. By the Rev. William Rudder. Philadelphia. 1869. 12mo. pp. 48.

Fenelon's Conversations with M. de Ramsai, on The Truth of Religion, with his Letters on The Immortality of the Soul, and The Freedom of the Will. Translated from the French, by A. E. Silliman. 1869. 12mo. pp. 71.

On the Duty of Carrying the Voluntary Principle into the Conduct of the Foreign Missions of the Protestant Episcopal Church. Philadelphia. 1869. 12mo. pp. 16.

The Mode of Baptism: A Discourse. By Rev. J. W. Hough, Jackson, Michigan. 1869. 16mo. pp. 26.

Review of the Baptismal Controversy. With a Statement of the Argument for a Revision of the office for Infant Baptism. By Rev. C. W. Andrews, D. D. Second Edition. Philadelphia. 1869. 12mo. pp. 19.

The New Affinities of Faith: A Plea for free Christian Union. By James Martineau. Boston: William V. Spencer. 1869. 16mo. pp. 38.

Is it Right to be Rich? By Lewis Tappan. Second Edition. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1869. 16mo. pp. 24.

Evening by Evening; or, Readings at Eventide for the Family or the Closet. By C. H. Spurgeon. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 400.

HISTORICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

The First Charter and the Early Religious Legislation of Massachusetts. A Lecture in a Course on the Early History of Massachusetts, by members of the Massachusetts Historical Society, at the Lowell Institute, Boston. Delivered February 9th, 1869. By Joel Parker. Boston. 1869. 12mo. pp. 85.

Reminiscences of Felix Mendelssohn Bartholdy. A Social and Artistic Biography. By Elise Polko. Translated from the German, by Lady Wallace, with additional letters addressed to English correspondents. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1869. 12mo. pp. 334.

Wandering Recollections of a Somewhat Busy Life. An autobiography. By John Neal. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1869. 12mo. pp. 431.

Jane Taylor. By Mrs. H. C. Knight. New York; American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street. 16mo. pp. 224.

The White Foreigners from over the Water. The Story of the American Mission to the Burmese and the Karens. New York: American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street. 12mo. pp. 334.

A Sermon in Memory of the Rev. George Champlin Shepard, D. D., Preached in Grace Church, Amherst, Mass., 20th December 1868. By S. P. Parker, Rector. Hartford. 1869. 12mo. pp. 11.

BELLES LETTRES.

Krilof and his Fables. By W. R. S. Ralston, M. A. of the British Museum. London: Strahan & Co. 1869. Geo. Routledge & Son, 416 Broome street, New York. 12mo. pp. 180.

The Man who Laughs. By Victor Hugo. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1869. 8vo.

Two Life-Paths. A Romance. By L. Mühlbach. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1869. 8vo. pp. 157.

Stretton. A Novel. By Henry Kingsley. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1869. 8vo. pp. 250.

The Habermester. A Tale of the Bavarian Mountains. Translated from the German of Herman Schmid. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1869. 12mo. pp. 369.

Mopsa the Fairy. By Jean Ingelow, with Illustrations. Boston. Roberts Brothers. 12mo. pp. 224

THE
NEW ENGLANDER.

No. CIX.

OCTOBER, 1869.

ARTICLE I.—PLATO'S CONCEPTION OF A SUPREME
BEING.

Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy. By WILLIAM
ARCHER BUTLER, M. A. Edited, with Notes, by WILLIAM
HEPWORTH THOMPSON, M. A. Two vols. Philadelphia:
Parry & McMillan, 1857.

Plato, and the other Companions of Sokrates. By GEORGE
GROTE, F. R. S. Three vols. London: John Murray, 1865.

The Christian Element in Plato and the Platonic Philosophy.
By Dr. C. ACKERMANN, Archdeacon at Jena. Translated
from the German, by SAMUEL RALPH ASBURY, B. A. With
an Introductory Note, by WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD, D. D.
Edinburg: T. & T. Clark, 1861.

*Plato against the Atheists; or, the Tenth Book of the Dia-
logue on Laws, accompanied with Critical Notes, &c.* By
TAYLER LEWIS, LL. D., Professor of the Greek Language
and Literature in the University in the City of New York.
New York: Harper & Brothers, 1859.

It is safe to say, that Plato's writings will never become *popular*, in the sense of being sought after and enjoyed by the multitude, as modern works of fiction, or even the better historical treatises, are popular. The subjects, the style of thought, the method of its arrangement and presentation, are such as to require a certain peculiar mental training, in order to enjoy or even understand in any good measure the plainest of the Dialogues. And many of the more abstruse would always remain above both the comprehension and patience of the ordinary reader.

But it is likewise safe to say, that Plato himself is often more easily understood than his commentators; that from a plain rendering of his works, as they stand, into our tongue, and from a careful perusal of them, his leading thoughts and points of belief soon come to be perceived. And, what renders the subsequent study more easy and profitable, it is also seen that these fixed principles of moral and philosophical faith rule in the mind of the author, and so serve constantly as a guide and key to the reader. And any commentary that is a faithful commentary on Plato alone, and not on something wholly second or third-hand from him, will be both interesting and valuable, and will make his real doctrines appear far more plain, not to say sensible, than is commonly supposed.

Within a few years only have such facilities been given to the English reader as to insure something like a tolerable understanding of real Platonism. There have been enough Histories of Ancient Philosophy, especially in the German language; and dry and technical enough, whether translated or not. Further than this, without taking up with the most meager outline—a bare skeleton without life or beauty—it was impossible to go. As a whole, and not in abstract alone, but in the fullness of the original presentation, Plato could not well be understood by the mere English reader.

Much has been done within a short time to remedy this defect. The entire works of Plato—all that can be associated with his name—have been given in English dress by Messrs. Cary, Davis, and Burges, and published in Bohn's Classical Library. This is a boon to others besides undergraduates; and

will be the means of aiding patient study and comparison in other spheres. Again, the published lectures of Wm. Archer Butler, on the History of Ancient Philosophy, contain a full and clear exposition of Platonism. Death intervened to cut short the entire work, leaving only sketches and memoranda of the schools after Plato; but fortunately the lectures on that philosopher and his system were written out. They are full, well arranged, and digested, and very valuable. And now the great work of Mr. Grote, on "Plato, and the other Companions of Sokrates," is before us—a noble sequel to his History—giving with his vast learning and thorough preparation for the task, a critical account of the philosopher, his immediate associates, his works, and, not least, a full analysis of his Dialogues.

That these publications, taken together, with others recently issued, and the various criticisms elicited by them, have added greatly to our philosophical stores, all will be eager to admit. They mark a new era for us in philosophy; and will doubtless stimulate thought and turn it back to the genuine fountains of Platonism.

It is our object in this Article to endeavor to show what Plato's conceptions were, so far as we can gather them from his writings, concerning the Deity; in what relation he placed Him to other truths; and to find the source of these ideas, in the measure in which they were derived. We have sought simply to bring into one view the main points relating to this subject.

Occupying so large a place in the history of speculation—both the treasury of antecedent and the germ of subsequent systems—the Platonic philosophy is yet most interesting as furnishing the index to the best productions of the ancient mind in matters religious and moral. It shows the highest summit reached by either Greek or Roman thought in ethics and theology. It both approaches nearest the doctrines of Inspiration, and, at the same time, when compared with them, gives the truest view of the unapproached and unapproachable simplicity and divine worth of Revelation. When we would know the most the human mind can do without the aid of special enlightenment from above, we turn to Plato. When

we would measure how far the subtlest intellect—enriched with all natural gifts, but without the peculiar breathings of that Spirit by which holy men of old spake, falls short of the perfect wisdom that is from heaven, we turn to Plato. His thoughts are thus a landmark to all who would compare human and divine knowledge. Though outside the temple, where the ancient servants of God bow and worship and feel the living coal from off the altar touch their lips, he yet seems to stand on the threshold, and to hear and repeat the echoes of the holy oracle. His conceptions of God, of the human soul, of sin, and redemption, are, accordingly, marked with a two-fold character; pointing, at once, with wonderful accuracy to the truth, and at the same time failing fully to reach the clear and perfect substance of the truth. In this light we must regard them.

Turning now to consider the fact and nature of Plato's belief in God, we remark, that he has never been claimed by Atheists as one of their number. And those who have sought to shelter Pantheism, at least in anything of its grosser nature, under his authority, have wholly erred. Long ago, and with sufficient reason, he was reckoned by Cudworth among the foremost of the ancient believers in the existence of one supreme God. His mental vision was too clear, his moral instincts were too true, either to rest in the contradictions of polytheism, or to confound mind with matter. His reason demanded a ruling intelligence; his heart craved a God to worship, one in whom his best aspirations could center. Accordingly, he sets forth a personal Being, arrayed in the true attributes of personality. In this he is distinguished from most who preceded him, and stands on ground reached by but one or two philosophers before his time. Rather, he makes their ground a basis and point of departure, and rises far above them—his views both broader and profounder.

Plato separates widely between the Deity and the Universe, as to their essence and mode of existence. But yet he maintains a close relation between them. From and around the supreme Deity he sees all things proceed and revolve. He places Him at the head of the vast hosts of subordinate deities—His agents and servants. He makes Him the arranger and

architect of the Universe, and its constant upholder and director. He is the center of the moral world. He is the end of aspiration, and likeness to him is the highest attainment of the human soul.

Though here and there Plato seems to confound the Deity with some principle or virtue, so that for the moment we hesitate; though in some of the Dialogues we grope for the truth; in other places the record is so clear and the assertions so plain; and, moreover, the *ground-work* is of such a nature, as to admit of little hesitation regarding his real views.* The Dialogues were written at widely different times, and for various objects. In some it is the writer's purpose to raise questions, rather than to solve them. In others he plays with the subject, and introduces others' views, instead of his own. Even here there is richness of thought, and wealth of illustration, serviceable for future use, if seeming for the present to disappoint. It seems scarcely worth while to deny that Plato had gathered his speculations upon *metaphysica*† and *moral* subjects, at least, into a system. Does not his very anxiety to marshal into order the few physical facts with which he is familiar, prove this? If his works do not express the perfect result, in his own mind, doubtless, he clearly saw the relation of the different parts to a single structure; and all his writings were made to fit into some portion of that edifice, and to aid in its completion.‡ And when in sober earnestness he propounds his own doctrines—and the tone at such times changes, and a certain sincerity and depth pervade the words—then we find no uncertainty in the expression, but a precise and clear statement, showing profound belief in a personal God.‡

If we would appreciate the real position occupied by him in this respect, and understand the extent to which he had freed himself from the chains of contemporary and prior religious belief, we must compare his views of the universe and its Ruler with those of the chief of the Greek poets. We should find him in a different sphere from them. We should imagine

* Thus Ackermann, in his very valuable work, appeals to the *spirit* and *basis* of the Platonic system, rather than to detached passages, in finding a Christian element in that philosophy.

† Ackermann, pp. 128-4.

‡ For the outlines of the Platonic Theology, see Ackermann, pp. 44-55.

that many centuries, instead of a short space, separated him from Sophocles or Æschylus. Sincere as is the piety of the Father of Tragedy, deep as is his reverence for the Olympian rulers, and high as he has enthroned the chief among them, we feel that he is still held in the bonds of Greek thought, and that it is only a great and earnest mind worshiping what at best is but the old and imperfect god—the familiar Zeus—and bowing down before the dictates of the well-known Fates.

Not so with Plato. Without a special announcement of his creed, we see that he occupies a different stand-point, and looks on a different world. And, what is more remarkable, he does not go back to the common theories. He is emancipated from them *in spirit*, because he is conversant with purer truths. His hopes and fears and reverence have an aim other than those of either Æschylus, or Sophocles, or even the pious Pindar. His heaven is higher than Olympus, his God is greater and mightier and more ancient than Zeus. He is a Being to be loved and revered for the ineffable purity of his nature, no less than for his greatness and wisdom. There surely is some ground for this change in representation; it can arise only from a total change in conception. If it is true, as Professor Blackie remarks,* that “all the previous culture of Greece, intellectual and poetical, culminated in Plato,” it is no less obvious that in all that pertains to a clear perception of spiritual entities there is here great and unlooked for superiority over the past. If it is true, again, that “to Plato’s mind atheistical science would convey about as much meaning as suicidal life; for science is possible only where there are ideas, and ideas are possible only where there is mind; and minds are the offspring of God; and atheism itself is not merely ignorance and stupidity, it is the purely nonsensical and the unintelligible;”†—we must certainly find the reason for this quickened apprehension in a really purified discernment both of intellectual and moral truth.

But we proceed to verify these general statements by examining more in detail Plato’s idea of God. As he has made God the center

* *Edinburgh Essays*. 1856. p. 13.

† *Ib.*, p. 27.

of his philosophical system, so he has made all the parts of that system unite in Him and hold a special relation to Him. Grouped around are these truths; ideas, rational beings, the material universe: and understanding the relations of the supreme Deity to these facts, we shall be in a position to appreciate the views of our Philosopher on the subject, both in their deficiency and their truth.

I. We will consider first the Mode of God's Existence, as conceived by Plato.

1. The Unity of God is a real point in his belief. It was of necessity a truth not easily grasped, much less, easily set forth, in that ancient age. Various considerations tended to increase the difficulty of its clear and constant presentation. The inherent abstruseness of the idea—the philosopher's respect for the sacred dictates of hoary tradition—the incompatibility of the truth with the dominant faith of the Greeks—and the little sympathy it was likely to meet with, nay, the hostility its announcement without veil or compromise was sure to incur—all tended to obscure its exposition in words. But its reception by Plato is not a matter of doubt. Professor Lewis, in very copious remarks upon the tenth book of the *Laws*, gives his views of the Platonic Theology. While noticing the occasional inconsistencies of his author, he expresses, in eloquent terms, a sentiment that every reader of the *Dialogues* must feel—an earnest conviction of a real perception of and reverence for one God by the philosopher. What he says of the employment of the plural *θεοὶ* in that book, to denote the *divine nature*, seems perfectly correct: "Throughout this whole argument with the atheist, *θεός* may be substituted for *θεοὶ*, without at all affecting its validity, and we should by so doing come nearer to the philosopher's true meaning, than by retaining the common term, with the misconception arising from our modern notions; that is, we should better translate his spirit by adopting a slight mistranslation of the letter."*

This is a point denied by some and reluctantly admitted by others. And it is only after careful comparison of the various dialogues that we gain a settled conviction of the fact. But

* Plato against the Atheists. p. 104.

such study shows more and more evidently this truth, the unity of God, lying in the inmost consciousness of Plato and directing his thoughts. The "gods many" of heathenism retire one by one from around the throne of the Supreme Spirit, and veil their faces in His presence. Clouds and darkness are around Him; but there are moments when the clouds lift and reveal Him in His ineffable glory. This vagueness, added to a conscious inability on the part of the philosopher to speak worthily of what is so high, and an unwillingness to attempt the impossible task, permits the casual reader to pass over hints and half-finished outlines, that, duly regarded and joined with fuller statements, would lead to the true stand-point of the writer.*

It is matter for wonder, not chiefly that Plato gave personality to this highest Being—for the Greek mind could not too distinctly clothe its deities with both the forms and frailties of mortals—but that he put that mighty Presence far back of the ordinary gods of his country, and while defining, at the same time not *too fully* disclosing, the glorious One. He finds God; and at once is fearful of degrading Him. This is no slight proof that something of the truth had been revealed to him. He draws aside the veil to gaze, and straightway the vision awes him, and lays restraint upon his tongue. Not that the vision is lost upon him: it forms his thoughts to order in all higher contemplations, and becomes the moulding principle of his speculations.—See where he stands: Others had caught a view of a ruling Intelligence, but the belief was for the most

* Cf. Van Heusde, *Initia philosoph. Platonica*. Veruntamen, quia unum respice, qui mundi et auctor et gubernator esset, Deum habuerit Plato, non est quod dubitemus." Vol. iii., p. 246.

President (then Professor) Woolsey, in a review of the first edition of Mr. Lewis' work, suggests three causes as operating to forbid fuller and more precise phraseology upon the unity of God in Plato. 1. His notion of the supreme God was somewhat transcendental, and he felt the difficulty of bringing it down to the level of the popular mind. Not that he made God a mere essence, without attributes: but a true knowledge of ideas was difficult for most men; and the idea of God was the last to be reached. 2. In view of disorders in the universe, he may have been disposed to confine God to the intelligible world, and to introduce a set of mediators between the Supreme and the lower universe. 3. By nature his mind was prone to believe in spiritual causes, and to look with reverence upon the tradition of the olden times. Bib. Sacra, vol. ii., pp. 532-3.

part loosely held. Anaxagoras proclaimed a presiding Mind, and rose at a step far above his predecessors. But he was not constant in his representations; and as he proceeds the material dims his view, and Intelligence merges into mere physical force. Socrates rose still higher, and found an ever-present Providence arranging for the good of all. Plato *enthroned* this Being, and made all things dependent on His will.

Doubtless, the more serious minds of Greece, as exemplified in the chief tragic poets, saw a dim Image above the Olympian dynasty, swaying all things by its irrevocable decrees. Zeus himself is not supreme, when we look with exactest scrutiny into the sources of his power. Fate or Destiny controls even the god of gods. But Fate only emerges when the deepest feelings of the soul are stirred, and it is seen that a power higher than that of a generated and finite being must guide and balance the strangely conflicting forces of the moral world.

The ruling God of Plato is not *Fate*. He is brought into more constant and gracious connection with human affairs. He is more distinctly visible than the old shadowy Destiny, for He is possessed of human emotions. Heart is added to unconquerable will; wisdom to blind, crushing power. A wise and loving Providence takes the throne of dreadful Fate; and yet, though brought nearer, it is not lowered to finite frailties. It is interesting to observe how the primitive idea of one God, after being almost lost, works itself out thus toward the light. The Platonic Demiurge is sufficiently hidden, but He is far more personal than the awful Destiny of the poets. He is even "somewhat transcendental," but He is in any event as truly one and as personal as Zeus himself, while his personality is unstained by the remotest touch of imperfection.

2. The God of Plato has Eternity of existence ascribed to Him. Uncreated, self-existent, He has no beginning. Matter and Ideas share in this eternity of being. The necessary, and so eternal, existence of the Deity is argued at length and with great beauty and force in the tenth book of the *Laws*. The reasoning is founded on the well-known principle that soul is a substance self-moved—so a first source of motion, and hence

eternal.* However delusive the principle when made thus general, and held irrespective of the will and power of God—and Plato himself was led to the proper limitation and use of this argument in subsequent investigations†—it certainly applies with entire truth to the eternity of *God*. And in the *Laws* the weight of argument rests on this point. Soul is declared to exist before body,‡ and to be superior to it. Among all the species and causes of motion soul holds a distinct place, and is the only all-sufficient cause of motion, both of other things and also of *itself*.§ Hence its superiority of nature. It is the great first cause of change.¶ It is itself endowed with life, and it alone bestows life.¶ It rules the universe, directing all things, in heaven, on earth, and in the sea.** It rules through intelligence and virtue, having taken the former as an ally.†† The harmony of the whole course of nature attests that it is under such a guide,—the best, the noblest kind of soul.‡‡ And it rules and guides as a god. §§

From the termination of the discussion on this point, we, indeed, find the universe filled with guiding and impelling souls—*gods*, as Plato calls them. But he, himself, seems to give this term in a lower sense here, and for the sake of the argument. Instead of finding *no* God, is not the universe, he argues, *full*

* Phædrus, 51-53, (Eng. trans. Plato's Works. Bohm's ed., London).

† *Laws*, B. X. *Timæus*, *passim*.

‡ Not before matter, but *body—organized matter*.

§ See Plato against Atheists, Excursus xvi., on the impossibility of separating the notion of spirit from that of self-motion. Also Ex. xxvi., on Aristotle's misrepresentation of Plato's doctrine; inferring an eternal activity on the part of the Deity, and so deducing the eternity of the universe. Such was not Plato's meaning. What he intended was this: "that the first Cause was something more than *δυναμις*; an eternal *activity* constituting its very essence, yet by no means *necessitating* it to act out of itself, until by an exercise of will, it should give rise to an outward universe, which, although actuated by, remains clearly distinct from, this everlasting energy." p. 192. Throughout the tenth book of the *Laws*, and especially in the argument respecting motion, Plato speaks not of the *anima mundi* of the *Timæus*, which Aristotle has in mind, but "employs the term *soul* for the immaterial principle which was prior to all creation and generation of matter—in fact, as another name for the Eternal Deity himself"—*Ib.*

¶ *Laws*, x. c. 7.

¶ *Ib.*

** *Ib.*, c. 8.

†† *Ib.*

‡‡ *Ib.*

§§ *Ib.*, c. 9.

of gods? One eternal Soul, at least, impels the world of matter.* In the *Timæus* the one eternal God is set apart from all subordinate deities.

As to the mode of the existence of this Being, Plato, in part, shuns the question, declaring "that to find the Creator and Father of the universe is hard indeed; and when found it is impossible to reveal Him to all."† But his whole system is built on the division of all things into the generated and mutable, and the uncreated and unchangeable.‡ The material universe stands in one class; God and the archetypal Ideas in the other. As to the duration of the existence of the Deity, it is unending. After the lesser gods are formed, He declares to them that they are made possessors of an immortality bestowed upon and assured to them by his own unchanging will. "Whatsoever is formed by me is by my will indestructible." And hence He declines to form the inferior races, lest by virtue of that creation they should be immortal.§ Still he himself furnishes the material for the human soul.||

He who can thus bestow immortality of His own good pleasure is viewed as self-existent. He is called the "eternal" God.¶

And terms alone, though abundant, do not express the whole conception on this point. We are best impressed with the majesty of Him who is here seen through a glass darkly, as we find it the sole object of all these writings to carry back every conceivable principle to God, and make Him the Source—the great First Cause. We need not dispute about words, when a Being is revealed who in His greatness and eternity embraces every perfection.

3. Plato conceives of God as *unchangeable* in His being. One of the main points of contrast in the Platonic philosophy between the intelligible world and the sensible, as they are termed, is, that the former always exists according to the "same"—is constant and immutable—while the latter is subject to change and decay.** This indeed constitutes the very

* Cf. *Laws*, xii., c. 13.

|| *Tim.* xvii.

† *Tim.* c. ix.

¶ *Tim.* xii.

‡ *Ibid*

** *Tim.* ix.

§ *Tim.* xvi.

strength and sublimity of that system, that it reaches up out of the sphere of the fading and transitory, and takes hold of that within the veil. None had so wholly separated the two worlds, and assigned them such truthful attributes. The visible and the invisible—what the senses reach and what is reserved for the cognizance of the reason alone—these are here first, by human philosophy, made to occupy their rightful places. But that immutability which shines so clearly in the invisible world, and exists in the visible, though hidden under changing forms, has primarily its ground in the nature of the immutable God.

Add to this, that the God of Plato is pure spirit and incorporeal; that he fills immensity and His power is everywhere felt; that He is invisible and ineffable; and we see the basis of Theism in this profound philosophy. Gathering together the divine attributes, scattered here and there through the *Dialogues*, a Being emerges personal and spiritual.*

II. We pass to consider the relation of the Deity to *Ideas*.

And here we enter a field unknown to modern speculation, except as received from the great Thinker and made the subject of criticism. But if we would understand Plato, we must receive as realities these ideal forms, and walk not as amid shadows but facts. Not to enter into the subject of Platonic *Ideas* further than is necessary to set forth the nature of the divine Being, it will be needful to realize the principles of that belief which pervades every part of the Platonic philosophy.

In the same sphere, and co-existent with the Deity, are the *forms* of things—the archetypal patterns—the *Ideas*, according to which He fashioned every part of the universe. In the first instance they exist apart, from eternity dwelling in the view of God. They belong to that world that is unfolded only to the pure intellect, and are the objects of reason, without the agency of the senses. Looking upon these, the Supreme mind formed all things, as after a divine and perfect

* Cf. Ackermann, p. 49. He finds also in Plato's partiality for a *Monarchy* in government a strong argument for his real belief in the unity of God. For in his view the State is a microcosm—a copy of the universe ordered and ruled by God. p. 47.

model.* The completed work was imperfect in any wise, not through defect in the Ideas, nor through want of goodness in God, but from the intractability of matter, with which and on which He wrought. Hence, the universe as a whole, and every, the minutest part, was fashioned after patterns existing forever in the divine mind.

What were they? What was the nature, in the view of our philosopher, of these "forms" which he makes to be impressed on matter in reducing it to bodies,—of these *Ideas* after which it was wrought? What is the very *substance* of that theory which Cicero declares Plato most strenuously held, and in which he affirms there was something divine?† To answer this satisfactorily may be beyond our power. With one class of subsequent thinkers—to leave out of view wholly the term as employed in modern speculation—we should consider them as veritable *models*, eternal and immaterial. With another class we shall find them held as the *causes* and *principles* of things. With still another, as the eternal Laws and Reasons of things.‡ Others hold that they are the "thoughts of God," mere *conceptions*, in accordance with which he formed the world.§

Of these it may be difficult to select any one that fulfills all the requirements of Plato's Idea. He evidently held that it was something more than a thought—a conception of the divine mind. He would have made it, rather, the *object* of such thought, placing it before the mind of God as a subject of contemplation, and so have widely separated Ideas from divine conceptions.¶ Again, though we might regard them as causes, it would clearly be in a secondary sense, and from their close connection with creation. That they are *principles*, in some sense, as having in a manner passed into the essence of the material world, we cannot deny, and probably Plato so regarded them. Professor Butler finds in the Ideal theory a

* Tim. ix.

† Acad. I. 9.

‡ Butler, Lectures Hist. Anc. Phil. Vol. ii., p. 127.

§ For various opinions, cf. Fleming's Vocab. Phil., *Idea*.

¶ In the Republic, x. 2, God is represented as the *originator* of these patterns in nature, as something objective to Himself.

reference to the *laws* and *reasons* of things. He holds this as the real truth contained in that theory. It does, indeed, give clearness to this intricate subject, and by its simplicity commends itself to modern thought. But we must still doubt whether this lay in the mind of Plato with such distinctness and simplicity as set forth by his expounder. And while this was doubtless embraced as a prominent part in his conception, it evidently did not completely measure it.

The word *idéa* is used in place of *εἶδος*, according to the Editor and Annotator of Professor Butler's Lectures, in the more *mature* of Plato's works, and marks the completed theory in the mind of its author.* And he likewise says, this former term, expressing the perfect and the purest form of the doctrine, is used where it is desired to express the Idea under the aspect of a *παράδειγμα*, or pattern. Professor Butler himself remarks,† that "of all the terms expressive of the original idea, none is more constantly used than *παράδειγμα*, an exemplar," in the writings of Plato. This then is the acknowledged form under which he most constantly presents his theory. Now the inquiry is, is this a mere figurative expression, or did Plato put a part of the very truth and reality of his doctrine here? Did he believe, and did he mean to teach, that there was a world filled with immaterial *patterns*, of which this world and all it contains are simple copies? His representations will scarcely allow us to doubt it.‡ While likewise em-

* Butler, vol. ii, p. 121, note.

† *Ib.*, p. 123.

‡ *Timæus*, *passim*. Grote speaks thus of the Platonic theory, as introducing "two distinct but partially inter-communicating worlds—one of separate, permanent, unchangeable Forms or Ideas—the other of individual objects, transient and variable; participating in, and receiving denomination from these Forms." "Plato," &c., vol. ii, p. 270. He determines that the common doctrine is decidedly that of "separate, self-existent, absolute Forms or Ideas." This is the doctrine which Plato in various dialogues—the *Republic*, *Phædo*, *Philebus*, *Timæus*, &c.,—"most frequently insists upon, and which Aristotle both announces and combats as characteristic of Plato."—*Ib.*, p. 275.

In the *Cratylus* appropriate, self-existent, and purely objective Forms are predicated of *names* themselves, no less than of things. That Plato felt the full force of the objections to his settled views may be seen from the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist*.

For other opinions than those of Grote, see Ritter, *Hist. Anc. Phil.* ii, p. 361. Ackermann, p. 183.

bracing the ultimate reason of things, and the laws under which they are formed ; and while holding, moreover, that the invisible essence of each thing is most intimately connected with its "idea," and so becomes a subtle bond, uniting it with the eternal, and carrying our thoughts, as well, to the absolute and unchangeable—is not the first and underlying conception of the whole with Plato, what indeed he terms it, that the "idea" is a *pattern* of the body ? And when these "ideas" are stripped of all material clothing, have we not a conception sufficiently abstract ? Here is an ideal world, uncreated, existing apart—the only object of certain knowledge—dimly shadowed in this visible world, through which the mind of man must struggle up to the perfect and absolute.

It has been a favorite thought with the poets, this unseen and perfect original of the material world. Akenside employs it in a passage of much elegance :

" Ere the rising sun
Shone o'er the deep, or 'mid the vault of night
The moon her silver lamp suspended ; ere
The vales with springs were water'd, or with groves
Of oak or pine the ancient hills were crown'd ;
Then the Great Spirit, whom his works adore,
Within his own deep essence view'd the forms,
The forms eternal of created things :
The radiant sun ; the moon's nocturnal lamp ;
The mountains and the streams ; the ample stores
Of earth, of heaven, of nature. From the first,
On that full scene his love divine he fix'd,
His admiration ; till, in time complete,
What he admir'd and lov'd, his vital power
Unfolded into being. Hence the breath
Of life informing each organic frame ;
Hence the green earth, and wild-resounding waves ;
Hence light and shade, alternate ; warmth and cold ;
And bright autumnal skies, and vernal showers,
And all the fair variety of things."

Pleasures of the Imagination, Book I.

And Spenser reaches the inmost conception of Platonism in the following lines, in making perfect Beauty to be the essence of the divine exemplar, wherever that may exist :

"That wondrous patternes, wheresoe'er it be,
Whether in earth, laid up in secret store,
Or else in heaven, that no man may it see
With sinful eyes, for fear it to deflore,
Is perfect beauty."

Quoted, Vocab. Phil., *Idea*.

How grand a conception is this, when we consider for what purpose Plato wrought it out; and how firm and sure a basis of belief he gave himself and others, where no solid footing before existed! He needed surety. He would find some bond uniting the soul of man directly with God. He would see even in the fleeting and imperfect things of sense some trace of the divine. He would make even the visible world, and all things that are, bear within themselves some imperishable token of their great Former's power. He would bind the world to its Maker; and connect time with eternity—weakness with strength—imperfection with perfection—the perishable with the eternal!

At this he aimed in the construction of his theory. Whatever his success—whatever the precise meaning of his doctrine—this was his *aim*. And he built up a theory that apparently met completely his purpose. None before him had attempted a work so high and pure. The need of some such result was felt, but none had seen the problem so clearly, much less was any other able to solve it so satisfactorily. And this, as we have said, binds the world to God. And God is seen working after a pre-existing order and plan, and imposing laws that had ruled from eternity in that upper invisible sphere. All then is ONE. All is bound into one system—God the Fashioner and Upholder of all. By a golden chain the eternal Father descends to the world and girds it to himself.

How noble is the thought, and how nobly is it developed! But when discoursing of these high things—the nature of the Supreme Being and His works—Plato, with perfect candor, declares his inability to give more than *probable* explanations; to propound a theory that shall be least open to objection, and that shall remove the greatest difficulties.* Here is the bur-

* Tim. c. ix.

den the philosopher felt in all his speculations. He might set in order a harmonious system; he could not but feel it was human reasoning, after all. How he longed for a confirming or rectifying word from above!

But for us, as for him, his theory of Ideas serves to connect the Deity with His works, and His works with Him. Here is the ladder, up which the mind ascends to unchanging realities. *Principles*, the philosopher felt, could not be found among the fleeting forms of earth. There was nothing stable in which they could exist. Where was perfection? Nothing here could show it. There was justice, but not perfect without admixture. There was goodness, but none could find it in its purity; beauty, but none could gather its scattered forms and combine it into one complete image. And imperfection in all he saw, or heard, or imagined, as existing here, called for Perfection. Plato searched the earth in vain for the principles that all phenomena shadowed forth. Therefore he rose into another sphere, and made that the world of realities. There he found that perfect Justice, and Goodness, and Beauty sought for in vain here. And thus he pointed out the lofty goal, and winged the thoughts of man to ascend to it. How does the whole soul rise, like the eager Eros, he has so beautifully pictured, to seek the high and eternal things of that upper sphere! Plato is the great Teacher of Faith. Wearied, dissatisfied with the fading and incomplete treasures of this world, he has taught the soul, like the fabled god of Love, in want, but longing for enduring riches, to pass to more and more lofty objects, till it finds the fruition of its hopes.* By these terms—ideas, forms, patterns, the intelligible—harsh and meaningless as they seem to us, he was enabled to pass from the seen to the invisible. They formed the avenue leading from the blind doorway on earth to the grand and imperishable temple on high! From separate and finite ideas he rose to the crowning IDEA—God.

What Revelation has given us, Plato attempted in this rude but most noble way to form for himself. He threw up a pathway for faith, and reached the very presence of God. We admire

* Banquet, 29, 34, 35.

the power that could grasp such a truth in any way; and rejoice that the rest he sought was in some measure given him. And we shall see the Deity, whom he found and realized to himself, entering in this way into the universe of matter and mind.

III. To Plato's conception, again, the relation of the Supreme Deity to the world of matter is that of Architect, rather than Creator.

The material with which He works exists uncreated from eternity, like Himself. There are questions concerning the Platonic "matter" hard to settle. But some things are distinctly stated as the belief of the philosopher, at least what he readily accepts. From his representations the almost necessary inference is, that matter, or what, for a better name, he calls matter, is eternal.* But we must in thought divest it of all qualities, abstract from it form and every primary and secondary attribute—reduce it to the bare substratum—before we shall reach the conception of Plato.† When this is done, we have what he considered the condition of all that is produced; the "receptacle," the "nurse," the "mother," the "seat," of all things formed.‡ This primary element the great Architect fashioned according to pre-existing types, and by imposing upon it forms of every variety produced all things that exist. This crude abstract material, what Aristotle terms *ύλη*, is thus considered the basis of all things, and is wrought up from a shapeless and unformed mass into every species of animate and inanimate nature.§

The notion of absolute creation out of nothing was wholly unknown to ancient speculation. And in receiving this primary matter as the substance of the universe Plato merely followed—a thing of necessity, as he seemingly deemed it—those who had preceded him. And yet he feels restraint in dealing with it. He knows not how rightly to designate the chaotic mass, which is indeed without any distinguishing feature. He labors to define what admits of only negative definition and figurative illustration.

* Butler, vol. ii., p. 171, *et seq.*

† Tim. xxii., xxiv.

‡ Tim. xxiii. Cf. Cicero, *Acad.* i, 7.

§ Cf. Lewis, p. 128.

What shall we say of this principle of his philosophy? We must admit it; but at the same time acknowledge that he reduces the offending term as nearly as possible to nothing, and allows it in no wise to contest the palm with the one Supreme God. It has no life, no attributes, it is simple existence—almost to be compared to pure *space*. In order to eliminate this co-eternal element, some would make the philosopher teach that matter itself is the product of the creative power of the Deity. But this is contrary to the express doctrine of Plato.* His scheme is not perfect. But taking it as it is, with all its defects, which Revelation alone could remove, we wonder at his noble conceptions and the amount of truth he has unfolded.

And this consideration must be borne in mind, as we find innumerable subordinate deities ranging themselves under the leadership of the supreme God. These are His servants and vicegerents, ruling with delegated authority in every part of His dominions, supplying the immediate power that controls the details of life and fortune and government, and thus, while filling offices beneath the dignity of their master to engage in, accounting also for the presence of disorders and evils in the divine economy.† If other philosophers had felt no need of introducing Mind into their speculations upon the ori-

* Professor Lewis hesitates to admit the strict eternity of matter as a belief of Plato. pp. 272-286. His Reviewer writes thus: "To us it seems likely that Plato conceived of matter as an eternal principle by the side of God. But then it was a principle in a very different sense from that in which God and ideas were principles. It was not the cause of the reality and essence of outward things, but was rather to be classed itself with non-existences. To it was to be ascribed that there could be outward things, but the perpetual flux and the necessary imperfection of outward things were due to it also. With such a view of the matter it is scarcely more strange that Plato felt no necessity of referring it to a cause, than that we feel none in respect to time and space." Bib. Sacra, vol. ii., p. 585.

† Tim. xvii. In the Laws this minute subdivision of the universe, with the varied offices of the inferior gods, is not so fully brought out, though it is suggested. There it is *soul* in the widest sense that rules. "This was enough for his argument, without any farther precision or explanation, when dealing with the atheist, who denied all powers above man, be they one or many."—Lewis, p. 230.

gin of nature, if even Anaxagoras had failed to hold with firm grasp his first most fruitful principle, Plato could frame no part of a system into which it should *not* enter. Intelligence was the element of perfection. Hence, with more than simple concurrence, he connected soul and its operations with all his theories. The *Timæus* confessedly is nothing but a collection of the physical notions current in the various schools of the day. But they are arranged according to Plato's own view of harmony, and especially by him are all things marshaled under the leadership of Mind.*

In various classes the lower deities rise, from the humble guardian spirit to the Life that fills the vast rolling universe. Incited by His own GOODNESS, the Father of all reduced the chaotic mass of primeval matter to form and order; and considering that intelligence, even here, was better than its lack, and that intelligence was inseparable from soul, He endowed the universe with a Soul, pervading and controlling all its motions.† The body of the universe He formed from fire and earth; and connected the two by air and water, in a strict proportion; making it indissoluble except by His own power. Globular, undecaying, perfect within itself, endowed with a circular motion, the universe was fashioned by the eternal Father "a blessed god." Soul animates the entire frame; bound to the centre of the sphere and reaching through and filling every part; soul, not later-born, but more ancient than the perfected body. Within the bounds of this only-begotten universe, the greatest and best, every created thing is contained. The planets roll within its borders, each a winged god. The fixed stars—each one the vehicle of a directing spirit—hold their course on a far exalted plane. All move according to the principles of number and harmony. All partake in their nature of the eternal and the constant on the one hand, and of the mutable, on the other.‡

* The views expressed in the *Timæus* "are not an idle ornament of a Platonic dialogue, but opinions which were gradually formed in Plato's mind as he followed out the thought that all in nature has its end and design, and is planned by reason and intelligence."—Ritter, ii, p. 380.

† Cf. Vocab. Phil., *Anima Mundi*.

‡ Tim. x-xv.

And now the Deity prepares to fill the world with life. The air, the sea, the dry land, are peopled; but not directly by His forming hand. The celestial gods having been formed, and the race of deities known in the Greek Theogony being generated, the great Architect commits to the former the creation of the inferior races, Himself compounding the immortal part. Thus the Supreme Being was the immediate Author of the human soul; composing it of the same elements as the soul of the universe, though somewhat reduced in purity, He made it divine and immortal, and declared its fate according to its chosen course of life.* This high position assigned to the nobler part of man, raises him above the material world in which he was placed, and makes him subordinate only to the race of gods.

The human body is the work of God's servants, who curiously knit the frame together from borrowed portions of the four elements—a debt to be repaid at death—and make it a mortal home for an immortal spirit.† The details of the work, carried out at great length, we need not dwell upon. A few words at the close of the *Timæus* embrace the formation of birds, reptiles, fishes, and quadrupeds.

In all we see Intelligence ruling supreme. And Intelligence and all its works proceed from the one eternal God. And Goodness likewise directed all. Wisdom and Goodness are stamped on the circle of the heavens, are inwoven into the very texture of the earth, and whatsoever breathes upon it, and into the essence of spirit. Wisdom and Goodness,—these are not occasional, but ever-pervading principles in the Platonic Philosophy. The teachings of Socrates are carried out most consistently. No other scheme of ancient philosophy reached this clearness of conception. No other introduced a God so perfectly endowed with these shining attributes, and made them stand foremost, always and without fear. Plato is as much distinguished by the *truth* of these fundamental points as by the sublimity of his conceptions. He found a God. He made Him supreme, and wise, and good, and consistently held Him forth in this character. And

* *Tim.* xvi., xvii.† *Tim.* xviii.

he calls us, and called those of his day, to admire the proofs of God's creative power and providential care—all in harmony, all upheld by His beneficence. His benign providence is fully argued in the Laws,* showing that sleepless watch is maintained by the heavenly powers over all—the least—of the affairs of men. And again, He is represented as giving the new-created man into the charge of the celestial beings who had assisted at his creation, and exhorting them to rule well and graciously over him, *that he might not become a source of evil to himself.*†

These representations of the divine power and providence are scarcely consistent with the view that would confound the Deity with His work. M. Bautain finds the germ of Pantheism in Plato's doctrines. He says, "It will not be necessary to press very much the Platonian dualism, in order to find in it this error; for, according to Plato, there is no existence, no perfection, no beauty, except in the spiritual, intelligible world. The world of matter, the hylè, has neither existence nor beauty; it expresses only privation, limitation, non-existence."‡ These words, we think, do not fairly interpret our philosopher. And further on M. Bautain admits that Plato in reality does not go beyond dualism, though he stops short by a logical inconsistency.§ This is well enough for a comparison of systems. But for our purpose the chief inquiry should be, whether in any way Plato was able to *escape* from the almost universal error of his age. If he *did* escape, we will not quarrel with the mode, nor thrust him back into bondage. He is often enough in the dark, he is not entirely consistent, but, on the whole, he seems to separate sufficiently between the Deity and His organized work, as well as between Him and the primordial matter.]

* B. x.

† Tim. xvii., end.

‡ Trans. in Theol. Eclectic, Vol. III., p. 96.

§ B. p. 109.

‖ Ackermann acknowledges the presence of Pantheistic tendencies and ideas in Plato, but remarks: "Pantheism, in the proper sense of the word, does not exist everywhere where Pantheistic elements may be found; the latter occur frequently, the first rarely occurs." Chr. Element, p. 258. Cf. Initia philosoph. Platonice, III., p. 251.

The doctrine of Necessity emerges in this connection. In the whole work of arranging the universe and ordering its parts, the Deity was opposed by a force inherent in the material wherewith He wrought. There was a struggle between mind and the intractability of matter, and the latter is represented as being overcome only by force; and, even thus, coming short of perfection.* This notion, found in all human philosophies, is grounded on the universal sentiment of an eternal combat between good and evil. It is a deep-seated feeling in the heart of man; and it is curious to note how little man has been able to fathom the real depth of the problem. This hostility and struggle are real. But it is a *moral* disorder and conflict; while human speculations have always made the prime offense rest in a material cause. Matter in itself has been made evil, and the source of evil to the spirit. What an error is this—the offspring of a darkened heart—changing the very *ground* and *terms* of depravity,—the most sad and real fact in the moral government of God! Plato was not free from the error, and in this form it emerges here.†

* Tim. xxi.

† Cf. "Plato against the Atheists," Ex. xxxi. May not Prof. Lewis lay too much stress on the assertion in the Laws that there are "two souls, at least; the one beneficent, the other able to work injury"? In deducing the doctrine of two uncreated principles, both personal in the same sense, he perhaps interprets too strongly a casual personification of Plato's. That Plato weighed carefully the data in the dark problem of the origin of evil, is evident. That he wavered in opinion, and finally failed of a satisfactory result, as all must, is certain. But it seems more consonant with his other teachings to think that he did not really set a malevolent, self-existent soul in opposition to the Good Spirit. All that opposes God, whether in the moral or physical world, is only, in a manner, personified into an evil principle. Explanation is thus given to the different accounts in the Laws, Republic, Timæus, and Politicus, as quoted by Mr. Lewis, (p. 212). The myth introduced by him from the last dialogue is confirmatory of this; and is deeply interesting as showing one way in which the mind may conceive of the entrance and working of evil. "God himself, at one time, guides this universe and turns it round. Again, he abandons it to itself, when the periods of its destined times have received their full complement," &c. p. 218. The universe, partaking of the divine, strives to keep a uniform course; but partaking also of matter, it is more or less turned aside, and evils ensue. "*Neither must we suppose that two Gods with opposing purposes conduct its revolutions,*" &c. p. 214. Here the cause of error is expressly assigned to an *innate physical*

But evil could not rule. Out of all the sovereign Deity brings harmony and unity ; and the universe, fashioned with consummate skill, and ordered by perfect laws, from center to circumference beats with the Thought of God as a heart-stroke. The doctrines of Pythagoras were turned, in their general principles, to good account by his disciple ; and are made to fit into and perfect a more noble structure than their author had conceived. They are made to render more apparent, by the aid of mathematical relations, the supreme wisdom and care seen in creation.

In the Statesman,* as we have seen, is given a curious picture of the early race of men under the reign of Saturn. That deity is described as watching over his charge, as a shepherd watches his flock,—leading them and providing for them in a simple, primitive way, not unlike that given in Scripture, and agreeing with the many delightful dreams of a golden age. While the deity himself presided over them they were blessed, according to the desire and injunction of the Supreme Ruler, who committed them to his hands. But when left to less watchful care, disasters attend them, and convulsions rack the world. This is fable. But it agrees well with the views already set forth. The feelings and purposes of the Sovereign Deity are Beneficence itself in the formation and ordering of all things ; and Intelligence guides His counsels.

Thus, according to Plato, is the world in the hands of a wise and good God.

IV. We come next to consider the relation of that Being to the *moral* world.

What, more fully, is the character of the Supreme Being ? In what position does He stand to virtue and vice, and to the spiritual welfare of His creatures ? Such an inquiry is important. We are anxious to know on what plane Plato will put the Author of all things in respect to moral phenomena.

perversity ; and this cause operates through various vicissitudes, engendering woe and ruin, until God again takes the helm.

Cf. Review of Mr. Lewis's work. Bib. Sacra, Vol. II, pp. 536-9. Also, Cudworth, "Intel. System of Universe," Vol. I, p. 295, seq. Also, Grote's, Plato, Vol. III., p. 249, on meaning of word necessity in the *Timæus*.

* Cap. 15, 16.

This, also, will be a test-question as to his own spiritual insight and sense of need, and will determine his standing among the philosophers of his day. Without doubt he is the most spiritual of all ancient inquirers after truth. And the God he has found is placed high above the gods of the popular mythology. But do we find a Christian Theism in his works? Far from that. The figure is imperfect enough, and the lines often undecided. But there are glimpses of truth there never caught by others of his time,—we may say, by none of any age without a revelation. There are attributes ascribed to the Deity, and tenaciously held, that place the God of Plato in a position of holy majesty and dignity.

1. He is not the Author of evil.* It would be a contradiction, in the view of our philosopher, to call Him good, while yet he in any wise produced evil. For it is the nature of good to produce good. "Accordingly," he says, "good is not the cause of all things, but only of the good, not of the evil."† God, to his mind, is essentially perfect; and so the source of blessings alone. Whatever may be said of the argument, the conclusion is positive, and is marked by a tone showing the conviction of the writer. And he says, further, that if we admit that great woes and signal judgments,—as in the case of Niobe, the Pelopides, and the Trojans,—are from God, we must do it with the understanding that God stands clear in His justice and goodness, and that He has chastised with a view to the benefit of the sufferer.‡ What can be more decisive? Plato here stands firm, where many under stronger light waver. He has answered, in part, at least, what such men as Bayle have pronounced unanswerable. Even at the outset, at the first formation of souls, the Deity gave them laws, and declared a

* Upon the origin of evil Ritter says: "In Plato we nowhere arrive at its true and ultimate cause." Though involving an incongruity, "it was perfectly accordant with his general habit of thought to find it in the corporeal nature which, in this world, is the obstacle to perfection,—i. e. to reduce it to a purely negative idea,—either the nature of 'other' or the necessity in the sensible world." *Hist. Anc. Phil.*, II, p. 375. He is in a strait between the supremacy he has ascribed to God and mind, on the one hand, and free will in both the universe and man on the other. But in any event—whatever the effect upon his philosophy—he holds fast to the goodness of God.

† *Repub. B. II.*, c. 18.

‡ *Ib.* c. 19.

destiny according to their course; that He might be free from blame for the evil into which they should plunge.*

2. And, again, the Deity declares Himself, in that He makes Right triumph in His dominions. Perceiving the nature of virtue and vice—their inherence in the soul and their contrary results—He so arranged that virtue should triumph over vice throughout the universe.† Here is proof of the highest beneficence; a Being loving righteousness and hating iniquity; no passive God indifferent to the character of His works, but one *choosing* goodness and truth, and providing in His eternal counsels for the overthrow of evil.

3. His own nature also is pure, and free from falsehood. It was not the purpose of Plato to make direct attacks upon the theology of his day. He despised the crude and blasphemous myths of the poets, for he had higher conceptions of the divine agency. He felt that unity, purity,‡ and perfection were demanded in that Being who formed the worlds. He makes Him unchangeable,—not becoming better, His perfection forbids that;—nor worse. His divine nature will not suffer that degradation.§ And unchangeable in His own being, He will not condescend to deceive His creatures. No conceivable motive—neither ignorance, nor fear, nor love—can influence the divine mind to depart from truth. Pure and true in His nature, neither by word nor deed, by dream or vision, will He lead astray.¶ This was a blow, not only at the “lying poets,” but at the popular mythology. In a covert and cautious way, unlike the fatal course of his master, he would purify the notions of his age, and make them more worthy of the eternal God.¶

4. The moral qualities find their perfection in God. When Socrates takes up the discourse in the Banquet, we rise with him in a lofty flight, and see beauty leaving one by one its restrictions, until it rests in unchangeable perfection. Then we look upon Beauty itself—divested of all that can mar or dim. And Love follows, and grows holier as its object becomes purer.**

* Tim. xvii.

† Laws, B. X, c. 12.

‡ On the purity of the divine nature, Cf. 1 Alcibiades, c. 58.

§ Repub. B. II., c. 20.

¶ Ib. c. 20, 21.

¶ Cf. Butler, Vol. II., pp. 253, 254.

** Banquet, c. 35.

So goodness finds its perfection in the Being supremely good. And justice, mercy, love, purity, and holiness have their end and fulfillment in Him. This being so, we have a God just in His ways, perfect in His attributes, far above the common conceptions of Plato's age.

5. Again, this Being looks to obedience rather than sacrifice. It would be derogatory to the divine nature to suppose that the gods can be turned aside from the right by oblations as bribes. They regard the soul, as holy and just, rather than gifts and sacrifices. The sentiment of Plato is well given, in this respect, in a dialogue of which he himself may not have been the author. To Alcibiades, Socrates is described* as narrating the tradition, showing the Lacedemonians blessed above the Athenians through their more sincere and noble prayers. They offered indeed no worthy sacrifices, while their rivals loaded the altars of the gods with gifts. But the petition that heaven would grant them ever what was noble and honorable, with what was good, availed over the offerings and low desires of the Athenians. And he concludes, "It appears, therefore, that Justice and Prudence are especially esteemed by the gods." A remarkable passage in the Laws† shows the state of heart which is acceptable to God, and the attitude in which men should approach Him. The humble, the pure and sincere may draw nigh and obtain a blessing. Like Him in nature, the holy man is dear to the Deity, and his offerings are not in vain.‡ We seem here to be reading the words of a Christian, rather than a heathen, philosopher.

6. Plato shows nowhere a clearer insight into the character of God, and man's relations to Him, than when he declares

* 2 Alcib. c. 18-22.

† B. iv., c. 8.

‡ The strictures of Grote ("Plato," &c., III., pp. 420-427), though they may be applicable to the general position of the Laws, seem too harsh upon the point here in question. We conceive that sacrifices offered in a right spirit, and with a view to honor God, are by no means deemed reprehensible by Plato; only when made from base and cowardly motives are they considered impious. It appears, then, not the intention here, "that the Gods, though persuadable by every one else, were thoroughly unforgiving, deaf to any prayer or sacrifice from one who had done wrong:" the calculating transgressor is indeed banished from the altars of a righteous Deity.

likeness to Him to be our aim. This is not a transient thought. It pervades his works, and enters wherever the destiny of the soul is discussed. We are not indeed to look for that high holiness in which *we* have been instructed; but, with his worthy conceptions of the divine nature, it is significant when he enjoins *the nearest possible resemblance to God** as the aim of man. We find in *him* no such dreams as fill the Oriental schools. He does not propose absorption into the Deity as the end of perfection, but likeness in moral character to Him. The soul of man is kept distinct in its personality to the end through all its changes. The doctrine of Transmigration is held,† after the example of Pythagoras. But the soul is carried through these changes, when necessary for its purification, with a view to living at last in the presence and under the smile of God. For this it is disciplined and instructed, and stripped of its low and earthly views, and washed from the gross contamination of mortal flesh; till its thoughts and desires shall be elevated to the divine realities to which it is allied by nature, and with which it was created to hold converse.‡

Here, again, is the implication that matter in itself is evil, and degrades the spirit. And it is even taught that only a few of the nobler minds will, in fact, ever reach the presence of divine realities, and, purified, spend an eternity in blessedness. But he draws a picture that would make us long for that state. A well-known passage in the Phædrus§ shows the eager struggle for the high glories of the divine presence. We have not space for it here. Suffice it, that the soul is there represented under the image of a charioteer drawn by two winged coursers; the one of divine breed, and beautiful and noble in his bearing, the other of different extraction and unruly. As Jupiter leads the train in a winged chariot, the gods accompany him, and with well-trained steeds ascend to the outer circle of the heavens, and there gaze upon Truth in its essence

* In Theæt. c. 84, 85, he says this resemblance consists in possessing a just and holy character, together with wisdom; and herein is the only escape for man from evil.

† Phædrus, c. 61. Tim. xvii.

‡ Cf. Ritter, I., p. 597.

§ C. 54, et seq.

and undimmed glory. They behold Justice, and Temperance, and Knowledge, and every other reality, in their perfection, and feast their souls on these sights. Other spirits follow as best they may. Some, perchance, urge the lagging steed up the difficult heights, and catch glimpses of the pure and serene beauties of that highest sphere. But they maintain their place only by the hardest, as the vicious courser seeks to drag them down. Others are not able to urge their chariots up these paths, and sink to a lower and more groveling life, and may not for ages again attempt the ascent. Still there is longing for those nobler spheres to which the better part of the soul soars of its own divine nature, and where lies its true nourishment; but vice drags it down.

Here is shown the arduous path that leads to the soul's perfection in bliss. Here is the road to divine knowledge, and the contemplation of truth. By following virtue, and contemplating divine things, and by crushing the passions of the lower nature, does the soul, according to Plato, wing itself for that blessed and satisfying life among the gods. This, with him, is not mere fancy, though he has clothed the truth in the richest garb of the imagination. *Virtue* is required for the soul's perfection, else it sinks into the unseemly form of the grosser animals. It is this, and this only, that shall finally elevate it to the presence of God. *Virtue*—not passive alone, but born from an earnest struggle with the enticements of the flesh and of the world—a wise and careful formation of the life to the nobler impulses of the soul.

Truly, here is something positive. The lines are firm, though they do not complete the character of an all-righteous God upon the Christian model; nor fill up the life of the soul with deeds of love and mercy and patience and long-suffering, which One higher than Plato has enjoined. But *morality*, and the *perfection of the spirit*, is the aim of the whole Platonic philosophy; and it is this high end that has given him his hold upon our reverence and affection.

Can this God of Plato be confounded with the mere *Idea* of the Good?—although in that idea—the last to be reached by man—we certainly come nearest to a true apprehension of

Him.* Is it a merely impersonal essence? Not so; He lives and acts, chooses and plans. He formed and upholds the different classes of the gods, and the race of mortals; and it is the highest aim of man to seek likeness to His pure and holy character. And He, too, has brought harmony into the moral world, as He has made beauty and order pervade the physical universe. As Former and Governor of all things, the eternal God of Plato sits supreme.

7. A single word on a point connected with this general subject. Plato combats the notion, that the moral quality of actions is dependent on the will of the Deity. In the *Laws*† he mentions, with disapproval, the opinion that the qualities just and unjust, good and evil, have no existence in the nature of things, but are the result of human enactments. And in the *Euthyphron*,‡ Socrates brings the argument to the point, that the gods love holiness because it is such in its nature; not that it is such essentially, because they approve it. The divine will, he argues, does not fix arbitrarily the morality of actions. That has an eternal and immutable basis. Cudworth found thus far, in fact, an ally in our philosopher.§

Such is the Deity set forth in this first of human philosophies. We hold, that, with much error and darkness, it yet contains the principles of Theism, in the stricter and better sense of that word. Its evident leanings are towards Unity in an overruling providence. And by both its sympathies and its groundwork we are led to *one* God, rather than to many; to an all-wise, and powerful, and good Being—the beginning, the middle, and the end of all—and the principle and measure of all things. Sir William Hamilton makes this the test of a true notion of a God: “It is not until the two attributes of *intelligence* and *virtue*, or holiness, are brought in, that the belief in a primary and omnipotent cause becomes the belief in a veritable Divinity.”¶ And are not these conditions—by no means perfectly, but in some good degree—fulfilled

* Cf. Butler, vol. ii., p. 61, note. Ackermann says: “God is not the idea of the good itself; the idea of the good only expresses most perfectly that which God is to all being and becoming—the paternity and operation of God.” p. 158.

† B. x., c. 4.

‡ C. 12!

§ Cf. Lewis, Excur. xiv.

¶ Metaphysics, p. 19.

in Him whom Plato has honored with chiefest honor? An eternal, most powerful—we cannot strictly say omnipotent—First Cause; endowed with holiness and intelligence; He *approaches* this standard. True, the many inferior gods too often shut him out of view; but at times He comes clearly forth. The impression, in reading Plato, is abiding, that he believes in and sees, though dimly, and struggles up toward one perfect God. He is in heart a Monotheist.

We search in vain, it is true, for an enduring, holy indignation against sin in the divine breast, that must kindle the fires of endless punishment. We search in vain for a redemption devised and offered through infinite love. And we search in vain for any true views of the nature of sin. The theory, that “no one is willingly evil,” vitiates the entire doctrine of human depravity and ill-desert. Professor Butler is right in marking these defects in the system before us.* But, on the other hand, we wonder at the insight, that, uninspired has penetrated so far into the works and being and attributes of God. We feel that in the great disciple of Socrates there is a heart loving *all truth*, and only truth; and a mind that has gone deeper, and risen higher, and taken a wider circuit to gain and harmonize truth, than any other in like surroundings.

We are sure that “the greatest moralist that ever lived” would have rejoiced—to borrow the sentiment of another†—to have “found the human race in the arms of Christianity,” and instructed in and elevated by the teachings of the Gospel of the Son of God. Yes, we believe Plato would have welcomed that divine revelation with its blessed doctrines, “which in germ were already at the foundation of his own spirit, and of which more than one trait can be found in his works.”

V. To trace, with much minuteness, the *origin* of Plato's views on this subject in the earlier philosophies, would require a more extended knowledge than we possess of those ancient forms of thought. We know only their general outlines, and most prominent points. But probably if we knew all, we

* Lectures, vol. ii., p. 281.

† Cousin. True Beaut. and Good. p. 242-3.

should find that in only one or two cases such principles had been reached as became in this matter directly the foundations of Plato's belief. That he was well acquainted with the details of former and contemporary speculations, we may be sure. And we may be certain that they were as food and stimulus to his own mind, powerful and original as it was. Independent in all his theories, he yet had before him the reasonings of every previous school and teacher of eminence. That he should not use these views, at least as stepping-stones, or by contrast to bring out and define more perfectly his own conceptions, would be unreasonable to suppose. He *did* use them, and rectified and enlarged upon them.*

His principal biographer has assured us of three sources whence he chiefly drew his materials and manner of philosophizing. The influence of Heraclitus, Pythagoras, and Socrates, each is seen in his system; and Parmenides and Anaxagoras had also, with many others, a share in forming it. As to his *theology*, in particular, it is incredible that the doctrines of Socrates, so full of a wise and gracious Providence, should have been lost upon him. We see it in the ever-present care of the heavenly powers for man, and in a designing and building Architect. These lessons of his revered master were fruitful in shaping his views of a Supreme Being; and we cannot doubt that, but for easily understood reasons, he would have maintained a still simpler form of doctrine.†

* "Of Plato it may justly be said, that he reduced into a beautiful whole the scattered results of the earlier Greek philosophy, reconciling their seeming differences and conflicting tendencies. From this fountain, as well as from the abundant sources of his own good powers, flowed the rich elements of his philosophy." Ritter, *Hist. Anc. Phil.*, ii, p. 155.

† The following is Ritter's estimate in brief of the theological position of Socrates: "While the earlier philosophers did not entirely neglect the marks of design discoverable in the universe, still they invariably confounded nature with intelligence; he, on the contrary, labored to show that reason is above nature, and that the natural is merely subservient to intellectual ends. The principal point in his theology was a conviction that the gods are omniscient and omnipresent, and that they rule everywhere by the law of goodness, and are all-sufficient. That besides this he held the Divine to be one, notwithstanding the multiplicity of gods, is clearly to be inferred from his insight into the unity both of reason, and the object of intellectual thought."—*History Anc. Phil.* ii, pp. 62, 63.

Going further back, the light that Anaxagoras had kindled shone for others, if not for himself. It caught the eye of Plato and became a clear and steady flame. Combating also the tenets of the Eleatic school, he could yet appreciate the simple purity of Xenophanes' conceptions of God; and the declaration, that "there is one God, among gods and men the greatest; unlike to mortals in outward shape, unlike in mind and thought," would find with him a ready response. A Being uncaused, all-powerful and good, pure spirit and intelligence, —these were conceptions that would find quick lodgment in Plato's mind.

In the early Ionic school there was, of course, no trace of a personal Deity. Water, air, and fire divided the sovereignty of the universe. There was nothing but the barest materialism. Thales' views were too crude to reach anything like an ordering Intelligence pervading the universe. The Atomic school could give nothing more satisfactory; it left no room for spirit, for it professed to explain all things by the concourse of material atoms. But there was something even in the grossness of these early beliefs to stimulate a better growth when the seed should once germinate.

With Pythagorean principles the Platonic philosophy was deeply tinged. The theology of Pythagoras was, however, vague and unsatisfactory, so far as we can trace it, but yielding some views worthy of being adopted into a better system. Under the form of a Monad, or absolute Unity, something like a controlling Presence is found harmonizing all motion and life; and the characteristics of this Deity, if so it may be called, are familiar through adoption among Plato's views. It was the Supreme Good; likeness to it was to be the aim of man; and evil found its origin elsewhere. The teachings of Socrates naturally brought this Being with far greater distinctness and perfection before the thoughts of his pupil.*

* "The doctrine of Anaxagoras had a considerable influence upon the opinions of the Socratic school; but the doctrines of the Pythagoreans also helped to shape the system of Plato, and it seems to have been from these two sources that he derived the dogma of a supreme divine intelligence on the one hand, and the soul of the world on the other." Bib. Sacra, vol. ii., p. 558.

To realize the very gradual approach of the ancient mind to even the simplest forms of a true theology, we have only to see the efforts of such men as Thales, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, and Xenophanes, to free themselves from the old theogonies, and to introduce some more rational principle for an explanation of the universe.* Step by step they drew nearer the goal; reason both demanding a better solution of the problem, and at the same time perplexed and almost powerless before its intricacies. The father of the Eleatics seemed reaching firm ground, but Parmenides, his successor, carried his views into Pantheism, and Zeno and Melissus could not escape these bonds. Anaxagoras entered the right path but soon went aside. And weighing all these contradictions, the first of the Sophists declared that he neither knew whether the gods existed, nor what were their attributes.† The sober sense of Socrates escaped these errors, and found a God purer in His mode of existence than the sage cared to reveal.

These were the theories, in part, that lay before Plato, and with which he was perfectly familiar. If he borrowed from them, it was in the way of a master-mind; selecting by instinct the best materials, and building on a plan of his own. His doctrine of a God, with its related subjects, was clearer and more consistent with truth than any that had preceded. But this is not all. Plato reached a plane that none of his successors, of whatever school, occupied. The greatest name after his is that of Aristotle; but the intelligent First Cause of the Peripatetic scarcely deserves the name of God. And after this we find no God in the schools, save the Stoic, till heathen thought merges in Christian. And of the Stoics, Cleanthes sings best the praises of the Deity; but his notes, though beautiful, celebrate Fate, as well as the glories of God.

In Plato alone is found the broadest groundwork of Theism, and a system that requires the presence and sustaining power

* With Ritter and Butler, cf. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, vol. i., pp. 367-347. iv., pp. 381-390.

† *Ibid.*, vol. viii., p. 365.

of mind, and that is animated by divine Wisdom and Goodness. This conception, in its length and breadth, he borrowed from none. And he bequeathed it to none. His defects on this point only attest in the strongest way the necessity of a revelation from Him in whom we live and move; who is not far from every one of us; but for whom we grope as in the night. The prayer of every earnest inquirer among the ancients was, "O, that some *god* would teach us!"

ARTICLE II.—HISTORICAL CREDIBILITY OF LUKE II., 1-5.

FEW passages in the New Testament have given so much trouble to interpreters and church historians as that relating to the "taxing," "when Cyrenius was governor of Syria," which we find in Luke ii., 2. The early Christian writers, indeed, saw nothing strange in a general census of the Roman Empire, or in Luke's assertion that it took place when Quirinius was head of the Syrian province. That they readily received the declaration touching a general census may be turned into an argument to show that there was nothing unhistorical in an event of that kind; for it does not appear that in the attacks on the gospels that statement was particularly assailed, nor that the Christian writers, some of whom were well versed in Roman usages, found from their own examinations that it needed special defense. As for the date, however, we cannot suppose that they had so much synchronistic skill as even to find a difficulty of themselves where one existed; the difficult points in chronology require an amount of research which was beyond their reach, and an acquaintance with astronomical science which has been attained only within the few past centuries.

To modern interpreters this passage has been a veritable cross. There are two points which needed to be settled and supported against objections:—was there a general census in the time of Augustus, and did it fall within the Syrian presidency of Quirinius; or, in other words, could Christ have been born while he was holding that office, and at the time of a general census? Besides these main difficulties, others started up to join their company, when earnest and repeated examination was directed to the passage in question. How could a country, not yet reduced to the form of a province and under an allied or protected king, be subjected to the census? Why should Joseph go to Bethlehem and take Mary with him? These doubts gave strength to the suspicions that the accounts of the nativity are fabulous or mixed with errors of fact, and

in turn gained strength from the predisposition to suspect the accounts of our Lord's miraculous birth. Against these *dubia vacata* believers in supernatural revelation have contended with weak or with solid arguments; they have given new meanings to the text in Luke, in order to avoid apparent contradictions of fact; they have proposed new solutions of the agency which Quirinius had in taking the census; they have confined the census itself to Judea, or made it a simple enumeration of inhabitants.

Meanwhile a greater acquaintance with Roman law and archæology has served to throw new light upon the system adopted under Augustus of utilizing the resources of the empire, and of spreading an institution something like the earlier Roman census through all the provinces. It has been argued, also, by classical scholars of our age, and not in the first instance by theologians, that Quirinius was more than once the provincial governor or emperor's legate in Syria. This opinion, indeed, was not wholly new, for so early a writer as Baronius suggested it, for which he is severely rebuked by his more learned countryman Noris (Norisius), as indeed he well might be, since he confuses chronology, and his opinion seems to be merely an unsupported guess.* But another learned Italian—San Clemente—revived the same opinion in regard to a two-fold legation of Quirinius in Syria, and supported it by arguments of weight.† His arguments found advocates among the classical scholars of Germany; his reference to Quirinius of a mutilated inscription, which speaks of some man who was President of Syria twice, has been accepted by Bergmann and Theodor Mommsen, while A. W. Zumpt, although he refers this inscription to another Roman, contemporary with Quirinius, seeks to show, on historical grounds, that Quirinius was

* Baronius says (Annal i., 67, ed. Antwerp): "Contra Josephi deliria certo appareret sub Augusto imperatore, vivente Herode seniore, reperiri duplicem, immo triplicem Quirini in Syria præfecturam, primam post consulatum ipsius, quæ exemplo aliorum potuerit esse prolixior, secundam cum Caio, ipsi inhærente Rectore, tertium post ejus mortem, cum eam solus administraret." Nothing could be more false than to place any presidency of Quirinius in Syria before the death of Herod. And this first presidency after his consulship is a pure fiction.

† In his treatise *de vulgaris aræ emendatione*. (Rome, 1793.)

twice employed in that special service.* The subject received its first exhaustive treatment from this learned archæologist, and all who now examine it, whether they assent to his conclusions or not, must own their great obligations to his nice and wide scholarship.

It is not strange that this new discovery, if we may so call it, should be thought to throw light on Luke ii., 1-3, and be made use of by the commentators. Professor Schaff, for example, who keeps pace with the learning of the day, and whose standing as a scholar entitles him to high respect, regards it as furnishing a solution for one class of the difficulties which have perplexed biblical exegesis. In his corrections of Van Oosterzee's commentary on Luke (in Lange's series), after advocating what is no doubt the right interpretation, he uses the following words :

"There is another and a better solution of the chronological difficulty which should be mentioned, viz: the assumption that Quirinius was *twice* governor of Syria, once three years before Christ, down to the birth of Christ (A. U. 750-753), and once about 6-11 after the birth of Christ (760). A double legation of Quirinius in Syria has recently been made almost certain by purely antiquarian researches from two independent testimonies, viz: 1. From a passage in Tacitus, *Annales* iii., 48. as interpreted by Zumpt.—2. From an old monumental inscription, etc. We hold, then, to a double census under Quirinius: the first (*πρώτη*) took place under his first Syrian governorship, and probably in connection with a general census of the whole empire (the *breviarium totius imperii*), including the dominion of Herod as a *rex socius*, and this is the one intended by Luke in our passage; while the second took place several years afterwards, during his second governorship, and had reference only to Palestine, with the view to fix its tribute, after it had become a direct Roman province (A. U. 759), and this is the census mentioned in Acts v., 37, and by Josephus in *Antiq. xviii.*, 1, 68. It is certain that Augustus held at least three *census populi* of the empire."

As there appear to be several weak points in this explana-

* In his treatise *de Syria Romanorum provincia* in the second volume of his *Commentationes Epigraphicæ*, pp. 88-107 (Berlin, 1854). The historian Theodor Mommsen expressed his opinion in R. Bergmann's essay *de inscriptione Latina ad P. S. Quirinium, ut videtur, referenda*, (Berlin, 1851), a *brochure* which the writer has never seen. The whole subject is re-examined by Dr. Hermann Gerlach in a little work entitled "die Römische Statthalter in Syrien und Judæa," etc. (Berlin, 1866)—a work of a theologian not completely at home in matters relating to classical antiquity. In the same year and at the same place, Mommsen, the historian, published his "*res gestæ divi Augusti*," (see note *infra*), to which he subjoins a short but excellent commentary on the inscription in question, entitled "de P. Sulpicii Quirini titulo Tiburtino."

tion given by Dr. Schaff, we take the liberty of subjecting it to a free examination, in doing which we intend not to confine ourselves to the points which he has made, but to discuss the whole question. It opens before us in three divisions: What is the true sense of the passage in Luke? Was Quirinius concerned in a census of Judea when our Lord was born? And was there a general census of the Roman Empire, such as Luke seems to conceive of?

I. The natural interpretation of v. 2, that which would, without doubt, first suggest itself to the mind, is that "this *apographe* or census took place as the first one when Cyrenius was Governor of Syria." Here then Luke conceives of the first census as opposed to subsequent ones, whether those subsequent ones took place under Quirinius or afterwards. He means, certainly, to be understood that this was the first census, and that it took place when Quirinius was Governor; but we cannot argue that he knew anything of more than one census during the time of this man's official connexion with Palestine. Furthermore, there is no indication in the sentence that Luke was acquainted with two Syrian legations of Quirinius, for then he could scarcely have failed to say *ἡγεμονεύοντος πρώτον*, etc., i. e. "when Quirinius was for the first time Governor of Syria."

Nor can it be objected to this interpretation that *πρώτη* ought to have the article if so taken. This is not true. We find that the ordinals *πρώτος* and *ἔσχατος* often do without the article in Greek where a fuller style might insert them. Confining ourselves to the style of the New Testament, we find examples like these: Apoc. xxii., 13, "I am the first and the last," *πρώτος καὶ ἔσχατος*, while in i. 17 they have the article; I. Tim. i., 15, 16, "to save sinners ὡν πρώτος εἰμι ἐγώ; and "I obtained mercy" *ἵνα ἐν ἐμοὶ πρώτῳ*. Mark xii., 28, 29, 30, affords three parallel examples. Comp. I. Cor. xv., 26, *ἔσχατος ἐχθρὸς καταργεῖται ὁ θάνατος*, where the two first words are in apposition to the subject, as *πρώτη (ἀπογραφῇ)* in Luke.

Now, in order to reconcile this statement with the fact, that the only well known census—mentioned also by Luke, Acts v., 37—with which Quirinius had to do as Governor of Syria, occurred in 6 A. D., that is some nine years after the customary date of Christ's birth, various expedients have been devised, which

labor under very serious objections. First, there are the desperate expedients, such as the conjectural substitution of Saturninus for Quirinius in the text,* and the erasure from the text, as of a marginal note that had crept in, of the whole of the second verse, which, it is true, can be left out without weakening the connexion. Then some would read *αὐτῇ* for *αὐτῆ*, and would suppose a contrast to exist between *the decree* or *δῶγμα* and *the census itself*, or actual execution of the decree. "The census itself took place —, when," etc. But this is wholly untenable. For if the *apographe* or census itself did not take place until long after Christ's birth, why did Joseph go to Bethlehem to get himself registered? No distinction can be made between this self-registration and the execution of the decree to take the *apographe*. Moreover, if this had been the sense, *δὲ* would inevitably have appeared after *αὐτῇ*.

Others, without troubling *αὐτῆ*, would render *ἐγένετο* emphatically *took effect*, a meaning which it certainly cannot bear. Why, if this sense were to be expressed, was the word chosen which denotes simply *coming into existence*. Our translators, who render *πρώτῃ* as if it were *πρώτον* ("took place first," i. e. did not take place until) seem to have had in mind an interpretation like the one just mentioned.

But the most popular expedient is that of making *Κυρηνίου* with its participle depend on *πρώτῃ*, which is thus made to take a comparative sense. Or, more exactly, *πρώτῃ* is made to mean not only *the first*, but also *the first* in relation to another census; and the sense thus extracted is that "this census took place before Quirinius was Governor in Syria." In other words, there is an express caution not to confound this census with the better known one which was made in Judea after our Lord's birth. It appears that Joseph Scaliger suggested this interpretation to Isaac Casaubon, but that great Greek scholar could not receive it. It survived his time, however, and has come into vogue in the recent discussions among the

* H. Valesius (on Euseb. hist. eccles., i., cap. v.) was of this opinion, which was of older date, since Baronius called it *novatorum vesania*. He says "at mihi quidem videtur error in textu irrepsisse in Quirinii nomine, et pro Quirinio restituendum esse nomen Sentii Saturnini." Why he thought so will appear in the sequel, when we come to consider a remarkable passage in Tertullian.

Germans. Huschke, the learned law-professor at Breslau, author of an essay—in many respects excellent—on the census at the birth of Christ,* Neander, Tholuck, Wieseler, and others take this ground.† We will notice only Huschke's positions which are defended at length and with quite an array of examples. First, he adduces instances of the undoubted use of *πρῶτος* with a genitive, like *πρότερος* or *πρό*, such as that in John i., 15, 30, *ὅτι πρῶτός μου ἦν*; xv., 18, *ὅτι ἐμὲ πρῶτον ὁμῶν μεμίσηκεν*, and others in Greek writers, chiefly of a later age. An analogous construction is found in ii. Maccab. vii., 41, “the mother died after the sons,” *ἐσχάτῃ τῶν υἱῶν*. This usage may be explained, perhaps, on the principle that *first* and *last*, the extreme terms in the series of ordinals, are naturally conceived of in their relations to other terms following or preceding them, whence they acquire a comparative sense.

Next Huschke calls attention to those forms of speech known to the Greek but still more to the Latin, where a participle agreeing with a noun performs with it the part of an abstract noun and a genitive, as *μετὰ Σόλωνα οἰχόμενον*, *after the departure of Solon*, from Herodotus, *ἅμα Καρχηδόνι κτισζομένη*, *at the same time with the founding of Carthage*, from Dionys of Halicarnassus. These forms of expression usually follow a preposition in both languages, as, in Greek, *ἐπὶ Κύρου βασιλεύοντος*, so with *ἀπὸ*, as *ἀπ' Εὐκλείδου ἀρχόντος*, *from the Archbishop of Euclid*. So, without doubt, Luke might have said *πρὸ Κ. ἡγεμονεύοντος*. But Huschke again, somewhat unnecessarily it should seem for his cause, finds a brevity in the expression of our text, such as we see in Matt. v., 20, “unless your righteousness exceed the scribes,”—a very common brachy-

* Über den zur zeit der geburt Jesu Christi gehaltenen census, Breslau, 1840. This was followed by another excellent little book—Über den census und die Steuerverfassung der frühern Römischen Kaiserzeit, Berlin, 1847.

† This opinion, which Wieseler long ago advocated in his Chronologische Synopse, he adheres to in his Zeitrechnung des Neuen Testaments, an article in Herzog's Theol. Encycl., Supplement, published in 1866. A still later writing of the same eminent critic and chronologer,—Beiträge zur richtigen würdigung der Evangelien und der Evangelischen Geschichte, (Gotha, 1869,)—reached us just as this article was about to be put into type. We have delayed the printing in order to make ourselves acquainted with his views, and will give a brief synopsis of them, as far as may be necessary, at the end of the present Article.

logy in Greek. So, here, *before* or earlier than *Quirinius*, etc., would mean "*earlier than the census which took place when Quirinius*," etc., τῆς ἀπογραφῆς τῆς γενομένης being to be supplied.

The reader of this ingenious but artificial solution can scarcely avoid the feeling that it is devised to get rid of a difficulty, honestly no doubt, but in a state of warped judgment. As Winer puts it, (N. Test. Gram. 6th ed., p. 219 of the German), the natural sense of the words being that "this census took place as the first (census) when Quirinius was Governor of Syria," how could Luke express a very different thought in the same language, without the consciousness that he would be misunderstood; and if so, how could he write thus? But waiving this objection, no example has been adduced—we venture to say none can be adduced—in which *πρῶτος* or *πρότερος* governs a genitive with a participle. This must be regarded as very awkward, if not impossible Greek, as well as unnatural, since *πρὸ* with a genitive and better *πρὶν ἢ* with an infinitive would have readily been thought of as unambiguous and admissible expressions.*

Having thus discussed the sense of v. 2, we add an observation or two upon the rest of the passage.

1. *In those days*, i. e. when the events of chapter first were happening. These words are not to be pressed. The *ὁῶμα*

* A monster of an expression, if it have any analogy with the case in hand, has been found by Tholuck in the Sept. Jer. xxix, 2, "These are the words of the letter that Jeremiah the prophet sent — after that Jeconiah — had departed," etc. ὅτερον ἐξελθόντος ἰεχονίου, etc., in the original, *after the going out of Jeconiah*. Thus, if the translation followed the Hebrew, ὅτερον would govern the following words. But it is scarcely conceivable that the translator could have taken the genitives in any other than the absolute construction, when, to follow the Hebrew construction, it would have been easy to say ὅτερον ἢ ἐξελθὲν ἰεχονίαν, etc. The sense, then, is *afterwards, when J. had gone out*, etc. And yet two instances of a strange use of the participle, not wholly unlike the one just given, may perhaps lead us to explain that one as a barbarous solecism. They are Jer. xxxi., 32, cited also Hebr. viii., 9, "In the day of my taking hold of their hand," ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἐπιλαβόντων, etc., and Baruch ii., 28, "As thou speakest by thy servant Moses in the day of thy commanding him to write the law, etc.," ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἐντειλαμένου σου αἰνῶ, etc. In the Hebrew the infinitive was used in the first instance, and must have been found in the original text of Baruch. Why did the translator avoid an easy construction familiar to the Greeks by using the participle?

may have "gone forth" some time before the birth of Jesus. If there was a general census at all, it must have been no small or short labor to take it over the empire, and it may have begun or ended sooner in one province than in another.

2. *The whole world.* We may regard it as conceded that this does not mean the land of Judea—the *whole inhabited land*, but the whole Roman Empire, whether directly under Roman sway, or as Judea then was, indirectly.

3. *Ἀπογραφή.* This word, it is said, differs from *ἀποτίμησις*, which includes the notion of report and estimation of property. But *ἀπογραφή* often and usually contains the same notions, as may be shown by copious examples, of which we give one or two from Dio Cassius in a note.* Of course this word would not imply that a levy of tribute necessarily followed, but this was the purpose of it. A mere enumeration of inhabitants, or one including population and property for the purpose of getting information concerning the provinces might be called an *ἀπογραφή*, as even *census* was occasionally used in a somewhat large sense. But here the act of persons going to the cities of their origin or ancestry shows that a mere census of population could not have been thought of. Moreover, this *ἀπογραφή* is spoken of as the first of its kind, but the others had undoubtedly *professions* of property in view.

This census took place, etc. A question may be raised whether here Luke meant to speak of a time when the general census everywhere was going on, or only that of Judea and

* The usual expression in Dio Cass. is *ἀπογραφὰς ποιῆσθαι*, and that, whether a Roman or a provincial census is spoken of. Examples of a Roman occur, in which *ἀπογραφὰς* is used in xliii., 24, liii., 1, liv., 35, lv., 18; Comp. also xlv., 78, lii., 17, 18, liv., 28. Examples of a provincial occur in liii., 23, (727 a. u.) lix., 22, (792 a. u.) In the last Caligula, being short of money in Gaul, while gambling with dice, asked for *τὰς τῶν Γαλατῶν ἀπογραφὰς*, and had the richest proprietors put to death in order to raise the money. It is remarked by a Roman lawyer, perhaps Cervidius Scaevola, in Huschke's recent edition of the Jurisprud. Antea Justin quæ supra. (Berl., 1867), that the word *census* was especially applicable to the Roman census—i. e. as including all the formalities civil and sacred there observed, while the term *professions* was more appropriate to the provincial declarations of property, etc., which was a term already in use at Rome for that part of the whole operation denoted by the census in a limited sense. But the term census itself is also used for what the provincials had to do. Comp. Tac. Annal. i., 31 (767 a. u.) *Germanicum agendo Galliarum Censui tum intentum*.

Syria. The first naturally suggests itself as his meaning, and yet we cannot help feeling that it is fair to suppose him to pass over in thought from the *general* to the *local* census, from the Roman Empire to Syria, or even to Judea, and to indicate the time of the latter. This may be called an inaccuracy, but it is one which a historian driving towards a main point, and regardless of extraneous particulars, might naturally fall into. This view of the transition of thought must be taken, unless we conceive of the Evangelist, as supposing that all persons through the empire, and not merely taxable persons in Judea, went to their respective cities (of domicil or of origin) in order to go through with the forms of the census.

Because he was of the house, etc. It is plain that the narrative, as it came into Luke's hands, accounted for Joseph's going to Bethlehem to comply with the requisitions of the census, on the ground that he was of David's stock, and not on the ground that he held property there.

To be taxed with Mary. Here the natural order suggests that Mary went to be registered as well as Joseph. In other words, *ὁὐ Μαρίας* is to be taken not only with *ἀνέβη* but with the nearer word *ἀπογράφασθαι* also. Otherwise Luke would have written, Joseph went up with Mary, etc., to Bethlehem, etc. And yet there is a possibility that owing to the crowd of particulars relating to Joseph which were to be inserted in one sentence, he may have chosen an order of words not free from ambiguity, and may not have intended to convey the thought that Mary was to be "taxed" also. And here the question naturally comes in, what is the relation of *οὗση ἐν κύβω* to the leading part of the sentence. It can denote "because she was *ἐγκυος*," in which case the meaning would be that Joseph went up with Mary because she was not in a condition to be left behind, or that he went up to be taxed with her because, being in that situation, she was liable to appear before the magistrates who took the census. The latter is wholly improbable. The plain explanation is that this clause renders no reason, but only states a fact, out of which the events of the next verse derive their explanation.

II. The next point which demands our attention is the part which Quirinius could have taken in a census which was going on at the time of our Lord's birth.

Here one thing is certain—that he was not President of Syria until after the death of Herod the Great, and therefore not until after the birth of Christ, unless the narrative of Matthew is to be entirely rejected, nay, further, unless Luke himself is to be taxed with error, when he describes the events in general of his first chapter as occurring in the days of Herod, the King.

The succession of imperial legates in Syria for many years before the death of Herod is established by Josephus, and in part by other concurrent testimony. To go no further back than the year 741 U. C.=13 B. C., when M. Agrippa left the East, which he had been governing with a proconsular power like that of his father-in-law Augustus, he was succeeded by a consular man, M. Titius, whom Herod, on his way to Rome about the year 734,* found at Antioch in the government of the province, and succeeded in reconciling with Archelaus, King of Cappadocia. (Jos. Antiq., xvi., 8, § 6.) Strabo also speaks of him (xvi., p. 515), as τὸν ἐπιστατοῦντα τῆς Συρίας. On or soon after Herod's return from Rome, that king had an interview with Saturninus, i. e. C. Sentius Saturninus, Governor of Syria (Jos. xvi., 9, § 1), and he was succeeded, as Josephus expressly says (xvii., 5, §2), by Quintilius Varus. The Jewish historian has no occasion to speak of Varus until near the time of Herod's death, when the king's son, Antipater, was brought to trial. He is thus spoken of: "Quintilius Varus happened to be in Jerusalem at that time, who had been sent as a successor of Saturninus in his Syrian Presidency, and had come there [i. e. to Jerusalem] of his own free will, to give counsel to Herod in regard to the state of his affairs at his request." From this we must not infer that Josephus supposed him to have arrived within his Presidency just before proceeding to Jerusalem, but he simply makes a rhetorical contrast between the office on which he had been sent, and the business which led him voluntarily out of his proper province to that city.† But whether Josephus thought, so or not, we

* The time cannot be fixed with entire certainty.

† H. Gerlach, in his *brochure* entitled "die Röm. Statthalter in Syrien und Judæa," etc, Berlin, 1865, seems to make this inference in regard to what Josephus supposed.

have certain proof that Varus had been some time in the province. There are three coins of Antioch described by Eckhel (*Doctr. numm.* iii., p. 275) with the legend *ANTIOXEQN ENI OYAPOT*, and the years *EK*, *ςK*, *ZK*. That the era to which these years pertain is the Actiac, i. e. that of the battle of Actium, September 2, 723 U. C.=31 B. C., is made out beyond question by Noris and Eckhel. The years then begin Sept. 2, 747=7, and end Sept. 1, 750=4.

The year 750 was the year of Herod's death. This is ascertained by a number of independent proofs, for which we refer to Wieseler's *Synopsis*, and especially to Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici*, vol. iii., under the year. We only mention one evidence which seems impregnable,—the eclipse that took place shortly before Herod's death and during his last illness. Certain men, among whom was Matthias, son of Margolothus, understanding that he was desperately ill, conspired to take down a golden eagle that he had placed over the great gate of the temple, and, on learning a report of his death, cut down the ornament at mid day, while many were in the vicinity. They were seized, and this Matthias, with some others, was burnt alive. "And the moon was eclipsed the same night," says Josephus (*Ant.* xvii., 6, § 2-4; *B. J.* i., 32, § 4). This eclipse, according to Petavius, happened in the Julian year 42, or 750=4, on the 13th of March, three hours before sunrise. Its beginning he sets at 1° 24', its end at 4° 9', its extent at 6 digits. Ideler, with the better tables of our day, does not materially differ from the old Jesuit. "In the night," says he, "between March 12th and 13th of 756 U. C., or the year 4 before our era, a partial eclipse of the moon occurred, which I have submitted to accurate calculations. According to the solar tables of DeLambre, and the Mayor-Mason lunar tables, its beginning took place at Jerusalem—two hours thirteen minutes from Paris—at 1° 48', and its end at 4° 12' in the morning. In the middle of the eclipse, at 3 o'clock, its magnitude amounted to 4.7 digits on the northern side of the disk. The ensuing full moon, the first in the spring, determined without doubt the time of the passover, and hence the King's death must have occurred in the first days of April, as well as of Nisan. This being assumed, all the chronological indications of this event

appear completely correct, and, moreover, it ought to be said that in the year 750, no other eclipse of the moon took place, which was visible at Jerusalem. In the year 751, to which some would assign Herod's death, there was no eclipse of the moon at all."*

Herod died between the night of this eclipse and the passover, that is within the month before the next full moon, and at a time so near to the passover that the seven days' mourning had scarcely ended—it would seem—when it began. (Comp. Jos. Ant. xvii., 8, § 1, 9, §3).

It is objected by a German writer, Rösch, in the *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie*, xi., 1, that a month is too short a time to contain all the events between the eclipse and the passover. And if this were so, we should have to conclude that Herod lingered more than a year until near the passover of 751. *If this could be made out, it would have an important bearing on the question of our Lord's birth, but would have no significance, as far as the Presidency of Quirinius is concerned.* Whenever Herod died, Varus remained in his office for months afterwards. But the objection is without weight, as we have convinced ourselves by a careful examination of Josephus. The month was full, but not overfull, of events, and the historian evidently thought that Herod died before the next passover.

Not long after the passover, Archelaus finds it necessary to go to Rome in order to have the kingdom confirmed to him by the Emperor, and during his absence dangerous commotions in Judea required the presence of the President of Syria in that country with a Roman army. Varus relieves the troops besieged in the city, quells the rebellion in the land, and according to Tacitus (Hist. v., § 9),—in contradiction, however, as to that particular, with Josephus—is personally concerned in putting down the movement of one Simon, a slave of Herod who had been set up as king by his followers (Jos. xvii., 10, § 6). After his march back to Antioch we hear no more of Varus in these quarters. He may have continued after 750, or have given place to a successor in that year.

* Petavius, *Doctr. temp.* Book xl., cap. 61. Ideler's *Handbuch* ii., §91, et seq.

It is evident, then, that if our Lord was born before the death of Herod, Quirinius can have had no agency as Governor of Syria, in a census that was then beginning in that province. There are, however, two possibilities consistent with the account in Luke, as well as with that in Matthew. Either there was an *earlier* census, in which he served as a *commissioner*, which gave rise to his being called, somewhat inaccurately by Luke, governor of Syria, or he was president of Syria after Varus, and *continued a census* which had been begun before, and was going on at the time of Christ's birth. We propose to look at these possibilities, taking up the last mentioned first, and then to discuss the question of a general census at the close of our essay.

Was Quirinius the emperor's legate in Syria twice, and if so, to what year can his first legation be referred? Perhaps it will be the clearest and briefest way of examining this question to put down first in the text what we learn about this man from ancient authorities.

1. He was a man of inferior origin, no way connected with the patrician Sulpicii, born at Lanuvium. He distinguished himself by activity in military and other service, and was raised to the consulship. (Tac. Annal. iii., 48).

2. His consulship belongs to the year 742=12, when M. Valerius Messala Appianus was his colleague. He held the office part of the year, when L. Volusius Saturninus took his place. Valgus also was consul in the same year instead of Valerius, deceased, and his name appears as a colleague of Quirinius on several inscriptions in the Orelli-Henzen Sylloge (Nos. 3,693, 4,471, 7,041). In one of these his name is written out full and the cognomen is Quirinio. This reading, that of the Medicean manuscript of Tacitus, the Greek form of his name *Κυρήμιος* in Josephus, and the N. T., *Κυρίνος* in Strabo xii., p. 569, and in the heading of Dio Cass. liv., like *Κυρήνιος* for Quirinus, *η* and long *ι* being to some extent even then interchangeable), all show, what the older scholars of repute and the best modern ones admit, that his name ended in *ius*. If some manuscripts have the reading Quirinus, it may be explained by the not uncommon practice of the Latins of leaning an *i* upon or making it coalesce with a preceding *N*. Quirinius is indeed a family name, and as such would have been unfit for a cognomen.

men, but at this age the old rules regarding names began to be overstepped.*

3. He was a Provincial Governor in Africa. According to Zumpt his office was that of Proconsul of the Roman Province of Africa, which was then given to a man who had filled the Consulship, but not until an interval had elapsed, since his Consulship, of five years. The office itself was an annual one and hence he might have held it during the year 748=6. The objections to this view, and the greater probability that he was, while a man of only prætorian dignity, Governor of the province of Crete and Cyrene, will afterwards appear.

That he was concerned in wars in Africa appears from Florus (iv., 12, § 41), and from that author only. After speaking of the victories of Cossus (i. e. Cossus Cornelius Lentulus, Consul, 753=1 B. C., Proconsul in Africa, 759=6 A. D.,) over the Gætuli, by which he obtained the name of Gætulicus and the *ornamenta triumphalia*, Florus adds that "Augustus gave the business of subduing the Marmaridæ and Garamantes to Quirinius (in the *Mss.* Quirinio, or per Quirinium). He too might have gone home with the title Marmaricus, but he was more modest [than Cossus was] in the value he put on his victory." It is probable that Florus mentions these men in the order, not of time, but of place, passing in review the transactions from West to East.

4. He subjugated, and in part deported from their country, a troublesome little nation in or near rough Cilicia, the Homonadenses, in conflict with whom Amyntas, King of Galatia, had been killed a number of years before (in 729=25). What led to these summary measures now, unless their general predatory habits, we are not informed. The words of Tacitus, in the passage already cited, referring to that transaction are "Mox expugnatis per Ciliciam Homonadensium castellis insignia triumphi adeptus," in which *mox*, referring back to his Consulship, is not to be pressed, any more than in Suet. Nero, § 6, "*mox adoptatus est*," where an interval of eleven years

* See especially Nipperdey on Tac. Annal. ii, 80. For the leaning on the *N* in inscriptions consult Zell, *Röm. Epigraphik* ii., p. 45.

occurred. Strabo gives a full account of this affair in book xii., 6, § 5, p. 569.

5. He was appointed *rector* or one of the *rectores* of Cains Cæsar when he went into the East, after his adoption by his grandfather, invested with proconsular power. Tacitus continues, "Datæque rector C. Cæsari Armeniam obtinenti, Tiberium quoque Rhodi agentem coluerat."

This is an important date, and for the purpose of fixing it more accurately, several other events, not immediately affecting Quirinius, need to be looked at. C. Cæsar spent his consular year, 754=A. D. 1, abroad, and must have gone abroad late in the year preceding. For Velleius (ii., 100) says: "Breve ab hoc [that is from the disgrace and banishment of Julia, his mother] intercesserat spatium, cum C. Cæsar, ante aliis provinciis ad visendum obitis, ad Syriam missus, convento prius Tiberio, varie se gessit." Julia was banished, as Clinton (anno 752) shows after Noris, late in 752=2; so that the young Cæsar could have left Rome in 753. Of his year in the Consulship (754), the second of the decrees of the Pisan colony, commonly called the *Cœnotaphia Pisana*, speaks thus: "Post consulatum, quem ultra finis extremas populi Romani bellum gerens feliciter peregerat."* On his way eastward he met, or was met by Tiberius, his stepfather, then in a kind of exile at Rhodes. They met at Chios or Samos (Dio Cass. lv., 11, Velleius, u. s., Sueton. Tiber. § 12). The year 754 was marked by his conference with Phraates, of which Velleius was a spectator, being then in the army. Phraates gave him proofs of the perfidy of Lollius, his rector, who soon afterwards died as did Censorinus, whom Zumpt regards, without convincing reason, as another of his *rectores*, in the same provinces. (Vell. u. s.) This interview with Phraates is assigned to A. D. 2 by

* These marbles are the subject of Cardinal Noris or Norisius' learned commentary, entitled *Cœnotaphia Pisana*, the reprint of which in the Grævius-Burmann Thesaurus, vol. viii., part 3, we have constantly used in this Article. The inscriptions have often been reprinted, as by Zell, in his Handb. d. Röm. Epigr., after Gorio's text, vol. i, 369=373. Noris, of Irish descent, born at Verona, in 1631, an Augustin friar at Rimini, then Librarian of the Vatican in 1692, and created Cardinal in 1696, published also a history of Pelagianism, a work entitled *Epochæ regum Syromacedonum*, and other works. He died in 1704.

Clinton, but he seems to be misled by a false interpretation of the words of Velleius.* In the same year, before the death of Lucius Cæsar, younger brother of Caius, Tiberius returned to Rome. For the death of Lucius at Marseilles took place, as Noris and Clinton after him have determined, in August of A. D. 2. And according to Velleius, again, "Ante utriusque horum obitum [that is before either of the young Cæsars died], patre tuo, P. Vinicio consule, Tiberius Nero reversus Rhodo incredibili lætitia patriam repleverat." But Vinicius, the father of the friend of Velleius, was Consul with Alphinus in A. D. 2. In this year also troubles broke out in Armenia, whereas there had been, as Dio Cass. says, no hostilities in the previous year. The young Cæsar was treacherously wounded under the walls of Artageira. After this he lost his health and languished, and died at Limyra, in Lycia, Feb. 21, A. D. 4=757.

It results from this exposition that Quirinius must have paid court to Tiberius in Rhodes, before August of A. D. 2.=755, before which time the latter had returned to Rome, and that he may have gone into the East sometime in 753, if not already there, which is quite probable.

6. He married Lepida, a woman of the highest patrician blood, who had been betrothed to Lucius Cæsar. This must have taken place soon after the death of Lucius, in August, A. D. 2.=775. For the divorce and trial of Lepida occurred, as Suetonius says, in the twentieth year after their marriage, and is assigned by Tacitus to A. D. 20.=773. Suetonius makes the time too long, but if we assume that the marriage was celebrated in 775, and count both years, we make nineteen, so that the biographer is not much out of the way.†

7. He was president or emperor's legate in Syria in 6, A. D.=759, sent there just after the banishment of Archelaus.

* This is a remark of Peter, *Gesch. Roms.* iii., p. 76.

† The words of Suetonius (*Tib.* § 49) are "condemnatam et generosissimam feminam, Lepidam, in gratiam Quirini prædixit et orbi, qui dimissam eam a matrimonio post vicessimum annum, venientem olim in se comparati arguebat." The fuller account in Tacitus *Annal.* iii., 22-23, is too long for insertion here. The clauses "defertur simulavisse partum ex Quirinio;—Quirinius post dictum repudium adhuc infensus;—Scauro qui filium ex ea genuerat;—aperuit Tiberius compertum sibi etiam ex P. Quirini servis veneno eum a Lepida pettum," will put the reader in possession of the leading facts.

(Joseph. Antiq. xviii., 1, § 1). "Cyrenius came into Judea, which had become an appendage of Syria, ἀποτιμησόμενος τὰ αὐτῶν τὰς οὐσίας, καὶ ἀποδωσόμενος τὰ Ἀρχελάου χρήματα." With him came Coponius as procurator of Judea. (ibid). The time is determined both by Dio Cass, lv., 25, 27, who includes this event under the consulship of Æmilius Lepidus and Lucius Arruntius, and by dates drawn from Josephus, for which Clinton (F. H., iii., anno 750) may be consulted. There is not the slightest reason for supposing, as a recent Catholic writer has done, that he was *now* not an ordinary *praeses* or *legatus*, but a *legatus ad census accipiendos*, for he is called by Josephus a *δικαιοδότης τοῦ ἔθνους*, and he exercised the highest civil power, in removing one high priest from his office and putting another in his place.*

8. The divorce from Lepida, in the year 773=A. D. 20. (Tacitus and Suetonius, u. s.).

9. His death in 774=A. D. 21. Tacitus Annal. iii. 45.

So much for Quirinius. The question now arises whether before his presidency in 6 A. D., he could have held the same office in the Syrian province. Here we notice

1. That he was immediately preceded, it is probable, when he held his last presidency, by L. Volusius Saturninus, who had been consul suffectus in his room (742=12 B. C). and whose death in 773=A. D. 20, is noticed by Tacitus, Annal. iii., 30. The fact of the legation of Volusius in Syria was unknown to the earlier writers on this text, and on the era of our Lord's birth; it is ascertained by a coin of the same Actiac era with those which record the name of Varus, and contains the legend *Αντιοχέων ἐπὶ Σατουρνίνου Ουολο*. with the year *ΕΔ*, i. e. the 35th year from Sept. 2, 723, or 757.† As, according to received usage in the emperor's provinces, he would hold

* We get our information concerning this theory of Dr. Aberle of Tübingen, from an article of Hilgenfeld's, in his *Zeitschr. f. Wissensch. Theol.* for 1865, p. 408. The Article is of no especial importance. Of as little is the part of the "Halben und Ganzen," of Strauss, relating to this question. (Berl. 1865). This passage in the work of Strauss is animadverted upon by Zumpt in the *Evang. Kirchenzeit.* Oct. 1865, who shows that Strauss is unacquainted with the more modern discussions on this subject proceeding from classical scholars.

† Eckhel iii., 275, 276.

his office not less than three years, and it is quite improbable that any other president governed Syria during the short period before 759, when Quirinius came, we may give him the years between 756 and 759.*

2. At what time Varus left his post in Syria, we are nowhere informed. He was there, as we have seen, in 748-750, and may have come in 747, and remained until 751, or even later. If he went into the East in 748 and staid through 752, his time of five years service would just reach the time when C. Cæsar received his proconsular power for that part of the world.

3. It is supposed by Noris, and Zumpt has further developed the supposition, that one or more of the *rectores* of the young Cæsar were presidents of Syria during his stay in the east. This, to say the least, is uncertain. When Caius Cæsar was sent eastward, Augustus, according to Zonaras (Annal. x, 36) who must have copied or abridged a lost passage in the 55th book of Dio Cassius, "gave him the proconsular power and a wife, that from this also he might gain some additional dignity, *καὶ οἱ καὶ συμβούλους προσέταξε.*" These *counsellors* can have been none other than the *rectores* of Tacitus and the *moderatores* of Velleius, the first of whom names only Quirinius, and the latter only Lollius and—as Zumpt thinks—Censorinus. When Agrippa had the same authority in the East, there was no governor of Syria besides. Why should there be governors now, when the young Cæsar, his son, had an equal dignity? At most, these counsellors can have been his legates, appointed and forced on him by his grandfather, in command of the legions of Syria, one or more of them, but not legates of the emperor. We conclude, then, from this analogy, that, between some part of 753 and the date of the accession of Volusius to the presidency of Syria,—which is to be assigned probably to some part of the year 756,—there were no presidents of Syria. In 755 Caius Cæsar was wounded, after which his health sank and he threw up the cares of his office.†

* See especially Zumpt, u. s. li. 88.

† In saying this we do not mean to deny that Quirinius, having been or being president of Syria, became a rector of the young Cæsar, but that there is no evidence that the office of rector brought with it the other. There is no evidence that Lollius was at the head of the Syrian province.

4. There remains, then, the interval between the end of the legation of Varus—whenever it was, whether in 750 or later—and sometime in 753 for another president of Syria. Was that president Quirinius? Was he there perhaps when the young Cæsar came into the province, and was he thus naturally appointed to be one of his counsellors?

5. The arguments for his being there about this time are two, one drawn from his defeat of the Homonadenses, and the other from an inscription of which we propose presently to speak. In considering these arguments we shall draw freely from Zumpt's essay already often mentioned, and from other sources.

Quirinius, when he subjugated these mountaineers, commanded an army, and, being a consular man, must, in the ordinary course of things, have commanded a consular, and even an imperial province, as there was generally no army in a senatorial province. These limitations will exclude all the provinces of Asia, as being either entrusted to men of a rank below the consular, or—as was probably true of proconsular Asia,—as being without an army. This province, moreover, was rather too far off from the scene of action.

Where exactly the Homonadenses lived it is not easy to determine. Tacitus assigns them to Cilicia, Strabo to Pisidia or Isauria, or to Cilicia, Pliny makes them conterminous with the Isaurians. They may have formed a portion of the kingdom of Archelaus king of Cappadocia, which, at the time of these events, embraced a considerable portion of rough Cilicia. But it is really of minor importance to settle this point, for there is no doubt that as Varus went out of his own province with his army to quell the commotions in Judea, then under a king, so a Syrian president would without scruple have sent or led his army into the neighboring Cilicia for the same reason.

Archbishop Usher thought that Quirinius was procousul of Cilicia when these events took place. The supposition cannot be defended, but it is quite probable that Cilicia was at this time united to Syria. This province, greatly reduced in its extent since the times of Cicero, was at one time united with Cyprus under one proconsul; and in 729=25. B. C., became

an imperial province, but in 732=22 B. C., was given back to the Senate. In 734=20 B. C., it was separated from Cyprus, over which was now placed a proprætor with the name and style of a proconsul. Such was Sergius Paulus. Cilicia now formed an imperial province, and *after* Augustus was governed by a *legatus pro prætore*, but we have no information how it was governed from 734 until Augustus died, and for some time afterward. Several cases of interference in Cilician affairs on the part of Syrian presidents—those namely recorded by Tacitus, Annal. ii., 78-80, vi., 41, xii., 55, seem to show that they had a right so to do, and Cilicia being a country with unquiet mountaineers in or around it, there was a kind of necessity in connecting it with a province, where a large army was indispensable.

These considerations render it probable that when Quirinius subjugated these barbarians, he was president of Syria. And the time can have just preceded that when he became rector of the young Cæsar, if Tacitus, in the passage so often referred to, has not violated historical sequence. To this may be added that the *insignia triumphi* which he obtained for this successful enterprise shows him to have been acting as emperor's legate.

The other source of evidence is an inscription found at Tibur in 1764, unfortunately mutilated, but having reference to some one who held the office of imperial legate twice in the province of Syria. We speak of one inscription only, passing by another of great importance (in which one Æmilius, serving under Quirinius, there called Quirinus, legate of Syria, is recorded as having taken the census of Apamea, and captured a fortress of the Ituræans in Mount Lebanon), on account of the suspicions now generally entertained of its genuineness, which are sufficient to condemn it as the product of fraud.* The genuine inscription, with missing parts that are certain or nearly so supplied in parenthesis, runs as follows :

re] gem, qua redacta in pot[estatem divi] || Augusti popu-

* See Zumpt ii., 105-107. Originally made known in 1719, said to be at Venice, received by San Clemente and Husccke with older writers, branded first as a forgery by Marini (*Atti e monumenti de' fratelli Arvali*, Rome, 1795), it now has no weight with cautious scholars.

lique Romani, Senatu[s decrevit] | Supplicationes binas ob res pros[er]e gestas[,] ipsi ornamenta triumph[alia]. Proconsul Asiam provinciam op[er]at[us] [t]inuit, leg[atus] | divi Augusti iterum Syriam et Ph[œ]nicen rexit.*

This marble honors the memory of a man who lived and served under Augustus, died after him (whence *divus Augustus*), had been proconsul of Asia, and twice legate of the emperor, once at least in Syria, had subjugated some tribe or nation (*quæ redacta*), and gave occasion by this to supplications or thanksgivings on two occasions, as well as received the triumphal insignia. The number of persons to whom this could possibly apply is very limited. Agrippa is out of the question, even if any of the deeds recorded on the monument could be ascribed to him, unless we suppose some one to have written a sepulchral inscription to his honor more than 25 years after his death, for so long Augustus survived him.† So also Titius—consul 44 years before Augustus' death—cannot have survived him, and we know that Varus and Lollius—if the latter were ever president of Syria—died long before Augustus. There remain two Syrian legates, of whose achievements nothing is recorded, Volusius, and Silanus, in whose presidency Augustus died, and two to whom the inscription

* We give a very short explanation of one or two points in the inscription. *Quæ redacta* refers to *gentem* or some such principal word, *regem* being subordinate. Supposing Quirinius to be the subject of the inscription, we can aptly supply after Mommsen, *quæ interfecerat Amyntam, Galatarum* [regem]—*supplicationes* here denotes thanksgivings, which sometimes in this age extended through from 10 to 60 days. *Binas* can only mean *on two separate occasions*, as the supplications were counted by no particular number of days. Comp. Marquardt, *Röm. alterth.* iii., 2, p. 446,—*Ornamenta triumphalia trivinculæ ryal* in Dion Cass. For the difference between this honor, which was frequently conferred on the legates of the emperor, who was general-in-chief, and a triumph which properly belonged to the general-in-chief, see Marquardt u.s.—*iterum*. There can be no reasonable doubt that the sense is not that the man spoken of was *twice legate*, and in his *second legation* governed Syria, but that he was legate of Syria twice. For this very essential point we must refer to Zumpt's often cited essay. San Clemente and Mommsen give the same explanation. Mommsen (on the *Res gestæ Augusti*, p. 112.) says that he has met with no other instance besides this of a legation or presidency of an imperial province being given the second time to the same man.

† Agrippa died in March 742, Augustus in September 767, U. C.

can, with some probability, be referred, Saturninus and Quirinius. Bergmann and Mommsen, after San Clemente, decide for Quirinius, Zumpt for Saturninus. The arguments of the latter against referring the inscription to Quirinius are two. 1. He had been, as we learn from Florus, proconsul of Africa. It was an unheard of thing at this age of Rome, that the same man should have the government in both those senatorial provinces, Africa and Asia, for which consular men were selected. No other examples can be given. There were generally more than two consuls (including the *suffecti*) every year, to whom these two provinces were to be assigned. 2. What could have called for the *two* supplications in the subjugation of a paltry tribe of mountaineers in Mount Taurus. Gerlach meets this by the remark that Zumpt forgets the successes of Quirinius in Africa. But he himself forgets that the inscription confines them to one occasion, *qua redacta* being the same as *on account of the subjugation of which*. Neither argument has much weight. If the public good demanded the presence of an active military man in the province of Asia like Quirinius, he might fill it, after his first Syrian legation, and while Volusius was president in Syria. And as for the second argument our ignorance of the circumstances makes it unreliable.

On the other hand Zumpt's arguments for Saturninus are these. When, as governor in Germany (758, 759=A. D. 5, 6), and acting with Tiberius, he penetrated beyond the Weser, several tribes were subdued and the Cherusci were re-subjugated. (Vell. ii., 105). The courtly writer adds that Tiberius took himself the leading part; Sentius, probably because he was quite old now, having for his share whatever was of less responsibility and hazard. The subsequent movements, as described by the same historian, consisted in a combination of two armies against Maroboduus and the Marcomanni, which amounted to nothing, because disturbances in Dalmatia and Pannonia required the employment of the troops elsewhere (ii., 108-109). Dio Cass. makes even less of these operations (lv., 28). Tiberius "marched as far as the Visurgis [Weser], and afterwards to the Elbe, yet nothing worthy of mention was effected. And yet both Augustus and Tiberius were called *imperatores* on account of the transactions, and Caius

Sentius, the governor of Germany, received triumphal honors, inasmuch as they [the Germans] both once and again made peace with them. But the reason why peace was granted to them, when they had violated their treaty a little before, was the unusually serious disturbances in Dalmatia and Pannonia, requiring speedy attention." Here we have a happy explanation of the *binas supplicationes* of the inscription and of the *ornamenta triumphalia*. But the weak point in Zumpt's reference of this marble to Saturninus is that there is no room for him in the list of presidents of Syria, nor evidence that he was ever there but once, unless we arbitrarily suppose, as Zumpt must, that he preceded Agrippa's eastern government, before his own consulship.* But there is really no evidence that any, besides consular men, were ever entrusted with the government of Syria. The only seeming exception to this remark, a Varro mentioned by Josephus (Antiq. xv., 1, §. 10 Bell. Jud. i., 20, § 4), was probably nothing but a legate of Agrippa.

Zumpt's objection, that Quirinius, as being consul of Africa, could not hold the same office in proconsular Asia, is happily met on the supposition which Mommsen defends, that he performed his achievements in Africa, before his consulship, while he was entrusted with the province of Crete and Cyrene. This senatorial province was now governed by a proprætor with the title of proconsul. The Marmaridæ, or inhabitants of Marmarica, lived to the east of Cyrenaica, if not counted as belonging to that district, and the Garamantes to the west, towards or within proconsular Africa. Why should a governor of the province of Africa traverse the length of coast included in another province, when there was a Roman Governor on hand to put down the disturbances at such a distance. Will it be said that there is no evidence of an army in Cyrenaica. To this Mommsen answers that it is not so certain that this province was now without troops, nor improbable that the third legion, called Cyrenaica from the province, was stationed there before being transferred to Egypt. But granting, says this

* In comparing the accounts of this expedition into Germany given by Velleius and Dio Cassius, one must conclude that the latter gives no just view of what it had actually accomplished, and of what it promised to do. But for the insurrection in Pannonia and Dalmatia, Germany might have been subdued.

learned man, that the arrangements concerning the legions mentioned by Tacitus (*Annal.* iv., 5) were already adopted at so early a time, what prevented the sending of a legion from Egypt, if war had broken out in Cyrene? Add to this that the words of Tacitus already cited "*impiger militiæ et acribus ministeriis—consulatum—adeptus,*" are thus fully explained. He distinguished himself so much in this war, that though a man of humble origin, he thus paved his way to the higher office.* Add to this that when Florus says that he might have had the title of *Marmaricus* but for his modesty, the historian shows that the war with the *Marmaridæ* was the principal affair, which naturally belonged to the proconsul of Cyrenaica.

This being admitted—that the deeds of Quirinius in Africa belong to a time before his consulship—every thing else becomes clear. He went to Asia as proconsul, when he could, according to established usage, that is in the year 748. He succeeded Varus in Syria as he had succeeded him in the consulship. He was then appointed rector of Caius. The length of time admits of all this, whereas, if we make him proconsul of Africa after his consulship, we crowd his offices inconveniently together.

Upon the whole the evidence for a double legation of Quirinius in Syria is tolerably strong, without the marble, and the marble itself, when it speaks of a nation being brought under Roman sway, says more than could, without exaggeration, be

* See Mommsen's *res gestæ* d. August, pp. 119, 120. Here we may make the remark that *Sentius Saturninus* himself may have been proconsul in Africa, so that the objections of Zumpt against understanding the inscription of Quirinius would apply with as good reason to the other. *Tertullian* (*de pallio* cap. 1) has these words: "*post longas Cæsaris moras mœnia Cathagini Statillum Taurum imposuisse, solemnia enarravisse Sentium Saturninum.*" The former was proconsul of Africa in 718-720, the latter might have been in 740. His sons were consuls in 757, but the interval would be too great to understand what *Tertullian* says of one of them. These remarks are borrowed from Mommsen *u. s.*, p. 117.

It may be further remarked that on the supposition that the campaign of Quirinius in Africa took place before his consulship, we have in Tacitus an orderly progress of events. First he is active in war (*viz.* against the *Marmaridæ*, near Cyrene). This wins him his consulship, then he obtains his triumphal ornaments by conquering the *Homonadenses*, then he becomes rector of young C. *Œsæar*, then on his way to or from the east he courts *Tiberius* at Rhodes.

said of Saturninus, while the objections against referring it to Quirinius are chiefly arguments from our ignorance.

To return now to the census or *apographe* of which the evangelist speaks. Supposing Quirinius to have been twice governor of Syria, we have not reached and cannot by this means reach a perfect solution of the difficulties in our text, for his first presidency must have begun sometime after the death of Herod, and Joseph went to Bethlehem for the census sometime before that event. There remain two possible ways of explaining the connexion of Quirinius with the census.

First we may conceive it to have begun sometime before and to have been interrupted or dragged slowly until, by the vigor of this man, it was carried through. The historical tradition would thus connect with his name the leading part in the affair. And he might thus be more readily selected to superintend the complete change in the relations of Judea to Rome, after the deposition of Archelaus, for having shown and gained experience in his earlier administration.

Or, *secondly*, we may conceive that he was in Syria, some years earlier,—*when* it is unnecessary for our purpose to determine, if only some time before Herod's death, in the capacity of a fiscal agent for taking the census, and that he is loosely called by Luke *ἡγεμὼν Συρίας*. This is the opinion of many, both of the older scholars, as Cardinal Noris, and of the newer, as Dr. Edward Robinson, and Gerlach in his recent essay on the Roman governors in Syria. Noris exhibits this opinion in these words (Cœnot. Pis. Diss. ii., cap. 16, p. 295, ed. Græv-Burm.): “hinc plures eruditi viri dicunt Quirinium cum imperio extraordinario in Syriam missum ad censum peragendum. Nam cum eo anno [749 a. u.] pax toto Romano imperio floreret, Augustus decrevit universorum qui vel subditi vel socii essent populi Romani, numerum et facultates noscere. Hinc Lucæ II dicitur: *Exiit edictum a Cæsare Augusto ut describeretur universus Orbis*. Ex hac illum postea descriptione breviarium confecisse putant.—Cum vero Quirinius, vir consularis, id temporis Oriente degeret, ac bellum contra Homonadenses feliciter confecisset, eundem in Syriam cum extraordinario imperio misit, ut tum ibidem, tum in Judæa, quæ gens erat socia et amica populi Romani, censum perage-

ret. Quamvis vero eo anno* Sentius Saturninus Syriam administraret, Quirinius, ob recentem victoriam tota Asia celebratus, descriptioni faciendæ præpositus fuit.—Apud Evangelistam vox ἡγεμονεύοντος non accipitur prolegato proprætoris Syriæ sed pro quocumque potestatem atque imperium in Syria obtinente; ita Felix eidem Lucæ in Actis Apost. cap. 24, nuncupatur ἡγεμόνος, qui tamen erat procurator.”†

In illustration of this opinion we remark (1) that Josephus uses ἡγεμών with the same freeness or looseness of meaning. This is remarkable when he speaks of Saturninus when President of Syria and of one Volumnius who was somehow connected with him. All the examples in the *Antiquities*, which occur of that kind touching these men we will cite unless some have escaped our notice xvi., 9, § 1. “He conversed about these things with the emperor’s ἡγεμόσιν, Saturninus and Volumnius.” ib., § 2. He associates Volumnius with the other, as if the consent of the former were needed. τῶν περὶ τὸν Σ. καὶ Ου. ἐπιτροπόντων. § 5. “He often went to S. and V. τοῦς τῆς Συρίας ἡγεμόνας.” xvi., 11, § 1. Calling into council τοῦς ἡγεμόνας. xvi., 9, § 1. ἐπὶ Σ. καὶ Ου. τῶν Συρίας ἐπιστατούντων. Yet Volumnius ranked after Saturninus, who is called στρατηγῶν and ἐπιμελητής, while he is called (B. J., i., 27, § 1, § 2), στρατοπεδάρχης and ἐπίτροπος. He was not a legate of Saturninus, whose sons filled those offices for the three Syrian legions, (Antiq. xvi, 11, § 3), but his name ἐπίτροπος seems to describe him as a special agent of Augustus, having relations of a direct nature, perhaps as a finance agent, with the ruling power, serving as a kind of check on the Syrian president.

2. Important persons of high station were often selected, when the census system for the empire was established, to undertake this duty in the provinces, as the censor formerly, and the emperor at the time of which Luke writes, superintended it at Rome and for Italy. Tacitus speaks of Germanicus (Annal. i., 31), as *agendo Galliarum Censui intentum*, although

* Noris is wrong here. The coins relating to Varus and his presidency between 747 and 750 a. u. could not have been known when he wrote.

† A little afterwards Noris notices the plan of removing all difficulty in regard to Quirinius from the text of Luke by making πῶτος mean *prior to*, and says, “hanc expositionem verborum Lucæ ita refero ut nec probem nec improbem.”

not governor of the province, and as, when the news of Augustus' death came to him, *per Gallias census accipienti*. (Ibid, 33). A number of other cases occur but most of them belong to a later time. The persons named—and all the examples are from inscriptions—have the title of *legatus Augusti pro pretore censuum accipiendorum*, or *ad census accipiendos*, or *legatus, etc. censor*, with the province following. They are not ordinary imperial legates but extraordinary, invested with proconsular imperium, and thus able to command armies. A list may be found in Marquardt, (Becker-Marq. iii., 2, 172). It would not have been beneath the consular dignity of Quirinius to undertake this delicate and important trust, a trust confided, in Gaul, to a member of the imperial family. And if, when so employed, he was deputed to put an end to disturbances in Cilicia, perhaps this might be justified by the emergency.

Of these two ways of solving the problem concerning Quirinius we prefer the first, as based on what we may now call a fact, a presidency of his in Syria before that in 759, and as bringing him more naturally into Cilicia, in a military capacity. This is all the aid that the theory of a double legation of his in Syria, which is established on probable grounds, gives to us, that it furnishes a not unlikely explanation. In either case we cannot claim for Luke the highest conceivable accuracy. If Quirinius was *governor*, as supposed, before 6 A. D., he could not have *commenced* the census; if he was a *special legate* for taking the census he could only *be called governor* by catachresis. Yet the accuracy is as great as could be expected or demanded of a historian in points which were to him of minor importance.

III. But was there a general census of the Roman empire in the age of Augustus. This is the other problem to be solved before the main difficulties of our text can be removed. Dr. Schaff says that "it is certain that Augustus held at least three census of the empire." In this he follows Huschke*

* This position taken in his first work, that on the census at our Lord's birth, p. 45, and onward, he still maintained in his second, on the census and the system of taxation of the earlier times of the Roman empire, in the preface and afterwards.

who is certainly in an error. We shall be glad, if, as the result of this enquiry, we may be able to show *that probably one census of the empire was taken*. Huschke bases his opinion on the account which Augustus gives of his three censuses in the monument of Ancyra.* The emperor there speaks in his own person as follows (Tab. ii.): "In my sixth consulship I held a census of the people with M. Agrippa for my colleague." This census, belonging to 726=28 B. C., is mentioned by Dio Cass. liii., 1. He continues, "I made a *lustrum*, the first after forty-two years, in which *lustrum* 4,063,000 polls of Roman citizens were registered." The earlier census referred to had been made in 681=70 B. C., when Cn. Lentulus and L. Gellius were consuls, unless with Mommsen we assign it to 685. "Another *lustrum* I made alone, invested with consular *imperium*, when C. Censorinus and C. Asinius were consuls, in which *lustrum* 4,233,000 polls of Roman citizens were registered." This census of Roman citizens occurred in the year 746=8 B. C., and is expressly mentioned only by Augustus himself. With this census the taxing of Judea spoken of by Luke, as contemporary with Christ's birth may be brought into connexion. "A third *lustrum*"—he goes on to say, "I made with Tib. Cæsar for my colleague, when Sextus Pompeius and Sextus Appuleius were consuls, in which *lustrum* 4,097,000 [or according to the newly discovered Greek version 4,937,000] polls of Roman citizens were registered." This census took place A. D. 14=766 U. C., the year of the death of Augustus, and was closed 108 days before that event. Suetonius also (Aug., § 27), mentions three censuses, as made under the direction of Augustus: "*recepit et morum regumque regimen perpetuum, quo jure, quanquam sine censuræ honore, censum tamen populi ter egit, primum et tertium cum collega, medium solus.*" These words show also the authority by which he

* Often published after copies taken by travellers at Ancyra. See the edition of Franz and Zumpt, Berlin, 1845, entitled *Cæsaris Augusti index rerum a se gestarum sive monumentum Ancyranum*, etc. Zell in his *Röm. Epigraphik* i., 358—364 has followed this edition. A more recent edition containing new discoveries of the Greek translation made by Perrot, a Frenchman, in 1861, was prepared by Th. Mommsen in 1865, and now supersedes all others. This edition was not in our hands while writing the first draft of this essay, but has since been carefully used in the way of correction and new remark.

acted. He was not a censor according to the old idea of that office, but held a controlling power over *leges* and *mores* in which the powers of the censorship were included. Dio Cassius describes his censorial power by such a word as *τιμωρεῖν*, the proper term for the old office, but not without a degree of incorrectness. The census of U. C. 726, his first, had, according to an excellent historian,* no reference to property, but was a simple enumeration of the number of Roman citizens. If such was its meaning, and we have failed to discover the evidence for the assertion, it was held on different principles from the old censuses, which always had respect to property, and this included Romans in all the provinces, whom it would be the duty of the provincial governor to enumerate. But these three censuses mentioned by Augustus touched *Roman citizens* only, as he expressly says—and if any others were registered he passes it over in silence. The three seem to have been of the same kind. If he says that he held the first in his sixth consulship, and the others “*cum consulari imperio*,” the meaning is that as having the *imperium* in all three cases, both in his consulship, and by his extraordinary consular *imperium*, such as the earliest consuls after the expulsion of the kings and before the creation of censors enjoyed, he issued the edict by which, as *censor morum*, he was authorized to take the census. This consular *imperium* in perpetuity was, according to the received views, granted to him in 735=19 B. C. after his first census and before the second. But this would not have been the function by which he would have prescribed a census of the provinces, and so when he issued an edict for a census of Italians (Dio Cass. lv., 13), he did so in the exercise of his proconsular power.†

* Hoeck, Röm. Gesch. ii., 1, 323.

† See the remarks of A. W. Zumpt on the Ancyra marbles in Franz and Zumpt's ed., p. 48. Dio says in that place, after speaking of a choice of a Senate, that “he made a census of those who lived in Italy and had property worth not less than 50,000 denarii. Those in Italy who had less pecuniary ability and those residing out of Italy he did not compel to give in their lists, out of fear of disturbance. And that he might not seem to do this as a censor (*τιμωρὴς*), for the reason which I have given before, he assumed proconsular power to the end of the census, and until the offering of the lustrum.” This imperfect census may have referred only to citizens: if so, why the proconsular power. Or by

Another passage of the marble has been caught hold of by Huschke to establish a general census of the provinces. The argument, however, is lame, for every thing depends on this learned lawyer's conjectural supplement to a deficient text, and his conjecture has not received the sanction of other scholars who have studied the marbles. In the fifth tablet occur these words:—"omnium provinciarum . . . quibus finitimæ fuerunt gentes quæ n. . . fines auxi." The first hiatus Huschke fills up with *censum egi*, and the second—in which it is admitted that he has hit the sense if not the words—with *nondum subiectæ erant populo Romano*. The restoration in the first place, which Zumpt has made is *populi Romani*. That some such supplement is more probable appears, 1st, from the consideration that Augustus would hardly have spoken of so great an operation with so much brevity; 2dly, from the fact that the lacuna in the Greek translation seems not to admit the words which Huschke's conjecture would require.*

Still less can Huschke's passage cited from Dio Cass. be of any use to his argument for a general census. It occurs in Book iv., § 35. "While these things were taking place, Augustus both made a census, πάντα τὰ ὑπάρχοντά οἱ, καθάπερ τις ιδιώτης, ἀπογραφάμενος, and selected the senate." The Greek words are translated by him as if they denoted all those things which could be said to belong to him, as the head of the Roman empire. But it needs no more than a look at the place to satisfy one's self that the historian represents him as handing in a list of all his property, just as any private man would.

The authors relied upon to establish a general census under Augustus are not only to a considerable extent of a late time, but in the case of the Christian ones, it may be that their re-

τοὺς ἐξω τῆς Ἰταλίας can he mean those Italians not citizens, who were living abroad? Here we remark that Mommsen (*Res Gestæ d. August.*, p. 23), taxes Dio with error in his statement that Augustus received perpetual consular power in the year 735=19, on the ground especially that he would, if so, have mentioned it in his account of himself.

* Fragments of a Greek translation have been found at Apollonia in Pisidia and at Ancyra—the latter much the more extensive. On column iii. of Table 8 in Franz and Zumpt's ed. of the marble we have *ωνασομορα*, i. e., *ων ἄς δυορα*. Here *ἄς* must refer to a Greek word for provinciarum, *ἐπαρχειων*, and *ων* can be nothing but the end of *ῥωμαίων*. Thus Huschke's conjecture is entirely set aside.

presentations are colored by this very passage of Luke. Or they may have been quite uncritical in their statements. Thus when Justin Martyr speaks of the results of the census in Judea under Quirinius as being laid up in the Roman archives, he may have thought that Christ was born in 6 A. D., when the noted census under that governor took place.*

Another tradition refers to a general land survey in the reign of Augustus, made under the superintendence of a certain Balbus. In the *liber coloniarum* we have the following passage:† *huic addendas mensuras limitum et terminorum Augusti et Neronis, sed et Balbi mensoris, qui temporibus Augusti omnium provinciarum et formas civitatum et mensuras compertas in commentariis contulit, etc.* In a writing falsely attributed to Boethius (Cent. 5), entitled "*demonstratio artis Geometricæ*," we have these words: "*jubente Cæsare Balbo mensori, qui omnium provinciarum mensuras distinxit et declaravit,*" etc. And by Cassiodorus (Var. iii., 52, Cent. 5-6) it is said that "*Augusti temporibus orbis Romanus agris divisus, censuque descriptus est, ut possessio sua nulli haberetur incerta, quam pro tributorum susceperat quantitate solvenda. Hoc auctor gramaticus‡ redigit ad dogma conscriptum, quatenus studiosus legendo possit agnoscere quod deberet oculis absolute monstrare.*" On this Th. Mommsen remarks that in this account contained in the *liber coloniarum* "two separate elements are unskillfully combined,—the general census of the empire under Augustus spoken of by Luke, and the catalogues of the *ager divisus assignatus* derived from Balbus, which to the late Christian writer [who compiled the book in question] appeared to be the result of the measurements under Augustus, as he elsewhere says: [Script gromat. 242, 11] "*Augustus omnem terram suis temporibus fecit permensurari ac veteranis assignari.*" And so, it follows *first* that the statement in

* Comp. Apol. i., § 64, and dial. c. Tryph. § 76.

† Contained in the *Gromatici veteres ex recens. Lachmanni*, Berlin, 1848, and also, in connexion with essays of other scholars, called *Schriften der Röm. Feldmesser*, herausg. u. erläut. v. F. Blumer, K. Lachmann, u. A. Rudolf, 2 vols., 1848-1852. Theodor Mommsen's essay, soon to be referred to, is contained in this work, ii., 177.

‡ This word is written also *gromaticus*. In the Mss. it is *hyrummeticus* or *grommeticus*.

Cassiodorus [u. s., as well as in Pseudo-Boethius] has been wrongly looked upon as independent of Luke, and confirmatory of his narrative, whereas it rather is derived from Luke; and *secondly* that the catalogues of Balbus are not to be ascribed to the times of Augustus." He goes on to pronounce that the lists of *towns* given in the *liber coloniarum* belong to Balbus, that he must have lived as late as the reigns of M. Aurelius and Commodus, and that the whole of Italy was embraced in his work.*

But although this evidence is to be set aside, there is proof that the plan of a general census of the empire was formed even by Julius Cæsar after his power became supreme. On this point the distinguished scholar whom we have just cited expresses himself in his history of Rome (iii., cap. 11, p. 529, 2d ed) as follows: "The new kingdom needed at once an institution which should lay before the eyes of the government in a summary way the principal foundations of the administration, the state of population and of property of the several communities—that is, an improved census. First the census of Italy was reformed.—That it was Cæsar's purpose to introduce similar institutions in the provinces we may be sure on *the one hand* from the measurements and cadasters of the entire empire which he set on foot, and by the institution itself *on the other*; for the general formula was thus found, by which, as well in the Italian as in the non-Italian communities, the requisite supplies for the central administration could be secured. Herein it was evidently Cæsar's intention to return to the traditions of the earlier republican times, and to revive the census of the empire which the earlier republic had instituted, in the same way substantially in which Cæsar carried out his Italian census,—namely by an extension of the city census, with its legal times of payment, and other essential rules, to the whole of the subject communities in Italy and Sicily.† The extant traces and the connexion of things itself show, without question, the preparations for the renewal of the census of the empire, which for centuries had been obsolete."

* Ritschl, in his essay soon to be referred to, written in 1842, believed that Balbus was a contemporary of Augustus. Zumpt holds the same opinion.

† He refers to the times of the war with Pyrrhus.

Our limits will not permit us to set before our readers in detail the transition from the old to the new notion of a census which Huschke has illustrated in a special work,* nor to show that the financial system, on which the emperors long after Augustus practiced, had its substantial birth at the beginning of the empire. The old census involved not only a description or profession of property and condition, but had moral bearings, affected the rights of citizens, was attended with a revision of the senate, and was generally closed by a solemn expiation. All of this was wanting in the censuses of the empire through the provinces, and therefore they were sometimes called, in distinction from the Roman census, by the name of *professiones*. In regard to this new and general census we shall attempt *first* to show that minute information was in the possession of Augustus touching the condition of the empire, and *then* that a settled plan was pursued which looked towards a complete estimate of population and property in the Roman world—an estimate carried out, not only in the provinces directly governed by Roman officials, but most probably also in half subject kingdoms such as Judea then was, and dictated evidently by a design to draw upon the resources of the empire through a general taxation.

With regard to the general fact, that the administration of Augustus aimed to get accurate information touching the resources of the empire, both in men and money, there can be no doubt, and such notices were collected in order to judge how best to maintain the financial and military strength of the new regime. Upon the death of Augustus, August 19, 767=14 A. D., says Suetonius (Aug. cap. 101) "the vestal virgins produced his testament made by him in the consulship of L. Plancus and C. Silius two days before the nones of April, written in two codices, partly in his hand, partly in those of his freedmen, Polybius and Hilarion, and given to them [the vestals] for safe-keeping, together with three rolls equally sealed. In one of the three volumes he included his commands concerning his funeral; in another a brief list (*indicem*) of what

* Entitled *über die Census und die Steuerverfassung der früheren Kaiserzeit*. (Berlin, 1847). This is a work of high merit.

he had done, which he wished to have engraved on brazen tablets that were to be placed before his mausoleum; in the third a "*breviarium totius imperii*, quantum militum sub signis ubique esset, quantum pecuniæ in ærario et fiscis et vectigalium residuis." Tacitus speaks of this *libellus* (Annal i., § 11) in which "opes publicæ continebantur, quantum civium sociorumque in armis, quot classes, regna, provinciæ, tributa, aut vectigalia, et necessitates ac largitiones," etc., all written by Augustus with his own hand. Dio Cass. mentioned the same note book (lvi., 33) in a passage, lost in our present text, but given for substance by Zonaras and Xiphilinus,—according to whom there were four books, instead of three, that Drusus read to the senate. The third contained matters relating to the troops, revenues, and expenses of the state, the amount of money in the treasuries, and whatever else of a similar nature had a bearing on the government. The fourth contained advice to Tiberius and to the public—to which Tacitus also refers without mentioning a fourth book, in the words "addideratque consilium coercendi intra terminos imperii," etc. All this shows *not a vague estimate of the resources of the empire, but one founded on actual examination through the provinces*. But further than this we cannot press these statements; still less can they be made to prove that a census or censuses were held throughout the Roman world. They are quite consistent with a general census and that is all.

But we may go farther and affirm that the general plan, initiated by Julius Cæsar, which aimed at ascertaining the area, and probably the population and the taxable property of the provinces, was kept in view by his successor. It is strange that our principal authority for a system of measurements extending all over the Roman world is a very late and in the present texts very corrupt writer, Æthicus or Julius Honoratus, author of a *Cosmographia*, which, as is now made out by Ritschl, Petersen, and others, is founded on the commentaries of M. Agrippa, the minister of Augustus. The author says that Julius Cæsar "ex senatus consulto censuit omnem orbem jam Romani nominis admetiri per prudentissimos viros et omni philosophiæ munere decoratos." The work began, he says, in the consulship of Julius Cæsar and Mark Antony [i. e. 710=

44 B. C.] the year of Caesar's assassination ; the measurements were entrusted to several men with Greek names, the empire being divided into four parts for this purpose ; and the several surveys were finished—that of the east by Zenodoxus in the fourth consulship of Augustus [724=30], taking 13 years 7 months and 9 days ; that of the north by Theodotus or Theodorus, in the tenth consulship of Augustus [730=24], in 19 years 8 months and 10 days ; that of the south by Polyclitus in the consulship of Saturninus and Cinna [735=19], in 24 years 1 month and 3 days ; and, as another Ms. adds, that of the West by Didymus, in the seventh consulship of Augustus with Agrippa [727=27], in 16 years 8 months and 17 days.*

Of all this not a word is said by the extant historians, but the elder Pliny is a voucher for its substantial truth. In many places of his third, fourth, and fifth books he refers, for the length, breadth, or circuit of territories, to the commentaries

*The cosmography of *Æthicus* was published in one of its shapes by A. Gronovius in his ed. of Pomponius Mela, Leyden, 1722, and in a form given in a Ms. of Leipzig by H. Wuttke (Leipz., 1858).

In vol. 1 of the new series of the Rhenish museum (for 1842) Ritschl published an essay entitled "reichvermessung unter Augustus, Agrippa's Weltkarte, *Æthicus' Cosmographie*." He seeks to show that *Æthicus* is indebted *indirectly* for his materials to the commentaries of Agrippa, and *directly* to the *orbis pictus* mentioned in the text. The commentaries of Agrippa furnished the materials for this map, in which, it would seem, the distances up and down the wall were contracted disproportionately to those following a horizontal direction.

In vol 8 of the same journal (for 1852), Petersen, after describing the Mss. and recensions of *Æthicus* illustrates and corrects his text by others who borrowed from him in the middle ages. He decides that the two parts of this work, the *expositio* and *descriptio* were originally followed by the *curiosum urbis Romæ* as an appendix, and that these with the Itinerary of Antonine were extracts of an original composed in the times of Augustus. They are in fact nothing else but extracts from Agrippa's commentaries, to which Strabo gives the name *chorographia* without naming the author. Petersen says in conclusion that "a work growing out of the measurements of the Roman empire under J. Caesar and Augustus, planned by Agrippa, edited by or at the procurement of Augustus existed, which is the original authority for the measurements in Pliny and through him in Solinus and Isidore. Extracts from that work, recast at a later time, are yet extant in the cosmography of the so-called *Æthicus*, of Julius Honorius, of Orosius, and of similar works, still preserved in a manuscript form as well as in the regionaries and *notabilia* of the city of Rome, and in the Itineraries of the provinces and the sea." This result of Petersen is accepted by Marquardt in Bekker-Marq. iii., 2, p. 168 and onwards.

of Agrippa, from which it would appear that that great man reduced the information furnished by the surveyors to a form in which it could be consulted. The results were also exhibited to the eye in a map of the empire, represented, according to his design but after his death, on the wall of the Vipsanian portico, from which map, it would seem, the table of Peutinger and the itinerary of Antonine derived their notices of distances.

With these measurements land surveys were connected, as the great length of time they took indicates, and as the *liber coloniarum* affirms, when it speaks, in the passage already cited, of “*mensuras limitum et terminorum ex libris Augusti et Neronis [i. e. Tiberii] Cæsarum.*” There was, indeed, no sufficient object for the practical Roman in taking the lengths and breadths of provinces, unless the area of the town territories and the taxable *juga* were also included in the surveys. But we have no *direct evidence* that the surveys for taxing purposes extended beyond Italy.

The nature of the case renders it probable that a census was also taken of the number of inhabitants. But it is not likely, if there were such an enumeration, that it was published by Agrippa. That jealousy, which at one time punished the possessor of a map, might from the first have prevented the tables of population from being published. But they lay without doubt, as Tertullian believed them to lie, in the archives of Rome. Pliny gives the number of inhabitants when speaking of certain tribes in the northwest corner of Spain, but not elsewhere.

Of a census including taxable inhabitants and property the lexicographer Suidas gives more precise information, which Huschke and Marquardt, able scholars and not theologians, received as trustworthy, but in which we confess that we cannot put entire confidence. It is under the word ἀπογραφή. “The emperor Augustus, when he had sole power, chose 20 men, excellent in life and morals, and sent them out over all the territory of his subjects, by whom he caused to be made censuses of persons and properties, requiring that a certain sufficient portion of the latter should be brought into the public treasury. This was the first census that was made, whereas

those who preceded him [the provincial governors during the republic] took what they pleased, so that for the affluent their wealth had been a ground of public accusation." The appointment of a college of twenty men for the senatorial provinces agrees with Roman usage. But the expression "this was the first census that was made," which follows the exact words in Luke seems to point to a Christian writer as the source of this passage. Such a writer may have had good authority for what he said, or he may have by mistake so brought things together as to produce a false impression of the reality.

That in some at least of the provinces censuses were made under Augustus with a tax in view is certain. Such was that held in Gaul in 727=27 B. C., of which Dio Cass. makes mention (liii., 22), and which, according to the epitome of Livy (book 139), gave occasion to an *emeute*. In the epitome of book 134 an earlier census of the same province is spoken of. At the time of Augustus' death Germanicus was busied in Gaul with another (767=14 A. D.), which seems to have been still unfinished two years afterwards. (Tac. Annal. i., 31, ii., 6). This produced for the government forty millions of sesterces. It does not appear that these censuses occurred simultaneously, or that they were taken at the time when the census was held at Rome. Nor, if they were simultaneous, could they have been closed together through all parts of the empire. And we may perhaps fairly interpret Luke as meaning, not that a decree issued from Rome which flashed into execution all over the world at once, but that a system was carried out by which registrations of persons and property went on all over the world, in one province sooner or faster, in another later or slower, but all in obedience to a settled plan laid at the heart of the empire.

With regard to the *πογραφή* in Syria and Judea, which cannot have been a mere counting of inhabitants, and yet may not, as a matter of course, have been followed at once, in Judea at least, by new taxation, the only trustworthy authority known to us is that of Tertullian in a well known passage of his treatise against Marcion (iv., § 19). In refuting the position of the Marcionites that Christ was not really born, he touches on their interpretation of the text "who is my mother

and who are my brethren," which they explained as meaning "I have no mother and no brethren." Among other arguments against them he produces this,—that even if Christ had no mother and no brethren, it would not prove their point, since there are many who have no mothers living and never had any brethren. Then he adds "*sed et census constat actos sub Augusto nunc (?) in Judæam (?) per Sentium Saturninum, apud quos genus ejus inquirere potuissent.*" If he had said *per Sulpicium Quirinium* it might fairly be contended that he got his information from Luke. But Tertullian was a lawyer of extensive knowledge, and here he cannot lean on the Scriptures, nor does a census held in Syria at that time excite any suspicion in his mind. He must have had a historical fact before his mind, which he reconciled somehow with our passage. This place of Tertullian is remarkable, 1st on account of this apparent discrepancy with the Evangelist, 2dly because a census then taken would coincide tolerably well with the date of the second Roman census as given on the monument of Ancyra, 3dly because a very remarkable conjunction of Jupiter and Saturn at that time might stand for the star in the east, and 4thly because about the same time Augustus was displeased with Herod and wrote to him that *πάλαυ χρόμενος αὐτῷ φίλῳ, νῦν ἐπὶ χρόμῳ χρήσεται*. He was indeed conciliated ere long, yet he might have adopted in some respects a new course of policy.* One or more of these considerations have led such important writers as San Clemente and Ideler to put our Lord's birth in 747=7 B. C.

* Under Saturninus, it may be added, 6,000 Pharisees refusing to take the oath required of the whole nation *ἢ μὴν εἰνοῦσαι Καίσαρι καὶ τοῖς βασιλέωσι πράγμασι*, (Jos. Antiq. xvii., 2, § 4), were fined and the most guilty among them killed.

It may be a service to those who have not access to Ideler's manual of chronology, to add that the great Kepler first hit on the thought that the star in the east was not an *ἀστήρ*, properly speaking, but an *ἀστρον* or constellation, so to speak, of the two aforesaid planets. Kepler's idea (in his *stella nova in pede Serpentarii*, Prague, 1606), united in near conjunction with the two planets another extraordinary star, which had recently, in his time, appeared and faded away. His views were taken up by Mänter, Bishop of Seeland, in Denmark, and then by Schubert, of St. Petersburg. Ideler made calculations anew, and found that in 747=7 B. C., before sunrise May 20, the two planets were one degree apart in the 20th degree of Pisces. A second conjunction took place

Nor ought Tertullian's discussion of dates in another place, (adv. Judæos. cap 8) where he arrives at a very different conclusion, and places the birth of Christ several years lower down, to weaken the force of the words which we have cited. For in the latter passage he makes calculations founded on his views of Luke iii, vv. 1, 23; while in the passage before us he follows a tradition or states a historical fact seemingly at variance with Luke's own words.*

But would the Roman authorities have extended the operations of the census into Judea while yet under its somewhat independent king. And may not Luke have followed a tradition, which was shaped and colored by what actually occurred under the well known ἀπογραφὴ of Quirinius after the deposition of Archelaus. There was need of a motive for bringing Joseph from Nazareth to Bethlehem, in order to have the prophecy of Micah (v. 2) fulfilled, as it was then understood. That motive was found in a census held at some time not far

October 17, in the 16th degree of Pisces, and again, November 12, a third in the 15th degree of the same constellation. These results of calculation are remarkable enough, says Ideler, and the more since Münter found, "in Abarbanel's commentary on Daniel, indications of the great influence which the Jewish astrologers ascribed to a conjunction of the two planets, Saturn and Jupiter, in Pisces, with reference to the Messiah to be expected." (ii, 399-410).

* In three other passages Tertullian speaks of this census. 1. In the treatise adv. Marcion. iv., § 7. "Et tamen quomodo in synagogam potuit admitti tam repentinus, tam ignotus, cujus nemo adhuc certus de tribu, de populo, de domo, de censu denique Augusti, quem testem fidelissimum dominicæ nativitatis Romana archiva custodiunt." 2. iv., § 36, of the same treatise. "Tam distincta fuit a primordio Judæa gens per tribus et populos et familias et domos, ut nemo facile ignorari de genere potuisset vel de recentibus Augustianis censibus adhuc tunc fortasse pendentibus." Here *tunc* refers to the time when the blind man said "Jesus, thou son of David," and the census spoken of may have been, as Rigalt remarks, a later one. 3. Adv. Judæos § 9. "Ex stirpe Jesse deputatum, per Mariam scilicet censendum. Fuit enim de patria Bethlehem et de domo David, sicut apud Romanos in censu descripta est Maria, ex qua nascitur Christus." That is Mary was put in the census books, but not her son. These passages show a firm faith in an existing record of the census mentioned by Luke, and also that a learned lawyer saw nothing, in the account inconsistent with the usages of Rome in his own times. But beyond this they cannot be pressed. By the time of Chrysostom this had become a fixed tradition. In a sermon on Christ's birth he conceived of the codices then made as deposited at Rome, and still open for the inspection of any one wishing to know the time of the census.

distant. The tradition or myth groping about, at its formation, for some point of support, caught hold of the census of 6 A. D., and there was nothing more shocking in the anachronism than there was when Attila and Theodoric appear as contemporaries in the *Nibelungenlied*, or even in some statements of grave history.

It is not within our province to discuss the general possibilities that traditions having a small nucleus of reality can creep into the place of historical verities. We admit such possibilities. But if tradition or the mythical tendency can be supposed capable of disturbing the order of things, it cannot have equal power of violating usages or of creating institutions by an arbitrary act of its own. Thus if it be said to be a myth that Joseph went to Bethlehem to be registered, and was accompanied by Mary that she might discharge the same civil duty, *the hypothesis in a degree overthrows itself, for how could a myth take such a form, unless it were a well established usage for men and women in Judea to go from their domiciles to the cities of their tribes, when a census was held?*

But in reference to the doubts and difficulties which we have just noticed we remark—

1. That Judea had long been paying taxes to Rome. Some of the proofs for this are the following, collected for the most part by Huschke in his often cited work on the census at Christ's birth (pp. 99-113). Pompey, when he took Jerusalem in 691=63 B. C., made it tributary to the Romans; (*ὑποτάξῃ* Jos. Antiq. xiv., 4, § 4), and immediately afterward, the Jewish historian adds that, the Roman general stripped the Jews of their possessions in Syria, and exacted from them more than 10,000 talents in a little time. This last, however, can have been an extraordinary measure. So also Julius Cæsar, when dictator the second time, in 707=47 B. C.,* ordained that "every year," excepting the sabbatical ones, there should be a tribute paid "on behalf of Jerusalem"—the city of Joppa alone being exempted from the obligation,—and that,† in the second year, the

* Josephus (Antiq. Jud. xiv., 10, § 6), calls him *αὐτοκράτωρ τὸ δεύτερον*, having left out the proper title *dictator* from his copy or translation of the decree.

† i. e., the next year but one after the Sabbatical.

fourth part of what had been sown should be delivered over on this account at Sidon, besides the tithes which were due, as of old, to Hyrcanus, the high priest and ethnarch, and to his children succeeding him. That is, as it is explained, a tribute of one quarter of the grain was to be paid over to the Roman government in Sidon only one year out of seven (?) or, taking the average for all the years, one twenty-eighth of the crops—which was no great burden. And again, Antony (Appian de bell. civ. v. 75) set up Herod as king of the Idumæans and Samaritans ἐπὶ φόρος τεταγμενός. This occurred about the year 716=38 B. C. Still later, under the presidency of Saturninus in Syria, we find a διοικητής of Augustus mentioned as being in those parts, who is also called a slave of his (Jos. B. J. i., 29, § 3, Antiq. xvii., 3, § 2), who can have been no other than a fiscal agent of the emperor. Possibly Volumnius, a man of importance and ranking in dignity near the emperor's legate himself, in the time of the same governor, and Sabinus under Varus, who had a half independent position, may have had the revenue from Judea under their control. Judea thus seems to have paid tribute to the Romans all along from its subjugation by Pompey onward.*

But it is objected that in other cases the introduction of a census was concurrent with the *redactio in formam provinciarum*. There are, however, two examples to the contrary, one drawn from earlier and one from somewhat later Roman history. The first is that of the twelve Latin colonies which had refused to furnish their quota of troops in the war with Hannibal. They were required besides other burdens imposed on them, to pay a *stipendium* of one-tenth of one per cent yearly, and to have a census taken according to a formula made out by the censors at Rome, which was to be the same as the

* Appian, in his Syrian history (§ 50), says that the Jews were required, on account of their resistance to Rome, to pay a heavier φόρος τῶν σωματίων than the surrounding nations, of whom the Syrians and Cilicians had levied on them for each property holder one per cent. of his assessed property. But this burden may have become greater in Appian's time, in consequence of the wars under Vespasian and Hadrian, as the context seems to show. This passage then cannot be safely used as Huschke has used it. The reader will mark here the connexion of Syria and Cilicia.

formula for the Roman people, and that the census should be reported at Rome by sworn censors of the colonies before they went out of office. (Livy xxix., § 15). This was accordingly done, being the first instance of the kind. (Livy u. s., § 37). The other case was that of the Clitæ, a tribe in rough Cilicia, subject to Archelaus the Cappadocian, a son probably of him who died in the year 737=17 B. C. They seceded into Mount Taurus, because, says Tacitus (Ann. vi., 41), "nostrum in modum deferre census, pati tributa adigebatur." And they maintained themselves against the weak king's troops, until a legate of Vitellius, president of Syria, subdued them.*

There can certainly be no reason why Syria should be exempted from the census. If now Judea paid a tribute to Rome, is it not quite credible that the census, on somewhat different principles perhaps, and by officers of the native dynasty immediately, should reach into that territory also?

But would Joseph go to Bethlehem for the purpose of giving in his answers to the formula of the census? He would if he had property there, it is said in reply, and possibly this may be one explanation of his presence. But this is not the motive to which Luke attributes his journey. He went, as being of the house and lineage of David, and might have owned a plot of ground at Bethlehem or not. But we know of no proof that after the return from the captivity lands reverted to particular tribes or families. It is, however, very credible that in Judea the principle of tribe and lineage, so consonant even then to the feelings of the country, should be followed in the operations of the census. Of this, however, we know little, and if an objection is to be drawn from our ignorance, it must go for what it is worth. We know, however, in regard to Roman usage, that Roman citizens were expected to be present at Rome during the census, until the extent of the empire calling them into remote parts, the needs of citizen soldiers and merchants abroad brought about some relaxation. We know also that it was irregular for a man belonging to the Latin allies to give in his census at Rome.

* The reader will notice here again that the interference came from the president of Syria.—These cases, perhaps, are not altogether in point.

When Roman citizenship was extended so as to cover a large part of Italy, the rule was that a person belonging to one of the municipia or coloniæ or præfecturæ, who would have the rights of Roman citizens, must there on oath render in to the proper magistrate a report of his name, prænomen, and cognomen, his father or patron, tribe, age, and property, according to the formula of the census laid down at Rome, and within sixty days after the census was held in the city.* Birth, adoption, or manumission by a *municeps* or burgess, gave to a person a burgess' rights.

But what need was there for Mary to go to Bethlehem with Joseph? It is idle to say that she may have been the heiress of a proprietor there. This is a mere possibility. But the capitation tax, the *φόρος τῶν σωματῶν*, which was paid to the Syrian kings, while the Jews were under their yoke (Jos. Antiq. xii., 3, § 3), and which was retained by the Romans,† might render it proper for her to accompany him on the journey. This tax under the emperors was levied on males and females alike. "*Ætatem in censendo*," says Ulpian cited by Huschke, "*significare necesse est; quia quibusdam ætas tribuit ne tributo onerentur. Veluti in Syriis a quatuordecim annis masculi, a duodecim fœminæ usque ad sexagesimum [quintum] annum tributo capitis obligantur.*"‡

It has also been objected to the credibility of this narrative, but not until quite recent times, that Mary was not in a condition to travel. The only reply we shall make is that she was not in a condition to be left behind.

It is said also by way of objection that, if a general census had been held, it would have been noticed by the historians, and that Josephus would have spoken of its operations in Judea. But we have seen that the system of measurements of the empire is noticed by no historian. To the Romans the census might have appeared as extending from one province to another, without being understood in its unity. The extant

* So the *Lex Julia municipalis* of Julius Cæsar, cited by Huschke. It is on the brazen tablets of Heraclea published by Mazochi (Naples, 1754). See p. 453 et seq. Zell (Röm. Epigraphik) has repeated it in his useful work (i., 262-277).

† Appian Syr. 50, the passage above cited.

‡ Dig. 50. 15.

historians take but little interest in the civil affairs of the provinces, but little in the rise or changes of institutions. There arose under the empire a vast system of serfdom, but when the *colonatus* began it is uncertain, although the laws regulating the *coloni* are minute and prolix. So in the department of law, the *legis actiones* of the earlier Roman times, in which the exact words of the law had to be followed by the plaintiff at the hazard of losing his suit, were done away with by an *Æbutian* and two Julian laws,—a vast change in the practice of the law, for the knowledge of which we are indebted to Gains alone, and of which no historian speaks. It is well known that the later system of voting by fusing together the *comitia centuriata* and *tributa* is left without a record of its time, and the history of so great a change is lost. Nay further, those who particularly mention it,—as Livy and Dionysius,—do not agree in their statements, although it was a living institution of their times. As for Josephus his omissions are as remarkable as his insertions. The whole nine or ten years of Archelaus are despatched in a few sentences. Why does he keep silence about Christ—supposing the passage in which he is mentioned to be an interpolation—while he speaks of John the Baptist and James, the brother of Jesus called Christ. The registration spoken of by Luke would not have interested him, unless it had been attended with disturbances, and these might certainly have been avoided by the manner of conducting it (as by employing native subordinates, for instance), and by not enhancing the taxation.

We come now to our conclusion that a census, held in Judea at the time of our Lord's birth, and in which, either at its commencement or afterwards, Quirinius was concerned in some capacity, is not historically improbable.

This conclusion, as far as a census is concerned, for we have spoken of the other point before, rests only on probable evidence, and we cannot complain of those who cannot receive it as being blind to the truth or hostile to revelation. And yet some of those whose pursuits bring them into the closest connexion with ancient history and institutions consider such a general census as an established fact. We mention Marquardt one of the most eminent archæologists of our day, and Peter

of Schul-Pforta, a most respectable historian of Rome. In his third volume of Roman history (pp. 46, 47) published in 1867, he thus speaks of the matter before us, after having described other measures of Augustus tending to unite the empire and to promote communication between its parts. "Then, too, he carried out the geographical undertaking begun by Julius Cæsar as early as the year 44, [B. C.=710 A. U.], embracing not only the Roman empire but the whole known world, which was completed in the year 19 B. C. [=735]. This had for its fruit a chorographic and topographic catalogue, composed by Agrippa, of the lands, rivers, and places of the earth, with a statement of their measures and distances, and also a representation of the entire earth, which, after Agrippa's death, adorned the portico which was erected to his honor by his sister (Polla) and by Augustus himself. But finally in continuation of this work he caused enumerations of the inhabitants to be made in the provinces, and *the plots of ground to be estimated according to their size and value*, in which way he was put in a condition to divide the capitation and land taxes more equally and equitably, as well as also to get more revenue from them." Here, indeed, nothing is said of a census in Judea, which was not then a province, but it seems to us that if any one will go so far as to receive for truth all that this historian receives, the testimony of Luke and the tributary condition of Judea even under its kings will lead him to accept a census there also as a fact.

This position appears to us stronger than another taken by some who stand nearer the mythical hypothesis, which still they reject and dislike. Let us look at the opinions expressed by two writers, one a classical scholar and the other a theologian. Professor Hoeck, of Gottingen, the author of an excellent but unfinished history of Rome, from the fall of the republic to Constantine, already cited, has an essay on this subject at the end of the second part of his first volume. (Brunswick, 1841-1843). While he cannot accept, as he says, the demolishing criticism of Strauss, he regards as inconclusive the investigation of Huschke. Yet the many doubts, which are excited by a Roman census in Judea, while Herod was king, do

not force him to maintain that the *ἀπογραφὴ* of Luke had no reality. There was a census of Roman citizens through the provinces in 746 (one of the three which Augustus, as we have seen, mentions on the Ancyra marbles), probably also in 747, when Christ, as he thinks, was born, a Jewish census, instituted by Herod to ascertain the population of his realm. With this very probably was connected the oath of allegiance which Herod, after the execution of his sons (Alexander and Aristobulus), required all the Jews to take to himself and to Augustus. Comp. Jos. Ant. xvii., 2, § 4, before cited.*

We turn to the theological commentator, Meyer, one of the best of expositors and a Christian man, whose view as given in the fourth edition of his Luke is in brief the following: Criticism passes judgment upon itself, when it represents the entire account of the census as mythical or even as invented by Luke. Something census-like must have found place in the Roman empire by order of the emperor, of the population perhaps, the civil and military resources, the finances, etc., giving such information as was contained in the *Breviarium totius imperii* of Augustus. The consolidating tendencies at Rome and the dependence of Herod, a vassal-king, apart from the earlier analogous measures of surveying the empire, divest this of all historic improbability. Quirinius was not president of Syria

* The position of Mommsen in his edition of the *Res gestæ* d. August., p. 124, somewhat resembles that of Hoeck, but he does not seem to have carefully examined the subject or to have considered the general accuracy of Luke. (Comp. Zumpt's criticism, *Evangel. Kircheng.*, for October, 1865). Luke, he thinks, had in mind the second legation of Quirinius in 769=6 A. D., and extended it to the whole world, instead of confining it, as he should have done, to Palestine, thus making a mistake of a number of years, and referring it to a time before Herod's death, when Judea could by no means have been subject to a census by the Romans. Yet, by the chronology given in chap. iii, 1, 23, Luke to a certain extent confirms the prior legation of Quirinius, "et præterquam quod Herodem male ascevit, eo solo nomine erravit, quod censum, ex Quirinii administratione posteriore transtulit in priorem." That is a confusion of the two legations—it being admitted that there were two—lay at the bottom of the error. But how could a connexion be established between this event and the birth of Jesus at Bethlehem, unless it were intentionally created. And so the ante-dating of the census itself must have been intentional.

but an extraordinary commissioner to superintend these operations. This is the less improbable because he was then in the East in the service of the state, and because Augustus would naturally in such a business trust a special commissioner rather than a *rex socius* or a proconsul (a legate, he should have said). This business in which Quirinius was engaged explains why tradition turned him into a president of Syria, and turned the registration (*Katastrirung*) into a census, because he afterwards was concerned in a census properly so called. Thus Luke gives us an account of what really happened in the erroneous form which it received from tradition.

The main objection to these hypotheses is that they give no adequate explanation of the journey of Joseph to Bethlehem, where the gist of the whole matter lies. Some new flaw in the tradition may be detected there, and thus either Joseph never lived at Nazareth before the birth of Christ, or was never at Bethlehem at all.

We close our essay with the remark that Luke himself ought to be regarded as an independent and careful witness, whose declarations are not lightly to be overthrown. And the course of criticism has on the whole vindicated his claims to this character. Nothing, if we accept the foregoing explanation of this text, remains unsolved or, at least, not capable of a probable solution, except the statement about Theudas, which, if incorrect, is monstrously so, involving an anachronism of more than a generation, and therefore less likely to prove in the end a historical error. On the other hand the difficulty found in a Lysanias, tetrarch of Abilene, when John the Baptist began his ministry, has been dispersed; the doubtful city of Lasea, which some would cast out of the text, has disclosed its site to the explorers of Crete; Sergius Paulus is a pro-consul in official style, although never having attained to the dignity of a consul; the Adriatic sea had already extended its name beyond the Iapygian promontory, as we learn from Josephus and others; and so we might go on to give examples of Luke's very nice knowledge, as where he calls the magistrates of Thessalonica *politarchs*, a rare name which an inscrip-

tion verifies. Contrast Luke's accuracy with that of some of his commentators. He carries Paul to a river outside of Philippi, where the Jews had a place of prayer. This river was the Strymon, say DeWette, and Meyer, and more than one of the most respectable of the German ecclesiastical historians. But it was not the Strymon, and that stream was twenty miles distant from Philippi. Now if a laborious German commentator, if a prince among commentators, as we may call Meyer, has made such a blunder, with all the maps and travels of modern times within his reach, not discovering his mistake in his second edition, even after Hackett and Howson had furnished the correction, we may pardon the mistake, for we make worse ones; but we ought certainly to rate the more highly an ancient writer who shows unusual carefulness and minuteness of investigation. Such a writer's authority ought to go some length towards freeing him from the imputation of a gross mistake about Thendas or of those found by some modern critics in our text, if there are possible solutions which can save his credit.

Since writing this Article we have received a work of Professor Wieseler, of Greifswald, entitled "Beiträge zur richtigen Würdigung der Evangelien, etc.," intended as an appendix to his well-known "Chronologische Synopse," and published at Gotha a few months since. This is a careful and very learned work. We notice some of its leading views. (1) As in his earlier Synopsis he adheres to the interpretation of Luke ii., 2, which Huschke and others adopt: "this *apographe* took place before (or first and before) the governorship of Quirinius," etc. This explanation he defends by new passages, and declares himself authorized to say that such eminent Greek scholars as G. Curtius and Schömann approve of the construction which he advocates. They see no difficulty in regarding *Κυρηνίου ἔτη* as a dependent clause. (2) He understands this *apographe* to have been concerned with Roman subjects, not with Roman citizens. By "*the whole world*" is intended the world subjugated by Rome, as in some other places. (3) He denies a

double Syrian legation of Quirinius. (4) He thinks, as we do, that Luke, after once mentioning the general decree, confines his attention naturally to Palestine alone, and that the edict need not have been carried into execution in all the provinces at one and the same time. (5) While examining the objection that the edict is mentioned by none of the historians, he mentions, as we have done, a number of important measures of administration—such as the measurements of the empire begun by Cæsar—but inclines to attach a greater degree of authority to Cassiodorus, Suidas, and other late Christian writers than we have conceded to them. (6) His remarks on the credibility of a Roman census under Herod the Great, in Judea, agree with what we have said, but he seems to us to have entered with more care and minuteness into this point than any other scholar, whose works are accessible to us. (p. 64, onward. See especially what he says on Herod's limited power to coin money). His interpretation of v. 2 relieves him entirely from the necessity of supposing that a Roman legate in Syria managed the census in Judea. His words (p. 93) on Herod's relation to Rome we cite: "Hence it appears that Herod, who by a resolution of the Senate wore the title and crown of king, always continued subject to Rome, and, as procurator of Syria and Judea, was especially in financial matters subordinated to Augustus, so that not Roman magistrates, but he himself by virtue of his procuratorship executed such ordinances of the emperor in Judea." (7) His remarks on the silence of Josephus are valuable (p. 94, onward). That writer, in his "*Jewish War*" says nothing of the well-known census of Quirinius in 6 A. D.; censuses as in other lands are little noticed by historians, so that we are indebted to inscriptions for our knowledge of them; it was the mode of the census just mentioned, the way of taking the oath before a heathen magistrate, not the census itself to which they were used, which excited commotions, etc.

If we could admit the explanation given by Wieseler and others of v. 2, it would offer us a smoother way than that which we have taken, but in spite of the alleged opinion of G. Curtius and Schömann we must regard it, to say the

least, as very unlikely. The question always recurs, how could the Evangelist have chosen a phrase, susceptible, according to the ordinary usage of the Greek tongue, of an easy and ready meaning, in order to convey a wholly different sense, when it was the most natural thing possible to express the sense wished by Wieseler and others in wholly unambiguous language.*

* While this Article was nearly through the press, we received A. W. Zumpt's work on the "birth year of Christ," which has just reached this country. In what relates to the census, he agrees mainly with the views here advocated. As for Quirinius he adheres to his old opinion, of which we have given a sufficient account.

ARTICLE III.—THE METHOD OF ACADEMIC CULTURE.*

I COUNT myself happy in coming before you furnished with a subject to which your sympathies are already pledged. The occasion suggests a theme. Surely we may accept it as an auspicious sign that the tie between the graduate and his *alma mater* has ceased to be merely nominal. These annual gatherings are invigorated with new life, as we come more and more to view them as arenas for the discussion of whatever concerns the supreme academic interests. As conservators of these interests we can tolerate no narrower interpretation of our function. We are here to take care that the republic of letters receives no harm. And at a time when the foremost minds among us are earnestly grappling with one problem it would imperil the highest uses of this hour to divert your thoughts to any other. Confident that your appreciation of the subject will supplement my short comings, I shall ask you to consider the Method of Academic Culture.

Before such a company as this I may assume the existence of a distinctive academic discipline. Well nigh seventy years have, indeed, elapsed since Schelling, in the famous lectures which he gave at Jena, said that a youth in pursuit of liberal culture was adrift on a boundless sea without star or compass, and still, after this long interval, we find the historian of Elizabeth, in his inaugural oration at St. Andrews, declaring, in almost the same strain, that the great schools and colleges of England were in the midst of a revolution which, like most revolutions, meant discontent with what they had, with no clear idea of what they wanted. Yet this unpromising result need not make us waver in the faith that there is an aim and scope of education more complete than mere acquisition of knowledge or technical skill; and in the rush and pressure of this modern age, hemmed in with material wants and

* An Address before the Phi Beta Kappa Society, of Amherst College, July 6, 1869.

triumphs, begirt with paltry expedients of politics and trade, we gather to-night about the old altars, to confess ourselves the worshipers of this perennial Truth and Beauty.

It is proof of wholesome progress that, of late, the controversy respecting education has changed its front. The old babbling about useful knowledge is now well nigh banished to the baser sort. Both parties have seen at length that the ineffectual debate between the advocates of classical and of scientific training was wide of the real mark. A mere classical pedant like Dr. Moberly may avow without a blush that he does not know in what the disciplinary value of the sciences consists, or a mere intellectual gladiator, like Mr. Robert Lowe, may find a pleasure in measuring his strength with the mother from whose breasts he drew it, but more liberal minds are coming to loathe this false antagonism. The great high priest of the utilitarian philosophy has shamed Oxford's ungrateful son with his appreciative estimate of classical study, while at the same time the most intelligent advocates of scientific training rest the distinctive claims of the sciences to form a part of education on their disciplinary power. They hold to intellectual culture as the chief end, thus conceding the position on which the defenders of the classical discipline have stood from the beginning. Mr. Atkinson, in his spirited assault on the great schools of England, frankly confesses this. But while both sides have taken the only sound and tenable position, that the comparative value of all studies must be measured by this common standard, the important fact is not overlooked that the strain and tendency of the two methods remain essentially distinct. Says the recently elected President of Harvard University, who has earned the praise of stating more fairly than any other what the new education may be expected to accomplish: "Between this course and the ordinary semi-classical course, there is no question of information by the one and formation by the other; of cramming utilitarian facts by one system, and developing mental powers by the other. Both courses form, train, and educate the mind, and one no more than the other, only the disciplines are different. The fact is that the whole tone and spirit of a good college ought to be different in kind from that of a good polytechnic or scientific school."

Such an admission, from such a source, has a significance that cannot be overlooked. Had this essential distinction between the college and the scientific school been always borne in mind we might have been saved much wild experimenting. I make it the starting point of this discussion. This distinction will not, however, avail us much if we fail to reach an adequate conception of what culture means. For if by culture we understand no more than the word is often taken to imply, the formal training of the intellectual powers, the question between the classics and the sciences is not worth the ink that has been wasted on it. If we value the study of ancient languages, or the study of modern sciences, simply as mental whetstones on which to sharpen youthful wits, there is no need to set one against the other. The utility of both has been amply vindicated. Surely no one would deem the time was wasted that the younger Pitt spent in translating the rhapsody of Lycophron, or that Peel was idle when as a boy he used to sit on the stone steps of Harrow school house, and while the bell was ringing, write Greek verses for his playmates. And in his memorable speech in introducing the Irish Church Bill, certainly the most marvelous intellectual display that the British parliament has seen during the present generation, Mr. Gladstone has abundantly demonstrated the value of that early discipline which Eton and Oxford gave him. On the other hand, the pure disciplinary uses of scientific study can hardly be overestimated. The mere intellectual powers are nowhere more highly taxed. Whatever opinion we may form of such methods of dealing with the natural sciences, as Mr. Wilson tells us he has been practising for the past eight years at Rugby, the truth of Mill's maxim is indisputable that in the higher physical investigations "reasoning and observation have been carried to their greatest known perfection." It is absurd to say that such studies do not furnish an intellectual discipline of the highest order. If, therefore, the mere formal training of the mental parts be made the chief aim, there is no question between the classics and the sciences that need cause a long dispute.

But can the meaning of culture be thus restricted? In other words does the value of a study reside chiefly in the intellec-

tual strain required to master it, or is there beyond all this some vital and fruitful relation between its subject matter and the acquiring mind? Is there not a power to inspire as well as a power to train? If effort only be the aim, there might seem some show of reason in the rule of an English teacher that a study is good just in the proportion that it is dry and disagreeable. To stop with this is a hopeless confusion of means and ends. Mere mental training, however nice or rigorous, must remain but the threshold of genuine culture. No matter whether it be the discipline of the observing or of the reflecting powers, no matter whether acquired by dealing with words or things, with the critical comparisons of language, or the analytical processes of science, if we do not go beyond this, we content ourselves with a theory of education which Montaigne might correct. "The advantages of our study," he says, "are to become better and wiser."

Not that we would in the least underrate fine intellectual discipline, but it is always the means, not the end. Even when this intellectual discipline is put to its final use in the mastery of new truth, it is yet far short of culture in the highest sense. For mere intellectual activity may be vain and profitless, and earn at last the bitter verdict, "all is vanity and vexation of spirit." The most varied training of the reasoning powers, the most far-reaching and all embracing application of them may still fail to touch the great circumference of spiritual completeness. Culture is the aspiration for all things that may be desired. Its aim is the perfect man. It is realized not in any one-sided development of human nature, nor in the exclusive recognition of one kind of truth, but in the happy, harmonious play of all spiritual energies, in the pursuit of whatever things are true, honest, just, pure, lovely, and of good report. Thus it has its origin not in scientific curiosity, still less in petty social pride; its true source is man's insatiable longing to be made complete in the image of the infinite perfection. "The foundation of culture," says Emerson, "is the moral sentiment."

This complete inclusion of man's nature within the scope of culture at once renders culture vital and dynamic. It is not the mere perception by the mind of the true order, but the con-

forming of the whole nature to it. The cultivated man is not the man who has mastered truth, but the man who has been mastered by it; the man in whose soul the love of truth is the sovereign principle; whose inner citadel of reason and desire is garrisoned with all noble and just and rational convictions; whose feet are swift to run in the pathway of gracious and magnanimous acts. Mr. Bright has sneered at culture as a smattering of a little Latin and less Greek. It is not this; nor is it all the knowledge of Latin and Greek possessed by Porson or Bentley, or all the knowledge of the physical sciences possessed by Oersted or Faraday. It is measured not by any variety or extent of acquisition; it is in the man. All intellectual acquisition is tributary to it, all the faculties do its behests, yet these all are but

"The shapes the masking spirit wears."

Culture sucks the sweetness from all laws, from all civilization. Apprehended in its true meaning, all things that men have sought after are its ministering servants. Not mind alone, but will, emotion, sensibility are the material with which it works. It combines them all in prolific alliance. It bears its fruit in the indestructible harvest of sweet and beautiful souls. In this sense culture is its own end. It is self-sufficing and final. To possess it is to realize the chief good of life. Nor is it merely the aspiration for individual perfection. Resting on the benign principle that we are members one of another, and that the perfection of human nature, as it is the aspiration for one eternal truth and beauty, can only be realized in the unity of one body, culture is not selfish but social, not exclusive but comprehensive, not individual but catholic. A divine judgment on every forced and mechanical method of reform, it is the main-spring of all effectual philanthropy "The men of culture," says Matthew Arnold, "are the true apostles of equality."

With this definition of culture, there is no need of showing that in any method not the form alone, but the subject matter must be of prime importance. The question as to the comparative value of certain courses becomes not merely a question as to their disciplinary power; we must also ask by which study is the mind brought into most fruitful contact with noble, in-

spiring, stimulating truth. If it be the final object of a complete and generous education to achieve so far as we may this ideal of compact and proportioned character, plainly those studies must have the preference which touch the mind in its most vital parts, and waken it to most harmonious action. And these must be truths which appeal to the spiritual sense; truths not of form and relation, but of essence; not of inanimate, unconscious nature, but of life and feeling; truths not of expedient application to mere present needs, reaching no interests beyond the range of things seen and temporal; but truths of the supersensuous, eternal world, "truths which wake 'to perish never."

"Greatness of style in painting," says Ruskin, "is always in exact proportion to nobleness of subject." The rule holds just as well in education, for culture in its highest stage is simply genial assimilation. It is only when commercing with the highest truth that the soul is touched to its finest issues. Never can culture wrest itself from this alliance with the supreme interests of humanity. It ceases to be the expression of completeness and harmony soon as it shuts its eyes to this horizon. The ultramontane De Maistre did not exaggerate this principle when he claimed that educational not less than social institutions must rest on the principles of all existence; and Niebuhr laid down a principle more profound and far-reaching than himself, perhaps, perceived, when writing to Madame Hensler about the education of his boy, he said, with a sad sincerity, "I shall nurture in him from infancy, a firm faith in all that I have lost." As the law of culture is centrality, so it can never be gained when the true centre is lost sight of.

Does it seem the mere summing up of our discussion to say with Stuart Mill, that Education has for its object, "besides calling forth the greatest possible quantity of intellectual power, to inspire the intensest love of truth." But the question still remains, in relation to what truth is this most intense love exerted? In the perception of what relations and affinities are these inmost springs of being touched, and the soul thrilled, absorbed, enraptured, with its vision: In contact with what superior forces are these tides of feeling at their flood? There may be joy in the perception of mere

mathematical relations, as Newton, when he drew near the demonstration of his great law, was overpowered by his emotion; the mind may be exalted by tracing the broad operation of physical principles, as Kepler cried with rapture, "I read thy thoughts after thee, O God:" yet who will question that the intensest feeling can be aroused only with reference to those questions of the soul that are linked to the eternal poles of the spiritual firmament.

It is this that draws the ineradicable line between literature and science as sources of a complete and noble culture. Remember it is no question here as to their disciplinary power, but as to their capacity to furnish this living bread which must form the diet of all generous souls. It is not the form but the substance that now concerns us. Judged by this rule the sciences must be assigned a lower relative position, as failing to lead the mind to the most invigorating springs of spiritual culture; and a method of discipline in which the sciences are made predominant can never be relied on to achieve the highest end. I am far from wishing to deny the sciences all moral and aesthetic influence, but where this influence can be most clearly traced, it will be always found that the spirit of rigid scientific method has been qualified by convictions drawn from an independent source. That sense in nature of "something far more deeply interfused," which is one of the prime characteristics of modern in distinction from ancient literature, is, in fact, a protest of the spiritual nature against the materialistic tendency of modern science.

So far as science comes into contact with the great problems of humanity, it holds a two-fold attitude. In the first place it ignores religion altogether, restricting the study of man's spiritual relations to those ties and obligations simply that connect him with his fellow-man;—the position of Mr. Herbert Spencer, to whose cheerless attempts to co-ordinate the sciences might be applied the words of an old writer, "that like Ulysses wandering through the shades, he met all the ghosts, but could not see the queen." For he not only rejects as failures, all attempts to cross the confines of phenomena, he goes to the limit of denying that the human mind has any capacity for apprehending a supreme cause. He does not

even rise to the level of worshipping an Unknown God. And in professing this dismal creed, it is past doubt, that Mr. Spencer does not speak for himself alone. A second position, but one hardly in advance of this, is when Mr. Mill generously concedes that Theism, "under certain conditions," is still an open question. "The positive mode of thought," says he, "is not necessarily a denial of the supernatural; it merely throws back that question to the origin of things. The positive philosopher is free to give his opinion on this subject, according to the weight he attaches to the analogies, which are called marks of design, and to the general traditions of the human race: the value of these evidences is indeed a question for Positive philosophy, but it is not one in which Positive philosophers must necessarily be agreed." Mr. Mill admits, therefore, no nearer approach to Deity than through the inference from design, or external evidence. "In his general philosophy," says Masson, "he provides no room or function whatever for belief as distinct from knowledge." And who that recalls the tone of unconsoled, comfortless sorrow that sighs through the dedication to the memory of his deceased wife of his *Essay upon Liberty* can doubt that, to this capacious and highly trained understanding, the truths which minister the most serene and beneficent discipline to the soul are indeed open questions.

That these carefully expressed opinions of the two foremost English writers who have discussed the logical connections of the sciences must be accepted as a fair exposition of the most advanced speculative opinion among scientific men of the present day, will be doubted by no reader of Huxley or Darwin. The unmistakable tone of both is indifference towards those truths which science cannot readily coordinate. This position at times is temperately implied, at times arrogantly asserted, but the result in either case remains the same. It is no exaggeration to affirm that the study of the physical sciences, as the scope and limits of that study are expounded by some of its most eminent professors, excludes the mind from the highest and most pressing questions that concern man as an immortal being. And a student whose mental diet is drawn exclusively or mainly from these sources, must inevitably miss

the most vitalizing sources of intellectual culture. The spirit is hopelessly dwarfed on which these shackles have once been fastened.

"There are," as the Duke of Argyll most truly says, "many kinds of Priestcraft." In behalf of science, some men seem on the point of putting forth an "Index Expurgatorius" of scientific study. It furnishes an instructive lesson to find one of the loudest advocates of intellectual freedom laying down the rule that "whatever is inaccessible to reason, should be strictly interdicted to research." But who shall sit on this high tribunal; who shall draw the line where reason ends? Alas, there are "slaves of thought," as well as "slaves of sense," chambers of darkness, in which the soul may wander, more dismal than any dungeon in which the body can be immured. Of all servitude, there is none so grinding as servitude to a system of ideas, when the reason, proud, self-satisfied, boasting its emancipation from all vulgar prejudice, repelling with scorn dependence upon any higher guidance, is all the time hopelessly chained by its own processes, weighed down with fetters,

"Forged by the imperious, lonely, thinking power."

Even when Physical Science does not assume this despotic right of legislation respecting the limits of intellectual activity, it may equally sap the highest culture by tempting the soul to lower ranges of inquiry. This point need not be argued; we may appeal to history. If the end and use of literary history be, as Bacon has declared, "not so much for curiosity, or satisfaction of those that are the lovers of learning; but chiefly for a more serious and grave purpose, which is, that it will make learned men wise in the use and administration of learning," we may gain a lesson from the Italian Universities. In the 14th century, Italy had the intellectual preëminence, which in the 12th had belonged to France. But the institutions which had been centres of living thought became, after the Reformation, mere scientific schools. They boast a continuous series of illustrious names, but with the single exception of Vico, illustrious only in one direction. Says Matthew Arnold: "It shows how insufficient are the natural sciences alone to keep up in a people culture and life, that the Italians,

at the end of a period with the natural sciences alone thriving in it, and letters and philosophy moribund, found themselves, by their own confession, with a poverty of general culture, and in an atmosphere unpropitious to knowledge, which they sorrowfully contrast with the condition of other and happier nations."

Is it said, on the other hand, that the method of scientific culture is very different now from what it was in the days of Gallileo and Torricelli; I answer the method has been improved, but the subject matter, with which alone the present discussion is concerned, remains the same. The instruments of investigation are more perfect, but the field itself has not been enlarged. In its widest scope, science aims simply at finding a theory of nature; its last word is impersonal, inexorable Law. The more complete the absorption of the intellect in purely scientific methods, the more complete the severance from all spiritual intuitions. To the soul imprisoned within these processes, the "*flamentia moenia mundi*," are walls of brass. Huxley, like Hume, can find no refuge from materialism but in scepticism. Science yields him no more solid ground than this.

The most ringing protest against this absorbing tyranny, in modern times, of the scientific spirit, is seen in the wonderful development of modern music. Here the æsthetic sensibilities escape the sway of the understanding. The part of man's nature that science does not touch, and cannot arouse, struggles for expression. "Music," says Taine, "is the organ of the overrefined sensibility, and vague, boundless aspiration of modern life." That refuge from the limitations of corroding every-day existence, which coarse natures seek in coarse excitements, is furnished the more cultivated mind in the enchanting melodies of Orpheus, in the profound sadness that underlies the impetuous movement of Don Giovanni, and in the linked sweetness of Fidelio. The serene domain of fancy and imagination which the lively Greek possessed in the fair humanities of old religion, now lingers in the modern world of tones; where the dim feeling of the soul for things not dreamed of in earth-born philosophies finds such fit embodiment. Indeed, as I stood the other day with the great

multitude which the Jubilee had gathered, and caught the dense waves of sound which beat on the air with almost the solidity of Atlantic billows, it seemed far less a festival of Peace than the fleeing of men and women from that sway of the Common, which, says Goethe, binds us all. Against such wants science can furnish no antidote. On the contrary, science has most in common with these tendencies of a materialistic civilization. Science addresses the understanding. Along her straight and even path, the mind runs with swift-ness and precision, but never soars. Her graded course shuns heights and depths alike. Shut up in her luxurious cars, the traveler speeds to his journey's end, unconscious that during the night he has had the glitter of the Northern lights above him, or the boiling surges of Niagara beneath. Science discusses Force and Method, but says nothing of God, Freedom, and Immortality. She leads us to the tree of Knowledge; not to the tree of Life.

The distinction and supreme excellence, considered as a part of academic method, of what were aptly termed, in former times, the "*Litteræ Humaniores*," consists in this contact which they furnish with the central and indestructible interests of the soul. There is, after all, no such music in the spheres, as the "still, sad music of humanity." How undying are these wants! The oldest book that time has spared is fresh and new, when looked at in this aspect. The problems that troubled the patriarchs are the problems that trouble us. The circle that began with Job comes round again with Faust. The moral and aesthetic influence of science is limited and indirect, but in converse with literature, we feel a power that is close and living; we tread the overshadowing verge of the great mysteries that have baffled sages and saints; our hearts throb in unison with all that man has hoped or feared; we wrestle with him in his midnight conflicts with unknown foes; we pillow our heads beside him, and dream his heavenly dreams.

Were the study of the classics no more than a school-room drill it might be difficult to show that some modern tongues could not be used with the same advantage. But surely the tale of Troy divine has a higher use than to furnish pain-

ful lists of exceptions to the Greek Grammars. The highest value of all literature is in its substance, not its form. Bacon calls it the first distemper of learning when men study words. A man may waste years in the fruitless labor of wearing out his dictionary, and yet die without catching a sound of the infinite melody of the many-voiced Sea; while Keats, who knew no Greek, by the subtlety of a kindred poetic sense, filched some of its fairest flowers from old Parnassus. Unless our classical discipline goes beyond mere grammatical analysis, we may as well dismiss the classics from our curriculum. The doubtful advantage otherwise derived from them will hardly compensate for the toil and trouble. Ascham tells us that Queen Elizabeth never took Greek or Latin grammar in hand after the first declining of a noun and a verb.

Accepting literature in its widest sense as the vehicle for expressing the whole varied and subtle experience of humanity, including in it whatever of genuine and noble utterance, whether in poetry, in philosophy, in history, and how ample and manifold its material as a means of highest culture! How high its reach, how broad and comprehensive its scope! What shapes it evokes! What pictures it holds up before us! What joy, what sorrow, what triumph, what despair; what biting accents of doubt and mockery; what angel voices of faith and love! The anguish of Lear; the troubled conscience of Macbeth; the mental torture of Othello; the introspection of Hamlet; do these speak to us in a foreign tongue? The spiritual struggles of Augustine; the haunted rhymes of Dante; the doubts of Pascal; the sentimentalism of Rousseau; what have we in all this but ourselves, sketched in larger outlines, and dyed in deeper tints?

Mr. Herbert Spencer speaks with a sneer of "such as care not to understand the architecture of the heavens, but are deeply interested in some contemptible controversy about the intrigues of Mary Queen of Scots." Had his philosophy gone a little deeper, he would have guessed the reason. The moral laws that appeal to the conscience are more vital than the physical laws that are comprehended by the intellect. A story of human sorrow and grief touches the heart more nearly than any star shining in the milky way. In the practical problems

before us we feel an interest that we cannot feel in any question of astronomy. Life and death are more mysterious, more awful, than gravitation or chemical affinity; what we are, and what we shall be, we are forced to ask ourselves with a solicitude that no inquiry about the origin of species or the law of metamorphosis can ever cause; heirs of immortal hopes, even Mr. Huxley's question whether all protoplasm be not proteinaceous, does not sum up all we want to know!

In thus defining the class of studies which must form the basis of all high and generous culture, I am not unmindful of the fact that some of the studies which I have grouped under the broad designation of literary, in distinction from scientific, as moral philosophy and history, admit scientific method, and are commonly classed among the sciences. Moral philosophy has always held this rank, nor is there any reason why it should be refused to history. For if not the foundation, history is undeniably the verification of the social sciences. Mr. Goldwin Smith, with a singular confusion of ideas, complains that the founders of the new physical science of history have to lay the foundation in what seems the quicksand of free will. "Let those," says he, "who have studied the science of man and history, predict a single event by means of these sciences." This objection springs from an altogether exaggerated and erroneous notion of what science undertakes to do. Prediction is, under no circumstances, part of its proper function. Science simply discerns a certain order, and is only competent to say that in case that order be maintained, results that are involved in it may be expected. It does not detract from the claim of medicine to be called a science that the most skillful physician cannot predict the day and the hour when some individual patient will be struck with sudden death; it does not detract from the claim of geology to be called a science that no observation of Murchison or Dana could forewarn men of the frightful convulsion that devastated South America. This line between the physical and moral sciences, with reference to prediction, has been altogether too loosely drawn. Says a much more discriminating thinker than Mr. Goldwin Smith, I mean the late Sir Cornewall Lewis: "Positive politics, like anatomy or physiology, does not, properly speaking, predict anything,

though it furnishes general truths, by which the determination of future facts may be facilitated." History, in this respect, differs from the physical sciences chiefly in the fact that its phenomena do not repeat themselves.

But while I thus claim for history, equally with moral philosophy or psychology, the application of scientific method, and trace all the advance made in this study, in recent times, to the recognition of this fact, I am just as much persuaded that the supreme and unequalled value of those studies as means of culture arises from precisely those features of them, which are not scientific. It is not because moral philosophy and history may be ranked as sciences, as Mr. Herbert Spencer and men of his school would argue, but because they are much more than sciences, and because they introduce the mind to the presence of mysteries too august and unfathomable to be brought within the confines of any science, that their educational influence is so ennobling. Soon as they are reduced to the rank of mere sciences we have but the skeleton remaining. We are like the poet when he had fetched his sea-born treasures home, and found

"The poor, unsightly, noisome things
Had left their beauty on the shore,
With the sun and the sand and the wild uproar."

Take such a system as that of Bain, where moral philosophy is merged in psychology, and where psychology in turn is rooted in physiology, the inner sanctuary of the reason being reduced to a mere phantasy of consciousness. Whatever may be the merits of such a system as a dry outline map of the human faculties, what satisfaction can it afford to a mind putting itself those questions which, in its deeper moods, it can never fail to put. How does it help us to conceive of our thinking, feeling selves as only complex bundles of nerve-currents, all diversities of knowledge and belief, of character and genius, resulting from their endless action and reaction. What interest would this study of ourselves retain were it thus cut off from the deeper ontological questions in which, like all the physical sciences, it lies imbedded?

"Sure, He, that made us with such large discourse,
Looking before and after, gave us not
That capability and godlike reason
To fast in us unused."

Or take such a view of history as that of the late Mr. Buckle, when the imposing range of illustration served for a time to veil the shallowness of thought. According to this writer, history is simply scientific: "For in the moral," he says, "as in the physical world, nothing is anomalous, nothing is unnatural, nothing is strange; all is order, symmetry, and law." In other words, there is no interest for us in the checkered story of human progress, more touching, more profound than that with which we watch the growth of a cactus, or note the pathway of a comet. Hence the conditions of human progress are intellectual, not moral; the chief concern of the student is with tables of statistics; he can rise no higher than the recognition of regular phenomena; all idea of an over-arching destiny, or a directing Providence, is scouted as absurd. History is made by this method merely a register of such facts as may be grouped and classified in some petty system, its pages as dry and lifeless and uninspiring as those of last year's almanac.

No one, of course, who admits a progress in the history of humanity, can deny the presence of some controlling principle by which that progress has been shaped. But when we say that the course of nature is determined by invariable laws we should remember that while those laws are invariable in their nature, they are subject to incessant variation in their application. History, like nature, is governed by variable combinations of invariable forces. In this sense law is not, as commonly conceived, an adamant barrier; it is not rigid, not immutable, not invariable; it is plastic, subtle, changeable, these endless transformations being determined by a regnant principle that lies behind the veil of phenomenal existence. What we dignify with the name of laws are but methods of a supreme will. "The supernatural order," says Uzanam, "rules, enlightens, and fertilizes the order of nature," and the principle is just as true when applied to history. As the events of history are in part results of will, a physical theory fails to account even for the physical facts.

We are all familiar with Aristotle's maxim that poetry is more weighty and philosophical than history; for those of us who have never read it in the original must have come across

it in the fine paraphrase of Sir Philip Sidney. And using the term history in the sense in which it is defined in the preface of Polybios, the maxim is correct ; for as Sidney puts it, " the historian is tied, not to what should be, but to what is ; to the particular truth of things ; not to the general reason." Yet Revelation has given history a meaning which not even Thucydides conceived. We tread the shores of a new world when we turn from the gloomy pages of Tacitus to the triumphant visions of Augustine. Bossuet, Vico, Bunsen, mark successive phases of a change by which history from being a mere discipline for the practical administration of affairs, has become a study of human destiny, addressed less to the lower than to the higher reason ; equally with poetry an intuition of the spiritual, the universal, the eternal. " The highest idea of history," says Schelling, " can never be realized through the understanding."

With this view of history as a progressive, ever unfolding verification and illustration of spiritual truths, I feel that its influence in giving tone and shape to all higher culture can hardly be exaggerated. The true historic spirit will always be a liberal, a catholic, but at the same time a humble, a reverential spirit. Says Carlyle : " Science has done much for us ; but it is a poor science that would hide from us the great deep sacred infinitude of nescience, whither we can never penetrate, upon which all science swims as a mere superficial film." We learn tolerance as we see how strangely mixed in all men's beliefs have been truth and error ; we look with distrust on our most cherished plans of reform as we remember how the hopes of the best and wisest have been often baffled ; and bearing in mind how this great mystery of Time, that rolls on without haste, without rest, is but a moment embosomed in eternity, we murmur " who is worthy to open the Book and to loose the seals thereof?"

History, Philosophy, Poetry, Art, these are then the sources of that supreme culture in which the ideal of academic method is reached. How urgent the need of such culture in this age and this land I need not add. We hear much about an education suited to the times. But an education truly suited to the times is not such an education as the times ask

for, an education that flatters our overweening conceit of material progress, that drives us with new force along the path on which we are already rushing with railroad speed; we want a corrective for this distemper; a power that shall struggle with these debilitating influences, and strengthen our civilization at precisely those points where it is most weak. Culture should lead, not follow. That indefinite tribunal which goes under the convenient designation of "public sentiment" has no right to meddle with these high matters. "The end of education," says Richter, "is to elevate *above* the spirit of the age."

In our politics, which are allowed to usurp such a disproportioned share of our time and thought, how much we need this corrective of high culture to instruct us in the worthlessness of most of the results at which politicians aim, to lessen our exaggerated estimate of the power of legislation; to cure us of the folly of confounding the right to vote with the grand end of life; in our religion how much we need it to enlarge our scope of doctrine; to save us from our distressing faith in mechanical appliances; to lift us above our little sects and systems; to make us realize that the Son of Man came that we might have life, and that we might have it more abundantly; in all our doing and seeking, in our business and pleasure, how much we need this wise, sweet, balanced temper which takes things at their true value, which refuses to confound means with ends; which recognizes all good; which strives after all perfection! In our strenuous, uncompromising moods how gladly should we welcome this gracious but invincible ally!

I know it has been questioned whether in such a social state as ours this highest culture will be cared for. The unmistakable leaning of an industrial democracy is towards the sciences. Not only do the sciences admit of more immediate application to those arts which a material civilization rates so high; but their method and scope suit the exaggerated estimate of mere mental power by which such a civilization is characterized. No doubt Knowledge is power; but it should be something more. It is much to our credit as a people that we have built so many miles of railroad and of telegraph; that we have spanned so many rivers and crossed so

many mountain chains, but if this is all we have to show, we shall make after all but a poor figure among the nations. It was a great thing to lift Chicago out of the mud; and so it was a great thing to pile up the pyramids, but these are not the things for which men, as they beheld them, have blessed God.

The disposition to lay such undue stress on things which belong to the mere shell of life and do not touch its vital essence, is the perilous side of the great social and political experiment which we are making. And the most discouraging part of it is that the influences which should correct, in many cases only intensify the evil. It grieves a right-minded man to see reported in the papers the saying of a preacher of the Gospel that the Pacific railroad would give us more enlarged conceptions of the divine attributes. But men have walked humbly with God who went on foot; the poor in spirit, the meek, the merciful, the pure in heart, the peacemakers, were on the earth before the days of Watt and Stephenson. How much are we benefited by crossing the continent in six days, if our object is greedy and selfish; why lay new wires beneath the Atlantic waves if, after all,

—“the light-outspeeding telegraph
Bears nothing on its beams!”

Does it seem that Religion is the corrective for all this? But the working of the religious sentiment is always shaped by the circumstances under which it manifests itself. In its specific forms it too often loses sight of its final aim. This aim is the constant clothing of man in the stature of an ampler spiritual completeness; but, alas, man's own apprehension of this aim is blurred and indistinct, so that religion, instead of being the spur to all perfection, becomes the excuse for narrowness, for resting satisfied with a stunted and enfeebled growth. And just in proportion as the religious sentiment is sincere and powerful does it often become a barrier to progress. A man of limited intellectual range, who is at the same time a man of sincere religious conviction, is apt to be the most impracticable and unreasonable of men. Nowhere is the illumination of sound culture so much needed as in that sphere where

the confounding of light and darkness entails such disastrous consequences.

In no country in the world is the religious sentiment so genuine, so energetic, as with us, and nowhere does there exist such multiplicity of sects, such endless disposition to lay exclusive stress on single truths, such unhealthy fostering of selfish instincts of spiritual life. It is pitiful to think of the ideal of Christianity enforced in much of our religious literature, and by so many of our religious teachers. I would not, in the least, underrate the real good that religion achieves even in its most imperfect forms. It is the infirmity of our nature, that we see in part, but surely it should be our constant aim to seek after better things. We have a superabundant religious energy. We rush about doing good with only less of zeal than we rush about in pursuit of money; we carry the Gospel into all the earth. But, after all, the kingdom cometh without observation. There are things more to be desired than making proselytes or multiplying churches.

If we are ever to have this high culture in the United States, is it not clear that our colleges must be its nurseries? Is not this the proper aim of that distinctive academic method, which I have been all along asserting? Is it not the supreme function of our colleges to supply this gracious and ennobling ministry. "The American College," as President Eliot has truly said, "is an institution without a parallel." Its aim must not be confounded with the aim of the common school, which seeks to effect the greatest good for the greatest number, nor with the aim of the scientific or professional school, which aims at special results in a particular direction. The training of a college, to be effective, must be, to a considerable degree, exclusive; it eliminates the best material, and aims at the highest mark; achieving its end, not in any special preparation for special avocations, but in the enlargement of the whole nature, in the expansion of the spiritual senses to just and adequate apprehension of all the ends of living.

We gain nothing by baptizing our colleges with high-sounding names, and hopelessly confounding the object of Academic with the object of University instruction. We need great

universities, institutions where the highest instruction shall be communicated in all departments, where libraries, cabinets, and all scientific apparatus, shall be provided; but we shall get them soonest, not by wiping out our old college course, but by making it more distinctive and exacting. It cannot be recognized too clearly, that the functions of the college and university are distinct. The university cannot be too varied in its courses; cannot be too well furnished with collections of every kind; is better for standing in a great centre, and being thronged with crowds of eager students; but the best results of college discipline are secured by severe training in few studies; great libraries and museums are not essential, and an increase of students beyond a certain limit, is an evil. The aim should be, not so much to have many, as to have them carefully matched.

The question has been asked, whether in the fundamental idea of the College, we are not at fault. Before we decide this question, let us remember that in this country the fundamental idea of the College has never yet been realized. Our oldest institutions were founded just at the crisis when, at Oxford and Cambridge, the colleges were supplanting the old mediæval universities, and hence they received the name of Colleges. And no doubt when the President and Fellows of Harvard College were incorporated the purpose was to introduce the English college system. But whatever the original purpose may have been, it was never carried out. Long rows of brick buildings, with less of architectural beauty than any well-built cotton mill may boast, do not make a college. Neither do dry, formal recitations to a tutor. All this may be found in any public school. The fundamental idea of a college is that of an academic family. This is the substance of which our American College system retains the shell alone. This it is that constitutes the distinctive excellence of the English Colleges; this, that with all their faults, makes Oxford and Cambridge the seats of such serene culture, the haunts of so many beautiful and gracious memories. Who that has read the delightful memoir of Keble, by his life-long friend and biographer, Sir John Coleridge, will need to be reminded of that apt illustration of what I mean, in the charming picture

which he gives of college life at Corpus sixty years ago, when Thomas Arnold had just been elected scholar, a "college," says Coleridge, "very small in its numbers, and humble in its buildings, but to which we and our fellow students formed an attachment never weakened in the after course of our lives." It is the fashion of the hour to speak with contempt of the English collegiate system, to decry the methods as antiquated, and the studies as useless. But a system which kindled the enthusiasm and retained the affection of two such opposite natures as Arnold and Keble, which armed one with heroic panoply for the thickest of life's battle, and sent the other to a remote country parish, to lead a life, whose singular purity and grace has breathed itself in heavenly music across oceans, and over continents, must have had in it some feature, which we can ill afford to spare.

This subtle charm of Oxford, the source of this deathless fascination, was what Keble, borrowing a word from his favorite Aristotle, used to call its *ἥθος*, that is the toning or general color that it diffused over the whole character, imparting a peculiar gentleness and grace to the habitual exercise of the vigorous moral virtues. And who can fail to see that this peculiar tone, this ineffable and characteristic grace that steeps Oxford in sentiment, and bathes her with enchantment, is the result in very great measure of that development of the idea of academic fellowship, which marks the English universities from their great continental rivals. In other words, it is the distinctive college spirit; the intimate fellowship of scholars gathered under one roof, and sitting around one board; the close contact of cultivated minds; the familiar exchange, not only between men of the same rank, but between pupil and instructor, meeting in private chambers and in classes of half-a-dozen, so painfully contrasting in all its aspects, with the unloveliness of our college life, and the frigid, formal intercourse of student and professor.

We need, then, to import into our academic life a different spirit. For, of course, such culture as I have been upholding cannot be imparted by mechanical and formal methods. The impulse must be living, personal; it must come not from books,

but men. The mere schoolmaster is never more out of place than in the professor's chair: I share to the full Lessing's contempt for what he called professoring. Unless mind touches mind there will be no heat. We make much of our improved methods and text books, but after all they matter less than we suppose. A genial, opulent, overflowing soul is the secret of success in teaching. To have read Euripides with Milton, were better than having the latest critical edition. Not the methods but the men gave Rugby and Sorèze their fame. And hence the advantage, in a college, of smaller numbers, where the students, brought into daily familiar contact with superior minds, may catch unconsciously the earnestness, the urbanity, the kindred glow which only such personal contact can communicate.

All inspirations are vital. The spirit of a living creature is in the wheels. It was in strict conformity with this supreme spiritual law that when the highest, holiest truth was manifested, it was manifested in a Living Person. And here, that nothing in this discussion be misunderstood, let me distinctly say, what I have all along implied, that the highest, most perfect culture is only possible through Him in whom alone we are made complete. For I have aimed to show that culture is not simply intellectual, but covers the whole nature. It is such quickening of the vital springs of being as can come only from a person. It is love of the Supreme Perfection, such love as can only be created by an inward loving apprehension of Him in whom it was revealed. The goal of human perfection can be reached in no other way. Without this personal fellowship with the Incarnate Life and Truth, we are cut off from the sovereign quickener. We hew out for ourselves broken cisterns instead of drinking of that river of God which is full of water. We garnish a sepulchre which within is full of rottenness and death.

And as the supreme, all constraining power of the Great Teacher was rooted in his transcendent personality, in itself a judgment of all evil, an allurements to all good, so in a lower sense is it not less true of all teachers. We have been discussing methods; but let us not forget that method, after all, is secondary. "To write well," says Milton, "a man must be himself a poem;" so to teach well his inmost soul must be

imbued with the sweetness, the generosity, the simplicity of that divine philosophy which it is his highest duty to inculcate. The springs which he causes to gush forth can never rise higher than their fount. We cannot be too earnestly persuaded that all fruitful academic reform must find its beginning here. And if our colleges are destined ever to become the seats of this serene culture, the chosen haunts of these gracious, ennobling influences, it will be chiefly for the reason that those to whom the sacred office of instruction is entrusted, warming to their work, and gathering their pupils about them in an emulation and rivalry of love, shall wield that spontaneous, rhythmic influence which flows "from soul to soul, and lives forever and forever."

I have been asserting a distinctive Academic Culture. It has been my aim to show that the progress of knowledge, the immense increase in the extent and variety of the sciences, instead of rendering the need of this distinctive culture less, has only made it greater. Let us banish the false notion of any antagonism between this culture, and education that has a different scope and aim. It is not necessary to deprecate the value of specific technical training in order to exalt the worth of this more complete development. Such an institution as the Technological School in Boston is doing a good work. It supplies a need which our colleges could supply only through the sacrifice of a greater good. I approve its method, and rejoice in its success. In our common schools we are doing a better work. We cannot forget that the great mass of the community, from the necessity of the case, can receive no other training than they receive here. I advocate a distinctive academic culture, not in place of these, not in opposition to them, but in alliance with them, to preside over and direct them. I advocate it, because scientific training, unless regulated and qualified by a broader culture, can only end in debilitating, instead of enlarging, the spiritual nature; because popular instruction, unless constantly invigorated and enlightened by higher intellectual forces, can move only in a dull mechanical routine. For education must receive its shape from above, not from beneath. Unless we do something to raise as well as to diffuse, there is danger that the sneer of Renan will prove

well founded and the new world atone for its neglect of superior instruction by a long course of vulgarity of thought and brutality of manners.

•I have not, then, in the view which I have advanced, been pleading for a puny, dilettanti culture; a culture remote from life and its serious concerns. On the contrary, the Culture I have been asserting keeps the soul in constant, inspiring contact with the deepest springs of action. It is not selfish and individual, but permeates the whole social organism. Itself accessible only to its elect, its benediction descends on all. Its influence is wide as the influence of spiritual truth. For man liveth not by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God.

ARTICLE IV.—THE AMERICAN COLLEGES AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.

IV.

THE consideration of the American colleges as communities has brought us to the question of their religious character. This includes several subordinate questions, such as, whether they ought to be placed under a positive religious influence, and to what extent and in what manner this influence may properly be exercised. These questions, and many others which arise under this comprehensive topic, are from the nature of the subject not easily answered, and in the present state of opinion are involved in somewhat serious complications.

We may as well say, at the outset, that the view which any man, otherwise well-informed, will take of this subject, must necessarily vary with the views which he takes of religion itself, as to its essential nature and authority, as to its relation to man's responsibility and destiny, and as to its evidence. It will vary also with the views which he takes of Christianity; according as he regards it as supernaturally given and historically true, or as he believes it to be of human origination, and, therefore, so far as its miracles and the claims and conceptions of its central personage are concerned, as more or less historically erroneous. It will vary also according as his views are more or less enlarged of its relations to human culture, and of its friendliness to the highest forms of human development.

The position which we occupy is that "the Christian faith is the perfection of human reason;" that supernatural and historical Christianity is the only Christianity which is worth defending or which is capable of being defended on the grounds of reason or history; and that such a Christianity, when interpreted by enlightened judgment, as to its truths and its pre-

cepts, is not only friendly to the highest forms of culture, but is an essential condition of the same.

There are not a few at the present time who do not agree with us in this position. More than a few, we fear, who are interested in the higher education of the country, so far hesitate to receive any positive form of religion as to assume in all their reasonings, that the claims of supernatural Christianity are more likely than otherwise to be set aside in the progress of historical and scientific investigation, and that it is therefore inconsistent as well as impolitic for the universities and colleges of the country to be very positively committed to the support of these claims. Such a recognition of Christianity, in their view, hinders the freedom of investigation and of teaching, and is inconsistent with that tolerance among scholars which is required by the spirit of the age. They might repel the charge of being anti-religious or atheistic or even anti-Christian in their own faith, but they reason that for a college to recognize the Christian faith in its teachings is to commit itself to an implied bondage of opinion, which cannot but constrain the freedom of its spirit, or which must, at least, make it unwisely intolerant. We cannot accept this position or the inferences to which it leads.

We must discuss this question in an important sense from a Christian position, and judge of the whole subject from a Christian point of view. But while we frankly avow our position, we trust that it will not make us so one-sided or one-eyed in our construction of those whose position differs from our own as to render us incapable of appreciating their difficulties or of looking at college and university education from their point of view. Though our position is distinctively and avowedly Christian, we do not propose to argue simply as theologians, or to use our assumption of the truth of Christianity as a vantage ground; but to argue as friends of education, and to occupy, so far as we may, the ground which is common to all friends of culture who are not avowedly irreligious and atheistic in their scientific and practical theories.

The view which we shall endeavor to maintain is that the American Colleges should have a positively religious and Christian character. We have in mind the college such as we

have conceived and described it,—the college which is a distinct community and maintains a separate and distinctive intellectual and social life. The few colleges which are not distinct as communities,—the colleges of the very large cities, where pupils live in their own homes and are rooted in their own families—can derive their religious influence from the same sources from which other youths derive theirs, that is, from the domestic, social, and church relations of the great community from which they have never been transplanted. While it is desirable, and in a sense, necessary that institutions of this kind should exert a positive religious and Christian influence, the necessity in this case is not so imperative. We are concerned with those colleges which maintain the distinctive and intensely active common life which we have described.

When we say that the college of this description should be positive in its religious and Christian influence, we mean that the essential facts and truths of the Christian system should be recognized in all its teachings as true; that as a community the college should participate in Christian worship, and that its instruction and discipline should, with rare exceptions, be in the hands of men of a positive and earnest Christian character.

Our reasons are the following:

First.—The colleges as such have the same duty and need of social religion which exist in every community. This can be doubted or denied only by those who deny altogether the obligation of united and common religious teaching and worship. We have seen that the college, as a community, is eminently independent and self-sufficing, deriving the roots of its life eminently from within itself, and living that life with an energy that is especially intense. If other human societies need to be socially religious, the need of the college is preëminent. If it is becoming that the great community of men should divide itself into separate societies in order that it may maintain religious teaching and worship, then it is especially appropriate that a society which of itself is separated from every other, should be provided with such teaching and worship. If every household ought to be a religious commonwealth, then the college which takes the youth from his home

and introduces him into a larger household of its own, ought to sustain that religious teaching and worship which are appropriate to its own necessities and position.

Second.—The college, as compared with other communities, stands in special and imperative need of religious restraints and religious influences. The individuals of which it is composed have been released, sometimes abruptly, from the restraints of the family and of the public opinion of society at large. They form to themselves a public opinion of their own, which, though often generous and just, is yet liable to strange caprices and sudden revolutions, even when sobered and elevated by the most active and ennobling religious elements. The passions are strong, the will is impetuous and weak, the judgment is immature, the experience of temptation is limited, the habits of good are not fixed, while those to evil are sometimes fearfully strong. Such a community, as it would seem, does of all others stand in pressing need of the best religious influences, and these should be constantly applied, wisely varied, and patiently maintained. If Christianity can do anything to control and elevate any class of persons, or if it is needed for any, it is adapted to and required for the susceptible, intelligent, and impetuous youth, who crowd the American colleges.

What is adapted to the welfare of young men as individuals, is equally required for the order and discipline of the whole body. To govern a college by mere law, or by the force of rules and penalties, without appealing to the ethical and religious feelings of the pupils, is not always successful in the lowest sense, and it never can be in the highest. The reason and conscience must often be appealed to, and if this is done with effect, both reason and conscience must be reinforced and quickened by religious faith and feeling. If religious restraints and religious hopes are required in every community of full grown men—not as is sometimes charged to do the work of a police, but to make the work of a police less necessary,—this must be eminently true in a community of youths whose sense of propriety is not always proportioned to their knowledge, and whose mobile and impetuous tempers are often exasperated to resistance by rules and *surveillance*. If the college contains none whose principles of duty are made sturdy by

religious reverence and whose consciences are quickened by the presence and love of God, then, on those occasions of strain and conflict between the students and the faculty which must inevitably occur from time to time, the cause of order must be imperiled. It is not according to the wisdom of experience to affirm that such exigencies will not arise, nor if they do occur, to rely upon any principles which are not enforced, either directly or indirectly, by religious faith.

Third.—It is a legitimate and important function of the college, to form the character to moral and religious excellence. Education should not and cannot be limited to the culture of the intellect and the tastes, but it properly includes the culture of the character. The Christian believer holds that the character can only be rightly formed when it is subjected to the authority of Christ. He holds that discipleship to Christ is the condition of complete success in the culture and regulation of the springs of action. When then he requires that the college should teach and influence its pupils according to this theory, he is only consistent with his own most sacred convictions. Whenever the instruction on scientific and literary themes can be of such a character as to afford the opportunity of confirming the Christian faith, and strengthening Christian purposes, it should in all cases be given. If it furnishes no such opportunity, the character of the instructor may still attract and influence his pupils. Those who found and endow Christian colleges may as properly endow them as places of religious culture, so far as such culture can be successfully applied, as make them places of intellectual discipline. Those who do not accept the Christian notion of character, who do not believe in Christ as the object of man's confidence and the light and hope of his life, may see no propriety in connecting these influences with his training in youth. They would exclude religion and Christianity from the college for the same reasons and no other that would exclude them from the conduct of their life. Conversely, the same reasoning which would exclude them from a place in the college, would require that they be rejected altogether.

Fourth.—If moral and religious perfection are the end of all education, then moral and religious culture are friendly to

education and culture of every kind. "The end of learning," says Milton, "is to repair the ruins of our first parents, by regaining to know God aright, and out of that knowledge to love him, to imitate him, to be like him, as we may the nearest by possessing our souls of true virtue, which being united to the heavenly grace of faith, makes up the highest perfection. But because our understanding cannot in this body found itself but on sensible things, nor arrive so clearly to the knowledge of God and invisible things, as by orderly conning over the visible and inferior creatures, the same method is necessarily to be followed in all discreet teaching." These views, with some qualifications of phraseology, will be accepted by all those who have any faith or interest in religious truth. They are in brief "that moral and religious perfection are the final aim of all human culture, as they are of our existence and discipline in the human condition. This end is promoted by education, chiefly by the study of nature and of books." Now the question upon which opinions differ, is, whether the final, that is the religious aim, ought to be distinctly recognized in our educational arrangements, especially in the higher institutions of learning. Some contend that any recognition of religious ends other than the most indirect and incidental must interfere with the direct object of education, which is culture, and in this way may defeat the ends of religion itself. Others contend, that inasmuch as religion is supreme, it should be recognized and pursued in the college, even at the expense and sacrifice of culture, that whatever else should be sacrificed even in an institution professedly devoted to education, religion should be regarded as supreme. We contend that there is no incompatibility between the two, that while culture should be made the direct object of every institution of learning, and in one sense the immediate aim of its arrangements, this aim is not hindered but promoted by that enlightened recognition of religion which culture makes possible. We hold that religion controls and tempers culture, in order to stimulate, refine, and elevate it; and culture, in its turn, enlightens and liberalizes religion. We do not agree with Matthew Arnold in his *Culture and Anarchy*, that the Christian element is essentially "Hebraistic" in the sense of being

dogmatic, narrow, and intolerant, and that as such it is opposed to the "Hellenistic" element, which is reflecting, enlightened, tolerant, and civilized. Rather do we hold that Christianity mediates between Judaism and Hellenism, that it is Hebraism Hellenized, and contains in itself the excellences of both directions, softening the austerities of Judaism by the refinements of Greece, and thus enlarging its narrowness by "turning a stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and habits." Or rather we should say that it is only by the touch of the divinely human Master and Lord of Christianity, that these antagonistic elements can be fused into something nobler than either, the self-sacrifice and worship of that Christian love which "seeketh not her own," which "believeth all things, and hopeth all things." Did we not believe that an earnest and spiritual Christianity was compatible with and favorable to the highest forms of human culture, we should not believe it to be from God. But believing that it is divine, not merely in its origin but in its adaptation to every possible development of humanity,—that it has "the promise of the life that now is as well as of that which is to come,"—we think that its truths and spirit should be distinctly and prominently recognized in all our higher institutions of learning; and this not merely from its acknowledged importance and supremacy, but because of its beneficent influence upon learning and culture themselves. We would not make of our colleges houses of piety as such, we would not turn their scholastic exercises into spiritual *retraites*; we would not lower the standard of learning or diminish the requirements of taste and culture; but we would distinctly hold up and exemplify the most spiritual and earnest forms of Christian duty and the Christian life, as the end to which all learning and all culture should be consecrated as supreme. The mottoes upon the seals of Harvard and Yale respectively, when united into one, happily express our own opinion, as they do justice to the claims of religion on the one hand, and culture on the other. Harvard, in her *Christo et Ecclesiae*, pays the chief homage to religion, as it was natural that she should, being older in time. Yale completes the motto, by *Lux et Veritas*, providing for culture in words that remind us of Arnold's oft-repeated "sweetness and light."

We trust that none of our readers will be surprised that we assert, that *other things being equal*,—as endowments, time, access to an intelligent and refined community, with the requirements with which such a community provides itself,—that institution of learning which is earnestly religious is certain to make the largest and most valuable achievements in science and learning, as well as in literary taste and capacity.

Among the particulars in which an earnest Christian spirit is fitted to act favorably upon the culture of the colleges, are the following. It is favorable to persevering *industry*. Culture of every sort is the fruit of application. Success in any science and art is achieved by labor. The spirit of Christianity is a spirit of self-denying and patient service. To what feats of literary work has it not prompted, in the amazing toil by day and night, through months and years, which has wrought those ponderous tomes that fill the libraries of the learned. It is true other motives prompt to laborious erudition and scientific toil; the motives of ambition in all its forms, and sometimes those of malevolent passion or critical spleen, but none of these is a force which in its nature is so tense and untiring as are religious duty and Christian self-denial. What superhuman patience has been shown by the devotees of Christian art in all its forms, who have labored, not merely for an immortality of earthly fame, but under the inspiration which came from the assured hope of a personal immortality which should surpass all their ideals by its satisfying realities.

The Christian spirit is in its nature *truth-loving*. If there is any one feature prominent in the character of its great Founder, in which he was before his own time and has given character to all the time that is subsequent, it is his recognition of the independence of the truth as such, and of its authority, by virtue of its hold upon the reason. If there is any one spirit which he has inculcated by precept and example, it is the spirit of brave allegiance to truth. If any duty may be said to have been prominently recognized and enforced by him, it is the duty of candor in weighing all sorts of evidence. The father of the inductive philosophy could find no better illustration of the spirit which was to be the condition

of successful investigation and of actual progress, than in these words, "that it is no less true in this human kingdom of knowledge, than in God's kingdom of heaven, that no man shall enter into it *except he become first as a little child.*" It enjoins the love of all sorts of truth—Truth of art, literature, as well as of that beauty which is but another name for æsthetic truth. The precept "whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, *think on these things,*" provides for the most catholic taste conceivable, for the most progressive civilization, for all true refinement in art, in literature, in manners, and in civilization of every kind. It not only provides for all these, but it impels to all these as duties.

It is, moreover, *refining* in its operation and influences, and so far is eminently favorable to culture. It represses the animal passions with the debasement which they involve. It rises above mere worldly tendencies with their inevitably hardening tendency, however brilliant the polish of which this hardness is capable, and substitutes for it the more delicate grace of spiritual modesty and spiritual aspirations. It destroys the selfish affections and substitutes for them the love which is warm as well as ennobling. It rises above the envious jealousies which, if reports are true, do sometimes separate men of science, poets, and musicians; as well as theologians and religionists. In short, the indirect effect of Christian feeling is to call forth and encourage whatever in human sensibility is of finer texture, and to keep it fresh and pure. The same Christian faith which, when it enters a cottage, other things being equal, awakens and intensifies the love of flowers, of music, of poetry, and of pictures, does also, when it dominates in the cultured soul, increase the delicacy and enlarge the sphere of its tastes, and when it rules in a university, tends to make its members more refined in all their capacities for æsthetic progress, as well as quickens the desire to exercise and perfect them.

We do not contend that Christianity is the same thing as culture, or that Christian attainments may in a college be accepted as an equivalent for attainments in science and literature. As we have said, the university and the college are

not proximately designed for religious culture and spiritual edification, but for study and intellectual discipline. To turn them into houses of religion or to use them chiefly or prominently as places for spiritual instead of intellectual exercises, is grossly to pervert them, and like all other perversions and half-truths is to foster all manner of spiritual monstrosities; as hypocrisy, cant, spiritual pride, asceticism, and the like. Hence we do not care to see the religious features of a college paraded in the newspapers, or reports of its religious condition and doings made the subject of ostentatious comments. The impropriety in such cases is eminently conspicuous and offensive, because it is an offense against religion and culture combined. Pharisaism and cant are never in good taste.

We cannot deny that Christianity sometimes seems to be antagonistic to culture, especially to culture in its higher forms. Its ethical claims are supreme and uncompromising. It sets the moral excellence which comes of its faith and obedience, far above all other excellences, and requires its disciples to esteem all these as nothing in this comparison, and at this sacrifice. Whenever the question arises between the gratification of a taste and the discharge of a duty, or between the culture of the intellect and the culture of the heart, the former must be sacrificed. All tastes and all enjoyments, which pertain to the present, must be held as secondary to those which pertain to the higher and unseen life. Hence it has been inferred by the detractors of Christianity, that it is barbarous because it does not exalt art and culture as supreme; they forgetting that the nature or fate which they set up in its stead is equally inexorable and cruel, when it burns, and bruises, and drowns, or limits, in myriads of ways, the works and aspirations of culture and art. Hence it has been inferred by those of its friends, who are narrow in their knowledge of Christianity or who make it a cloak for envy or suspicion toward those whose tastes are more refined than their own, that while a certain degree of knowledge and culture are enforced by Christianity, any excess beyond is inconsistent with its spirit. Hence the impression that it is unfriendly to eminent attainments in science and letters, and that for this reason it cannot be comfortably housed in a university, which would stand at the front of modern achievements.

To shut off these unfortunate and unwarrantable inferences, we assert that Christianity has much to learn from culture, that while it is refining in its influences and therefore tends to culture, it is itself refined and enlarged by the learning to which, in its essential nature, it is altogether friendly. Culture as such largely pertains to the form and expression of which Christianity is the spirit and soul. Grace and perfection of manners, purity, and felicitousness of diction, dexterity in the accomplishments of music, drawing, and painting, or nicety of sense in the judgment of the same, as well as skill and science in the more intellectual departments, all bring back to Christianity the means of more perfectly manifesting the power of its spiritual beauty, and teach Christianity itself how to become more attractive by assuming those adornments which she herself has very largely created, and all of which she welcomes and rejoices in as appropriate to herself.

But while we concede all this, and even contend that Christianity may learn from culture, we contend also that culture itself is exposed to certain excesses for which Christianity is the only adequate counterpoise and remedy. We affirm that a vigorous religious influence is needed in every university, if for no other reason, simply as a corrective against the one-sidedness, the Philistinism we might call it, of modern science and literature.

Modern culture, from the very perfection which it requires and attains in particular departments, tends to narrowness, positiveness, and conceit. The devotee of any single branch of knowledge or department of art must devote himself exclusively and perseveringly to his chosen profession. His zeal is usually proportioned to his success, and his enthusiasm fixes the attention more and more exclusively upon the objects within his limited sphere. He becomes great in a single line, because his mind moves within that alone. It often happens that while he is strong in one department, he is weak in thought and opinions with respect to every other. But it does not follow because he is weak and even ignorant, that he is sensible of his defects and incapacity. On the contrary, his conscious superiority in his chosen pursuit, makes him positive, dogmatic, and conceited in respect to every other. Hence

the sectarian narrowness which divides the devotees of the physical sciences, and their acknowledged proneness to cliques, which is recognized in the pointed words of President White: "It may seem strange that this should be alluded to; but in view of the fact that more than one American college has been ruined by such feuds, and that very many have been crippled, in view of the cognate fact that the *odium theologicum* seems now outdone by hates between scientific cliques and dogmas; that as a rule it is now impossible to receive an impartial opinion from one scientific man respecting another; and that these gentlemen, in their jealousies and likenings, are evidently awaiting some one with a spark of the *Molière* genius, to cover them before the country with ridicule and contempt, we do not think that the Board is likely to give too much importance to this." (*Report etc. on the organization of Cornell University.*)

It may seem to some a little strange that we suggest that Christian science furnishes the natural and most efficient prophylactic and cure for these sectarian narrownesses and embitterments. The study of God in his relations to what is known or knowable in the universe of spirit and matter certainly forces to a general consideration of what is known or knowable in the several departments of being. It requires the consideration, superficial indeed but respectful, of the principles and authority of every one of the sciences. It brings each expert to look beyond the narrow bounds of his own speciality, and to see how it adjusts itself to its neighbor. It now and then carries him up to a point of view which commands the limits of all the special sciences, that he may see how they all adjust themselves to that underlying philosophy, which recognizes in some sort their bond of unity—whether this is called the Absolute of the schools, or the living God of the people. In this way Theology becomes, not merely in the language of Bacon the "haven and Sabbath of all man's contemplations," but in a certain sense the *commune vinculum* of the special sciences. It is such, so far as it forces the devotee of each to look beyond the limits of his own field, and to recognize the existence and rights of his neighbors. It even becomes a harmonizing and purifying power, so far as it liberalizes

the mind of each narrow devotee, by lifting his thoughts now and then up to God, and forcing him to recognize the relations of his own science to Him. Even if Theology is not cultivated as a science, but is present to the individual scientist and the scientific community only so far as is required for religious faith and feeling, it must still quicken and widen their intellects, and enable them to pursue their special departments in a spirit less narrow and more catholic. Should it be urged that Theology, in its turn, is jealous of scientific progress, and hostile to its freedom, we have no occasion to affirm or deny that it may be. All that we contend for is that the influence of Christian theology and of Christian faith upon the professed devotees of science themselves, legitimately tends to make them more profound, and therefore more broad and catholic as philosophers. So far as observation or history has taught us, Christian Geologists, Chemists, Philosophers, and Historians have not loved scientific truth as truth any the less purely, or followed it any the less boldly or bravely than those who were not Christian. Nor have they, when other things were equal, been a whit less diligent, earnest, and successful, than those who have accepted none of the so-called "theological dogmas or Christian traditions." We venture to affirm, that when other things were equal, they have been, in every respect, better philosophers for being also "theologians;" more broad and more profound in their intellectual activities and achievements, and immeasurably more noble and generous in their tempers as teachers and writers, and in the intercourse of science and of life.

Faraday was no less enlightened and broad-minded as a chemical philosopher because he kept his Christian faith warm and true in the humblest fashion. *Alexander Humboldt* would have been wider-minded, and larger-hearted as a thinker, had he not so timidly shunned those religious avowals and religious sympathies, which his brother William so freely expressed. "They that deny a God, destroy man's nobility," says Bacon, and Atheism never fails to develop something of the ignoble, whether in the school, the salon, or the beer-shop. No Atheistic theory or Pantheistic philosophy was ever intellectually great, or æsthetically noble.

The question is not, as many would represent it to be, a question between the interests of theology and religion on the one hand and the interests of scientific culture on the other, but it is a question between the most efficient methods of advancing both science and culture. We contend, for the reasons already given, that a religious college will, if all else is equal, in the long run, do more for science and culture than the college which sets aside or makes little of religious influence and of Christian truth. Nor is it a question whether science shall be free and be pursued in a liberal spirit, or whether it shall be constrained by theological prepossessions and be limited by Christian dogmas and the Christian history. We contend that the Christian investigator is pledged by the very spirit of his system to be a bold and fearless follower of the truth wherever the truth shall lead, even though it should lead him to the rejection of any part or the whole of its own history and theology. It is simply whether true culture can be effectually received without moral culture, and whether moral culture can be effectually enforced without religious motives, and whether in a community which is in a condition of eminent exposure as well as of especial promise, Christian influences ought not to be employed with the utmost possible efficiency.

Fifth.—Religious influences and religious teaching should be employed in colleges, in order to exclude and counteract the atheistic tendencies of much of modern science, literature, and culture.

We have already alluded to the advantage which science and culture receive when they are truly Christian. We cannot overlook the fact that not a little of science and culture at present is conspicuously anti-Christian. Under whatever name this exclusion of Christianity is known or under whatever disguise it may hide itself, its existence and its presence can neither be disguised nor denied. Indeed, science in many of its forms does and must, as science, take a position which is theistic or anti-theistic, that is, which in principle is supernatural or anti-supernatural, which includes or excludes religious faith and worship. In much of the teaching that is appropriate to the college, scientific positions must be taken which, by logical necessity, lead to the one or the other of these consequences.

Every educated man now-a-days must either accept or reject the ill-disguised materialism of *Huxley*, the cerebralism of *Bain*, the thin and vacillating metaphysics of *Mill*, the evolutionism of *Herbert Spencer*, with its demonstrated impossibility of a positive theism, and the serene fatalism of the devotees of Nature or of the Absolute. In History every man must take or reject the atheistic fatalism of *Buckle*. In Literature, every one must accept or reject the worship of Genius, or the worship of God; the self-centered adoration of self-development, or the generous self-forgetfulness that has made heroes and martyrs; the imitation of *Goethe*, in his contentment with the present, and his cool submission to fate or the imitation of all Christian poets and critics in their discontent with the best of earth, and their ardent out-reaching to what is hoped for in the future life. There are, we know, multitudes of cultured youth who seek to evade this necessity of adopting either of these antagonistic theories of faith and of life, under the impression that true opinions and fixed opinions were never so hard as now to be reached, that philosophy, and literature, and theology each require and sanction uncertainty of decision, and protracted inquiry, and that so much can be said upon each of these opposing sides, that he must be a narrow and audacious man who decides and acts too soon. The plea of freedom and tolerance is put in on every quarter, and the dignity and duty of positive opinions earnestly held is too generally lost sight of among men of the most refined tastes, and the loftiest aspirations. To yield to this solicitation is to be, for the time, practically materialistic, atheistic, and un-Christian, and the fashion of the times in certain circles of educated young men, sets strongly in this direction. Least and last of all, would we have our colleges countenance or yield to such a fashion! If the higher institutions of learning take an indifferent position with respect to their influence, that position must be practically a negative position. If for fear of losing patronage, or in order to be perfectly tolerant and just, they shall abstain from exerting any positive religious influence, they must abstain altogether from teaching physiology, psychology, metaphysics, morals, history, and literature, for all of these do involve what is called a theological bias, either positive or

negative, in any way in which they can be taught. The question is not whether the college shall, or shall not, teach theology, but what theology it shall teach,—theology according to Comte and Spencer, or according to Bacon and Christ, theology according to Moses and Paul, or according to Buckle and Draper. For a college to hesitate to teach theism and Christianity is practically to proclaim that in the opinion of its guardians and teachers the questions are so evenly balanced that it would be unfair for them to throw their influence on either side, and thus in fact to throw it on the side of materialism, fatalism, or atheism.

Such a position, under whatever fair pretences it is taken, we hold not only to be dangerous to the community in the present crisis of opinion, but to be fearfully and fatally criminal. We assume that the guardians and patrons of every college in this country are in the very largest proportion positively and earnestly theistic and Christian in their own faith. It is their privilege and their duty to use the means within their own hands to arrest and stem the tendency to atheism and anti-christianism which we have described. They are bound to do this, not merely as theists and as Christians, but as the friends of science and culture. This they can do, as we shall show, without departing in the least from the utmost respect to the private judgment of their pupils, and without incurring the suspicion of sectarianism or bigotry. It is surely competent for the guardians of these colleges to judge whether the men whom they select are or are not possessed of the tolerance and tact which may be required to avoid reasonable occasions of offense. If all opinions should have a hearing, as they ought, let theistic teachers be selected who will represent fairly all the atheistic and anti-Christian objections and difficulties, but let not atheism or anti-Christianity be taught in any of its chairs, either directly or indirectly, either in the form of philosophy or theology, or in the guise of history, literature, or criticism. To claim that these forms of opinion have a right to be heard is to claim that any one of these so-called American public, and any score, have an inalienable right that any shade of opinion which he or they may hold, should be taught in some one of the chairs of a college.

We would distinguish here between the college and the university. The disposition to confound the two is perpetually appearing at every turn of this discussion, and at every step of our progress, not merely as involving the intellectual fallacy of the *ambiguous middle*, but the practical error of prescribing a course of instruction for boys which is only suitable for men. The college is a training place for minds that are yet immature in the elements of knowledge and culture. The university is a teaching place for those who are supposed to have been trained to the capacities and responsibilities of incipient manhood. Whatever freedom may be claimed for the university in teaching and learning, does not sanction a similar freedom in the college. We are not prepared to allow, that even in the university every shade of opinion should have a hearing, under the countenance of its guardians, and with the sanction of their consent. The tolerance of free speech and free discussion we would defend to the last degree. The courtesies of fair and dispassionate controversy we would enforce with the utmost scrupulousness, but we are not required by these duties to set in the chair of authorized teaching, even in a free university, the representatives of every shade of literary opinion, or of anti-religious philosophy. We acknowledge it is not always easy to apply these general principles. It is not easy to say how far a man's philosophical or religious creed should be considered as an objection to his holding a college or university chair, but the principle holds good that at whatever sacrifice, the college at least should maintain a positive religious influence and character.

These thoughts lead us to our next inquiry, by what means is this to be done? What methods of influence may be employed? and within what limits may they be applied? We cannot, as we have just suggested, be required to discuss or to answer these and the like questions any more than when we lay down certain fundamental principles and rules of duty, we can anticipate all the refinements of casuistry. The following points are clear. The college should maintain public Christian worship, and this should be conducted in an earnest, positive manner. It should give positive Christian instruction concerning the evidence and truths of theism and Christianity.

It should by the influence and activities of its teachers favor an active Christian life. It should pervade all the teaching which admits it with a distinct and earnest recognition of Christian truth. At the same time, as we have already explained, the college is professedly and primarily a place for intellectual culture. To intellectual culture the chief energies of instructors and pupils should be given. All the conditions required for successful study should be furnished. Among these are prominent, perfect tolerance of any form of religious opinion, encouragement to the utmost freedom of reading and inquiry, and the inculcation of the bravest confidence in the authority of evidence, and the application of a critical judgment.

The point of the greatest delicacy is a point upon which no fixed rules can be established, and that is how far the religious opinions and character of a person should be considered in estimating his qualifications for the post of teacher. Such a question as this cannot be settled in a general way, or by prescribed formulæ. There are manifold peculiarities of personal character, besides learning or even aptness to teach, which render an individual a very suitable or a very unsuitable member of a college faculty. There are many well instructed, and very eminent men, who are withal very earnest religionists, who by the very indiscretion and overplus of their zeal, are totally disqualified for a place in a college. There are men, on the other hand, the sensitiveness of whose conscience, and the hesitation of whose temper, make their "inquiring spirit" and their "honest doubts" express infinitely more of religious earnestness and of religious power, than the plump and unhesitating orthodoxy of many a coarse-minded and hard favored dogmatist. There are some chairs the instruction of which cannot be affected by the faith or the character of the incumbent. There are other chairs, which an anti-Christian sophist or a velvet-footed infidel might pervert to the most disastrous uses. If the principle and duty be acknowledged for which we contend, the application may be safely entrusted to the wise discretion of those whose business it is to decide upon individual cases.

Against the view which we have taken, manifold objections

may be offered. One of the most formidable is, that if the colleges are positively religious institutions, they must be necessarily sectarian. This does not follow. A sectarian or denominational college is a college conducted with reference to the interests of a single denomination. Its distinctive doctrines, its forms of worship, its peculiar religious spirit, are all made prominent, as fundamentally Christian, as alone authorized, or as preëminently excellent. Such colleges may sometimes be needed for the *prestige* of the denomination, or to guard its youth against being drawn from its fold. The lamentable and unjustifiable divisions among Christians may therefore involve the necessity of a few colleges that are distinctively and avowedly sectarian. But the foundation or the conducting of a college in the interests of a single denomination has not generally been successful, for the reason that the culture which colleges impart is, in its nature, liberalizing; and that to Christian earnestness, when instructed by Christian learning, the exclusiveness of any Protestant sect becomes almost invariably distasteful. Just in proportion as the college becomes eminent in its culture, just in that proportion does it lose sight of any single sect and denomination, and take in to its larger view the common relations of all to culture and to Christ. A truly religious college cannot, in our opinion, be eminently sectarian, and yet be true to its appropriate function, by yielding itself up to the influence of the science, art, and culture which it is appointed to promote. However strictly it may be held by its character to the name or the organization of any single denomination, it will outgrow all narrowing relations to it, or make its denomination outgrow them, just as fast as it grows at all.

If this be so, then why should it be attached to any one denomination,—why should it not be the common property of many, or the common property of none? We reply, a college in which several denominations have an equal interest, will inevitably be divided and dishonored by ignoble sectarian strifes. The several denominations which hold it in common will regard each other with that “eternal vigilance” which in such cases easily degenerates into perpetual suspicion; its officers will be elected, its policy will be deter-

mined, with a judgment divided between the interests of the college and the interests of the sect. Some of the most disgraceful exhibitions of sectarian wrangling and craft of a religious sort that this country has ever witnessed, have occurred in the history of colleges which have been the joint property of two or three denominations.

But why not let them be the property of none? This can only happen as the board of trust and management is made up partially or wholly of members who have no religious preferences at all. Or why not solve the problem by throwing the college upon the endowments and the care of the State? The objection to either of these arrangements, so far as the religious relations and character of the college is concerned, is that it will immediately become the object of the ambition, or the victim of the strife of some one or more religious sects, with the never ending discussions which must inevitably follow; or it will have no religious character at all. In the present divided condition of Christendom, there seems to be no solution of the problem, except the one which has been accepted in this country, viz., that the college should be in the hands of some single religious denomination, in order to secure unity and effect to its religious character and influence, and that it should be preserved from sectarian bias and illiberality, by its responsibility to the community which it would influence, and the enlightening and catholic influence of the culture to which it is devoted.

We see no alternative between this and the abandonment of any special and efficient religious influence, i. e., the complete secularization of the college. For this alternative many leading minds are already prepared; more than are ready to acknowledge. There are not a few who contrast what they call the *people's colleges*, or the *state colleges*, with what they choose to designate as *sectarian colleges*, to the disadvantage of the latter,—who do not desire that the college should have any positively Christian influence, either because they do not believe it has any place there, or because they would attract students from those who have no positive religious faith for themselves, or desire none for their children. That these views are incorrect we have endeavored to prove, by our argument.

We have only to add, that as between terms of reproach, if *sectarian* is fairly charged on the one side, *godless* may be as fairly retorted on the other, and if a purely secular college will attract a certain portion of the community, positively religious colleges will attract another. If the two sorts of colleges are fairly tried, the fruits of the two will be made manifest. It will be seen after a generation, whether Christianized science, art, and literature, has any advantage over that which is un-Christian or non-Christian; whether the education and culture that are elevated by the Christian faith, has any advantage over that which is secular and atheistic. One thing is certain, that all the experiments which have been tried in this country to conduct institutions of learning without Christian worship and Christian influences, have failed; that all the so-called State colleges have, in some sort, been forced to adopt, either directly or indirectly, the same methods of religious influence which are employed in the Christian colleges; that in the choice of their officers, they have largely given the preference to men of positive and earnest Christian faith, for their greater usefulness as teachers, and their greater acceptableness to the community. Those who believe that the Christian argument has been nearly exhausted, and the Christian history has been demonstrated to be impossible, and must be regarded as practically false,—that the Christ of the New Testament is but a human ideal, with no personal authority, will of course, in the light of their advanced opinions, be willing to repeat the experiment under what they consider more favorable auspices, but they cannot ask those to believe in its success, who hold another theory of religion and Christianity.

We are reminded here of another topic which has been more or less distinctly discussed by and before the American public—*whether the instruction and government of the American colleges has not been too largely entrusted to clergymen?* Clergymen, it is said, must, by the very nature and influence of their profession, be essentially artificial and one-sided. They cannot and they ought not to be “men of the world” in the good sense of the phrase, that is, they cannot judge of men as they are, with fairness and discrimination, for the reason that all men present themselves to their view in a constrained atti-

tude and under an artificial light, and they in their turn must look at men through highly refracting media. They usually want tact and delicacy in the management of men. They do not approach them with that skill which can only be acquired by a large experience under a great variety of circumstances. They are also not usually good men of business, and ought, therefore, not to be intrusted with the investment and care of the large sums of money which are required for the support of a college. They are not abreast with the advancements of modern science, and unlikely to be abreast with the culture which is required by the present generation. For these and other reasons it is urged they ought not to constitute so large a portion of the boards of instruction and management as they have done in the majority of our colleges.

We are not prepared to assert that in some cases there is not reason for these criticisms. But we can assert with considerable confidence that it would be difficult to show in any individual case that where clergymen have failed, either as members of a college faculty or of a board of trustees, laymen would have succeeded. The relation of one of these boards to the other is so different in different colleges that it is almost impossible to reason from failure or success in one case to failure or success in another. In some colleges the faculty have little influence in the policy and appointments. In others one or two individuals, either lay or clerical, very largely determine both. The success or failure of many institutions seems to be occasioned by excellences or defects which are individual rather than professional.

There are several obvious reasons, however, why clergymen have been, and must still continue to be, intrusted very largely with duties and responsibilities of this kind. In the first place, most of the colleges have originated in the most thankless and self-sacrificing services. To services of this kind clergymen are consecrated by the vows and the spirit of their profession. The labor, self-denial, and disinterested toil which have been required to lay the foundations and rear the superstructure of the most successful colleges of this country cannot be too easily estimated. To a very large extent these have been endured and rendered by clergymen. The care, inquiry,

invention, and correspondence, the personal toil and sacrifice which devolve upon those who act as trustees of an infant and often of a well-established college are such that few persons except clergymen are willing to undertake them. Clergymen may not always be good men of business, but they generally know who are such, and have generally the good sense and good feeling to ask the advice and to defer to the decisions of those who are, which is more than can always be said of laymen who are called to duties and trusts to which they are not competent. Hence, with the best intentions and with far greater experience in affairs generally, laymen fail where clergymen succeed. As to defect of tact or power of adaptation, especially in the management of men, an excess of tact has not unfrequently been charged upon the clergy. Clerical art and finesse have in not a few cases become proverbial as grounds of reproach.

Clergymen are far more commonly interested in matters of education than laymen, by reason of a certain breadth of culture and generosity of disposition which are the results of Christian science. Though the *idola tribus* may exact from them a devotion which is sometimes narrow and exclusive, yet their profession is from its very nature, as we have shown, the most liberalizing of all, from the common relation it involves to other branches of knowledge and from the habit of seeking for the foundations of truth which the study of God and religion induces. It is but the simple truth to say that there is many a country clergyman, whose income is counted by hundreds where that of his classmate lawyer and judge is counted by thousands, who knows incalculably more of science as such and of the way to learn and to teach it than the aforesaid judge or lawyer, whose reputation is the very highest in his profession. The professional studies of the clergymen do also very emphatically involve and cultivate a sympathy with literature of all kinds. The practice of composition and of public speaking upon elevated themes, involves more or less interest in the study of language and in works of imaginative literature. The clergy as such have, at least in this country, a more pronounced and catholic literary taste than the members of any other profession. They constitute, indeed, to a very large

extent, the literary class—the class who furnish most frequently public addresses, essays, reviews, and pamphlets. Educated lawyers, physicians, and merchants write very little in comparison with them, and are much less frequently readers beyond the range of their own profession.

The reason why clergymen are so generally selected as professors and teachers in colleges, is two-fold: First, that the men best qualified by special culture are oftener found in the clerical profession; and, second, that the profession of teaching is akin to that of the clergyman in the smallness of its pay and the unselfish patience which it involves. At the same time it is not usually true, so far as we have observed, that there is not a sufficiently large number of laymen in the faculties and boards of trust to correct the one-sidedness and to supplement the defects of their clerical colleagues. We have never observed that there was in such boards any jealousy of lay coöperation, any disposition to foster a clerical spirit or any one-sided results from clerical supervision. The cloistered, scholastic and pedantic influences of the college which are sometimes complained of, so far as there are any, usually proceed from lay professors, who have never known anything but a scholar's life. The *doctores umbratiles* of the American colleges are more frequently laymen.

The relations of the colleges to the community are those of partially endowed *beneficent institutions*, which are designed to confer important benefits upon the young. For the faithful and successful discharge of their duties, the instructors are directly responsible to the managers or trustees, and both are indirectly responsible to the public. Many of the beneficent results which these institutions propose to accomplish are not immediately obvious. The adaptation of the means to the ends proposed is not always easy to be seen, and as a general rule can be judged and estimated only by a few. When the results do not seem to be the best conceivable, it is not always easy to say whether any other training or appliances would have wrought results so good. The training of an individual youth in a liberal spirit to the capacity and the desire to be a useful public man, either in the exercise of a profession or in any leading position, is a matter concerning which the

experience of the past should be most cautiously regarded. It should be committed to enterprising men, indeed, who are not afraid of innovation or reform, but who are also far-seeing, thoughtful, and self-relying. Extemporaneous and flippant dogmatism and ambitious and satirical criticism by bold adventurers or uncultivated Philistines are especially out of place in discussions concerning such trusts or the persons who manage them. They do not deserve to be heeded except for their power to mislead the confiding public. Though, in one sense, the managers of colleges need not ask the advice of the public, because they know and understand, better than the public can, the duties with which they are intrusted; yet, in another sense, they ought never to forget that, if they do not retain the confidence of the public, it will be impossible for them to be of service to the public. If the community do not value the training and the instruction which they give, they cannot benefit it, and they might as well not exist. And yet, as we have observed, the public are not competent to judge directly of many, not to say of most, of the questions involved.

It is most fortunate that, under these circumstances, the colleges have always had one resource. They have usually been able to rely upon their own graduates. These act as *inter-nuncii* between the colleges and the public whenever there is occasion for explanation or danger of a misunderstanding. In times of a conflict between the two, the alumni of a powerful college are, indeed, as "arrows in the hand of a mighty man." "Happy is the 'college' that hath its quiver full of them; *they shall speak with the enemies in the gate.*" The graduates of the American colleges are their glory and their strength. They are their *glory*, so far as they show, by mental power, by varied acquirements, and accomplished culture, what their *Alma Mater* has done for them, either by her unwelcome restraints and hard duties, or by those influences that were more genial in their operation and are more delightful in the remembrance. They are their *strength*, so far as they are distinctly conscious of the benefits which they derived from the college, and are forward to acknowledge them. The colleges of this country have nothing to fear, so long as the majority of their pupils continue to confide in their systems

of discipline and instruction, and in the men who administer them. It is true that the college or university, all the world over, is the object of special regard to those whom they have trained, but the colleges of America have the strongest conceivable hold upon the affection of their pupils, from the intimacy of the associations which are here fixed and interwoven, as well as from the sense of the value of the discipline here received. These alumni, it is true, retain and somewhat liberally exercise the traditional privileges of all children, freely to criticise the ways of the household. They retain vivid recollections of the tedium of many of the college tasks, and the unwelcome character of some of its exercises. Nor do they always weigh the import of what they say, or are they always very confident of the justice of the criticisms which they unthinkingly utter. Sometimes their fault-finding is but the result of their jealous regard for the honor of their college and an indirect expression of the fervor of their zeal for its abundant prosperity.

The alumni are greatly mistaken if they ever suppose that the trustees or faculty are indifferent to their good opinion, or delight to trifle with it. On the other hand, they are not only most desirous to have it, but they are sensible that if they lose it they must lose their hold upon the public at large. At the same time, as honest men, they will be more anxious to deserve than to gain their favor, and they would act most out of character should they strive to attain it by any sort of educational charlatanry or any varnish of superficial culture. They are not only willing to hear, but they are most ready to regard whatever suggestions may be made in respect to any improvements in the college system. But some of them are not prepared to initiate or follow any headlong rivalry for numbers which may be proposed, or to sacrifice their matured convictions at the dictation of editorial demagogues, or at the direction of the self-styled "spirit of the age."

It is their duty to desire, and we believe they do desire to be brought into the most intimate communication and sympathy with their graduates, and that the graduates themselves should feel that the college is *their own*; not as their *property* for capricious experiments and hazardous speculations, but as

their *trust* for wise support and administration in behalf of the interests of their country and of mankind. The importance of the colleges, as organized centers of the most valuable species of power, cannot be estimated too extravagantly. The man who feels any obligation to act upon his fellow-men for their good can scarcely find a place where his influence can be so extensively felt with respect to the most important interests as through a college that has a mature and established growth. Oxford and Cambridge are more powerful in England at this moment than the Lords, the Commons, and the Queen together. As permanent and enduring institutions, they are more lasting than dynasties, and have survived revolutions. If the alumni of the American colleges could but appreciate the dignity and duty of this trust, the country and mankind would have occasion to bless them, and they would have occasion to bless their own noble beneficence.

The wish has been expressed that this real trust, which is, in fact, committed to these alumni, should be made more formal and official, that the alumni should undertake the actual management of the concerns of the colleges, by electing their trustees in whole or in part. Such a measure has been in part introduced at Harvard, and an election is now held at every commencement, by which a class of the *board of overseers* are chosen by the direct votes of the graduates who are present. The movement in Harvard did not originate, as we understand the matter, in any special desire of the alumni to take a more direct part in its administration, but it was adopted to deliver the college from the interference of a troublesome class of political and sectarian intermeddlers who were constantly introducing into their deliberations, held in public, all manner of uncomfortable insinuations and appeals, intended quite as much for the arena of political and religious parties as for their relation to the internal economy of the university. The board of overseers, though a numerous body, has only a confirming and visitorial power. The corporation of the university, as is well known, is a very small body, and has within its hands the chief, and as some contend the sole, authority. This remains intact upon its old historic foundation. But the movement thus initiated has extended to other colleges

and propositions have been made,—and in one instance, at least, adopted, to give to the alumni a similar power of electing by classes, at intervals, a part or the whole of a board of trustees. By some, such participation is claimed as a right, by others it is recommended as politic. We do not propose to discuss this question here, for any arguments concerning the principle or the details of such a measure would be entirely out of place. We have mentioned it as one among many indications that the alumni of many of the colleges are awakening to a more lively interest in their concerns, and we hope to a more serious sense of personal responsibility for their prosperity. We believe that the discussion of this and of every other subject which respects their external or their internal relations will be for their good. We deprecate only that this or any other question should be discussed with the spirit or debased by the arts of demagogues, or that the results of any discussion should tend to drive from these venerable seats of sound learning the studies and the arts which make men solidly great or nobly good. *That college does not deserve to live which would not welcome the counsel and accept the guidance of the choicest of its sons.* We believe, moreover, that there are few American colleges which have any character or age of which the majority of its trustees is not of its own graduates. The only question is, whether these boards are not at present so organized as to secure an adequate representation of the feelings and judgment of the alumni. It is a still more serious question, whether the uncertainties of a chance nomination, from a constituency that changes every year, would not on trial give eminent dissatisfaction to the alumni—whether it would not awaken jealousies and strifes which would divide their opinions and weaken their affection instead of uniting their efforts and kindling their enthusiasm.

A self-perpetuating board of trustees, resting on some historic basis, with a traditional spirit, acting in relations of confidence and free communication with the board of instructors, cannot be ignorant of the wishes and feelings of the alumni, and cannot, if they would, refuse to be affected by them. The chance nomination and election of one or more representatives by a body organized for an hour, and changing in its members

very considerably every year, might open the way to constant dissatisfaction and personal discussion, and should not be resorted to except after grave deliberation and inquiry. The alumni of an institution which has prospered under any system of organization and government, may well be content with its constitution and history. If any college has failed to explain its condition fully and frankly to its alumni, from motives of delicacy or for any other reason, let it freely and frequently open to the whole body its position, its policy, its wants, and its fears, in the frankness and freedom which are suitable to a family gathering, and it cannot fail to command the confidence and to receive the sympathy of all the generous and noble-minded of its sons.

Criticisms and complaints are also beginning to be heard in another direction.* It is contended that in this country the colleges have unwittingly departed from the original signification of Fellows; these, in the colleges of England, having been originally resident and charged with the duty of governing, as well as of teaching the college. It is urged that, in substituting for such Fellows a body of persons, who may themselves have been uneducated at a college, and many of whom have had little or no experience of its instruction and government, to the exclusion of all the faculty except the president, we have weakened too greatly the influence of the instructors. We call attention to these criticisms for their relation to one most important condition of the prosperity of any college. This is the maintenance of a full understanding and complete harmony between the board of trust and the faculty or faculties of instruction. It is of little consequence what may be the legal privileges and powers of the three great elements of college administration and legislation, provided they conspire to-

* We ought, rather, to say that a movement in this direction has been revived. In 1824 a memorial was addressed to the corporation of Harvard university, signed by all the professors, among whom were Henry Ware, Andrews Norton, and Edward Everett, urging that, according to the original constitution and design of the charter, the Board of Fellows should consist of resident instructors, and giving many reasons why such an arrangement would be most advantageous to the university. It failed after having given birth to a half score of able and spirited pamphlets.

gether for its support. A college in which the trustees, the graduates, and the faculty are of one mind, and work in harmony and mutual confidence, cannot but prosper, provided there is any occasion for its existing at all.

The charge has not unfrequently been urged against the American colleges, by some portions of the American public, that they are bound so rigidly by the traditions of the past, as to be incapable of those improvements which are required by the changing phases of the present generation. No charge is more untrue or unfounded. The oldest of these colleges were not in the beginning servilely copied from the colleges of the old world, though founded at a time and by men who revered the traditions of the venerable schools in which they themselves had been trained. In their original constitution they were adapted to the condition and wants of the communities for which they were provided, and in their growth and development they have undergone successive transformations, according to the shaping spirit of successive generations. We have not designed to protest against reforms in the college system or in its administration. We are quite willing to admit that some are imperatively required. We are not displeased that questions concerning them should be freely discussed by any class of thinkers or writers, or before any tribunal. We insist only that the tribunal should be competent to judge of these questions, and that the parties who discuss the subject should have clear and just conceptions of the ends of higher education, and some experience concerning the means by which these ends can be most successfully attained. The recent agitation of these questions which has occasioned this series of papers, will, we are confident, result only in advantage to the higher education of the country, by calling attention to those reforms which the colleges require, and by vindicating their essential features from the objections of shallow and ill-informed critics.

We are in no sense averse to the development of the college into a university. We believe this to be desirable and possible, with enterprise, patience, money, and time. But we are opposed to the employment of university instruction, and of university freedom and irresponsibility for classes which re-

quire the discipline of the college. To introduce the option of the university, or the lectures of the university, to pupils who are grounded in nothing but in a conceit of their adequacy to grapple with any subject, and who are impelled by aspirations to arrive speedily at the goal without traveling over the intervening space, tends only to destroy the college by substituting the show of a university, and to sink the so-called university into a special school of technology. Were it not advocated in England by men who represent both the aristocracy of birth and of culture, we should pronounce it to be an American expedient, to dignify superficial and limited attainments by high sounding names, and to substitute an apparently short cut over bushes and briars for a path that has been tried and found to be the shortest practicable. We are not opposed to trying every method and study by the criterion of usefulness, but we would always interpose the question, *useful for what?* We believe that those studies and that discipline which are the most useful to train to manly thinking, to nice discrimination, to simple expression, as well as to noble purposes, and an enlarged acquaintance with man and his history, are the most useful studies in fact; while the criterion of direct service for the exercise of one's immediate trade, calling, or profession, is sophistical and misleading. We do not reject the mathematics from our course, though their direct utility in the vulgar sense seems to be more questionable than that of any other class of studies. At the same time, we question whether, in a general course, they should be pursued beyond the limit at which their best disciplinary effect seems to have been exhausted, and their special refinements and intricacies seem to confuse rather than to sharpen the wits, and to burden rather than to excite the powers. We would retain the study of the classics, for the reasons which we have given at length, but we would, if possible, make the study serviceable to the cultivation of the taste for literature as well as to intellectual discipline. The design of this study in college should be not to train for the tastes and discriminations of grammarians and philologists, but for the mastery of these languages for pleasurable and easy reading. The sciences of nature have already received liberal attention in the colleges. The claim

that they can take the place of the humanistic studies as means of discipline, or that they can even be thoroughly taught and mastered except in special classes or in special schools, must, we think, be abandoned. The modern languages have already been introduced into the courses of many colleges. It is greatly to be regretted that the elements of French and German cannot be required for admission in order that the college training might be more liberal and æsthetic. For this and many other improvements in the college course we must look to the preparatory schools. These are an essential element in the system of higher education of which the college forms a part. Some of these schools are admirable, needing no special reform except in respect to general culture, as in Natural History, in Geography, History, and the English language, in all of which special knowledge and refinement, as well as the facile use of some modern language, is more important than is usually believed as a preparation for the highest advantages from the college course.

Indeed, many of the defects charged upon the colleges of the country, are fairly chargeable to the low standard of general culture among the better classes in this country, and to the want of thoroughness and breadth in many of the secondary schools. We shall never forget the remark of one of the most eminent scholars of Germany—himself a courtier and man of the world as well as an accomplished classicist: "The great want of England and America is an organized system of secondary schools. You cannot have a successful higher instruction, till these are provided." We believe it to be true, that if the tens of millions of dollars which have been wasted, and worse than wasted, in founding and equipping superfluous colleges and pretended universities in this country, had been bestowed in endowing and equipping a large number of classical schools of the highest order, the colleges themselves and the higher education of the country would long ago have been lifted to a higher plane. Perhaps we should have been ready by this time for the inauguration of the American University—that much talked of institution which so many long to see, and complain that if it were not for the stupidity and obstinacy of the colleges, would have long ago come into

being. Will it ever appear? When and by what methods will it come into being?

We answer, it will not come into being by prematurely introducing its studies and methods into the college. Nor will it be hastened by overloading the last year of the college course by a great variety of studies, a little knowledge of which is very desirable, and a short course of lectures upon which is therefore prescribed. The spirit of *cram*, and of the superficial and mechanical mastery of a few elements of many sciences, is the curse of the colleges as they are. To intensify this tendency is to commit the worst of all blunders. The university will come only as professors are found capable of teaching more than the elements of the branches which they profess, and as pupils are found who are willing to pursue them with the requisite thoroughness and perseverance. We have a few professors who are already qualified to give as valuable and as profound instruction as any professors in European universities. Some of them, indeed, are so occupied by college work, or by *bread and butter* labors, as to want the time and opportunity to prepare and give the formal instruction which an organized university class would require. Others have more leisure and would delight in nothing so much as in giving advanced instruction to pupils competent and desirous to receive it. The chief desideratum, however, is a sufficient number of pupils in any one place to furnish an inspiring audience, and to warrant the beginnings of organization. The experiments already made at Harvard and Yale are not without promise. We are glad to see that another step forward has recently been taken at Harvard in the direction of systematic university instruction. The serious *desiderata* in this tentative course would be acknowledged most readily by its originators and friends. It deserves, however, the best wishes for its success—a good word for the enterprise which it exhibits—if it did not for its promise of success.

It must be confessed, however, that the number of persons in this country is exceedingly small, who are competent and desirous to receive university instruction in branches which are not professional, and who are also not able and desirous to go to the continent. Or rather, we should say, the attractions

of travel, with the opportunity of becoming familiar with two or three European languages, are so decided as to present a very serious obstacle to the development of provisions for any university studies except those which are strictly professional. Not a few professional students seek to prosecute or to finish their studies in France or Germany. Of a large class graduating at Yale within a short period, a fifth visited Europe within the first year. Students who have the leisure to give a year or two to general studies in history, literature, philology, or any branch of philosophy, usually have the means of crossing the ocean, and, when they have done this, the expenses of living are lower than at home, and they meet many attractions which, for a long time, will continue to be fascinating to the natives of a new country like ours. It is ridiculous to hear such empty gasconading as was written within a few months, to the effect that it would not be very long before European students would flock to some great American university as freely as American scholars now go to Europe. We feel no disposition to depreciate American scholarship or American thought. We are forward to acknowledge that some among us have no reason to be ashamed when measured by their peers in Europe. But a great university cannot be built up in a day in an old country, nor in a new country, till many generations have provided the material. That material is something more than a few millions of money and a score of brilliant occasional lecturers. A great community of highly cultured scholars and literary men must first exist before the representatives of every branch of knowledge can appear who are competent to teach the choicest youth of the world, and before a large body of American pupils will be satisfied that they will find no advantage in going abroad. These facts should teach us good sense, which is another name for modesty in our expectations and promises. But they furnish no reasons why the beginnings of university instruction and study should not be made at once in connection with all the leading colleges. The professional schools already exist, and have flourished for many years, and so far as they have given thorough and scientific instruction, and have required an adequate preparation, have been the *disjecta membra* of a proper university. Let schools

of philology and modern literature, including the English, of the higher mathematics and physics, of geography and geology, of metaphysical, moral, political, and social science be added—or, in brief, let a department of philosophy, in its comprehensive import, be added to the schools of law, medicine, and theology, and we have the skeleton of a university complete. We must be content with small beginnings in such a department for the reasons already given.

One reason we have omitted. The sentiment of the cultivated classes of the country must favor the love of learning for its own sake, and the pursuit of study for the satisfaction it brings, and the manhood which it trains, if University professors are to be encouraged by the presence of even a small number of pupils knocking at their door. As long as study is valued for the money or position it brings, and the theory of disciplinary study and of liberal culture is openly scouted in the forum and the market place, and attacked in the newspaper and the review, so long will the true university be unknown among us.

We began these papers with no thought of writing a series. But the matter has expanded itself under our hands in a somewhat immethodical way. We offer our thanks to those readers who have followed us with patient attention to the close.

ARTICLE V.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL'S "PRIMEVAL MAN."*—This is a republication, from "Good Words," of a reply to a paper, read by Sir John Lubbock, before the British Association for the Advancement of Science, in 1867, on the "Early Condition of Man," as this, in turn, was an answer to a lecture by Abp. Whately, on the "Origin of Civilization," published in 1854. The position of Abp. Whately was that mere savages "never did and never can raise themselves unaided into a higher condition," and that, consequently, the starting-point of the race must have been from a higher plane. Sir J. Lubbock seeks to establish the opposite, or "savage" theory, by showing, "first, that there are indications of progress even among savages; and, second, that among the most civilized nations there are traces of original barbarism." The Duke of Argyll, like Abp. Whately, conducts his argument on a professedly scientific basis, making no appeal to the authority of the Scriptures. As preliminary to the question of the *primitive condition*, he discusses the *origin* and the *antiquity* of the race, and insists strongly that these questions should be kept distinct. The development theory he admits is not inconsistent with belief in a personal Creator; his objections to it are rather scientific than theological; but, at the same time, his statement of the grounds on which the theory rests is altogether inadequate. It is resorted to, he says (and he is here speaking not of the Darwinian or Lamarckian theory alone, but of every theory of development), "simply because of the difficulty of conceiving any mode of creation except creation by birth." It is true that the difficulties which the theory raises are greater than those which it removes, but that it furnishes a key to many otherwise unexplained facts no student of nature, however opposed to the theory, will deny. In the view of our author, a *species* is something having always a sharply-defined and inflexible character, which, his opponents would argue, savors

* *Primeval Man*. An examination of some recent speculations by the DUKE OF ARGYLL. George Routledge & Sons, New York. 1869. 8vo. pp. 200.

more strongly of the closet than of the field. Of the difficulty which the botanist, for example, finds often in determining what a species is, or how he shall divide a given genus, he is wholly unconscious. But it is, perhaps, too much to expect, in view of the possible consequences of the development theory, and at the present stage of the discussion, entire calmness from either the opponents or the advocates of the theory.

The antiquity of the race is the second question considered; and here the author is led by the converging testimony of history, the page of which opens two thousand years B. C., on civilizations already old; of archæology, which casts its light somewhat farther back; of geology, which finds human remains associated with those of extinct animals; of language, which at the dawn of history had already separated into widely-branched families;—by all this accumulated evidence, he is led to ascribe to the race an age so great that the whole historical period does not furnish a base for its computation. Strangely enough, however, he does not perceive that one of the arguments to which he attaches most weight is inadmissible under the limitations of the present discussions. It is this: We find in Egyptian paintings, more than three thousand years old, the negro type of features as marked, apparently, as it is at the present day. If, now, all the existing varieties of the race were descended from one pair, with so slow a rate of divergence established, you must lengthen out the human period indefinitely. The antiquity of the race is the condition of its unity. But that the whole race is descended from one pair, not only has not been, but from the nature of the case hardly can be, proved by scientific reasoning, and, as an article of faith merely, cannot be admitted into the argument. The antiquity of the race is a problem of far easier solution than the unity, and it is an inversion of sound method to reason from the less to the better known.

The last chapter only is devoted to a discussion of the views of Abp. Whately and Sir J. Lubbock, on the primitive condition of man, and here, also, the author makes a merit of resolving the question into several parts. What, namely, was his original moral endowment, what his intellectual endowment, and with what stock of knowledge did he start? Against Whately he maintains that the native powers and instincts of the mind were a sufficient outfit without instruction in the industrial arts, and against Lubbock, that ignorance of these arts may have coexisted

with a clear knowledge of God and of moral obligation. The proofs of advance in savage tribes he offsets in the instances of degradation; and the relics of barbarism among civilized nations he regards as traces of a condition through which the race had passed in falling from its original height, not as relics of its primitive state. The Esquimaux and Faegians have not just emerged from a still lower depth of barbarism, but are outcasts, driven by more powerful tribes, under the pressure of increasing population, into their present inhospitable abodes, where they have been sinking rather than rising. That some tribes are found so low as to be absolutely without a religion is also no matter of surprise, if we take into account the inherent tendency in all heathen religions to decay, a tendency which Max Müller assures us the comparative study of religions proves beyond a question. That the dark, cruel superstitions of savage tribes are the remote descendants of a pure monotheism is, however, conclusive, which, however consonant with fact, is hardly warranted by the example quoted, a companion of the earlier Vedic, with the later Hindu religion. The earlier purer religion, as found in the hymns of the Vedas, is a simple, childlike worship of the powers of nature, in which merely the beginnings of the later mythology are traceable.

As a contribution toward the solution of the profoundly interesting questions which it discusses, this work of the Duke of Argyll is unimportant; but as an attempt to consider them in a fair spirit, it is welcome, and may not be altogether fruitless.

At the meeting of the British Association for the present year Sir J. Lubbock replied to the Duke's argument, explaining, also, more fully some points in which his own views have been misapprehended by the Duke. The synopsis of his remarks, given in the Athenæum of September 4, is too brief for a proper consideration here.

MAN IN GENESIS AND GEOLOGY.*—In this small treatise, Dr. Thompson reproduces for the public perusal, a series of familiar lectures, originally preached to his own congregation. His aim has been not so much to harmonize Genesis and Geology by any compromise on either side, as to show the real harmony of the

* *Man in Genesis and Geology*: or, the Biblical account of Man's Creation, tested by scientific theories of his Origin and Antiquity. By JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, D. D., LL. D. New York: Samuel R. Wells, Publisher, No. 389, Broadway. 1870. pp. 149.

Biblical narrative, when explained according to legitimate principles of interpretation, with the facts which have been brought to view by the study of nature. Every one understands what changes in the *interpretation* of the Bible have been made imperative in time past by the progress of investigation of natural phenomena, especially in the departments of astronomy and geology. More recent speculations respecting the origin and antiquity of man challenge the attention of Bible readers to alleged contradictions between the Scriptures, as commonly understood, and the conclusions drawn by students in special fields of inquiry. As new theories come forward for popular discussion, such questions as these follow in their train. Can the chronology of the Bible be adjusted to a theory that the human race has lived on the earth for more than about six thousand years? Is the record of Genesis, fairly interpreted, consistent with the supposition that the race began at the lowest stage of barbarism, and by slow degrees worked its way up to civilization? If it could be proved that man is historically developed from an ape, or that human beings existed on the earth before Adam, would the Mosaic narrative of the creation be impeached?

Dr. Thompson's first and second lectures show the remarkable correspondence between the order of creation, given in Genesis, and that indicated, independently of Scripture, by geological research. Devoting his next lecture to theories of development, he quotes Dana, Agassiz, and Rochet, as against the theories of Darwin, Huxley, and Carl Vogt, and in the fourth lecture more fully and elaborately discusses Man's Dominion over Nature. He then proceeds to the question of the Antiquity of the race, as affected by traditions, monumental remains, and relics of human workmanship; and devotes the remainder of the volume to the Sabbath, and the Family, as divine institutions, and to Woman's primeval relation to Man and the Family.

The candid and liberal spirit with which these questions are discussed is illustrated by some paragraphs which we quote.

"It is unwise and unfair to impute materialistic or sceptical opinions to physicists, simply because they adhere to physical terms and methods in investigating and describing the phenomena of Nature, and refer all those phenomena to material causes. The most rigid Naturist may believe in an intelligent First Cause of the Universe, and, apart from his naturalism in Science, may believe in the Bible as a revelation from God. This both Darwin

and Owen profess to do ; and the latter says, expressly, ' My faith in a future life, and the resurrection from the dead, rests on the ground of their being parts of a divine revelation.' Both these scientists only carry farther back, in the succession of things, the point of contact with that divine Will which was the original cause of all." p. 80.

Again : " I would earnestly exhort theologians, and all Christians, to guard against the tendency on the other side,—to raise the cry of infidelity or scepticism against men of Science for every theory that they propound which is not in obvious harmony with the Bible. That is not the way to deal with questions on either side. I make no pretensions to being a man of science, but as an interpreter of the Bible, I am as much beholden to any fact of Science as the most accomplished scientist. We are not warranted in pitting Science and the Scriptures one against the other. It is not philosophical in the man of Science to raise a hue and cry against the Bible as soon as he discovers something new ; but on the other hand, let the theologian be careful how he raises the cry of infidelity." p. 94.

After some illustrations of the instability of scientific theories, he says :

" Hence, those who hold to the Bible in its integrity as a revelation from God need not be disturbed by a scientific hypothesis of to-day that seems to contradict the letter of the scriptures. Twenty years may show the hypothesis to be untenable, or modify the facts of which it was constructed. It becomes physicists to be modest in the assertion of theories, especially in the sciences of physiology, archæology, and geology, where so much remains to be explored or revised ; and it equally becomes biblicists to be modest in condemning a theory of science upon the authority of the Bible, when there is yet so much to be learned in regard to the interpretation of the Scriptures. Experience has thus far shown that any true result in Science tends to harmonize with a true interpretation of the Bible." p. 82.

There are many who will look to the opinions of Dr. Thompson in respect to the *Antiquity of Man*, not only with interest but with deference. He says :

" *How long has Man been upon the globe ?* I do not know. Does anybody know ? Are we able to trace back the human race to its beginning and to measure the term of its duration ? Not yet, I think. The data upon this subject are meagre and uncer-

tain, and the question which ought to be simply one of fact, resolves itself pretty much into one of speculative or problematical inquiry. Hence when we study it purely as a question in Natural History, we should keep distinctly in our minds the only fact that as yet is a fact about it, viz., that it is extremely problematical." pp. 85, 86.

He goes on to say that the *monumental remains* fall within *measurable* periods of time. From *traditions*, also, comparatively little help can be gained for determining the time of Man's beginning. The age of certain *remains of human workmanship* depends on the length of time required for the formation of the peat which covers them, and in respect to that, the authorities in science are not agreed. The *mounds* too of Denmark and of Scotland are, thus far, a very indeterminate element in any calculation of the Antiquity of Man, and though it is probable that "Man existed in Europe contemporaneously with the cave-bear, and at least upon the margin of the glacial age," the data are insufficient for the solution of the problem.

Dr. Thompson then enumerates four groundless assumptions, viz., that Man began his existence at a low stage of barbarism; that if the "stone age" existed, it was ever universal at one time; that the stone age was the first type of human existence anywhere; and that the present rate of geological changes is the proper gauge for measuring such changes in the past.

But while he regards a judgment in favor of the extreme antiquity of Man upon the globe as premature and unauthoritative, he concedes that "facts seem to call for an extension of time considerably beyond the computed chronology of the Bible, in order to admit of all that has been effected by Man and in Man since his first appearance on the earth." "The oldest monuments of Egypt can hardly be brought within the date of the flood of Noah according to the received Hebrew chronology. * * * The unchanged appearance of leading types of mankind as far back as we can trace these in history, requires a considerable extension of time to account for their origin. * * The formation of Language, and its distribution into the great classes of human speech, call for an extension of time, if one adheres to the belief that all the languages were derived from one primitive root. * * Man in the fossil state, although rarely found, is another element of perplexity in the question of his antiquity." Meantime the Science of interpretation is not yet perfected, and we have reason to hope

that a closer study of Oriental idioms may throw light upon the chronology of the Scriptures, and open the way for all the time which is required.

For the fuller treatment of these theories, we must refer our readers to the work itself, which will surely repay a perusal.

THE BEING OF GOD, MORAL GOVERNMENT, AND THESES IN THEOLOGY.*—The late Dr. Squier was an acute and logical thinker, who has already furnished the world his theological testimony in "The Problem Solved," "Reason and the Bible," and his "Autobiography and Miscellaneous Writings." To these are now added his Theological Remains, under the three topics given in the title below. These last are written in a somewhat aphoristic or skeletonlike way, and would almost satisfy the conditions enjoined by Bishop Butler, that the heads of argument or thought should be furnished, and the filling up be left to each reader to provide for himself, should he require any. Dr. Squier, though an acute, consistent, bold thinker, was a little too pompous and apothegmatic in his utterance to satisfy the rules of good taste, or to leave the happiest impression. It was rather easier, however, to laugh at his peculiarities of style than it was to answer his arguments. But the zeal and earnestness with which he attested fundamental truth, and the power with which he enforced it, are worthy of all praise. It would have been well for the cause of truth and of free enquiry, if he had been spared a little longer to be welcomed back to the fellowship of the newly compacted Presbyterian communion from which he was so unceremoniously excised in 1836. This little volume of last thoughts has some very excellent features, and would serve as a very useful manual for thought and reference in the hands of clergymen and students of theology.

"PRIMARY TRUTHS OF RELIGION,"† by Bishop Clark of Rhode Island, is full of seed thoughts, which, like all good seed, are themselves the fruit of a ripe growth of earnest reflection. In very

* *The Being of God, Moral Government, and Theses in Theology.* By MILES P. SQUIER, D. D., late Professor of Intellectual Philosophy, Beloit College, Wisconsin. Edited by Rev. JAMES R. BOYD. Rochester, N. Y.: E. Darrow & Kempshall. 1868.

† "*Primary Truths of Religion.*" By THOMAS M. CLARK, D. D., LL. D., Bishop of the Diocese of Rhode Island. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1869.

simple statements, and with little parade of reasoning, the author has given the results of much careful thinking in respect to the great truths which are fundamental to the Christian faith. He has not, like too many Bishops, contented himself with reproducing the received doctrines of the faith in oft repeated platitudes, but has used the English of cultivated men to express certain definite opinions of his own. In forming and making public their opinions, he has not chosen entirely to ignore the difficulties and objections that are current among lay and non-Episcopal Christians, as is the fashion with too many who speak *ex cathedra episcopali*, but has thoughtfully pondered these difficulties and the best methods of removing them. In attempting to meet them, he has dared to think for himself and to express his own convictions, even though some of his views do not square with the received formulæ "in such cases made and provided." In short, he has produced a very readable, thoughtful, and useful volume, on the most important subjects, which is none the less useful because it is condensed and brief. We trust that the Episcopal *prestige* with which the work is invested, will ensure to the volume a circulation even wider than that to which its intrinsic merits entitle it.

HAVEN'S "STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY."*—Professor Haven, of the Chicago Theological Seminary, has gratified his pupils as well as his many friends, both lay and clerical, by republishing in a handsome volume the Articles published by him on different occasions, from 1849 to 1868.

The subjects discussed are :

PART I. *Studies in Philosophy*: 1. Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton; 2. Mill versus Hamilton; 3. The Moral Faculty; 4. The Province of Imagination in Sacred Oratory; 5. The Ideal and the Actual.

PART II. *Studies in Theology*: 1. Natural Theology; 2. The Doctrine of the Trinity; 3. Theology as a Science—its Dignity and Value; 4. Place and Value of Miracles in the Christian System; 5. Sin, as related to Human Nature and the Divine Mind; 6. Arianism—the Natural Development of the Views held by the Early Church Fathers.

The titles of these papers are all very attractive to those who take an interest in the fundamental questions of Philosophy and

* *Studies in Philosophy and Theology*. By JOSEPH HAVEN, D. D., Professor in Chicago Theological Seminary. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1869.

Theology. Those of our readers who are acquainted with Dr. Haven, as a thinker and writer, do not need to be told that he is clear, candid, able, and elegant, and that he never writes upon a subject without earnest and patient thinking, and, as a consequence, without producing that which is well worthy to be read.

WADSWORTH'S SERMONS.*—Dr. Wadsworth's volume of sermons is from a well-known popular preacher, and seems to confirm the opinion already established by an ample number of precedents that not a few sermons which are greatly admired and may be very useful when heard and delivered, should not for this reason be printed in a volume. These discourses are after the florid style of pulpit oratory; of that particular variety called "the sunflower variety." Lord Macaulay informs us that all effective orators must paint in vivid colors and in strokes somewhat bold and coarse. We see no reason why the coloring should be as gaudy, or the strokes should be as rough, and the drawing as untrue as we find them to be in these well intended and no doubt highly effective discourses.

SERMONS BY REV. WILLIAM JAMES.†—Two sermons by the late gifted William James of Albany, with a very few of his characteristic letters; a sketch of the principal incidents of his life by Rev. Dr. Sprague of Albany; and a characterizing letter by his intimate friend, Rev. Henry Neill, make up a small but delightful volume. We cannot but hope that Mr. Neill will be prompted to issue such a volume of Remains, consisting of his correspondence and sermons, as may fully acquaint the public with the rare gifts, and still more rare spiritual use of them, which were so conspicuous in Mr. James's life and history. It would be a great loss if not a grievous wrong, were the world to lose all the good which it might derive from so rich a volume as might be made up from his letters and sermons.

UNSPOKEN SERMONS ‡—There is a relish for certain books as for

* *Sermons*. By CHARLES WADSWORTH, Minister of Calvary Church, San Francisco. New York and San Francisco: A. Roman & Co. 1869.

† *The Marriage of the King's Son, and the Guilt of Unbelief*. Two Sermons, by REV. WILLIAM JAMES. With some Memorials of his Life. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1869.

‡ *Unspoken Sermons*. By GEORGE McDONALD. London: Strahan & Co., Publishers. New York, 416 Broome Street. 1863. 12mo. pp. 245.

certain viands, which has to be learned, even supplanting dislike. So, possibly, one might reconcile himself to such a treatment of sacred things as runs through what we have read of these twelve "Sermons." As far as the author intends them for additions to the common stock of religious truth, they strike us as unsatisfactory both in the matter and the manner. What we conceive to be grave errors are almost taken for granted. There is more of assertion than of argument. Here and there, at the best, we find some savor of Quakerism, or of the doctrine of "*Ecce Homo*," concerning the Spirit, along with jealousy of the deference commonly paid to the Scriptures, and a freedom approaching to wantonness in the use and interpretation of their language. The only punishment recognized for sin is in its inherent power, which, moreover, is never endless, and conscious deliverance is the only forgiveness. In the fourth sermon on the Unpardonable Sin, "all sin" is declared "unpardonable." The suicide of Judas was a fruit of his repentance, and when he "fled from his hanged and fallen body, he fled to the tender help of Jesus, and found it—I say not how." Much account is made of God's love, but none of his wrath. The commonly received doctrines of the atonement and justification, we suppose the author would repudiate with scorn, if he noticed them at all. Since he speaks so confidently, it would be unfortunate if we could not give him credit for some thoughtful and earnest utterances.

NOTES OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE.*—In this collection of nineteen Sermons, as far as we have examined them, we recognize the work of a thoughtful, original, and evangelical preacher, more likely to become a favorite upon familiarity than to attract on first acquaintance. They deserve this republication, and will have their circle of readers and admirers, especially among those who, without rejecting evangelical doctrines, are not attracted but rather repelled by the more common forms of presentation. Comparing them with such a volume as "*The Day Dawn and the Rain*," which we strongly commended in the July Number, we should complain of their structure and style as inferior in unity, simplicity, and ease—a want which might be felt still more by hearers than by readers.

**Notes of the Christian Life* : a Selection of Sermons preached by HENRY ROBERT REYNOLDS, B.A., President of Cheshunt College, and Fellow of University College, London. With a preface by Rev. Elbert S. Porter, D. D. New York : P. S. Wynkoop & Son, 1868. 12mo. pp. 411.

SERMONS BY THE REV. STOPFORD A. BROOKE.*—This volume of Sermons by the editor of the *Life and Letters of Frederick A. Robertson*, will necessarily attract the attention of the reading public among us. Those who will buy or read the volume will, we think, not be disappointed. Although the Sermons are by no means equal in interest or real merit, and though the doctrine in one is amazingly foolhardy and presumptuous, yet there is in many of these discourses much freshness and occasional originality and force of thought. Some of the discourses are equal to any of Robertson's. Were it not for too frequent straining and ambitiousness of the style, we should like the Sermons better, but as a collection they will reward the reader well, and will, we doubt not, be extensively circulated.

THE DIVINE HUMAN IN THE INCARNATE AND WRITTEN WORD,† by a member of the New York Bar, is a spirited protest against what he deems to be overstrained and unwarranted conceptions of Inspiration and the Atonement. It was written by a layman who had evidently struggled for a long time with difficulties and doubts, and has either suddenly or gradually awakened to the discovery that certain representations of these doctrines are warranted neither by Reason nor the Scriptures. Forthwith he gives expression to his surprise and indignation in no measured terms, and not always with the most wisely chosen arguments. We cannot always agree with the opinions which he expresses nor with the expositions of the Creed or of the Scriptures which he would substitute for those he rejects, but the book is well worth the reading, especially by some of the clergy. It might waken them from their "dogmatic slumber," and summon them to a renewed study of the Scriptures, and to other versions of the creed.

* *Sermons preached in St. James's Chapel, York Street, London.* By the Rev. STOPFORD A. BROOKE, M. A., Honorary Chaplain in ordinary to the Queen. Boston: Fields, Osgood, & Co. 1869.

† *The Divine Human in the Incarnate and Written Word*; and some thoughts on the Atonement older than the Creeds. By a member of the New York Bar. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1869.

BIOGRAPHICAL.

MEMOIR OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.*—Prof. Veitch's *Memoir of Sir William Hamilton* is a well-written life of one of the most remarkable English scholars and philosophers of the present century. It derives its chief interest, as every biography should, from the peculiar and striking characteristics of its subject; but it has the very great merit of setting forth these characteristics in a manner that is altogether suitable to the unique career of the learned philosopher. It is in an eminent sense a literary life of a man whose career was almost exclusively limited to the world of letters; who derived his chief enjoyment from this world and achieved in it the only successes which he esteemed of importance. Prof. Veitch has devoted his chief attention to the history of this career from its earliest beginnings to its close. He has not, indeed, left out of sight those personal sketches which give so great an interest to the life of the most recluse book-worm, as indeed they often furnish the most satisfying explanation of his intellectual development and achievements. But while his notices of these points are as ample as could reasonably be required, and are abundantly satisfactory, they are all subordinated to the single object which was continually before the mind of the author, and that was the illustration of the progress and development of Hamilton's mind, and of the principal epochs and events which made up his career as a student, a writer, and a teacher. In illustrating these points, he has, as of necessity he ought, introduced very ample and interesting notices of the leading influences which formed the mind, and developed the character, and confirmed the tastes of Hamilton in his own home; of his University life at Glasgow, Edinburgh, and Oxford, of his unostentatious but not insignificant career as an advocate, of his early literary associations with Scott, Jeffrey, Lockhart, and others, of his aspirations for the chair of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh, and his defeat through political influences, and, not least, of the doubtful and almost desperate contest which terminated in securing for him the chair of Logic. The most interesting of these notices is that very modestly given of his

* *Memoir of Sir William Hamilton*, Bart. Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. By JOHN VEITCH, M. A., Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of Glasgow. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons. 1869.

accomplished and devoted wife, and of the efficient sympathy as well as the patient and devoted assistance which she rendered him in his special literary avocations. D'Israeli, in his work on *The Literary Character*, etc., has a chapter on the *Matrimonial State of Men of Letters*, in which he introduces a few striking notices of the felicities and infelicities of this state. That the wives of not a few literary men have been to them helps and hindrances, is made apparent in many biographies. Among all the instances of those who have been helps and blessings, none occur to us which is more interesting and affecting than that of Lady Hamilton. One can hardly read it without strong emotion, nor without exclaiming at the close, Many daughters have done virtuously, but thou excellest them all.

LIFE OF WALTER SAVAGE LANDOR.*—Mr. John Forster's Biography of Walter Savage Landor will attract general attention from the lovers of literature of the best class. The eminent reputation of the biographer for solidity of judgment, for fairness of temper, and thoroughness of research, and the preëminent reputation of Mr. Landor for purity and force of style, for catholicity of taste, for breadth of reading, and for the generosity of his sympathies, will ensure for this biography a warm, though it may be a limited interest. Mr. Landor has attracted to himself and his works the very highest class of readers in this country and in Great Britain. Though known to the multitude by reputation only, he has been familiarly known to his admirers as one of the most distinguished personages of modern literature, and as a writer who, if he requires study, will most generously repay the demands which he makes upon his readers. Especially is he known and admired for the acuteness of his critical judgments, and the wonderful catholicity of his tastes, and the breadth of his sympathies. • The many sidedness of his critical sympathies is only matched by that of Christopher North, with whom in more than one particular he deserves to be compared, while he is as strikingly contrasted with him in respect to the direction of his predilections; Mr. Landor being as conspicuous a defender of liberals and agitators as Prof. Wilson was the apologist of established institutions in both church and state.

* *Walter Savage Landor: A Biography.* By JOHN FORSTER. In eight books. Boston: Fields, Osgood, & Co. One volume. 12mo. 1869.

This biography is remarkable for the fairness with which it is written. Though Mr. Forster was the entirely trusted though often sorely tried friend of Mr. Landor, for the later portion of his long life, he does not seek to hide or excuse his faults of temper, and his serious errors of judgment. The story of his faults is told as faithfully and as fully as is the record of his virtues. There is no concealment of any of his more serious errors, and the painful history of his many practical mistakes is fully and faithfully narrated. A very considerable part of the volume consists of extended descriptions and critical judgments of Landor's writings. Exception might be taken to the length of these notices for a writer whose works were better known, but in consideration of the fact that many of these writings are not likely to be in the hands of the readers of the Memoir, these descriptive criticisms serve a very useful and acceptable purpose. To all the students and lovers of the higher and better English literature, this biography will prove most acceptable. To many younger students and readers of this literature, it may be recommended as a valuable addition to the accessible stores—already embarrassingly rich—of literary biography in the English language.

MISS MARTINEAU'S BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES.*—These are republished, by the author, from the *London Daily News*. They comprise brief essays upon many of her distinguished contemporaries, the most, if not all, of whom she has personally known. The vigor and independence of the veteran author—if we may apply this term to a lady—are conspicuously exemplified in these sketches. Her prejudices are equally manifest, and give a strong color to her portraits. She has evidently, for example, a dislike of Macaulay, and taxes him with habitual inaccuracy. This she charges as the great fault of his speeches; but this charge is probably without good foundation. The article on Lady Noel Byron derives special interest from the recently reopened discussion of the matter of her separation from her husband. Miss Martineau speaks with the knowledge of a personal acquaintance, and her testimony to the intellectual and moral worth of that unfortunate lady is doubtless trustworthy. The profligacy and baseness of Lord Byron's conduct really required no further proof than was afforded by his own published letters. The brutality of his treat-

* *Biographical Sketches by Harriet Martineau*. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1869.

ment of his wife is established, independently of the horrible allegation recently brought against him. She is known, apart from this and whether it be true or false, to have had ample cause in refusing to live with him. As to this recent accusation, which sees the light through the agency of Mrs. Stowe—say what we will of the propriety of giving it publicity under all the circumstances of the case, and say what we will of the proofs adduced in support of it—it is by no means incredible, so far as Byron himself is concerned. His lawless state of mind, his armed contempt for the moral instincts of human nature, and espousal of the doctrine of “affinities,” place this story within the bounds of credibility. It cannot be considered as true, however, unless more proof can be brought forward than has yet appeared. If it be not true, it remains to be explained how a lady of Lady Byron’s insight and excellence could have cause to believe it.

MISCELLANEOUS.

MULLER’S “CHIPS FROM A GERMAN WORKSHOP.”*—The singular name given to these volumes is accounted for in the Preface by an interesting anecdote of the late Baron Bunsen. “More than twenty years have passed since my revered friend Bunsen called me one day into his library at Carlton House Terrace, and announced to me with beaming eyes that the publication of the *Rigveda* was secure. He had spent many days in seeing the Directors of the East India Company, and explaining to them the importance of this work, and the necessity of having it published in England. At last his efforts had been successful, the funds for printing my edition of the text and commentary of the Sacred Hymns of the Brahmans had been granted, and Bunsen was the first to announce to me the happy result of his literary diplomacy. ‘Now,’ he said, ‘you have got a work for life—a large block that will take years to plane and polish. But mind,’ he added, ‘let us have from time to time some *chips from your workshop*.’ I have tried to follow the advice of my departed friend, and have published, almost every year, a few articles on such subjects as had engaged my attention, while prosecuting at the same time, as far as altered circumstances would allow, my edition of the *Rigveda* and of other Sanskrit works connected with it. These arti-

* *Chips from a German Workshop.* By MAX MULLER, M. A., Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. Volume I. *Essays on the Science of Religion.* Volume II. *Essays on Mythology, Traditions, and Customs.* New York: Charles Scribner and Company. 1869. 12mo. pp. 374, 402.

cles were chiefly published in the 'Edinburgh' and 'Quarterly' Reviews, in the 'Oxford Essays,' and 'Macmillan's' and 'Fraser's' Magazines, in the 'Saturday Review,' and in the 'Times.'—"And now while the two last volumes of my edition of the Rigveda are passing through the press, I thought that the time had come for gathering up a few armfuls of these chips and splinters, throwing away what seemed worthless, and putting the rest into some kind of shape, in order to clear my workshop for other work."

The last sentence might be thought to imply that the essays here republished had also been recast by their author; but on a later page he states that "while he thought it right to alter what he could no longer defend as true, and also, though rarely, to add some new facts that seemed essential for the purpose of establishing what he wished to prove, yet in the main they have been left as they were originally published." He is careful to give the date of every article, and thus mark the precise point to which it belongs in the progress of his study and thinking. Repetitions, which are naturally frequent in different articles, he has not thought it worth while to expunge. Intelligent readers will not be disposed to complain of them. They will be glad that a scholar so learned and ingenious has thus, as it were, taken the public into his studio, and allowed them to see the unfinished results of his labor. Such a course is indeed not unsuited to the peculiar character of our author's genius. Gifted with a brilliant and inventive mind, with a rich imagination, and with fine powers of expression, he has little talent for systematic development and orderly construction. This deficiency was strikingly shown in his lectures on the "Science of Language," a book in many respects of great merit, but unsatisfactory from its pervading want of symmetry and method. In a series of unconnected or loosely connected essays, the defect is much less obvious and injurious than in a large comprehensive work. Yet it will be felt even here by many who would perhaps be puzzled to explain the reason of their feeling. In each essay we find certain aspects of a subject presented with great force and vividness, but hardly a well developed, well proportioned view of the subject as a whole. It may fairly be said, however, that on many of the subjects treated in this book, the state of knowledge is as yet too imperfect and fragmentary to admit of a really methodical or satisfying treatment.

The first volume opens with essays on the Vedas, the sacred books of the ancient Indians. The description given of those

venerable texts, the specimen translations by which they are represented, the remarks on their antiquity, character, and value, will be received with interest as coming from one who has made these books the study of his life; though in these brief and popular statements there was little room for the exhibition of his profound Vedic learning. Next come essays on the Zend-Avesta, or Bible of the Zoroastrian religion, the documents of that great ancient reformation which set itself in opposition to the polytheistic nature-worship represented in the Vedas. A separate article is devoted to proving the weakness of the arguments by which Dr. Spiegel, an editor of the Zend-Avesta, has sought to establish the often-asserted connection between it and the Hebrew book of Genesis. Another article deals with the modern Parsis of India, the sole remaining adherents of the old Zoroastrian faith. Nor does our author neglect Buddhism, which arose in India five centuries before our era, a protestant reaction against the established Brahmanism: though long ago extinguished in its native land, it is still supposed to number more votaries than any other religion of the world. We do not vouch for this estimate, connected as it is with the prevailing over-estimate of the population of China, at present the great seat of Buddhism. Perhaps the most interesting paper in the volume is that which describes the travels of a Chinese Buddhist in the seventh century, who wandered over India as a pilgrim to visit the ancient sanctuaries of his religion. Another paper relates to the "Nirvâna" of the Buddhist system, the ultimate crowning reward of perfect holiness and virtue; and aims to prove that this is no other than *annihilation* pure and simple. It may be that that removal of finite conditions, whereby the individual being is merged in the all-pervading, all-embracing, infinite divinity, is in reality no better than annihilation; but as viewed in the pantheistic philosophico-religious speculation of the Indians, it is certainly not the same thing.

Professor Müller does not confine himself to the religions of the old world. He has an article on the "Popol Vuh," a book in the language of the Quiché Indians of Guatemala, which professes to have been written soon after the Spanish conquest of that country, and to embody the traditions of the Quiché people. From this book he gives some mythic stories of the creation of man, and the confusion of tongues, as having curious relations with European and Biblical narratives. He seems not to be aware

how readily and rapidly the legends of the American Indians, when brought under European influence, assume these strange and wild resemblances, and how utterly valueless these resemblances are for the purposes of comparative mythology, unless it can be shown—which is almost always impossible, and confessedly so as regards the Popol Vuh—that they existed prior to all European influence.

The first half of the second volume is occupied with comparative mythology. It opens with an elaborate article of 140 pages, in which the author develops his general views of this subject with abundant and striking illustrations. He regards mythology as being, to a great extent, a phenomenon of linguistic history, a "disease of language," by which expressions originally figurative lose their figurative character and come to be understood and treated in a literal sense. Thus the *χρυσόθρονος ἠώς* of early Greek poetry, which in its original conception represented the morning dawn as sitting in the golden radiance of the eastern sky, in process of time ceased to be thought of as a metaphor, and became the designation of a divine person, Eos or Aurora, who was supposed to be seated on an actual throne of gold. Perhaps our author lays too much emphasis on the passive side of this process, views it too exclusively as a loss of the primitive metaphor, and does not sufficiently recognize that personifying tendency, that disposition to find personal powers and agencies everywhere around them, which must have been active in the first mythus-makers. He is still more peculiar in regarding nearly all primitive myths as turning on the succession of night and day, darkness and light, and thus as having a connection with the morning dawn. He acknowledges, indeed, that there is "another class of legends, embodying the strife between winter and summer, the return of spring, the revival of nature;" but says that "it is in most languages only a reflection and amplification of the more ancient stories telling of the strife between night and day, the return of the morn, the revival of the whole world." And he makes a similar assertion in reference to the numerous legends which seem to turn upon and represent the phenomena of rain-clouds and thunder-storms. The reader should understand that this tendency to bring all myths into connection with the dawn is not generally shared by other eminent inquirers in this most interesting field of study.

The contents of the remaining half-volume are of a varied character. Folk-lore, popular tales of Norsemen, Celts, and Zulus, Arabic numerals, manners and customs of many nations, are among the subjects embraced in it. Of course, none is fully treated; but on all, the reader will find much to engage and reward his attention. And of the work taken as a whole, we may say with truth that it is eminently awakening; it abounds in curious information, in novel suggestions, in bold and brilliant views, which may not always command assent, but will stimulate reflection and study.

WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE.*—Dr. Bushnell comes into the field of discussion respecting women's suffrage, under the strong impulse of earnest conviction. He writes on the subject like a man who is fearfully in earnest. We need not say to our readers that he writes in an able and interesting manner, or that whatever thoughts he presents deserve to be carefully considered. The position which he takes is indicated by the title of his volume—*Women's Suffrage: the Reform against Nature*. In other words the movement in favor of women's suffrage is so fearfully unnatural as to be fraught with serious mischief and danger. In sustaining this position he gives a preliminary chapter in which the question is stated. In this he concedes that the position of women at present is in many respects a condition of disadvantage, often of oppression, but the denial of suffrage is neither an evil nor a wrong. We are surprised to find in this chapter the assertion so pronounced and positive that the experiment of admitting females into colleges with those of the other sex has proved successful. It is founded on the brief observation by the writer of its apparently successful working in the college at Oberlin, and on the much more uncertain testimony of Hon. Horace Mann—that most sanguine and confident of all educators—concerning its success at Antioch College! Leaving this preliminary discussion, the author, in Chapter II., defends the position, that there is *no absolute right of suffrage in man or woman*. This is a fact preliminary to the main question, though a preliminary essential to be established in our country, where the right of voting is so generally assumed to be one of the inalienable rights of man; and inasmuch as every woman is a man, it is logically concluded to be one of the divine rights of

* *Women's Suffrage: the Reform against Nature*. By HORACE BUSHNELL. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1869.

woman. This falsely assumed axiom is properly disposed of, but we fear it will require still more elaboration or rather belaboration than even Dr. Bushnell has bestowed upon it to drive the faith in it out of the muddled intellects of many people. Chapter III., *Women not created or called to govern*, is the key note to the author's arguments. In this chapter he takes the ground and illustrates it by manifold considerations that the position of woman as indicated by her very constitution is necessarily the opposite of authority; that she must stoop if she would conquer, that she is born to win and not to command, and, or rather, it is only by winning that she both elevates and commands. Chapter IV. is a somewhat characteristic treatment of *Scripture Doctrine*. Chapter V. is entitled *Subtle Mistakes of Feeling and Analogy*, under which head are grouped a variety of topics, which present themselves in this discussion. Chapter VI. is upon the *Report of History*, in which the author records the result of the experiment in New Jersey, and gives his opinion of Aspasia, Cleopatra, Queen Elisabeth, and others. Chapter VII., *Probable Effects*, seems to us by far the ablest and most effective of the volume. In this chapter the author urges with not a little force the point, that the experiment so far from elevating and refining our politics will have a tendency to degrade and unsex women themselves, and therefore will tear out of the family and society the most powerful, the most subtle, and the most pervading of all existing influences in favor of refinement, purity, and religion. In short, that woman, as woman, will in a great measure cease to be; and also what we call the civilization which woman has thus far secured and sustained. The concluding Chapter, *Prospects and Possibilities*, discourses of what woman may do and become with entire safety to her sex, in the way of enlarging and elevating her sphere. We have given this brief analysis of the author's arguments, for the simple purpose of calling the attention of our readers to the interesting matter which it contains, without expressing any opinion of the pertinency and effect of his positions, in general or in particular.

SUBJECTION OF WOMEN.*—John Stuart Mill, in his "Subjection of Women," treats of a much broader subject than Dr. Bushnell. Dr. Bushnell confines himself to the question of female suffrage.

* *The Subjection of Women*. By JOHN STUART MILL. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1869.

Mr. Mill, as the title of his essay imports, treats of the alleged subjection of women in every particular. The opinion which he undertakes to explain and defend, is: "That the principle which regulates the existing social relations between the sexes—the legal subordination of one sex to another—is wrong in itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement; and that it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other."

The principal points which he makes and dwells upon in the progress of the essay are the following: The present condition of women has grown out of the condition of actual slavery, in which they were found when laws and institutions began to be framed. These converted a "physical fact into a legal right." "Those who had already been compelled to obedience became legally bound to it." From this condition of legalized bondage women have never yet been legally free. This condition has been greatly mitigated by the advance of civilization, the refinement of manners, and the improvement of ethical codes and religious systems; but the primitive state of slavery still remains, and has not lost the taint of its brutal origin.

To the objection, that this condition cannot be the effect of usurpation, but is natural, Mr. Mill replies that there was a time when every social abuse was judged to be natural, as domestic and personal slavery, military despotism, and feudal authority and allegiance. To the objection, that it is accepted voluntarily, he replies that it is not accepted voluntarily by many, as is evident by the manifold protests which are made against it; that no enslaved class ever asked for complete liberty at once, and that the training of women has taught them that it is their duty and glory to please men, and not to exact their rights.

He urges that the subordination of women is "an isolated fact in modern social institutions." He urges, also, that it cannot be said that there is anything in the nature of the two sexes which adapts them to their present functions and position. This point being obviously one of the most important, he makes it the subject of a long discussion. His own doctrine is that "what is now called the nature of women is an eminently artificial thing," so completely the product of the circumstances in which they have been placed for centuries, that "no one is thus far entitled to any positive opinion on the subject." "Conjectures are all that can at present be made." What the nature of women actually is can only

be determined by a psychological analysis that should separate every product of artificial legislation, artificial culture, and artificial domestic, social, and public opinion.

After this preliminary discussion of principles, Mr. Mill proceeds to the consideration of particulars. Among them he treats, in the second chapter, of the disabilities involved in the marriage contract. Of these he considers the disabilities which respect property and those which come from the power of command in the husband. The footing of perfect equality in every particular is the only one which can relieve women from these disabilities. Marriage is properly a condition of partnership, in which the members of the firm have an equal voice in respect to every question on the footing of a balanced friendship. As to how long this partnership ought to continue, and for what reasons it may be sundered, Mr. Mill does not explain himself very particularly. He seems to avoid a full and explicit avowal of his sentiments, and to shrink back from the logical inferences to which his premises ought to lead him.

Chapter III. is devoted to the discussion of the admissibility of women "to all the functions and occupations hitherto retained as the monopoly of the stronger sex." As, according to Mr. Mill, woman has no nature of her own which can be definitely ascertained and reasoned on—scarcely the peculiarity of sex—it would follow, as a matter of course, that she ought not to be disqualified for any of the occupations and functions which have been confined to man. This Mr. Mill does not labor so earnestly to prove as he does to show that the conclusion ought not to offend or surprise. He assumes a defensive and deprecatory position, rather than one which is offensive and commanding. Among these functions, suffrage and government are included. The propriety of conceding both of these to women is argued very briefly by Mill, but upon these special topics he expends far less strength and space than those who have heard of this volume would be led to expect.

Chapter IV. is devoted to the consideration of the advantages to mankind which would be likely to follow from the restoration to women of their natural rights and their legitimate functions. This point is discussed with arguments and in a strain similar to those employed in the preceding chapters.

We have confined ourselves to a brief analysis of the contents of the volume, without criticising any of its positions. We think

that only a few of the friends of female suffrage will accept his fundamental positions in respect to the nature of woman or the possibility of determining what her nature is.

Dr. Bushnell and Mr. Mill have no common ground on which to stand; the *nature* which Dr. B. contends is so distinct and peculiar not being conceded by Mr. M. to have a real, or at least an ascertainable, existence.

TAINÉ'S ITALY.*—The second volume of this work, as given to the American public, has just been issued from the house of Messrs. Leypoldt and Holt. All persons who have read the former volume, containing the author's account of Rome and Naples, will be ready to receive the story of Florence and Venice, and to read it with great pleasure. M. Taine is not an ordinary traveler telling of things which he has seen and enjoyed. He is an artist and a true lover of nature and of the beautiful. One follows him in his descriptions with the feeling that he has the taste and the knowledge to fit him for his work, and, therefore, with that confidence of being aided and stimulated which always comes from association with a competent critic. Not that he never passes a wrong judgment, nor that he is altogether uninfluenced by prejudice. Enthusiasts of the best order are often borne away by their very enthusiasm to hasty opinions, or to views from which they are not easily shaken even by reasonable considerations. But we pardon this for the good that they do to our minds and souls by their magnetic and inspiring power, and, when they are men of real learning and ability, we rejoice in them as the best of guides. One would like to travel in company with M. Taine, and yet one would enter upon one's journey with the assurance that there would be a good many good-natured intellectual fightings before it was ended. They would be conflicts, however, in which M. Taine would never suffer the humiliation of acknowledging himself defeated, while his companion would learn from his opponent much that would help him ever afterward. The same advantage is gained from his writings, in a measure, though the stimulus of the fighting is lost, from being all upon one side, and the stimulus of his written words cannot be like that of his conversation. The present volume deals, if possible, with a richer theme than the former one. The art of Florence and the beauties of Venice awaken the soul

* *Italy: Florence and Venice.* From the French of H. TAINÉ. By J. DURAND. New York: Leypoldt and Holt. 1869. 8vo. pp. 385.

to its most delightful thoughts and dreams—and to wander through all the scenes of Northern Italy with such a quickening of old memories or such an inspiration as an artist-author can give us, if he will, is a privilege which cannot be over-estimated. To many of the more “practical,” or the less refined and cultivated in this sphere of taste and art, we do not doubt that many other books of travels will prove far more interesting than these of M. Taine. But for the select company who know how to appreciate them, they will have a peculiar value, and we know of nothing lately published which equals them or which is so worthy to be read. The enterprising house, which have encouraged their translation, deserve public commendation for the energy they are constantly displaying in the issue of translations of foreign works of taste and excellence.

THE NEW WEST.*—Mr. Charles L. Brace’s “New West” came into market as a volume very opportunely, just as the Pacific Railway was finished, and the thoughts and conversation of so many upon the Atlantic slope were occupied with California. Large portions of it had indeed been previously published in the form of letters—but the whole comes to us with new attractions; and the letters, now chapters, will bear, if they do not require, to be read a second time, they are so full of well-digested information, of acute observation, and sagacious generalizations. Bating some private philosophical speculations of the author, and now and then a *faiblesse* of egoism, the book might be pronounced admirable. As it is, it is most excellent, and deserves a very extensive sale, and should be read by all who would form satisfactory notions of the great *New West*, which is so much in the thoughts and upon the tongues of those who live in the *Old East*.

OUR NEW WAY ROUND THE WORLD.†—“Carleton,” the author of this work, earned a high reputation as the war correspondent of the *Boston Journal*. Through the whole of the long, perilous conflict, he was in the field, shunning no hardship or danger, a kind of ubiquitous presence, seeing everything and noting everything—not as a newsmonger to manufacture paying paragraphs,

* *The New West: or California in 1867-1868.* By CHARLES LORING BRACE, etc., etc. New York: G. P. Putnam & Son. 1869.

† *Our New Way Round the World.* By CHARLES CARLETON COFFIN. Boston: Fields, Osgood, & Co

but as a patriot, ever striving to keep up the courage of the country. Offered a command and eager to fight as well as write for the sacred cause, his pen was like Roderick's "bugle horn," and eminent men advised him not to exchange it for the sword. What he did in that department may be seen in his "Four Years of Fighting," and "Days and Nights upon the Battle-Field," books which he might well have inscribed with the motto *veni vidi*, adding the *vici* also if he could have gratified his own desire to share in the combat.

In the Summer of 1866, he was sent to Europe to report on the great struggle then pending between the States of Germany, and threatening to involve the entire continent. But Sadowa proved its *coup de grace*, and Carleton, at the request of his constituents, continued his voyage round the world. Winged by steam, extending over two years, and passing through the Holy Land, Egypt, India, China, and Japan, it furnished him with material for a dozen volumes, but he has had the taste to condense his best observations into a handsome octavo of 500 pages.

His personal experiences he describes with much humor and vivacity, warming into generous sympathy as he traces the progress of Christian civilization in the empires of the East, and kindling into eloquence as he dwells on those grand enterprises that are now girdling the globe with canal, steamer, and railway.

A mistake or two have struck our attention, which it may be worth while to notice.

The rank of Chinese Mandarins is distinguished by the color, not, as Carleton assumes, by the number of their buttons, each officer wearing but one, which is mounted conspicuously on the top of his chapeau, and is red for the two highest grades, blue for the next two, white for the third pair, and yellow for the last three.

He is unable to get through a mandarin dinner without at least a hint at kitten cutlets and puppy pies to give it piquancy. A longer sojourn among the Chinese would have shown him that those articles are not more relished by the better classes than by ourselves—though less delicate dishes are eagerly devoured by the starving pariah.

While treating of Nagasaki in Japan, he makes the more serious blunder of speaking of Mr. Verbeck as "a Dutchman engaged in trade." Now Mr. Verbeck, though of Dutch descent, is an American. He is a missionary, not a trader; and such influence

has he acquired with the native authorities, that one of the princes lately invited him to visit his dominions, sending a steamer and a military escort; and he has now gone to Yedo, the capital of the Empire, by invitation of the leading *daimios*, to aid them in the revision of treaty regulations, and the establishment of a scientific institution. It is due to Carleton to say, that such slips are not of frequent occurrence.

As a specimen of our author's happiest vein, we will only refer to a fine outburst of feeling that was called forth by meeting with a piece of New England ice in the hot plains of India.

FORCE AND NATURE.*—Dr. Charles Winslow's treatise on Force and Nature is devoted to the establishment and vindication of the position suggested by its title, viz., that besides matter there are two forces universal in nature—Attraction and Repulsion—which are coördinate and coextensive, and that these universal forces in their varied methods of activity and combination are sufficient to account for all the manifold phenomena which the universe exhibits. He rejects the Newtonian doctrine that matter is inert, and substitutes for it the supposition that its masses and its molecules are mutually repellant. Under this general formula he accounts for and accepts the doctrine of the conservation and persistence of force, explaining force, viz., mechanical force, as that which acts in the double form of action and repulsion.

A very able scientific friend, to whom we have submitted this Essay for his opinion in respect to its value of the proofs and reasonings on which this theory rests, pronounces it a pure speculation, which is neither sustained nor enforced by any mathematical reasonings or experiments; a theory which might have been stated upon a very few pages with all the considerations which are adduced in its support. The doctrine of the treatise as stated by our expert is as follows: "There are in universal nature three things, and only three; *Matter, Attraction, and Repulsion*. The last two, like the first, are *real entities*, each having a positive existence of its own, irrespective of the agencies which they put forth—created in equal, definite, and limited quantities, to

* *Force and Nature. Attraction and Repulsion. The Radical Principles of Energy*, discussed in their relations to physical and morphological developments. By CHARLES FREDERICK WINSLOW, M. D. London: Mac Millan & Co. 1869.

which nothing can be added and from which nothing can be subtracted—both having a strong affinity for matter and always combined with it in equal or unequal proportions, and subject to fluctuations and transfers according to circumstances. This trinity of created things constitutes at once the artificers, the tools, and the materials by, with, and of which all material things have been constructed and arranged in their present mutual relations, and by which all the phenomena of nature of whatever kind are manifested.” That our critic is not unjust to the author, will be manifest from the following extract: “As force condenses into definite volumes, atoms follow or rather move with its movements, and are constrained into narrow limits in obedience to inherent law. Thus is cohesion effected. Force possesses—that is to say, molecular *attractive* forces possess—the inherent property of running together, mixing, centralizing, and magnifying their energies in certain numerical ratios. Atoms, always alive in their affinities for attractive force, or for combinations with it, follow its currents into the nearest juxtaposition.” p. 65.

We ought to say that the work is written in an easy and apparently very lucid style; though it leaves much of the very delusive impression of an apparently clear diction, which is left by that of J. S. Mill—a diction made up of common and almost colloquial words, which afford the easy instruments of the manifold ambiguities and dexterities of slipshod thinking.

PROF. DAY'S INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE.*—The rather long descriptive title of Professor Day's Introduction to the Study of English Literature relieves us from the necessity of characterizing it. The very acute and painstaking author has aimed to produce a work which may fill a gap in our elementary books. He reminds us in his preface that we have already numerous text-books in English Literature, but no one of these exhibits, or aims to exhibit, this literature as a growth. This the author has attempted to do, and, so far as he has contrib-

* *An Introduction to the Study of English Literature*; comprising representative masterpieces in poetry and prose, marking the successive stages of its growth, and a methodical exposition of the governing principles and general forms, both of the language and literature; with copious notes on the selections; glossary and chronology, designed for systematic study. By HENRY N. DAY, Author of “Logic,” etc., etc. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1869.

uted to this end, he has been successful. Whether his contributions are sufficiently numerous to make a strong impression on the beginner, is somewhat uncertain. Had the extracts been more brief so as to break up the work into a great number of single lessons, it would, in our opinion, have been better suited to the purposes of a text-book. But, as it is, it deserves warm commendation for the care and scholarship it displays.

SACRED AND CONSTRUCTIVE ART.*—Mr. Otis's Essays on Sacred and Constructive Art are by an independent thinker, but a somewhat unpracticed writer. They seem to us to be characterized by common sense and elevated feeling, and though the hints are not fully or elaborately worked out, they are all suggestive of many interesting applications. But theories of art are very difficult to organize, and often as difficult to accept and understand.

MRS. E. A. WALKER'S LIFE OF JESUS,† AND PILGRIM'S PROGRESS,‡
IN WORDS OF ONE SYLLABLE.—In these two beautiful volumes Mrs. E. A. Walker has told the story of the life of Jesus, and the story of the Pilgrim's Progress, in words of a single syllable, for children. She has been very successful; for she has not only maintained great simplicity of language, but, what is of more importance, she has written with an engaging frankness of manner and a vivacity which will surely keep the attention of children and invest the old story with new interest even for adult readers. The books are printed in large type, and are each illustrated with ten full page engravings in oil colors.

* *Sacred and Constructive Art: Its Origin and Progress. A Series of Essays.* By CALVIN N. OTIS, Architect. New York: G. P. Putnam & Son. 1869.

† *From the Crrib to the Cross: A Life of Christ, in Words of One Syllable.* By MRS. EDWARD ASHLEY WALKER. With Illustrations in Oil Colors. New York: Geo. A. Leavitt. 1869. 16mo. pp. 320.

‡ *The Pilgrim's Progress from this World to that which is to Come.* By JOHN BUNYAN. In Words of One Syllable. By MRS. EDWARD ASHLEY WALKER. New York: Geo. A. Leavitt. 1869. 16mo. pp. 336.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

Institutes of Ecclesiastical History, Ancient and Modern. In Four Books, much corrected, enlarged, and improved from the primary authorities. By John Lawrence Von Mosheim, D. D., Chancellor of the University of Gottingen. A new and literal translation from the original Latin, with copious additional notes, original and selected. By James Murdock, D. D. In Three Volumes. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1869. 8vo. pp. 470, 485, 506. [The publishers state that the need of this well-known and valuable work as a text-book by many persons of limited means, has induced them to issue it in three handsome volumes, on fine paper, and neatly bound in cloth, at the extremely low price of five dollars; it has heretofore been \$7.50.]

The New Testament; or, The Book of the Gospel of our Lord and our God, Jesus the Messiah. A literal translation from the Syriac Peshito version. By James Murdock, D. D. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1869. 8vo. pp. 515. [A new edition.]

Help to the Reading of the Bible. By the late Benjamin Elliott Nicholls, M. A., of Queen's College, Cambridge. General Protestant Episcopal Sunday School Union, New York. 1867. 16mo. pp. 486.

Order and Chaos: A Lecture, delivered at Loyola College, Baltimore, in July, 1869. By T. W. M. Marshall, Esq., author of "Christian Missions." John Murphy & Co., Baltimore. 12mo. pp. 45.

Hand-book of Religious Instruction. Part first: the History of Religion.—Part second: the Christian Religion. Translated from the Dutch of J. H. Maronier, preacher at Leyden, by Francis T. Washburn. Boston: W. V. Spencer. 1869. 16mo. pp. 36, 31.

The Promise of Shiloh; or, Christ's Temporal Sovereignty upon the Earth: When will it be Fulfilled? By Joseph L. Lord, M. A., of the Boston Bar. E. P. Dutton & Co., Boston. 1869. 12mo. pp. 106.

Bible Wonders. By Rev. Richard Newton, D. D., author of "Safe Compass," "Bible Jewels," "Great Pilot," etc. Robert Carter & Brothers, New York. 1870. 16mo. pp. 315.

The Secret of Swedenborg: Being an Elucidation of his Doctrine of the Divine Natural Humanity. By Henry James. Fields, Osgood, & Co., Boston. 1869. 12mo. pp. 243.

In Heaven We Know Our Own; or, Solace for the Suffering. Translated from the French with the permission and approval of the author, Rev. Father Blot, S. J. By a Lady. Catholic Publishing Society, New York. 1869. 24mo. pp. 186.

Lessons Brought from a Mother's Grave: A Sermon of Remembrance, preached at Cleveland, in the First Presbyterian Church, August 29, 1869, by William H. Goodrich. Cleveland, Ohio. 1869. 12mo. pp. 26.

Address of Col. H. B. Carrington, U. S. A., at Indianapolis, Ind., June 17, 1869, in aid of the erection of a New Church Edifice for the Methodist Episcopal (colored) Society. 1869. 12mo. pp. 23.

HISTORICAL.

History of England, from the Fall of Wolsey to the Death of Elizabeth. By James Anthony Froude, M. A., late Fellow of Exeter College. Oxford: Vol. I, and II. New "Popular edition" in 12 volumes. 12mo. \$1.25 per volume. Charles Scribner & Co. 1870. 12mo. pp. 447, 501.

The Patriot's History of Ireland. By M. F. Cusack. L. Kehoe, Catholic Publication House, 126 Nassau street, New York. 1869. 24mo. pp. 320.

BELLES LETTRES.

The Improvisatore. By Hans Christian Andersen. Translated from the Danish, by Mary Howitt. Hurd & Houghton, New York. 1869. 12mo. pp. 341.

The Two Barronesses: A Romance. By Hans Christian Andersen. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 12mo. pp. 261.

Out of Town. By F. C. Burnand, author of "Happy Thoughts." Bradbury Evans, & Co., London. 1868. 16mo. pp. 346.

Little Women: or, Meg, Jo, Beth, and Amy. Parts first and second. By Louisa M. Alcott. With illustrations. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1869. 12mo. pp. 350.

Realities of Irish Life. By W. Stewart French. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1869. 16mo. pp. 297.

Lettice Lisle. Boston: Littell & Gay. 8vo. pp. 94.

All for Greed. By the Baroness Blare de Bury. Boston: Littell & Gay. 8vo. pp. 93.

The Crescent and the Cross: A Story of the Siege of Malta. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York. 16mo. pp. 283.

The Rescued Child. By Mrs. J. W. Schenck. Published by the American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York. 24mo. pp. 96.

The Cozy-House Tales. By J. T. H., author of "Christmas at the Beeches." Published by the American Tract Society, 28 Cornhill, Boston. 24mo. pp. 163.

The Children's Chip-Basket. By Harriet N. Hathaway. Published by the American Tract Society, 28 Cornhill, Boston. 24mo. pp. 102.

Netherlift: The Story of a Merchant, told by Himself. By Miss L. Bates. Published by the American Tract Society, 28 Cornhill, Boston. 16mo. 279.

Lindenwood; or, Bertha's Resolve. By Mrs. S. E. Dawes. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York. 12mo. pp. 446.

Little Effie's Home. By the author of "Donald Fraser," "Bertie Lee," etc. Robert Carter & Brothers, New York. 1870. 16mo. pp. 266.

No Sects in Heaven; and other Poems. By Mrs. E. H. J. Cleaveland. New York: Clark & Maynard. 1869. 24mo. pp. 95.

SCIENTIFIC.

On the Physical Basis of Life. By T. H. Huxley, LL. D., F. R. S. Published at the office of the "College Courant," New Haven, Conn. 1869. 12mo. pp. 24.

Treatises on Light, Color, Electricity, and Magnetism. By Johann Ferdinand Jencken, M. D. Translated and prefaced by Historical and Critical Essays, by Henry D. Jencken, Barrister-at-Law, M. R. I., F. R. G. S., etc., etc. London, Trübner & Co., 66 Paternoster Row. 1869. 12mo. pp. 232.

The Phenomena and Laws of Heat. By Achille Cazin, Professor of Physics

in the Lyceum of Versailles. Translated and edited by Elihu Rich. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 265.

The Wonders of Optics. By F. Marion. Translated from the French, and edited by Charles W. Quin, F. C. S. Illustrated with seventy Engravings on wood and a colored Frontispiece. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 12mo. pp. 248.

Thunder and Lightning. By W. De Fonvielle. Translated from the French, and edited by T. L. Phipson, Ph. D., F. C. S., etc. Illustrated with thirty-nine Engravings on wood. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 12mo. pp. 216.

TEXT BOOKS.

A Compendious German Grammar. By William D. Whitney, Professor of Sanskrit, and Instructor in Modern Languages in Yale College. Leypoldt & Holt, New York. 1869. 16mo. pp. 248.

A German Reader, in Prose and Verse, with Notes and Vocabulary. By William D. Whitney, Professor of Sanskrit, and Instructor in Modern Languages in Yale College. Leypoldt & Holt, New York. 1869. 16mo. pp. 231.

Elements of the Greek Language: Taken from the Greek Grammar of James Hadley, Professor in Yale College. D. Appleton & Co., New York. 1869. 16mo. pp. 246.

Elements of Latin Grammar for Schools. By Albert Harkness, Ph. D., Professor in Brown University. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 156.

Chase & Stuart's Classical Series. The Works of Horace. By Thomas Chase. A. M., Professor in Haverford College. Eldredge & Brother, Philadelphia. 1870. 16mo. pp. 429.

The German Echo, a Guide to German Conversation; or, Dialogues on Ordinary and Familiar Subjects. With an adequate Vocabulary. Edited for the use of American Students, by James K. Worman, A. M. A. S. Barnes & Co. New York. 1869. 16mo. pp. 203.

Abriss der Deutschen Literaturgeschichte. Von Dr. E. P. Evans, Professor der neueren Sprachen und Literatur an der Universität von Michigan. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1869. 12mo. pp. 235.

The Elements of Theoretical and Descriptive Economy, for the use of Colleges and Academies. By Charles T. White, A. M., Assistant Professor of Astronomy and Navigation in the United States Naval Academy. Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen, & Haffelfinger. 1869. 16mo. pp. 272.

MISCELLANEOUS.

The Innocents Abroad, or the New Pilgrim's Progress; being some account of the Steamship Quaker City's pleasure excursion to Europe and the Holy Land; with descriptions of countries, nations, incidents, and adventures, as they appeared to the author. With two hundred and thirty-four illustrations. By Mark Twain (Samuel L. Clemens). Hartford: American Publishing Company. 1869. 8vo. pp. 651.

Foreign Missions: Their Relations and Claims. By Rufus Anderson, D. D., LL. D., late Foreign Secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 373.

The Letters of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu. Edited by Mrs. Hala. Revised Edition. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1869. 12mo. pp. 407.

The Letters of Madame de Sevigné to her Daughter and Friends. Edited by Mrs. Hale. Revised Edition. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1869. 12mo. pp. 488.

Woman in Prison. By Caroline H. Woods. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1869. 12mo. pp. 198.

Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds. By Charles Mackay, LL. D. George Routledge & Sons, 416 Broome street, New York. 12mo. pp. 322.

The Intelligence of Animals: With Illustrative Anecdotes. From the French of Ernest Menault. Charles Scribner & Co., New York. 1869. 16mo. pp. 370.

Adventures on the Great Hunting Grounds of the World. By Victor Meunier. Illustrated with twenty-two wood cuts. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1869. 16mo. pp. 297.

Dame Nature and her Three Daughters (La Mere Gigogne et ses trois filles). A Grandpapa's talks and stories about Natural History, and things of daily use. Translated from the French of X. B. Saintine, Author of "Picciola." New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1869. 12mo. pp. 268.

The American College: An Address before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Marietta College, June 29, 1869. By I. W. Andrews. Marietta. 1869. 12mo. pp. 22.

Letter to the Alumni of Dartmouth College, on its Hundredth Anniversary, by Nathan Lord. Hurd & Houghton, New York. 1869. 12mo. pp. 89.

Woman as God Made Her: The True Woman. By Rev. J. D. Fulton, Tremont Temple, Boston. To which is added, Woman vs. Ballot. Boston: Lee & Sheppard. 1869. 16mo. pp. xii, 218, 50.

Tommy Try, and What he did in Science. By Charles Ottley Groom Napier (of Merchiston), F. G. S. With 46 Illustrations. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 308.

Some Thoughts Concerning Education. By John Locke. New York: J. W. Schermerhorn & Co., 14 Bond street. First Edition. January, 1869. 24mo. pp. 192.

Shining Light. By the author of "Memorials of Captain Hedley Vicars." Robert Carter & Brothers, New York. 1869. 24mo. pp. 181.

New York. Illustrated with Maps. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 8vo. pp. 52.

Mental Photographs: An Album for Confessions of Tastes, Habits, and Convictions. Edited by Robert Saxton. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1869.

The Mount Zion Collection. By Theodore E. Perkins. New York: A. S. Barnes & Co. pp. 384.

Sabbath Carols: A New Collection of Music and Hymns. Prepared for the use of Sunday Schools. By Theodore E. Perkins. A. S. Barnes & Co. New York: 16mo. pp. 144.

The Dance of Modern Society. By W. C. Wilkinson. New York: Oakley, Mason, & Co. 1869. 16mo. pp. 77.

ALMANACS.

The Atlantic Almanac. Boston: Fields, Osgood, & Co. 1870. Large octavo. pp. 64.

Appleton's Illustrated Almanac. 1870. New York: D. Appleton & Co. Edited by Miss Susan Fenimore Cooper. Large octavo. pp. 48.

The Christian Almanac for 1869. 16mo. pp. 60. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York.

J. S.

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